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# About

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

*Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990* was published in 1992 by Pantheon Books, a division of Random House, Inc.

Informed by recently declassified and previously unpublished documents, *Instruments of Statecraft* is an authoritative study of American covert, unconventional warfare waged against ideological adversaries, from the Truman administration up to the recent war in the Persian Gulf.

Since World War II, assassination, sabotage, kidnaping, torture, the overthrow of foreign governments, and other terroristic activities have been intrinsic to our national defense policy. These have been justified time and again as necessary to combat communist insurgency and, more recently, terrorism-as the only effective response to the barbarism ascribed to, or projected onto, our enemies- be they Sandinistas or the PLO.

So it is that America has maintained forces -including the OSS, the CIA, the Green Berets, and the Delta Force-that have specialized in dirty warfare with impunity, in Nicaragua, Lebanon, Laos, Vietnam, the Philippines, Afghanistan, Guatemala, Africa, Cuba, Central America, and Greece, among other places.

Michael McClintock gives a fascinating and alarming expose of the dark side of American foreign policy, while examining its tactical roots-from the pronouncements of Clausewitz and Raymond Aron, to its ideological basis in the Monroe Doctrine, Theodore Roosevelt's "Big Stick" foreign policy, and Woodrow Wilson's post-colonialist crusade.

Michael McClintock was born in Ohio and holds a bachelor's degree from Ohio University and a master's degree in political science from the University of Wisconsin. He has been a human rights monitor for the past sixteen years, traveling extensively throughout all of Central America, as well as in Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil, Thailand, and the Philippines. He is the author of *The American Connection*, a study of U.S. covert activities in Latin America.

# Introduction

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

The conduct of foreign affairs by the United States in the latter half of this century has a military dimension that can be seen only obliquely. The awesome military machine that emerged with the Cold War was designed largely for deterrence, for a war never meant to happen. It served, too, for occasional, limited, conventional wars; lesser conflicts; and shows of force. But the manpower and armaments of this behemoth were only a part of the United States' military response to the Cold War. Another, nearly opaque, military dimension entailed what has been variously referred to as secret, special, unconventional, or political warfare. This hidden dimension became the chosen instrument for permanent military action below the threshold of full-scale war or open intervention—another kind of war, that was waged continuously behind the false peace of the post-World War II era.

This secret warfare introduced a unique new element into foreign affairs and into the domestic arrangements of nations friendly to the United States. Its influence was most significant in the lesser theaters of the Cold War—including much of the Third World—where military answers to new global challenges were removed from public scrutiny. Through the efforts of the armed forces' special warfare establishment and the Central Intelligence Agency, the military thread of the new warfare wound around and through the formalities of above-board international relations.

The paramilitary covert operation became the occasional signpost of the secret war, deflecting attention from long-term policies or programs, from the unconventional side of America's regular armed forces, and indeed, from the larger goals of American foreign policy. Responsibility for such operations was usually displaced to the CIA, which was neatly set apart from the regular armed forces—in public perception if not wholly in fact—while the military remained prudently in the shadows. The impact of the armed forces' special warfare apparatus and doctrine was most telling, not in the record of American operations, but in the extent to which it influenced the attitudes, organization, and programs of American allies throughout much of the Third World during the Cold War.

A fascination with special warfare, from guerrilla warfare to the subtleties of ideological indoctrination, was characteristic of U.S. foreign policy makers at the onset of the Cold War. Belief that the Soviets were masters of special warfare, wielding an instrument of great power helped shape our Cold War attitudes toward them while creating anxiety over whether the United States, constrained by its self-proclaimed virtue, could compete in a war without rules.

Argument prevailed that this kind of war was best fought at two levels: through occasional use of overwhelming military power (e.g., Greece and Korea); and through uninterrupted use of the kind of unconventional methods of low-level conflict attributed to the Soviets. The guardians of the national interest concluded that the United States should respond to communist treachery in kind—fire against fire.

The United States learned secret warfare from the experiences of World War II, from both its allies and its enemies. American officers were baptized in the fire of what

seemed to be a new kind of war in enemy-occupied territories of both European and Pacific theaters. The tactics and attitudes they developed found ready application in the tensions of the postwar world. Officers who had operated with resistance movements were brought together to organize the new special warfare establishment. The Army Special Forces were developed to take American-style guerrilla warfare to nations under Soviet domination.

The men who drafted the field manuals for the American guerrillas— or what they generally referred to as *unconventional* warfare—used as models, the guerrilla campaigns in the Philippines; the partisan movements in the Soviet Union and the Balkans; the experiences of emigres' co-opted into American service, and former German officers. The Army's secret review of the European partisan movements was assisted by ex-Wehrmacht officers who had taken part in their suppression; they were coauthors of reports that colored American views of the nature of guerrilla (and counterguerrilla) warfare for decades to come. A common view emerged that terror was an essential tool of both guerrillas and counterguerrillas. The American manuals and assorted training materials made explicit reference to the utility—indeed, the necessity—of its use from hostage-taking to selective assassination.

The counterinsurgency era (the subject of [Part Two](#)) began with John F. Kennedy's call for a radical reappraisal of U.S. special warfare. His fascination with the Special Forces and the idea of American guerrillas meshed neatly with his Cold War view that the small wars of subversion and insurgency on the periphery of the "Free World" posed the greatest challenge to our national security. In particular, Kennedy emphasized counterinsurgency's use for political and economic reform. Chapter Eight profiles one of the President's principal counterinsurgency advisers, Edward



Geary Lansdale, who is known both for his advocacy of reform and "civic action" and for his pioneering role in the field of dirty tricks and psychological warfare.

Until 1961, the purpose of the Special Forces was to train guerrillas, rather than combat them. In accord with Kennedy's wishes, the military redefined counterinsurgency as a discipline of special warfare, departing from the pre-World War II concepts of counterinsurgency based on conventional tactics—i.e., occupation and administration. The unconventional dimension of counterinsurgency became an integral part of American Cold War doctrine. Counterinsurgency became a medium of the secret war directed against internal enemies wherever friendly governments were under threat of subversion or insurgency. These domestic campaigns were aspects of a larger war within which the United States also launched unilateral "guerrilla" operations (which often included air and naval support) to overthrow undesirable regimes. The crux of the new doctrine (set out in Chapter Nine), that the adversary was best fought with its own methods, was based as much on assumption as on fact, and proposed that we should become the "mirror image" of what we imagined the enemy to be.

As terror was seen as integral to guerrilla tactics, the counterguerrilla would apply *counterterror*; guerilla organization (e.g., recruitment surveillance) would be mimicked by *counterorganization*. Counterorganization, taken to its extreme, could (and often did) cutrail placing hundreds of thousands of people under virtual totalitarian control. Which combined with the psychological warfare technique of ideological indoctrination, totalitarian potential could become reality. The consequences were most dramatic in countries where friendly governments uncritically adopted the American model on a massive scale.

The end of the war in Vietnam was a watershed in the development of special warfare, both offensive (guerrilla operations) and, nominally defensive (counterinsurgency). ([Part Three](#) outlines the development of special warfare from the end of the Vietnam War to the last days of the Reagan administration.) Jimmy Carter's human rights policy, which might have led to a radical reassessment of covert U.S. foreign policy, faltered and failed in the face of political pressure and the intransigence of the military and foreign-policy establishments. By 1980, the spirit behind the housecleaning of the CIA, which had begun with Carter, was superseded by measures strengthening the United States' special operations potential and by open-ended commitments to secret wars in Central America, Afghanistan, and the Middle East.

The real post-Vietnam revival of special warfare—as part of the new concept of "low-intensity conflict"—came with the Reagan administration. The rollback of perceived gains made by the Soviet Union, notably in Central America, was the centerpiece of foreign policy during his first term in office. The apparent American slippage in the Cold War was taken up as a challenge that would justify a newly aggressive pursuit of special warfare. (The rapid buildup of the United States' special warfare apparatus and its role in planning for new wars on the periphery is outlined in [Chapter Eighteen](#).)

Developments in the Middle East during Reagan's first term complicated the administration's response to low-intensity challenges (see [Chapter Sixteen](#)). The loss of American lives, particularly the 246 Marines killed in Beirut, prompted a new direction in the White House's action and a new vehemence in its rhetoric. Onto its crusade against the ideological enemy in Central America and the Caribbean was superimposed a campaign against international

terrorism. In doing this, the Reagan administration broke with the reticence of past advocates of counterterrorism and openly espoused the logic of adopting terrorist methods to fight terrorists. Implying the legitimacy of a state's turning to terror tactics as a utilitarian means to an end, the Reagan administration publicly extended the logic of covert counterinsurgency in internal conflicts to the sphere of international relations. Despite Reagan's overwrought rhetoric about terrorism, there was evidence that the United States had, indeed, experimented in perpetrating the very kind of terrorism it claimed to oppose.

The new commitment to special warfare was most amply and visibly manifest in Latin America and the Caribbean, from the Windward Islands to the wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The consensus of the special warfare experts then, as now, was that low-intensity conflict was intrinsically an "un-American way of war." The substance of the United States' doctrine for these unpalatable, dirty wars, however, was to reaffirm the logic of the 1950s. The special warfare establishment would do whatever was necessary to prevail in secret, political warfare. The United States could wage dirty wars with the best (or worst) of them.

The events of the first three years of George Bush's presidency—most notably the collapse of communism, the invasion of Panama, and the Gulf War—required an epilogue to this study. The end of the Cold War did not eliminate at a stroke the Cold War attitudes, ideology, and military doctrine that fuel the secret war on the periphery; there is little to show that the United States has modified its use of special warfare in any discernible manner. Even if it were to progressively do so, the legacy of decades of clandestine special warfare and its influence on foreign affairs will not readily dissipate. The United States' Cold War doctrine and ideology remain particularly potent for the many "Free

World" clients that have used them as a template with which to remodel their societies, political institutions, and security systems into effective instruments of counterinsurgency. The overarching threat which once welded American special warfare into a cohesive and comprehensive program may be gone, but special warfare remains a principal instrument of low intensity conflict in the new world order.

# Chapter 1: Interest, Intervention, and Containment

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

The great American philosopher of naval power and American destiny, Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, one of the architects of U.S. expansionism at the turn of the century, defined national interest as a universal constant through which disinterested governments must pursue their nations' destinies. A nation's leaders were merely agents tasked with the pursuit of interests on the nation's behalf; they could not permit personal qualms (or ideology) to interfere with the job at hand. Moreover:

*[I]t is vain to expect nations to act consistently from any other motive than of interest. That, under the name of Realism, is the frankly avowed policy of German statecraft. It follows from this directly that the study of interests—international interests—is the one basis of sound, provident policy for statesmen.... Governments are corporations, and corporations have no souls . . . [they] must put first the interests of their own wards . . . their own people.<sup>1</sup>*

Even in Mahan's day, some governments, unlike "soulless" corporations, had ethical principles built into their very charters, as in the Constitution of the United States—a moral code of a kind, even if often observed in the breach. Mahan's writing, though, like that of earlier proponents of "manifest

destiny,” suggested that as far as the United States or any other nation was concerned, governments could not—for the good of their people—be held even to their own principles beyond their national. Beyond their borders, governments did what they had to do: putting first the interests of their own people—or, at least, of their nation’s shipbuilders, iron merchants, and textile manufacturers.

Admiral Mahan was not the last to reduce complex ethical issues to simple formulae. Mahan sidestepped the moral issues by maintaining that a nation needed no other justification for its actions than its own self-interest. The concept of national interest was for him an absolute beyond ethical considerations (but still somehow righteous) from which all statecraft evolved.<sup>2</sup>

The national interest argument for overseas intervention was vigorously promoted by Theodore Roosevelt, an admirer and supporter of Mahan’s realpolitik. As president, Roosevelt oversaw a dramatic rise in American military interventions in the Caribbean; customs house interventions, and deploying Marine expeditionary forces throughout the region. His policy, however, was enunciated in terms familiar to the observers of European colonialism, not in the calculated simplicity of “national interest.” The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, whereby President Monroe warned the European powers to get out and keep out of the Americas — ostensibly championing democracy and anticolonialism — took on an unabashedly colonialist corollary.<sup>3</sup> Roosevelt announced the intention of the United States to put to good use its newly developed naval power to keep order in the Americas and to guarantee uninterrupted commerce and finance on U. S. terms, as done elsewhere by the European powers. Henceforth, the means of intervention would be the U.S. Marines.

While the Monroe Doctrine was couched in the language of a young republic in a world of monarchic empire, Roosevelt's "Big Stick" corollary was a bully's proclamation of self-interest, veneered with a pious claim to have shouldered a "white man's burden" to "civilize" America's neighbors. Mahan might have disagreed with Roosevelt's approach; the national interest alone was, for Mahan, "not only a legitimate, but a fundamental cause for national policy; one which needs no cloak of hypocrisy."<sup>4</sup> What that interest was, and is, is another matter. And despite Mahan, initiatives in the name of the national interest would, over the years, require any number of "cloaks of hypocrisy," if only to make intervention more palatable to the people of the United States itself.

A more comprehensive elaboration of the nature of American interest crystallized as Woodrow Wilson confronted European disintegration in the Great War and the new challenge of the Bolshevik revolution. Wilson converted Mahan's doctrine of calculated self-interest into a comprehensive ideology combining political principles, economic theory, and a crusading spirit. A mission of virtuous internationalism was superimposed on Mahan's essentially amoral logic of the primacy of interest — an ironic combination, given Mahan's vehement distrust of international checks and balances on the right of nations to wage war. Wilson's ideal was "to use America's moral and material power to create a new international order, safe from the related threats of war and revolution, in which America could serve mankind from a position of political and economic preeminence."<sup>5</sup> The international framework of law Mahan so distrusted would, in Wilson's world, be an American creation to further American prospects and principles on American terms.

The liberal ideology of the Wilson administration impelled a foreign policy of unprecedented self-confidence and activism. Morally superior to the decrepit Great Powers of Europe, the United States would determine a new balance of power, a new political and economic order. At the heart of the vision was the breaking-down of imperial barriers to free trade and investment: an Open Door to the “underdeveloped” world, which would be used—in gentlemanly fashion—by the metropolitan nations of the North to the benefit of all the world. National interest and military power were inextricably linked in a missionary liberalism of commercial expansion.

The commitment to an ideology of liberal internationalism welded the national interest of the United States to the achievement of a new order, safe from war and safe for business. At its core was the peculiarly popular belief of the American people, if not of its corporate planners, that the export of American goods and capital would somehow bring democracy and the good life to the world.<sup>6</sup> In the 1960s, the liberal ideal of the beneficence of American commerce and arms remained: American counterinsurgency programs were promoted as measures to oppose “internal aggression” in order to permit economic development, which would bring about an evolution to representative democracy. The published “Statement of U. S. Overseas Internal Defense Objectives” of the Kennedy administration would not have been dramatically out of tune fifty years before; its sole innovation was the incorporation of the theory of the stages of economic growth then in vogue.

*The U. S. believes that the processes of development and nation-building should be and encouraged but not manipulated by outside forces. The creation of a relatively stable international environment within which economic growth can occur and free people are able to*



*determine their own form of government is therefore a primary U.S. objective.... It is the policy of the U.S. to assist threatened nations . . . to prevent or defeat communist inspired, supported, or directed insurgency in order to ensure that all nations—especially those newly emerging and developing states—are given the opportunity to determine their own future.*<sup>7</sup>

In Woodrow Wilson's world, an aggressive foreign policy was seen as a means to bring about international peace. In the following decades, U. S. policy was to be dedicated with equal confidence to the supplanting of the old imperialist order and the suppression of global revolutionism. The United States would wade into the fight against German imperialism, oppose the dismemberment of China (through the Open Door policy), and welcome the downfall of the Czar in March 1917 (receiving an ambassador of an essentially liberal Russian Provisional Government). At the same time, the United States would identify Bolshevism as its principal adversary, a position that would rapidly find shape in military action. Much as the efforts of the European powers to suppress the French Revolution and its political influence dominated war and peace in the century after 1789, the United States' antagonism to Bolshevism would come to dominate its own twentieth-century foreign policy. The Wilson government, which might have supported a Russian liberal reformist government, concluded that the new Soviet government was as threatening to liberal democracy as to aristocracy; that to recognize it would encourage similar movements elsewhere; and generally, in the words of the Secretary of State, that the Bolshevik forces were "menacing the present social order in nearly every European country,"<sup>8</sup> and so must be opposed. Wilson could strike a blow against the Bolsheviks while continuing the fight against the Central Powers by assisting anti-Bolshevik forces. On 3 September 1918 an American military contingent landed in

Vladivostok; the force would penetrate up to 1,200 rail miles into the interior of the just-created Soviet Union before withdrawing on 1 April 1920. The exercise, perhaps more so than even the U. S. policy on China, showed that the United States was prepared to intervene anywhere in the world, in conjunction with the European powers or unilaterally, in support of its developing vision of the new world order.” To the Soviets, of course, the intervention reinforced the belief in a hostile world, and encirclement by a host of enemies. [10](#)

Efforts at mediation between the European powers prior to 1917 on the one hand, and postwar support of the League of Nations on the other, aimed to usher in “a world liberal order made safe from traditional imperialism and revolutionary-socialism,” under a kind of international social contract.[11](#) Wilson championed the principle that what was good for America was necessarily good for the rest of the world—an overarching belief still dominant in the way Americans see themselves. America’s task was to champion principles of economic liberalism while it would make the world safe for democracy—but not necessarily democratic—by making it unsafe for aggressive old-style imperialism and new-style revolutionism alike. The weight given to collective security through international law would be subject to a pendulum swing toward and away from internationalism.

The later domination and moderate transformation of Europe’s Old Regime in the wake of World War II and the establishment of a United Nations with its liberal internationalist charter would have appeared to Wilson giant steps toward the achievement of his ideal. The Marshall Plan, which injected some \$27 billion into postwar Europe, promoted the economic and political adjustment of its old order to the new, and threw up bulwarks against the remaining adversary.[12](#) The United Nations, moreover, would provide a global political framework through which to bring

an American peace, as President Truman stated in his famous “containment” speech of 12 March 1947:

*To insure the peaceful development of nations, free from coercion, the United States has taken a leading part in establishing the United Nations. The United Nations is designed to make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.*<sup>13</sup>

Peace was desirable insofar as interest required it: but interest could be subordinated to neither peace nor principles. The cold facts of interest, as seen in the harsh light of postwar Foggy Bottom, reflected little of Truman’s—or later Kennedy’s—American idealism, but rather a view that because the United States already dominated the world economically and militarily, its task was to retain the upper hand, ceding nothing in its relations with a world in flux, whatever the long-term consequences. Rarely has a policy paper emerged that more bluntly defined a “go it alone” view of interest than did George F. Kennan’s now oft quoted (then top-secret) “Review of Current Trends, U. S. Foreign Policy” in 1948. Kennan, then director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, observed that “we have about 50 percent of the world’s wealth but only 6.3 percent of its population,” and suggested that interest required the United States to junk idealism—at least within the “inner in” of policymakers:

*Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our national security. To do so, we will have to dispense*

*with all sentimentality and day-dreaming.... We should dispense with the aspiration to “be liked” or to be regarded as the repository of a high-minded international altruism.... The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.*<sup>14</sup>

The young Kennan’s paper called a spade a spade, acknowledging that steps must be taken to sustain the United States’ advantages, and warning that the defense of economic privilege was not, by any means, congruent with the democratic ideal. The effort to define a power-oriented national security, without the ideological wrapping of today’s New Right ranters (or Wilsonian idealism), might have been refreshing if this concept had not so blindly bound the essence of security to the maintenance of economic privilege alone. The failure to comprehend that material advantage is never immutable, that economic relationships must gradually—or abruptly—readjust, and that security is best not balanced on undependable economic theory (or aspirations) was one characteristic of the American foray into realpolitik. Efforts to restore at least a veneer of idealism to Cold War politics in the 1960s would, in turn, fail to challenge Kennan’s essential premise that power and privilege were what mattered in international affairs.

The two-tracked aggressive military component of Wilson’s foreign policy—opposing the remnants of Europe’s imperial Old Regime and combating revolutionary socialism—lasted through the decolonization period of the 1950s. From the inception of the Cold War, the two tracks came together. The central commitment to a world order in an American image had overcome the resistance of Europe’s imperial powers in the course of World War II. The new consolidated thrust that took shape

in the closing days of the war and found expression in the ideological formulations of the Truman administration called for a crusade against a single enemy: Soviet communism. In the formulation of the containment policy, the two antagonists of Wilson's missionary liberalism merged into a single enemy, which combined the worst of atavistic imperialist expansionism with the ideological nemesis communism. Before the war had ended, the protection and promotion of the ideal world order, in conjunction with the defeat of the new German and Japanese imperialism, would contribute to a new emphasis, almost to the exclusion of all other considerations, on counterrevolutionary policy, or containment; a revised version of nineteenth-century British policy toward Czarist Russia—its bloodiest battlefields, the Crimea and the mountains of Afghanistan—and later British efforts to contain the expansion of German sea power after 1880.

Although interest, real or imagined, was the primary motor of overseas intervention, political realities required the presentation of policies to the American public in terms of fairly consistent principles. Intervention was rationalized and justified not on selfish grounds of national aggrandizement but as a selfless mission to aid the underdog. Truman's doctrine of containment was offered as a policy to assist small, vulnerable nations against superpower aggression and to promote self-determination—and, of course, to aid the cause of world freedom.<sup>15</sup>

The formulation of the containment doctrine has frequently been attributed to State Department analyst George Kennan and, if to any single document, to Kennan's essay "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," published under the name "Mr. X" in *Foreign Affairs* in July 1947.<sup>16</sup> Kennan's analysis, which reflected a long-standing consensus on the nature of the "Soviet threat," restored the main thrust of

U.S. foreign policy to bare bones realpolitik. The focus narrowed to a single generality: The uneasy peace after 1946 was identified as no peace at all, but a new kind of ever-present war, pitting the United States against its global adversary, Soviet communism. The new war, dubbed the “Cold War” in 1948, was a conflict that comprised political, psychological, and economic warfare—an unprecedented war in peace, involving not-so-unprecedented manifestations of old-fashioned, limited war on the periphery of the “free world.”<sup>[17](#)</sup>

The principal Cold War actors had developed a view of global polarization and conflict some time before postwar policy took shape. In his diaries, Dwight D. Eisenhower recalled visits by James V. Forrestal (Secretary of the Navy and later Secretary of Defense) during the war and their agreement then that “the free world is under threat by the monolithic mass of Communist Imperialism,” and that to meet that threat the United States must “wake up to prepare a position of strength.”<sup>[18](#)</sup>

Kennan’s contribution was to transform confrontation into an action oriented policy of containment. Kennan warned that “it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.”<sup>[19](#)</sup> Soviet pressure on the West could be “contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy.”<sup>[20](#)</sup> Kennan argued that the United States must answer the Soviet challenge or face inevitable destruction, a latter-day doomsday vision that would fuel the Cold War and the counterinsurgency era.<sup>[21](#)</sup>

The postwar thesis of containment was enunciated in President Truman's "containment" speech. The stated object was not merely to end war but to go further, to build a community of nations free from coercion itself:

*One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their will, and their way of life, upon other nations.*

In the postwar world, though, peoples of a number of countries once again had "totalitarian regimes forced upon them against their will." The immediate challenge was in Greece, where "the very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists, who defy the government's authority."<sup>22</sup> The Truman administration asked Congress to allocate \$400 million in economic and military assistance for Greece, then enmeshed in a bloody civil war, and for Turkey as a bulwark against foreign aggression.

Truman did not name the Soviet Union or Soviet communism as the aggressor, but the communist threat was clearly implied. The level of ideological hype was in direct proportion to the enormous sums of money involved and reflected a concern that the American people might balk at involvement in yet another overseas conflict so soon after the conclusion of World War II. The message was that 1947 was a critical juncture when the new order was taking shape, a time for taking sides: "At the present moment in world history, nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one." Should the United States fail to act, Truman warned,

there would be no second chance; the new order was to be an order of absolutes—our way of life or its opposite, either with us or against us. Once a nation fell to communism, there would be no return.<sup>23</sup>

The 1980s saw further elaboration of the Truman Doctrine, including regional corollaries. The most coherent statement of these principles, the April 1950 “United States Objectives for National Security” (NSC-68), formulated a worldview of polarization between two opposing camps—that of the Soviet Union and that of the United States. American policymakers perceived Soviet intentions to be principally the attainment of world hegemony, and so concluded that perpetual conflict was inescapable without victory by one side or the other.<sup>24</sup> In 1952, NSC-141 reiterated the principles in the Latin American context.<sup>25</sup> Political and economic development was an objective, but as a means to an end: to build nations “resistant to the internal growth of communism and to Soviet political warfare.” The policy further sought regional political support in the global arena and cooperation “in safeguarding the hemisphere through individual and collective defense measures against external aggression and internal subversion.”<sup>26</sup>

## **The Cold War Begins**

The Greek Civil War of 1946-1949 has been characterized as “the formal proclamation of the cold war” between the “Free World . . . and the forces of communism.”<sup>27</sup> The U. S. intervention in the civil war was the first counterinsurgent campaign of the Cold War. The U.S. Army Group Greece (USAGG) was established as part of the American Mission for Aid to Greece on 14 April 1947. The Aid to Greece and Turkey Bill, Public Law 75, the fruit of Truman’s “containment” speech, authorized what was then the War



Department to send military advisers to Greece, and required of Greece free access to U.S. personnel. The first personnel of USAGG, intended primarily to assess military assistance needs, reached Athens on 24 May, with a complement of forty military and twenty civilian personnel in place by 31 July. The first shipload of American military supplies arrived on 2 August. The USAGG was replaced by a full military advisory establishment, the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) on 31 December 1947. From that time, U.S. Army advisers went into the field with combat forces with a mandate to provide “aggressive assistance in the form of operational and logistic advice.”<sup>28</sup>

The actual numbers of Americans involved on the ground in the Greek Civil War were not released to the public or to Congress at the time. Moreover, a 1961 White House paper on the Greek conflict, prepared for President Kennedy as a case study on counterinsurgency, suggests a deliberate concealing of the level and intimacy of American a military involvement.”<sup>29</sup> The State Department’s second report to Congress reported that the Mission to Greece itself had grown within two years to over “100 military personnel, 220 civilians in the economic mission, 100 diplomatic and intelligence officers,” and 80 administrative officers.<sup>30</sup> “ The 1961 White House report gave rather larger figures, reporting personnel levels at the peak period at about 1,500, some 800 of whom were military personnel attached to the military mission. The same report quantifies assistance by the United States as having totaled \$ 723.6 million (\$ 198.4 military) “for the critical years 1946- 48 and an additional \$ 362 million (\$ 158.7 military) for 1949,” although the exact proportion of military to economic aid was unclear: “It is very difficult, however, to state just what

resources we contributed, or how much economic aid was devoted to counter-guerrilla activity.”<sup>31</sup>

The 1961 report stressed as essential to the campaign’s success the almost total command of the operation by Americans and the presence of advisers on combat operations—conditions that would remain at the top of the agendas of American counterinsurgents from Vietnam to El Salvador. Although JUSMAPG was originally limited to supply and training in the use of new weaponry, under General James Van Fleet, appointed to head the military group in February 1948, “its mission was broadened to include training and operations.”<sup>32</sup> As one analyst has observed, Van Fleet became “the de facto senior tactical officer of the Greek National Army,” with the American military group “insisting that all its recommendations be carried out fully and speedily.”<sup>33</sup> Another lesson drawn by Kennedy’s counterinsurgency advisers from the Greek intervention was that U. S. combat troops were not committed and that “only three U.S. military personnel were lost during the campaign.”<sup>34</sup>

The Greek armed forces in early 1948, as the American military mission began operations, numbered some 120,000 and were organized in a combination of conventional and mountain infantry divisions, British organized commando Wits (known by their Greek initials as LOK), and territorial forces known as the National Defense Corps (sometimes called National Guard).<sup>35</sup> A National Civil Guard had been set up immediately after the fall of Germany but had been replaced by a national police force (or gendarmerie) in November 1945.<sup>36</sup> The gendarmerie, which operated in all areas except large towns that had their own police services had, at war’s end, some 20,000 men but “had fallen into disrepute through continuing to function under the German

occupation authorities.”<sup>37</sup> A British Police and Prisons Mission took charge of the “purification” of the force: Within a month of the British landings, the “reconstituted” — but largely unchanged — gendarmerie was fully operational.<sup>38</sup> The reorganization of the Greek army was considered complete by May 1948. Force levels rose to some 145,000 regulars in 1949.<sup>39</sup>

The American military strategy was largely conventional: to pin down Democratic Army forces with massed troops and overwhelming firepower, and systematically to clear the adversary from mountain redoubts. Commando forces—some 2,000 men in all—were reserved for “raiding, deep penetration patrolling and as an air mobile strategic reserve.”<sup>40</sup> Massive operations in 1948 combined artillery and airpower (including strafing, high-explosive bombardment, and napalm) with infantry sweeps. Air power in Operation CROWN, a June-August 1948 offensive against Democratic Army forces in the Grammos Mountains, involved the “not-always-Greek pilots” of the Greek Air Force in “over 2,400 offensive sorties as well as 750 reconnaissance and 180 supply missions.”<sup>41</sup>

The counterinsurgency campaign included some aspects that would become familiar in later campaigns (and which had antecedents in British and French colonial doctrine, and in the United States’ own experience as a neocolonial power). Most significant of these was the forcible relocation, or clearance of the population from certain areas to create a “no-man’s-land.” British counterinsurgent Edgar O’Ballance described the measure:

*Under American insistence energetic counter-measures were taken. . . and one of the most effective of these was the systematic removal of whole sections of the population. This was more far-reaching than is usually*

*realized. It removed the people, it demarcated a "front line," it prevented "back infiltration" and it caused a blanket of silence to descend. Without to support and succor him, the guerrilla is a fish out of water; he might as well be fighting in a foreign and hostile country.*<sup>42</sup>

A second innovation was the system of the Greek National Defense Corps, a kind of territorial militia organized for defense duties at the local level: As a classic example of counterorganization for counterinsurgency, its recruitment criteria were political. The militia armed and mobilized population sectors predisposed to combat real or suspected communists. The system evolved from an earlier right-wing paramilitary force which was based largely on the wartime Greek Democratic National League (EDES). This had been a principal vehicle of the "White Terror" of 1946-1947, and the disbanding of the ad hoc "home guard" was a principal demand of the Left prior to the outbreak of open civil war.<sup>43</sup> A 1947 *New York Times* article reported the creation of the new force in the context of Prime Minister Sophoulis's September 1947 pledge to call a "national rally" to "exterminate" the guerrillas if they did not hand in their arms.<sup>44</sup> "Exterminating' guerrillas," however, was "one of the most difficult assignments an army can have...." The new program would combine local paramilitary forces at the grassroots with mobile regular units:

*Everyone now seems to agree that the army should use guerrilla methods, but little has been done to implement the idea. One thing that has been done, however, is to begin organizing a National Guard composed of reservists. Thirty-five to forty battalions of 500 men each will take on static defensive duties in endangered areas and release regular troops for offensive operations. The guard will replace . . . an unpaid, ill-equipped home guard recruited among Right-*

*wing elements which frequently compensated for its military ineffectiveness by persecuting so-called Communist villagers. The American Mission for Aid to Greece. . . views the National Guard plan with favor.*<sup>45</sup>

The National Defense Corps was established in October 1947, its force level authorized initially at 20,000 and raised to 50,000 in January 1948. The force was to be under army command, with active-duty army personnel serving as trainers; its recruits were to be veterans of military service, and were to serve on a part-time basis in their home areas while living at home. A *Marine Corps Gazette* study described the theory as that of “minutemen,” a militia that could protect the civil community—in general, providing local patrols and serving on guard duty—and free the army for the pursuit of the guerrillas.<sup>46</sup> Although the force level eventually reached some 50,000, the same source observes that “the ‘minuteman’ function was gradually abandoned” as these reserve units were called up to serve as conventional light infantry battalions.

The paramilitary militia system persisted after the collapse of National People’s Liberation Army (ELAS) forces in 1949, to be cited later by U. S. counterinsurgents as a model for the “counterorganization” of the civil population for grass-roots population control and counter guerrilla action. Lt. Col. John McCuen, in *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* (1966), cites the postwar incarnation of the National Defense Corps (*Tagmata Ethnofylackha Amynhs*, or TEA) as a model for local self-defense, military training, and political indoctrination: “We have had few near-ideal examples of effective counter-revolutionary strategy, but the T.E.A. organization is one of the best. It seems worthy of close emulation by other countries threatened with revolutionary action.”<sup>47</sup>

A key characteristic of the system was the interpenetration and close control of the system by the regular army,<sup>48</sup> a shared feature of later paramilitary systems such as El Salvador's ORDEN and the civil self-defense organizations set up in Latin America, Vietnam, and the Philippines since the early 1960s. The TEA's model recruitment procedure— again similar to that of El Salvador's ORDEN and current civil defense systems— employed a system of vetting personnel according to their political proclivities and of keeping costs down: remuneration came in the form of patronage jobs and surplus commodities.<sup>49</sup> The incorporation of ax-conscripts into the system provided a means of taking advantage of military training in the long-term, as well as retaining a means of ongoing supervision of trained personnel.

The political dimension went beyond recruitment criteria; although a form of active military reserve, TEA also had the characteristics of a paramilitary political organization:

*A significant element of the T. E.A. training is political— as part of the Greek Army's "enlightenment" campaign. Officers get special courses to prepare them for this responsibility. Not only do the officers indoctrinate their men, but they often travel through their areas of responsibility giving speeches to the villagers. . . . As a result the Greeks look upon the T. E. A. organization as an important means of influence, commitment, and control of the population.*<sup>50</sup>

At base, however, the political role was superimposed on a political-policing role of intelligence, vigilance, and repression. TEA units were armed with rifles, submachine guns, and light machine guns (kept locked up by officers), and they carried out guard and patrolling functions in rotation.<sup>51</sup>

In late 1948, the Democratic Army leadership changed from a strategy of guerrilla warfare to employ the conventional tactics of open confrontation and battle—in an apparent move to achieve a victory before the inflow of American arms could turn the tide (or the Tito-Stalin rift led to a total rupture between its leaders and Yugoslavia, which had hitherto provided sanctuary). The strategic shift proved catastrophic. In a final campaign in August 1949, the Democratic Army confronted the national army's combination of infantry, artillery, and air power "in heavy, positional combat" in the Gramos and Vitsi ranges, and after six days of fighting it was routed.<sup>52</sup> Although many guerrillas fled across the border into Albania, the military victory effectively ended the Greek Civil War.

The 1961 reexamination of the Greek campaign for the Kennedy White House summarized factors in the Greek conflict considered to bear on contemporary counterinsurgency.<sup>53</sup> The report very much shared the American view held in 1948: The guerrilla Democratic Army was a straightforward extension of Soviet power, and cutting the Democratic Army off from sanctuary and resupply had proved decisive in its defeat.<sup>54</sup> Attributing the military defeat of the Democratic Army to the closure of the Yugoslav border, however, ignored Albania's uninterrupted supply and sanctuary role. And, as Larry Cable notes, cross-border traffic into Yugoslavia remained partially open until July 1949, "less than a month before the insurrection was finally suppressed."<sup>55</sup>

The 1961 paper provides insight into the way insurgency was seen at the time. Although called a "civil war," the American view of the Greek conflict in 1949 was that of "a partisan war in which [the Democratic Army] operated as auxiliaries of the Soviet Army whose intervention was possible and, for a while, seen as probable." The view then

was that a guerrilla movement could not represent a serious threat in the absence of the conventional forces of an external sponsoring power. The nonmilitary aspects, however, from civic action to the forced relocation of civilians were fully noted and seen as integral parts of the counterinsurgency campaign. Population control measures, in particular, were seen to have been successful, in part because the “protection or removal to positions of safety of exposed Greek civilians” gave them “the courage to resist the guerrillas.” The conclusion was that earlier support for the guerrillas “was largely a result of fear.”;

The events in Greece tended to reconfirm wartime perceptions of guerrillas as partisans attached to contending powers and insignificant without outside support. The conversion of Colonel Zervas’s EDES collaborationists (and Zervas himself) into American allies in turn reaffirmed American military views that (noncommunist) partisans, however unsavory, could be brought to heel and used to good effect by the United States—whether in offensive unconventional warfare or in counterinsurgency warfare.

Although the Greek conflict was outstanding for the level of atrocities committed by both sides, the element of terror was downplayed by the American military in its later analyses of the conflict. Rather, the consensus was that victory resulted largely from the combination of conventional military tactics with the kind of “firm but fair” policies associated elsewhere in Europe with American occupation forces, and, perhaps decisively, the isolation of the guerrillas from their foreign sanctuaries. An August 1966 *Military Review*, however, reflected later thinking by describing the Greek conflict—“the Anti-Bandit War”—as the first step toward the aggressive and innovative counterinsurgency strategies of the 1960s:



*From the military point of view, it established four significant trends in US strategy:*

- *The provision of large-scale military assistance to a foreign government in “peacetime. ”*
- *The use of US military personnel as advisors to indigenous forces in the conduct of active military operations.*
- *The development of counter guerrilla tactics as a paramount requisite of the cold war.*
- *The acceptance of US involvement in military hostilities without the commitment of maximum resources.*[57](#)

## **Korea: Limited War and Unconventional Warfare**

As noted, USAGG’s strategy against communist guerrillas in Greece was largely conventional. The army’s move into the unconventional warfare arena was precipitated by the outbreak of war in Korea. The defeat of Japan had been followed by Korea’s occupation by U.S. and Soviet troops and its partition along the 38th parallel. Although the partition was initially proposed as temporary, as with the later division of Vietnam, the Cold War climate was not amenable to reunification.. In 1946, the American occupation force created a South Korean “constabulary” along military lines and prepared for withdrawal after 15 August 1948 when a South Korean government, elected under United Nations auspices, took office. The military forces of the constabulary became the army of the Republic of Korea, growing to nearly 100,000 men by 30 June 1949, when American occupation forces withdrew. Their initial task would be to confront guerrilla forces much like those of revolutionary China. .[58](#)

Sporadic guerrilla actions and army mutinies were first reported in the south in October 1948 and attributed to adherents of North Korean leader Kim Il Sung; by December 1949, they had prompted major (if ineffectual) South Korean offensives into guerrilla base areas in the Tae-back and Chiri Mountains.<sup>59</sup> When North Korean troops spilled over the 38th parallel on 25 June 1950, a partisan support network estimated at some 7,000 strong was in place. Following the American landing at Inchon, North Korean troops cut off by U.N. forces linked up with growing partisans; and by November “the total guerrilla strength had jumped astronomically to 40,000, of whom roughly half were armed....”<sup>60</sup> These forces stayed behind when U.N. forces thrust north toward the Chinese border, disrupting supply lines and facilitating the subsequent return to the south by North Korean and Chinese forces through “agitprop, reconnaissance, sabotage and ambush.”<sup>61</sup>

The invading North Koreans rapidly overran Seoul in the June offensive, and within weeks drove the South Korean troops (ROK) and the small American force to the extreme southern end of the peninsula; a bridgehead was retained at Pusan through which reinforcements and supplies were rapidly available for what had become a U.N. force (although largely American). An amphibious landing at Inchon, to the west of Seoul, combined with the moves north from Pusan obliged the North Koreans to withdraw beyond the 38th parallel in September 1950. Thousands of North Koreans cut off from their units in the withdrawal joined local partisans and deliberate “stay- behinds,” which would subsequently disrupt U.N. rear areas. The seesaw front line was thrust rapidly to the north by U.N. troops commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. Despite allied warnings to stop the advance after the capture of Pyongyang, MacArthur continued north. In the first week of November, as U.N.

troops approached the Chinese border, the feared Chinese response was forthcoming: Chinese and North Korean troops pushed the U.N. forces south of the 38th parallel by Christmas and captured Seoul. U.N. forces regained control by the spring, and the front remained near the 38th parallel until the armistice of July 1953.

The American response to the strictly guerrilla aspect of the conflict was disjointed and largely conventional in concept. Antiguerilla tactics were left largely to the imagination of local commanders.<sup>62</sup> Major operations, using conventional tactics to search and clear even mountainous guerrilla areas, proved relatively effective in combination with the large war against the enemy main force. In January 1951, the First Marine Division was turned to the task of clearing guerrillas from a mountainous area in the Taebaek Mountains, in Marine lore the “Pohang Guerrilla Hunt.” A combination of “sweeps, search and clear missions and rapid reaction forces, “ the operation resulted in the withdrawal of the bulk of partisan forces from the area.<sup>63</sup> The offensive to clear guerrillas from the Chiri Mountains followed in December 1951. Dubbed “Operation RATKILLER,” it involved primarily South Korean forces cordoning escape routes and moving in force to screen the area; repeated sweeps after RATKILLER were credited by November 1952 with clearing guerrillas from the area.<sup>64</sup>

Although Korea catalyzed the military revival and extension of psychological and unconventional warfare capabilities, the very nature of the Korean conflict, from its origin in invasion to its essentially conventional confrontation of military forces, conspired against the development of an innovative counter guerrilla/unconventional warfare doctrine. The dramatic movement of its conventional front line, in particular, would result in the conversion of regular troops

into “partisans” and back into regulars as territorial control shifted in a matter of weeks. The postwar mainstream military analysis was that guerrillas could be successfully eradicated by conventional forces—military and police—adapting essentially conventional tactics to the task.<sup>65</sup> The analysis found almost immediate application with the American move into Vietnam at the time of the Paris peace accords of 1954, and molded the American effort to build a South Vietnamese military establishment. A view of guerrilla warfare based largely on the Korean experience was outlined by American commander Lt. Gen. Samuel Williams, who saw a beefed-up police force as the answer to guerrillas, in a 1955 memorandum to the new Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem:

*Communist guerrillas have been destroyed in Greece, Korea, the Philippines and Iran. They can be destroyed in Vietnam.... Communist guerrilla strategy is simple. By using a small amount of arms and equipment and a few good military leaders, they force (their opponents) to utilize relatively large military forces in a campaign that is costly in money and men.... When the North Koreans attacked, the South Korean Army suffered from this diversion as their army was not strategically or tactically deployed to meet the North Korean attack.*<sup>66</sup>

Korea’s principal influence was on the military perception of guerrilla warfare, its tactics and limitation. Preconceptions of the guerrilla as an auxiliary to conventional forces were reinforced. And while little new in the way of fighting guerrillas emerged, a model of guerrilla methods was constructed for the United States’ own “guerrillas.”

Efforts to organize an American “guerrilla” effort on the World War II model were begun by the Operations Division (G-3) of the U.S. Eighth Army in the winter of 1950. The

recruitment of Korean nationals for behind-the-lines operations was the task of a special Eighth Army unit, whose mission was “To develop and direct partisan warfare by training in sabotage indigenous groups and individuals both within Allied lines and behind enemy lines.”<sup>67</sup> A 1981 Special Forces field manual describes Korea as a turning point after a tendency “to ignore the lessons taught by the resistance fighters” of World War II. It describes the organization of the Korean “guerrillas” after the Eighth Army’s retreat from the Yalu River, and reports that from “6,000 to 10,000 Korean irregular troops [were] swept along with it. The decision was made to employ these irregulars as guerrillas, and for 3 years these guerrillas— later named partisans—were trained, supported, and directed by the US Army.”<sup>68</sup> In practice, the army unhappily shared its control with both the CIA, through an unwieldy coordinating body at the Far East Command (FECOM), and the remarkable Covert, Clandestine and Related Activities in Korea (CCRACK, oddly metamorphosed in the 1981 manual to the drab “Combined Command Reconnaissance Activities Korea”).<sup>69</sup> Based on offshore islands on the two coasts, the Eighth Army ran three guerrilla commands — WOLFPACK, LEOPARD, and KIRKLAND — averaging around 5,000 men each.<sup>70</sup> In practice, their principal tasks of hit and-run raids and sabotage were more akin to commando operations than to “guerrilla” operations, although some long-range reconnaissance operations called for infiltration of small units, which remained behind lines for up to six months at a time.<sup>71</sup> The 1981 Special Forces manual describes their function, rather more romantically, as groundwork for a new “liberation”: “The Eighth US Army . . . assigned them the mission to establish a resistance net in North Korea that would support regular forces in an anticipated offensive to liberate all or part of North Korea.”<sup>72</sup> Other “guerrilla” initiatives were undertaken by the CIA in Korea and the

neighboring mainland of China, nominally, but in army eyes ineffectually, coordinated with the FECOM through the CCRAK liaison group.<sup>[73](#)</sup>

# Chapter 2: Toward a Doctrine of Special Warfare

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## **Cold War and Covert Action: From OSS to CIA**

The 1950s and early 1960s were the heyday of covert action, in part because the determination to wage a cold war at every level coincided, perhaps ironically, with the fruition of U. S. efforts to develop functioning structures of international law designed to halt intervention, aggression, and international conflict. The immediate aftermath of World War II saw dramatic advances in the development of international law and of machinery for its monitoring, promotion, and implementation. Its principal framework and forum was the United Nations, the successor to Woodrow Wilson's stillborn League of Nations (and inheritor of its enormous Peace Palace overlooking Lake Geneva). A better basis was thus established for the regulation of international relations in war and peace.

Overt intervention, therefore, could no longer be justified on the simple grounds of realpolitik but had to be rationalized in the terms of the new international order. In the 1960s, a formula would be found—the doctrine of counterinsurgency—through which a new kind of intervention would become a permanent and ostensibly “legal” feature of everyday international relations—and, of

course, an alternative to the major wars unacceptable in the nuclear age. In the 1950s, however, intervention was generally more crude, an outright disregard for the new international standards through clandestinity.

Although the waging of the Cold War frequently involved contravening the new standards of international law, domestic and diplomatic realities required explanation of every foreign-policy initiative as at least consistent with the ideals of international law, if not central to its very survival. Having effectively outlawed armed intervention, “counterintervention” became the norm. The use of proxies to this end, in turn, required recourse to legal gymnastics, and the use of propaganda as a palliative to improprieties. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy rejected a 1961 legal brief that held the Bay of Pigs invasion to be in violation of international law and the United States’ own neutrality laws, on the grounds that those involved were “patriots” (the “freedom fighters” of the 1960s, prefiguring those of the 1980s)—and that times had changed:

*The neutrality laws. . . are among the oldest laws in our statute books.... Clearly they were not designed for the kind of situation which exists in the world today.... No activities engaged in by Cuban patriots which have been brought to our attention appear to be violations of our neutrality laws.*<sup>1</sup>

Similarly ambivalent views of the merits and demerits of international law have long been a feature in U. S. foreign policy. At the turn of the century, Admiral Mahan urged placing the United States above the developing framework of international law. In an 1899 article on the first of the Hague peace conferences of the same year, Mahan argued that the principle of international arbitration, “this most humane impulse,” threatened compulsion “to vitally impair



the moral freedom, and the consequent moral responsibility, which are the distinguishing glory of the rational man, and of the sovereign state.”<sup>2</sup> Mahan’s thesis was not that might makes right, but that the exercise of might faithful to duty and conscience was a moral obligation. The failure to go to war, to act, was to him as immoral as a war waged without conviction— “Nor is this... vitiated by the fact that war is made at times upon mistaken conviction.”<sup>3</sup> International law, then, must not *in extremis* be permitted to interfere with a nation’s conviction as to what is (its) right.<sup>4</sup> The virtue is in the act and in the resolution to act on conviction — however misguided, whatever the consequences. The weight of responsibility, then, remains on the nation’s leaders to correctly interpret interest and to act accordingly.

Ethics in Mahan’s view of international affairs—and war—were entirely subordinate to national interests; and because interests were a matter of convictions, the will to war was an ethical sufficiency unto itself. Foreign affairs after Mahan, however, required adjustment to the consensus of American policymakers that it was, after all, in the national interest to introduce order into international relations through a framework of law. It was immediately after the creation of the United Nations that American leaders found it necessary—as a matter of interest—to break the new rules they publicly lauded. In doing so, they developed new systems by which to evade accountability for lawbreaking—including an enormous apparatus for covert intervention—and, by means of extraordinary effort, to present the United States’ actions, whatever their nature, as in accord with international law.

The public statements of Cold War policy define American military involvement overseas strictly in terms of counteraggression: intervention is preferably on the invitation of a threatened, legal government, to counter a projection of Soviet military—and ideological—power.

Policymakers of the early Cold War, the 1960s proponents of counterinsurgency, and the Reagan administration each projected military power by means of formulations that “transcended” or circumvented the spirit, and often the letter, of international law. The deployment of the covert paramilitary apparatus of the Eisenhower administration’s Central Intelligence Agency on the one hand, and the abortive American invasion of Cuba three months after John F. Kennedy’s inauguration on the other, exemplify the ethical conundrum of Cold War covert action and democratic ideals—and bear directly on the revival of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency doctrine in the 1980s.

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The United States’ venture into the field of unconventional warfare generally defined in terms of “guerrilla” and assorted covert operations in enemy-occupied or influenced territory, began with President Franklin Roosevelt’s creation, in July 1941, of the first autonomous American intelligence agency. The Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) later to become the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), held an expanding brief that by 1945 ranged from espionage and intelligence to behind-the-lines operations with indigenous guerrilla resistance forces. To an extraordinary extent the path taken by the COI-OSS (and later by its successor the Central Intelligence Agency [CIA]) can be attributed to its director, World War I veteran Colonel William J. Donovan. Donovan, in turn, drew on his own familiarity with the British system, and his admiration for the coordination by the British of “intelligence activities with psychological warfare and special operations.” The British successfully combined “propaganda efforts with the ‘unorthodox’ operations of sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare”—through the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) and Special Operations Executive (SOE)—in coordination with the Secret

Intelligence Service's intelligence and counterintelligence activities.<sup>6</sup>

Donovan had proposed in 1941 to match or excel the British in their covert management of political skulduggery overseas, but to combine into one central agency the intelligence, psychological warfare, and special operations functions. Army historian Alfred H. Paddock summarizes Donovan's broad approach to psychological warfare: "Intelligence penetration" provides a basis for strategic planning and propaganda, to be followed by special operations, "in the form of sabotage and subversion, followed by commando-like raids, guerrilla actions, and behind-the-lines resistance movements." The combined effort was to prepare for allied invasion; the unified operation thus representing "a new instrument of war."<sup>7</sup>

In June 1942, the COI was dissolved and the OSS emerged, with Donovan at its head, under the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Most of the COI's wartime propaganda function had been hived off to a new civilian Office of War Information (OWI). The OSS's psychological warfare (psy-war) responsibilities, however, covered those wartime propaganda functions considered inappropriate to the public operations of the OWI—particularly "black" and "gray" propaganda operations, wherein authorship was wrongly attributed to enemy sources (black) or simply concealed (gray). Psy-war fell within the OSS Special Operations branch—along with guerrilla warfare.<sup>8</sup> In OSS parlance, special operations covered "espionage, counterintelligence in foreign nations, sabotage, commando raids, guerrilla and partisan-group activity... various other forms of psychological warfare and underground operations"<sup>9</sup>—a definition that would remain largely unchanged into the 1990s.

The OSS was the United States' principal unconventional warfare agency during the war, but drew on the regular services for most of its personnel. Although a civilian organization, subordination to the JCS ensured the institutional military support that OSS unconventional warfare initiatives required, although the military still questioned the wisdom of a major investment in wartime "guerrilla" activities. The OSS received its operational charter for unconventional with JCS Directive 155/4D, December 23, 1942, assigning it responsibility for guerrilla warfare. It specified that OSS personnel were to serve as the "organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei of guerrilla units." The army provided the bulk of the OSS's people, totaling 4,097 in November 1943, and 8,360 by May 1945; the OSS maximum personnel level, according to the *War Report of the OSS*, reached 13,000 in December 1944, with some 7,500 overseas.<sup>[11](#)</sup>

The Operational Groups (OGs) were created in May 1943 as an OSS branch, and put under a separate command in November 1944. OG personnel were trained for behind-the-lines commando operations, but unlike the army Rangers and conventional commandos, their primary task was to organize and work with indigenous resistance groups. In that respect, the OSS Operational Groups would provide a prototype for the organization of the Special Forces in the 1950s.<sup>[12](#)</sup> Their particular role was outlined in a 1944 OSS manual: "OG personnel activate guerrillas as military organizations to engage enemy forces. They always operate in uniform as military units and are not primarily concerned with individual acts of sabotage.") Commandos, in contrast, performed the relatively straightforward task of stealthy hit-and-run destruction, more or less what Winston Churchill demanded in the early days of the war: "Enterprises must be prepared, with specially trained troops of the hunter class who can develop a reign of terror down these coasts, first of

all on the 'butcher and bolt' policy... leaving a trail of German corpses behind them.'"[14](#)

OSS unconventional warfare operations were carried out in Europe in conjunction with the British, coordinated by a joint headquarters set up between the OSS and the Special Operations Executive in 1943 (and in 1944 renamed "Special Forces Headquarters"). Operations in occupied Europe included liaison and assistance work with the French resistance, and for the Normandy invasion the infiltration of French-speaking OGs and "Jedburgh" Teams, consisting of a British or American officer, a French officer, and a radio operator, who were parachuted in to coordinate local Maquis actions with the Allied invasion force.

In Asia, OSS unconventional warfare operations included the exploits of Detachment 101 in Burma, where over three years U.S. Army personnel organized and led a force of some 10,000 Kachin tribesmen in guerrilla operations against the Japanese in 1943-1945, and another operation in tandem with British "guerrillas" working with Karen tribesmen (the "Chindits") during the same period. The Kachin experience in leading mercenary tribesmen in guerrilla operations would provide a model for later CIA paramilitary adventures with the mountain peoples of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam.

Only in the Pacific theater was the OSS excluded from unconventional warfare operations, at the insistence of General Douglas MacArthur. In the Philippine Islands, however, stay-behind U.S. Army officers raised and led indigenous guerrilla forces to harry the Japanese occupation forces, and gathered intelligence information for the eventual American return to the islands. In the aftermath of the war, army officers who were tried and tested in the Philippine guerrilla field joined former OSS officers to

develop the doctrine and organization for unconventional warfare.

On 1 October 1945 Harry Truman broke up the OSS, rejecting General Donovan's proposal (made to Roosevelt shortly before his death in April of that year) to transform the OSS into a permanent "general intelligence service."<sup>15</sup> The OSS Research and Analysis branch was put under State Department control, while remnants of the Secret Intelligence and Special Operations branches moved to the War Department, placed within a newly established Strategic Services Unit (SSU).<sup>16</sup> The rebuilding of a centralized agency along OSS lines began shortly afterward, despite Truman's apparent concern at its "totalitarian" implications. A Central Intelligence Group (CIG) was set up in January 1946 as a relatively powerless coordinating body with a staff of less than 100; by year end, under the direction of General Hoyt Vandenberg, its staff grew to some 400. In August 1946, Vandenberg moved further toward reassembling the OSS, or something very much like it, bringing the some 1,000 personnel of the Strategic Services Unit to the CIG. Appropriately renamed Office of Special Operations (OSO), the new resources would provide the institutional basis for a renewal of unconventional warfare activities—in peacetime. After the National Security Act of 1947 transformed the CIG into the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the apparatus only awaited a clarification of its mandate.

## **To Fight Fire with Fire**

The political go-ahead for covert, unconventional warfare initiatives was a matter of time and the anxiety of the incipient Cold War. Already in late 1946, Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, proposed "a study of ways in which

psychological warfare might be used in Europe”; and in late December 1946 a joint State-War-Navy committee drew up guidelines for such operations. <sup>17</sup> A consensus was found that primary responsibility for covert action in “political” warfare should fall to the new civilian intelligence resources; a military role, however, remained an option.

In September 1947, a State Department proposal was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff addressing the perceived imbalance in the Soviet Union-versus-United States Cold War equation. A paper prepared by Charles Thayer and Franklin Lindsay—both longtime State Department personnel and OSS veterans who had worked with partisans in Yugoslavia—eloquently proposed meeting the Soviets “on their own terms,” and urged the establishment of a “guerrilla warfare school and a guerrilla warfare corps” under the newly established Defense Department. IM The proposal was endorsed and forwarded by George Kennan. Kennan’s letter to Secretary of Defense Forrestal expressed the now-classic rationale of political warfare:

*I think we have to face the fact that Russian successes have been gained in many areas by irregular and underground methods. I do not think the American people would ever approve of policies which rely fundamentally on similar methods for their effectiveness. I do feel, however, that there are cases where it might be essential to our security to fight fire with fire.*<sup>19</sup>

The proposal prompted a series of studies of guerrilla warfare for the Joint Chiefs, and a JCS position paper for the Secretary of Defense (17 August 1948), concluding that the United States should have the means to support foreign resistance movements in guerrilla warfare, and that peacetime responsibility in this regard should be that of the

CIA. Recommending that “a separate guerrilla warfare school and corps should not be established,” the JCS conceded, however, that personnel could be trained in existing service schools and be “on call for introduction into countries to organize, direct, and lead native guerrillas.”<sup>20</sup>

In the early years of the Cold War, the military questioned the propriety of the armed services’ participation in either covert action or guerrilla warfare. While the military saw the utility of friendly “guerrilla” forces working in conjunction with regular forces in wartime, there was something unsavory about the new peacetime warfare, and they preferred to maintain their distance. Training for future “guerrilla” warfare was seen as something that could be arranged through existing service schools, without the creation of either a “guerrilla” curriculum, or a “guerrilla” elite.

The military agreed, with apparent relief, to national security directives, in December 1947 and June 1948, giving the CIA primary responsibility for conducting psychological and unconventional— including guerrilla—warfare activities.<sup>21</sup> Army distaste at involvement in “unsoldierly” covert activities extended even to the oversight procedure. In June 1948, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall took a strong position against army involvement even with the covert action monitoring committee: “He did not want a representative of the Army to be a member of the special services group... and further that he does not want the Army to get into covert activities or even to know anything about it.”<sup>22</sup> Other views prevailed and an officer was provided.

The CIA mandate to take up the cudgel in the Cold War has been dated to the first meeting, on 19 December 1947, of the National Security Council (which, like the CIA and the JCS, also stemmed from the National Security Act). NSC 4/A,



the memorandum ordering the CIA to undertake covert “psychological operations,” however, called only for the fiddling of an election—to ensure the defeat of the Communist Party in Italy in 1948.<sup>[23](#)</sup>

A broader mandate for a standing covert action apparatus and permanent program followed in June 1948. NSC 10/2 established a CIA covert action arm—obscurely called the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC)—and ordered it to respond in kind to the “vicious covert activities of the USSR, its satellite countries and Communist groups.”<sup>[24](#)</sup> NSC 10/2 of 18 June 1948 was the CIA’s covert action charter, citing as its tasks:

*Any covert activities related to propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, antisabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to under ground resistance groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.*<sup>[25](#)</sup>

With the shift in the CIA’s orientation toward covert operations, NSC 10/2 stimulated a recruitment drive to bring into the fold many of the OSS people with special operations experience, with a growing influx of personnel with “guerrilla” warfare expertise from late 1948, and after the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950.<sup>[26](#)</sup>

The drafters of NSC 10/2 clearly envisioned the new sphere of activity as falling outside the scope of international law, its objectively military aspects blind the laws and usages of war. The limits of covert action were defined by NSC 10/2 in terms of appearances, not substance, with the enunciation of the now-familiar yardstick of “plausible deniability.” Covert action was to be

“so planned and conducted that any U. S. government responsibility for them was not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered, the U. S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”<sup>27</sup> Thus, by June 1948, the CIA had both the organization and the mandate for the broad range of activities of which the public would only begin to be aware in the aftermath of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion.

## **Guerrilla Warfare and Military Doctrine**

The U. S. Army’s experience in fighting guerrillas before World War II was extensive, from the Indian wars to the neocolonial conquest of the Philippines, but reference to guerrilla warfare was largely absent from its formal doctrine. Because of the army’s relative success in fighting guerrillas by conventional means, it remained no more than an afterthought in the larger body of conventional doctrine. The Marines, by contrast, took the matter more seriously, and produced their *Small Wars Manual* in 1940, providing a comprehensive guide to counterinsurgency tactics based on the Marines’ own experience as an international constabulary.

The Marines’ doctrine, in 1940, was predicated on overt intervention and political control: either through out-and-out military government or through a more complex neocolonial form of intervention. In that respect it was perhaps more realistic than the army’s counterinsurgency doctrine to come—insofar as it was more directly concerned with establishing control (and a system of order) than with sustaining a mythology of selfless aid to brothers in need. The Marines’ doctrine was also similar to the contemporary colonial doctrine of the French and British military.

The development of its doctrine after 1940 also built on the Corps' familiarity with overseas operations, and the particular skills of some of its officers. Marine Captain (later Brigadier General) Samuel B. Griffith is credited with a major contribution to the analysis of modern guerrilla warfare through his translation of some of Mao Zedong's writings.<sup>[29](#)</sup> Similarly, Marine training materials immediately after World War II, and articles in the *Marine Corps Gazette* included some of the most sensible, nonideological writing on guerrilla warfare produced in the military establishment. The revision of the *Small Wars Manual* produced in draft form in 1962, *Fleet Marine Force Manual-21* (FMFM-21), was, like its antecedent, accurately described by the Marines themselves as a "nuts-and-bolts" manual, which incorporated the practical lessons of the British in Malaya and the U.S. Army in the Philippines.<sup>[30](#)</sup>

Postwar army doctrine was of a parentage quite distinct from that of the Marines. The principal influence stemmed from the World War II experience of commando and partisan special operations—and a fascination with the potential application of "political warfare," "psychological warfare," or "special warfare" in the early years of the Cold War. Offensive guerrilla operations and counterinsurgency after World War II were seen as a "special" vocation that was not really appropriate for the conventional armed forces. From the late 1940s, the definition of problems related to guerrilla warfare, and the solutions, fell largely to veterans of the OSS, and of the army's own work with behind-the-lines guerrillas in the Philippines, China, and southern Europe.<sup>[31](#)</sup> The consolidation in 1951 of the army's unconventional warfare "assets" under the Office of Psychological Warfare provided the medium through which doctrine was formulated and plans prepared to put it into practice.

Whereas the objective of Marine counterinsurgency doctrine (and other patently colonial doctrine) was to impose a rule of law (however unjust) adapting tried and proven organization, weaponry, and tactics to subdue recalcitrants, postwar doctrine developed around the wartime concepts of unconventional warfare, secret operations, and a preference for expediency over law. The shapers of postwar military doctrine were many of the same officers who had participated in the free-form no-holds-barred tactics of partisan resistance warfare against the Germans and the Japanese. In the immediate postwar period, the object was to develop a capability for *unconventional* warfare to meet the Soviet threat—not to counter insurgencies but to encourage and support resistance movements to combat Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Europe.

The Korean War stimulated a reassessment of the threat of guerrilla warfare within the mainstream military, if not a radical reappraisal of its nature. A popular article in the *Combat Forces Journal* of September 1950 drew on the ongoing Korean experience, warning that “your air force won’t help you against guerrillas in a war of no fronts... for the Asiatic irregulars operate to blast and kill *behind* the lines” (a lesson on air power that was disregarded in the Vietnam later counterinsurgency wars).<sup>32</sup> The author, Major Robert B. Rigg, like many army officers, had had personal experience with “guerrillas,” and observed that “the problem isn’t new.” He had observed Chinese communists in combat “from both sides of the lines during the China Civil War and spent two months in a Red prison for having viewed them too closely,” and in 1943 had accompanied the Iraqi army in a campaign against the “Barzani Kurds, also guerrilla fighters.”

Riggs saw the remedy largely in a combination of various traditional military tactics (as in the Philippine system of military posts), and praised in particular the experience of the British and Indian armies on the Northwest Frontier. There was no option between “protective” and “punitive” measures: “Only a combination of both will win.”<sup>33</sup> An accompanying photograph, showing a prisoner apparently being given the “third degree” is captioned:

*When you capture a guerrilla put him through the interrogation wringer quickly so as to act the benefit of every bit of information you squeeze out of him. This Chinese Communist irregular is getting some bitter tea from Nationalist S-2s.*<sup>34</sup>

Riggs decried the army’s failure to produce an official manual on guerrilla warfare, while observing that what little material was available concentrated on organizing guerrillas, not fighting them: “Much has been written unofficially about partisan warfare from the standpoint of their *use*. But there is little in the way of organized doctrine on how to combat effectively the military plague of resistance from irregulars.”<sup>35</sup>

The army had in fact circulated, in draft form, its first effort toward a consolidated counter guerrilla doctrine shortly before the outbreak of war in Korea, and published it in its field- manual series in February 1951 as FM 31-20, *Operations Against Guerrilla Forces*.<sup>36</sup> The manual drew extensively on the experiences of its authors, Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Volckmann and other American wartime guerrillas, and outlined largely conventional tactics through which an American occupation force—and military governments—could deal with a World War II style guerrilla movement sponsored by a rival great power.

Mainstream army doctrine for counterinsurgency was, for a time still largely traditional. The doctrine sketched in the 1950s manuals was not particularly different from that followed by the Indian fighters of the nineteenth century and the army in the Philippines at the turn of the century. Punitive action, intended to punish and to coerce an uncooperative population, was still an option. The “counterguerrilla,” or counterorganization concept, in turn, drew on the army’s prior use of local “scouts” in the American West and the Philippines—forces with the same skills and local knowledge as the adversary and consequently able to fight the adversary with its own methods.

The Indian wars analogy with “modern” counterinsurgency was occasionally made even in U. S. military journals. A November 1960 article equates the communist guerrilla with the nineteenth-century Apache, and matches the tactics of General George Crook (“who was to subdue and effectively rule the Apache Indians”) with then-current army doctrine.<sup>37</sup> The outline of each aspect of the Apache campaign is followed by an excerpt from “instructional material” then in use at the Army Command and General Staff College, in order to show that “the current USA CGSC antiguerrilla doctrine and the methods used by General Crook are virtually identical.... They will work as well against any known present-day guerrilla force.” The use of “native troops,” recruited from Indian peoples hostile to the Apaches, or Apache renegades, was of particular importance. (The excerpt from doctrine is in the right-hand column.)

*Crook realized that no American soldier would be able to compete with the Apache warriors On a man-to-man basis in the field of endurance.... Recognizing the problem, Crook recruited scouts on a scale never before*

*employed in order that he would have fighting troops with the necessary individual endurance and “know how” to fight Indians on their own terms. Navahos, limes, and friendly Apaches were hired. . .*

*Whenever feasible, Allied troops native to the area should be employed against hostile resistance elements....*

*When feasible, special antiguerrilla units are organized, equipped, and trained to combat guerrilla forces by using guerrilla methods....*

*Under many conditions they are more effective than large conventional troops units.*[38](#)

The army's understanding of pacification and psychological warfare is described further in the threatening terms of the colonial officer: The population must be told very clearly, so that there is no misunderstanding, that they must submit. (“He also told them the alternative if they would not move peacefully to a reservation—that he would hunt them down and kill them.”) The warning given, in turn, must be supported by action—the premise being that the insurgent respects frankness (and of course will recognize the compelling argument of overwhelming force). 39 The revised doctrine of the 1960s redefined the terms of punitive action in terms more acceptable to the postwar world of democratization and decolonization. Counterinsurgency went more fully into the area of special warfare and covert action.

The new doctrine of counterinsurgency was an offshoot of the postwar doctrine of unconventional warfare, applying the offensive tactics of unconventional warfare to internal war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff definition in the 1960s as in the

1990s held unconventional warfare to encompass the related fields of guerrilla warfare and subversion, in enemy or enemy-controlled territory. Counterinsurgency applied similar norms and means to territories considered threatened by the enemy.

## **On the Eve of the Counterinsurgency Era**

Special warfare doctrine began with the wreckage of the OSS and the first serious consideration in 1947 of a permanent military capability to undertake the kind of initiatives only then assigned to the newborn CIA. In 1947, a secret army review of wartime behind-the-lines operations *A Study of Special and Subversive Operations*, concentrated on the organization, tactics, and operations of U. S.-supported partisans or “guerrillas.” This experience was duly reflected in 1960s manuals on offensive guerrilla warfare. The study also recommended a review of counter guerrilla measures and enumerated many of the options that were subsequently incorporated into the secret repertoire of the American counterinsurgent. Defensive measures “against an active underground” required “an efficient intelligence system, reliable communications,... fast mobile columns, radio direction finders, restrictions on the civilian use of radio, and very tight security....”<sup>40</sup> Going on the offensive required active measures to cut off the guerrillas from local support and to hold the people accountable for guerrilla action:

*Countermeasures include the control of movement of civilians, rendering civilian cooperation with our forces desirable, eliminating guerrilla sources of supply, the holding of hostages, reprisals against civilians, punitive expeditions, and transporting civilians on trains and columns to guaranty [sic] safe passage.... In general*



*means must be devised to remove any guerrilla logistic support, to alienate the civilian population from the guerrillas, to isolate the underground, and to prevent support of them by air, sea, or land.*<sup>41</sup>

The tactics considered in 1947 generally fell within the range of Special Forces doctrine in the 1950s: the later written doctrine, however, more explicitly ratified the utility—and legitimacy—of terror tactics for the American guerrilla and counter guerrilla.

## **Psychological Warfare: The Army's Covert Dimension**

An institutional antipathy to “guerrilla warfare”—as unmilitary and not particularly effective—as well as an aversion to elite units in the U.S. military establishment hindered the development of special operations forces in the early days of the Cold War. The military's reluctance to organize “guerrilla” forces prevailed until the Korean War; the military side of unconventional warfare fell principally within the ill-defined discipline of psychological warfare. In practice, psychological warfare in the Cold War came increasingly to be synonymous with special operations (its propaganda dimension became secondary)—and special operations meant covert action.<sup>42</sup>

The military's definitions of terms were often as confusing as the terms themselves were redundant, a problem of which the military was itself not unaware. Decades later, Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, commander of the army's First Special Forces Command in the 1980s, told a conference on special operations that he was

*still amazed at the lack of understanding in the community of what it is we are actually talking about.... [S]pecial forces, special operations, special warfare,*

*unconventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, paramilitary operations, revolutionary warfare, proxies, surrogates, low-intensity conflict, and escape and evasion.... We have really serious problems with definitions.*<sup>43</sup>

The ambiguity, elasticity, and overlap of definitions was, in some ways, indeed a problem to the extent that it contributed to muddy thinking within the military itself. However, from the 1940s into the 1990s, it has also had certain advantages as military institutions have sought to obscure the real nature of some of their less conventional disciplines and programs.

In the 1940s, special operations were classed by the military under the inherently misleading discipline psychological warfare. After 1960, the army used the term “special warfare” much as the cold warriors of the 1940s had used “political warfare.” Special warfare was the generic term that covered both the special operations and the propaganda side of 1940s and 1960s “psychological warfare.” Although the OSS had applied the term special operations broadly to its clandestine behind-the-lines operations, special operations before the Korean War referred to night combat, jungle operations, winter operations, and other specialized responses to unusual combat circumstances—and not “unconventional” operations at all.

The term “Special Forces Operations” was apparently first adopted by the board of officers detailed to draft the *Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare* manual (FM 31-21 of 1951). According to a memorandum by Russell Volckmann, the board applied the term broadly to “operations conducted for a military purpose in enemy-controlled territory beyond the combat zone.”<sup>44</sup> The 14

October 1953, Department of the Army statement of policy, *The Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare (Army Special Forces Program)*, defined the term as “operations conducted within or behind the enemy lines for military purposes.”<sup>45</sup>

At the inception of the Cold War, psychological warfare, however defined, was an area in which many military professionals were uncomfortable, despite its recognized importance during the war years. Many officers wanted to have “nothing at all” to do with it, believing “it was not ‘real soldiering.’ “ Others recognized its value as a resource to be husbanded. Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower instructed the army in June 1947 “to take those steps that are necessary to keep alive the arts of psychological warfare and of cover and deception and that there should continue in being a nucleus of personnel capable of handling these arts in case an emergency arises.”<sup>46</sup>

Although most psy-war personnel were demobilized immediately after the war, a nucleus remained, as did several eloquent advocates for a revival of psy-war to meet the new threats of the Cold War. Principal among them was Brigadier General Robert McClure, head of psy-war in the European theater in World War II. In June 1946, McClure had pressed army headquarters for a top- level psychological warfare division and was roundly rebuffed.<sup>47</sup> In November, however, he succeeded in moving psy-war within the army’s organizational system, from G-2, intelligence, to G-3, operations.<sup>48</sup> In a June 1947 paper, McClure recommended renewing research efforts of psy-war, rebuilding a psychological warfare division at army headquarters, bringing together a voluntary “mixed military-civilian group... charged with studying psychological warfare policies and practices during the war,” and establishing a training program in the military schools system.<sup>49</sup> Although no dramatic organizational changes followed McClure’s

effort to put psy-war on the military agenda, others in the military concurred with his views. The chief of information of the army's Plans and Operations pressed for even more immediate action on the psy-war front than McClure had proposed, "in view of Russia's all-out use of the PW weapon against the interests of the U.S." In an argument similar to Kennan's logic of fighting "fire with fire," he stressed that psy-war should not be held back, considering "the present *de facto* state of 'undeclared emergency' or 'cold war' which exists *vis-à-vis* Russia." The United States could respond in kind "in the field of ideological or psychological warfare."<sup>50</sup>

The army's eventual move into the unconventional warfare field was through the existing framework of psychological warfare. Wartime psy-war concepts were sufficiently broad to embrace the whole field of special, or covert operations, in line with OSS chief Donovan's "all encompassing concept" of psy-war, combining intelligence, special operations, and propaganda functions. As such, the development of an unconventional warfare capacity with a consolidated psy-war organization made sense to the Joins Chiefs.<sup>51</sup>

The military's arm's-length position on covert action was gradually modified in the course of 1949, with the assignment of army officers to assist the CIA in developing training programs in guerrilla warfare, and, in November, the creation of a JCS agency, awkwardly named the Joint Subsidiary Plans Division (JSPD), to collaborate with the CIA (and other civilian bodies) in the areas of "psychological warfare and covert operations." Its staff of fourteen was divided into teams: team A dealt with "Psychological-Ideological Warfare," team Z with "1) NSC 1()/2 and 1()/5 matters; 2) Covert-Clandestine-Unconventional Warfare matters; 3) Escape and Evasion Operations; 4) Para-Military

Operations; 5) Guerrilla Operations; 6) Preparation and Coordination of Plans; and 7) Special studies.”<sup>52</sup>

The outbreak of war in Korea on 25 June 1950 revitalized military interest in psychological warfare, and in particular, military capability for unconventional warfare—although the innovations it catalyzed would come too late to influence the course of that conflict. A Psychological Warfare Division was established within the Army General Staff (in G-3) in September 1950, headed by Brigadier General Robert McClure. The division was to have a relatively large staff and was supported by a crash training program initiated in conjunction with Georgetown University.<sup>53</sup> On 15 January 1951, McClure’s outfit was recognized as the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW), an autonomous Special Staff Division working directly with the chief of staff (the first of its kind).<sup>54</sup>

Brigadier McClure moved rapidly to organize his “agency” into separate propaganda, unconventional warfare, and support divisions—and to obtain a charter authorizing a special operations role through which to wage unconventional warfare. Army Special Regulation 10-250-1 (22 May 1951) provided the latter, defining a mission to “formulate and develop psychological and special operations plans for the Army in consonance with established policies for and supervise the execution of Department of the Army programs in these fields.”<sup>55</sup> “Propaganda planning” was undertaken by Psychological Operations, while administrative, personnel, training, logistics, and research matters were handled by a Requirements Division. Activities concerning special operations were fully compartmentalized: “All planning in connection with covert operations, in view of its particular sensitivity, is segregated in a Special Operations

Division...”<sup>56</sup> The definition of special operations, in turn, was much as it is in the 1990s:

*[T]hose conducted within or behind enemy lines for a military purpose, with the primary objective of organizing indigenous resistance potential and exploiting this potential to serve our military objectives. Such operations include: organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare; covert political, economic, and psychological warfare; subversion and sabotage; the infiltration of agents into the enemy’s sphere of influence; anti-guerrilla warfare and escape and evasion activities carried on by Special Operations units and agencies.*<sup>57</sup>

In May 1952, OCPW chief McClure presided over the opening of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The center provided the institutional foundation for rebuilding a psy-war propaganda capability—and provided the home base for what became the Army Special Forces. Colonel Charles Karlstad was named the first commander of the center and of the adjoining Psychological Warfare School.<sup>58</sup>

McClure’s OCPW and the center at Fort Bragg reclaimed for the army a major role in the covert side of the Cold War. In 1951, the OCPW’s Special Operations Division had been rapidly staffed with veterans of U.S. guerrilla warfare ventures—notably Colonel Wendell Fertig, who commanded Filipino guerrillas on Mindanao, and Colonel Aaron Bank, a former OSS agent with the French Maquis. McClure had detailed an officer to screen OSS files made available by General Donovan, and find some 3,500 names of personnel with experience in “guerrilla” operations. Some 1,500 were found “still available” and, where possible, “ordered to active duty” under McClure’s command.<sup>59</sup> Other key staff included army officers who since June 1950 had been

involved in joint army-CIA special operations in Korea. Principal among them was Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann, another veteran of guerrilla warfare in the Philippines (North Luzon), who in 1950 and 1951 “planned and directed behind-the-lines operations in North Korea.”[60](#)

The OCPW and the Psychological Warfare Center initially paid considerable attention to the traditional meaning of psychological warfare— of developing propaganda and “nonlethal” means of influencing enemy behavior. The emphasis gradually shifted, however, so that by 1960 the psy-war component of the work at the Psychological Warfare Center was by far subordinate to the concern with special operations and Special Forces. The files of the chief of psy-war for the 1951-1954 period (now in part declassified) are replete with psy-war studies and proposals along fairly conventional lines, ranging from developmental work on better loudspeakers, airborne leaflet delivery systems, and broadcasting technology, to harebrained schemes based on the pseudo- sociological unraveling of stereotypical “weaknesses” or foibles of particular ethnic groups. Some of the latter came from unsolicited suggestions from the public, which received serious attention (and polite responses).[61](#)

Although General McClure appears to have been equally committed to psy-war per se as to his special operations establishment, other principal figures in OCPW and the early years at Fort Bragg later recalled the combination as having been essentially a marriage of bureaucratic convenience. Colonel Bank, the Special Forces’ first commander, complained that in “all the time I was on the staff of PSYWAR (OCPW) I never saw any paper of any kind that indicates Special Forces operations is a part of psychological warfare.” That notwithstanding, “it is our concept that Special Forces operations is a part of unconventional warfare.” This clearly

made little sense to Bank: “Just because OCPW is responsible for the monitoring and supervision of planning and conduct of psychological warfare and special forces operations does not mean that they have to be the same.”<sup>62</sup>

Alfred Paddock has examined the organization of the special operations establishment in terms of institutional interests and initiatives, and the army’s resistance to involvement in “unmilitary” roles. Paddock attributes the creation of the Special Forces to General McClure’s bringing in unconventional warfare “through the back door of the psychological warfare house.” The Special Operations Division, while under the psy-war rubric, “gave unconventional warfare advocates like Bank and Volckmann the official platform from which to ‘sell’ the Army on the need for Special Forces units.”<sup>63</sup> The shift to an emphasis on special operations appears to have begun by mid-1953, when the Office of Psychological Strategy, hitherto the point of liaison between the psy-war/unconventional warfare establishment and the Secretary of Defense was dissolved and replaced by an Office of Special Operations.<sup>64</sup>

## **The Army Special Forces**

The Army Special Forces were an integral part of the army’s Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, and paralleled in their own development the formulation of doctrine there. The elaboration of unconventional warfare doctrine coincided with the expansion and deployment of Special Forces, first to the European command, and later successively into Asia in the 1980s and Latin America in the 1960s. The Special Forces experience of the 1980s in turn fundamentally influenced the later development of counterinsurgency doctrine. The armed forces’ “special” forces were organized in order to establish and assist a



particular kind of guerrilla—a partisan force dependent on a sponsoring power—and not as counterinsurgency forces. It was considerably later in the 1960s, that the two roles were combined in the same forces— with dramatic consequences for the development of doctrine and the conduct of counterinsurgency.

The armed forces' approach to “guerrilla” (and later “counterguerrilla”) doctrine and development was predictably cautious. Having acknowledged a military role in “guerrilla” warfare, the armed forces remained reluctant to assign its conventional forces to an unconventional task. As a consequence, the Special Forces were well insulated from conventional units. They provided a resource for unconventional warfare and a laboratory for the development of doctrine. “Unconventional warfare,” characterized “for Joint Usage” in military dictionaries, meant operations utilizing irregular forces and tactics in the enemy’s sphere of influence, and was to be the principal domain of the army Special Forces.

In its broader sense, and that of popular usage, unconventional warfare referred to a way of warfare, not a class of conflict; as Colonel Karlstad observed in a foreword to a service booklet on the new center, the Psychological Warfare and Special Forces departments “instruct in the unconventional weapons and tactics with which our modern army must be equipped to function effectively against enemy forces.”<sup>65</sup> Unconventional warfare, then, was both a kind of war and a range of tactics; the Special Forces were to become the adepts in their application.

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Commando and other irregular formations have traditionally been a minor interest to the military establishment—as much because of the odd-man-out

organizational structure as of their limited utility. The elite commando, guerrilla, and counter guerrilla forces attached to modern armies have antecedents in light infantry units of armies in the past.<sup>66</sup> Their function has primarily been that of "skirmishers and raiders," their tactical doctrine emphasizing "small-unit actions, mobility, surprise, and close-quarters combat." The United States, like the British, fielded commandos attached to the regular armed services and to the wartime intelligence services. The U.S. Army's Ranger Battalions served primarily as raiding and commando forces during World War II but suffered enormous casualties when deployed in conventional set-piece battles, and were disbanded as separate units after the Korean war.<sup>67</sup> Ranger training remained a specialist option for officers and enlisted men; in 1974, Ranger units—wearing black berets—were reestablished.<sup>68</sup> The forces of the OSS Operational Groups, like the later Special Forces, were distinguished from commandos, Rangers, and other strike forces by the complexity of their respective roles and their political nature. In military terms, their roles were envisioned as both tactical and strategic Alfred Paddock describes a 1948 proposal to establish an army Ranger Group, combining Ranger and OSS concepts that ignored the distinction: "It attempted to lump together missions and capabilities of Rangers and Commandos with those of Special Operations and Operational Group elements of OSS. It combined the tactical with the strategic. The mission statement said 'OSS,' but the title was 'Ranger.'"<sup>69</sup> A 1947 Department of the Army study of "Special and Subversive Operations" outlined the distinction as drawn by General Donovan: "It was his conception that Rangers should operate in front of enemy lines, whereas SOG's [Special Operations Groups] should operate behind enemy lines."<sup>70</sup> A more complex distinction was required to define military tasks in a war without fronts.

Colonel Aaron Bank, an OSS veteran and the first commander of the postwar Special Forces, stated that Special Forces “actually... have no connection with ranger-type organizations since their mission and operations are far more complex, time consuming, require much deeper penetration and initially are often of a strategic nature.” (Bank also recognized the difficulty in ensuring equal emphasis in training to the more subtle, or complex, areas of the Special Forces role, observing that “these are easily neglected in favor of more exciting guerrilla tactics.”<sup>71</sup>)

The tactics/strategy distinction has been part of military thought since at least the eighteenth century, and even then it found application in the field of “guerrilla” warfare. The classical writers wrote of small war, or guerrilla war, as a warfare of tactics subordinate to larger, conventional conflicts waged by regular troops—a small part of a larger strategy, bent to the attainment of conventional ends. Karl von Clausewitz, the Prussian military strategist, explained that tactics, in essence, concern “the use of armed forces in the engagement; strategy, the use of engagements for the object of the war.”<sup>72</sup> The tactical operation, then, is complete in itself, while the strategic, which may involve more than the use of force alone, affects the outcome of the conflict. The blurring of the distinction, however, and the glamorization of the strategic mission are characteristic of the treatment of elite forces, be they commandos or the kind of special forces Colonel Bank described. Churchill’s romantic view of the British Commandos, much like Kennedy’s view of the Special Forces, is reflected, for example, in his paean to the March 1942 St. Nazaire Commando raid: “here was a deed of glory intimately involved in high strategy.”<sup>73</sup>

In the field of counterinsurgency warfare, the strategy/tactics distinction took on perhaps even more

significance. The tactics of guerrilla/counterguerrilla warfare were nominally to have been part, and only a part, of an integrated *political* strategy. In counterinsurgency war, though, a strategy of establishing governmental control and winning hearts and minds was not always well served by unconventional tactics.

French and, later, American military doctrine assigned principal tasks in counterinsurgency to elite forces and devised for them tactics that mimicked guerrilla tactics. Taken out of their strategic context, these tactics lost their significance or were strategically counterproductive. The larger strategy—and the nonlethal side of counterinsurgency—often went by the board. Even in the French army in the Algerian War (1954 - 1962), in the “period of domination” of its doctrine *of guerre revolutionnaire*, by 1956 many army officers of all ranks “agreed only with the tactical concepts of the doctrine, and either ignored or rejected their wider, nonmilitary implications”; noncoms and privates, moreover, “were even less convinced.”<sup>74</sup>

The organizational structure of the Special Forces was designed for adaptability. Each Special Forces group would represent “a pool of manpower from which units or combinations of units could be drawn to execute specific unconventional warfare missions.” The baseline unit was the operational detachment, a team of from twelve to fifteen, which could be deployed singly or in combination. Unlike a Ranger unit, a division, or a brigade, “the Special Forces Group was not designed to be employed as a tactical entity... but rather was constructed around a cellular concept in which each area, district, and regimental detachment was viewed as a separate and distinct operating unit.”<sup>75</sup>

In March 1952, when the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg was authorized, provision was made for separate Psychological Warfare and Special Forces departments and the creation of a first Special Forces unit—the “Tenth” Special Forces Group. Activated in May 1952, the plans called for its development in three increments of 600 men, all volunteers fitting a demanding elite profile.<sup>76</sup> Recruitment from army units around the country proceeded slowly in part because of stringent security requirements.<sup>77</sup>

Early provision was also made for Special Forces personnel, once cleared, to remain on call even after completing their tours of duty or leaving the service. The personnel section of the OCPW was to coordinate screening, selection, and assignment of personnel and to “maintain rosters of individuals with PsyWar and UW [unconventional warfare] experience, to include civilian and inactive military personnel.”<sup>78</sup> Reassignment of officers from Special Forces units back into conventional postings was frowned upon; rather, a policy was implemented “to insure that PsyWar and SF [Special Forces] trained and experienced personnel follow, to the extent permitted by overall D/A [Department of the Army] policy, a career pattern in their fields.”<sup>79</sup>

Special Forces training proposals in May 1951 called for recruits to master weapons skills, demolitions, “sabotage. . . and the establishment of sabotage nets,” “organization of guerrilla units their development... into Special Forces units,” “guerrilla tactics,” “subversion and propaganda, “ and a range of other “skills.”<sup>80</sup> A 1952 precis added “anti-guerrilla warfare in areas overrun by friendly forces” to the repertoires Studies on guerrilla tactics, training, and equipment on file at the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare are still largely classified. Studies of specialized

equipment in the 1954 files included “Use of Non-Standard Items for Explosives,” “Special Allowance of Demolition and Sabotage Materials,” and “Dirty Trick Devices.”<sup>82</sup> Other manuals and training materials used in the early years of Special Forces but still classified, included a manual entitled *Covert Paramilitary Training Course* (ca. 1952), *The Sabotage Manual* (1954), the *Para-Military Manual Field Handbook* (FM 54-80()-1, May 1954), and such tantalizing titles as *Power Moves Involved in the Overthrow of an Unfriendly Government*.<sup>83</sup>

The planners of the Special Forces had envisioned their primary task as preparation for war in Europe—a Third World War with the Soviet Union as the adversary. A series of studies was undertaken in 1951 to consider the nature and role of the army’s unconventional warfare units and the special role to be played by emigres recruited under the terms of the 1951 Lodge bill. Studies dealing with “the utilization of Lodge Bill recruits and US personnel in EUCOM [European Command],” approved by the Joint Chiefs in 1951, envisioned Special Forces as an asset to prepare against an inevitable second “D-Day”: “The studies contemplate that these individuals will be ready on D-Day to exploit the guerrilla potential within the enemy’s sphere of influence.”<sup>84</sup>

A 1953 study that examined the organizational requirements for the Special Forces’ behind-the-lines role in war in Europe advised the incorporation of a heavy administrative capability to provide logistical support for the American “guerrillas.”<sup>85</sup> This, of course was in accord with the fundamental concept that “guerrilla” forces could survive only with massive external support. The force would require “officers and enlisted technicians... to meet the ‘A’ day mission of organizing and exploiting guerrilla forces to conduct operations behind the enemy lines in support of

conventional Military Forces.” These were to include “demolitions experts... to train indigenous guerrilla forces in use of explosives and in incendiaries, operational techniques involving demolitions, and planning and conduct of sabotage”; communications specialists; and experts in “small unit tactics. . . to train indigenous guerrilla forces in tactics and techniques of the hit-and-run operations which characterize guerrilla operations.”<sup>86</sup>

The Tenth Special Forces Group, authorized strength 1,713, was deployed to Bad Tolz, West Germany, in November 1953 to await its active role in the expected D-Day clash with the Warsaw Pact.<sup>87</sup> “The period immediately following ‘D’ day is considered of vital importance.... Therefore, it is imperative that prior to ‘D’ day Special Forces field detachments be organized, equipped and trained for infiltration into operational areas.”<sup>88</sup> They would remain on alert awaiting the outbreak of hostilities, while providing cadre for the training of a second such group at Fort Bragg (the “77th”), and in 1957—after the first major shift from the hypnotic European theater—for the “First” Group, activated in Okinawa.

Special Forces deployment in the Pacific theater in 1956 began on a minor scale, in great secrecy, with the assignment of seven-man Mobile Training Teams to military advisory groups in Taiwan, Thailand, and South Vietnam.’ Their task was to train counterpart forces in the “tactics and techniques” of unconventional warfare. The Special Forces presence in Asia expanded dramatically in June 1957 with the organization of the First (i.e., third) Special Forces Group based in Okinawa, with an initial force level of sixteen officers and ninety-six enlisted men.<sup>90</sup> Training remained a principal task: The object was to train in unconventional warfare counterparts who would provide a nucleus for Special Forces units in their home countries.

In 1957 a fifty-man cadre was trained over six months in Taiwan, and assistance given the Chinese Nationalists in setting up their own Special Forces center at Lung Tan.<sup>91</sup> The Nationalists had earlier had extensive contact with the CIA as well as with Psychological Warfare officers at the Far East Command and the Fort Bragg center. The psy-war-unconventional warfare establishment hosted Nationalist officers in visits to Fort Bragg as early as 1953, including Chiang Kai-shek's son, and received for "research, analysis and evaluation purposes" information on unconventional warfare tactics employed by the Nationalists in their occasional incursions into mainland China.<sup>92</sup> A psy-war report on a meeting with Lt. Gen. Cheng Kai-meng, chief of Mainland Operations, outlined measures taken, many of which would appear in the United States' own unconventional warfare repertoire. On the propaganda side, the Nationalists were adopting a traditional form of Peking drama for radio broadcasts, "inserting anti-communist material therein"—a dramatic but not particularly original psy-war effort. On the direct action side, efforts were underway utilize the Chinese secret societies for Nationalist purposes (as the Vietnamese Binh Xuyen sect would later be used in Saigon), and "assassination as a means toward intimidation has been effected."<sup>93</sup>

A former Special Forces officer has described the deployment of the first small units in the Pacific as a peripheral—and unpopular—element of the then-strategic projection of an impending nuclear conflict: a "pickup-the-pieces" sideline in a contest envisioned as depending upon tactical nuclear weapons. "Secretive special mission units were an unwelcome complication to the high-ranking officers at Pacific Command, who were told to program them into war plans to organize behind-the-lines guerrilla fighters after nuclear exchanges." The strategic role remained



unchanged throughout the 1950s: Special Forces were intended to supplement “the general scheme of atomic warfare” by preparing for insertion into enemy-held territory to organize partisans “capable of resistance and disrupting rear areas.”<sup>94</sup> In practical terms, the Special Forces’ principal task was to train Asian forces in the methods developed for action behind enemy lines. These forces, in turn, were to apply the unconventional tactics and techniques at home.

The basing of a major Special Forces resource in Latin America, the third world region to become a center of unconventional warfare activities, awaited the Cuban Revolution and coincided with the expansion of Special Forces’ assigned role to make counterinsurgency a priority task. The nature of that role was influenced by the overthrow of Guatemala’s elected president in 1954 and the failed invasion of Cuba of April 1961. A major U.S. military-paramilitary role in a fourth region, Africa, began in the 1960s in the Congo, but reached its full-blown form of textbook unconventional warfare in the 1970s with the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa.

## **A Doctrine for American’ Guerrillas**

Unconventional warfare in practice became the American form of covert war: American offensives for American prerogatives against adversary or ambiguous governments or blacklisted groups or personalities— whether or not a partisan movement existed, or indigenous “partisans” could be borrowed or bought for the task. The American unconventional warriors were themselves to be the sole foreigners involved in the scenarios to come. The tactics they utilized, from murder to hostage taking, were those historically used by partisans resisting foreign occupation— but the targets were the people of the countries themselves.

Special responsibility for review of guerrilla warfare manuals and doctrine was assigned to the Fort Bragg center in 1952. A review process for the 1951 manual on “guerrilla operations,” for example, was coordinated there in 1953 and drew considerable fire from at least one military department concerned with the laws of war. A paragraph on “hostage taking” in particular prompted a proposal that the manual be withdrawn:

*The inference which may be drawn from this paragraph is in violation of Section IV Hague 1907, negates provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and could prejudice responsible persons before an international tribunal. Deletion of this paragraph and all references in the manual to the right to take or “eliminate” hostages should be deleted. [sic]*

*Because of the impact of those sections of this manual dealing with hostages and the treatment of such, it is considered appropriate to consider the withdrawal of the manual.*<sup>95</sup>

The revised FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare*, deleted only part of the reference to hostages: A list of “measures to control an unfriendly population and minimize its ability to collaborate with hostile guerrillas” includes “taking hostages.”<sup>96</sup>

The psy-war center’s brief on the review of military manuals extended, however, beyond the strictly limited range of materials published on its own specialty. Its critique of the draft revision of the field manual on the *Law of Land Warfare* (FM 27-10), for example, suggested concern that certain Special Forces operations were too clearly proscribed by its interpretation of the law. The clause outlawing assassination, for example, was too broad: “The distinction

between assassination of an enemy (which is prohibited) and attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy wherever they may be (which is permissible) is obscure.”<sup>97</sup> And the reference to the status of “guerrillas” and “spies” was of concern insofar as it would rebound on the status of Special Forces personnel (and their allies) engaged in unconventional warfare:

*The effect... is to suggest that guerrillas and spies are classed as unlawful belligerents....*

*[T]he question arises of the status of guerrilla forces operating in support of a government-in- exile.... It appears that the manual gives no recognition to any distinctions other than guerrillas (unlawful belligerents) and regular (i.e., conventional) forces. The status of what, for lack of a better term, may be called “irregular military forces” appears to be undefined and unprotected. The draft seems to have been written with an eye to guaranteeing U.S. rights to protect itself against enemy guerrillas without consideration of the U. S. interest in guaranteeing some rights of protection to friendly guerrillas. To the extent permitted by international law, this aspect of the matter should also be considered....<sup>98</sup>*

(Another aspect of the status of “irregular military forces” that should have been considered was the applicability of the laws of war to the Central Intelligence Agency. Can a CIA officer be held accountable for a war crime?)

In February 1954, the responsibility for preparation and revision of the field manuals on guerrilla and counter guerrilla warfare was assigned to the Psychological Warfare School.<sup>99</sup> The psy-war school welcomed the transfer of responsibilities for offensive guerrilla warfare, but argued

that “the tactics, doctrine and the conduct of anti-guerrilla operations is not the responsibility or mission of Special Forces.”<sup>100</sup> The 4 March 1954 response of the chief of Army Field Forces, however, clinched Fort Bragg’s expanded role. The psy-war school from that date assumed responsibility for *all* matters concerning guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency as “the primary agency for the development of doctrine, tactics, techniques, and training literature pertaining to guerrilla warfare.”<sup>101</sup>

The “characteristics of guerrilla warfare” outlined in the revised *Guerrilla Warfare* manual (FM 31-21) are those of the “sponsored guerrilla” in conventional conflict. “I There is, astonishingly, no reference to revolutionary guerrilla warfare outside the scenario of conventional international conflict:

*Usually it is conducted to hinder, harass, sabotage, or delay operations of enemy forces. Guerrilla operations are useful in destroying signal communications, gaining information, disrupting lines of communications, destroying. . . installations, and assisting the combat operations of friendly conventional forces.*<sup>103</sup>

The organization, support, and deployment of a “guerrilla” force is outlined from the perspective of the external power. A “strong local leader” will generally serve as a focal point for recruitment, while “a conventional force may infiltrate qualified personnel to serve as military and technical advisers.”<sup>104</sup> “External logistical support comes from a sponsoring power” to the extent determined by “the existing plans and capabilities of the sponsor....”<sup>105</sup> Also, “raiding activities should be coordinated with the strategic bombing program of conventional forces so that guerrilla forces attack targets that are not suitable for air action.”<sup>106</sup> As in later manuals, a significant section is devoted to the *demobilization* of American guerrillas when their usefulness

is at an end: “Units kept in existence past their period of usefulness become a liability to the conventional forces and a source of potential trouble....”[107](#)

Although the manual stresses the importance of support from the civilian population—particularly for intelligence purposes—its prescriptions in this respect are relatively vague. Later manuals on guerrilla warfare define *terror* as the major factor in civilian control. The 1955 manual, for example, prescribes taking “action” against the recalcitrant:

*Guerrillas seek to insure support and loyal cooperation by exercising control over civilians. To achieve this control, guerrilla policies and measures may include—1) Dissemination of propaganda; 2) Action against individuals and communities that fail to cooperate; 3) Organization and regimentation of civilians.... Guerrillas publish orders and policies and act to enforce them in an effort to discourage collaboration.*[108](#)

The “strict discipline” of a guerrilla organization, in contrast with the popular conception of moderate anarchy, “far surpasses the discipline found in conventional units. It is enforced by quick and severe action without recourse to formal investigations and trials.”[109](#)

The writers of the manual were principally concerned with the actions through which guerrillas prevented civilian collaboration with an enemy occupation force. Similarly, the laws of land warfare are considered in the context of resistance to a foreign occupation force, outlining the conditions under which partisan forces are eligible for prisoner-of-war status if captured.[110](#) In practice, however, guerrillas “vary considerably in their respect for the rules of warfare” and may or may not wear distinctive insignia.[111](#) And in practice, guerrilla warfare was considered outside the

law, thus to be dealt with outside the law (a significant message for the American in either the guerrilla or the counterguerrilla role). "The guerrilla may be executed if captured... and civilians who aid them may be subject to severe penalties if detected." An earlier draft read simply "The guerrilla expects death...."[112](#)

The manual also considers the legal of collaborators with a enemy force:

*Land Warfare and the Guerrilla Traitor: The rules of land warfare are specific about the status of an individual who engages in or assists guerrilla operations in support of an enemy of his own country. Such an individual is classed as a traitor and is subject to punishment, including death. A traitor may be tried and punished even though captured long after the commission of his offense.*[113](#)

The prerogatives of an occupation force under the law of land warfare set the terms of the manual's *counterguerrilla* section: counterguerrilla action is predicated on a U.S. occupation of the territory in question, under the terms of a (temporary) military government.[114](#) The guerrilla, in turn, is envisioned as a counterpart of the U. S.-organized guerrilla: a sponsored or dependent guerrilla. The counterguerrilla objective is defined accordingly, and has remained more or less the same in doctrine to the present:

- a. Isolate guerrilla forces from the civilian population...;*
- b. Deny guerrilla forces contact with and support from friendly forces or a sympathetic sponsoring power;*
- c. Destroy the guerrilla forces.*[115](#)

In counterguerrilla operations by U. S. occupation forces, the civilian population is classified as “enemy nationals.” Here again, the Korean experience of wandering front lines (and the presence of North Korea/ Chinese-sponsored guerrillas throughout) appears to have influenced the formulation of doctrine. “Friendly elements of the population of occupied areas should be used as much as possible to conserve conventional forces. Enemy nationals [i.e., *any* Korean civilian] may be employed actively” as intelligence agents, informers, civil functionaries, local police and security forces, labor and service units, and in special “antiguerrilla combat units.” The counterinsurgent is to treat the locals warily, however, because “the premature organization and exploitation of such force may invite treachery”; counterintelligence units must identify “those enemy nationals upon whom he safely can rely.”<sup>116</sup> Having done so, the counterinsurgent has the option of organizing local “guerrillas” on their own terms: “A friendly guerrilla force then may be organized to combat hostile guerrilla forces.”<sup>117</sup>

## **Aggressor-Maneuver Warfare: The Image in the Mirror**

Some of the most elaborate doctrinal guidance on unconventional warfare has emerged in the training materials prepared for army maneuvers. The participation by Special Forces units in maneuvers—war games— with conventional forces contributed to the development of the American style of special warfare. The intent was to familiarize commanders with the kind of unconventional operations the adversary, dubbed “Aggressor,” would launch. “Aggressor” was the name applied to units playing the role of Soviet Bloc forces; Aggressor warfare was defined

in a body of doctrine modeled on the American conception of Soviet doctrine.

A series of army field manuals defined the order of battle, tactics, and strategies of the Aggressor in conventional warfare, including nuclear and biological scenarios, as well as insurgency. The Aggressor-warfare manuals enter into elaborate detail, from describing the uniforms and weaponry of Aggressor forces, conventional and unconventional, to outlining the (more or less imaginary) geography, politics, and indeed history of the Aggressor nation and its sphere of influence. The field manuals, prepared at the U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland, were used for maneuvers and war games by U. S. armed forces, with Special Forces units trained in Aggressor tactics playing the role of the adversary. The manuals on Aggressor insurgency define the tactics that *enemy* guerrillas are expected to employ, yet they are seemingly indistinguishable from Special Forces unconventional warfare tactics in general.

The Special Forces' role in Aggressor-maneuver warfare was, as explained in a January 1952 instruction, "to make the United States Forces guerrilla conscious and trained in anti-guerrilla tactics," and to show the possibilities "of the use of friendly guerrilla forces."<sup>118</sup> Special Forces were to organize "guerrilla groups... behind the United States lines," and carry out missions "in accordance with the principles of guerrilla warfare, i. e., surprise, maximum shock action, sudden disengagement."<sup>119</sup> Special limitations on Special Forces tactics for maneuver purposes include a ban on "propaganda of any type that might have permanent deleterious effect on troops" and a modification of Special Forces doctrine on the treatment of captives:

*Normally the guerrilla force would not take any prisoners. However, in the event that personnel of the*



*opposing force accidentally uncover an operational base, the guerillas would be forced to take them prisoner under maneuver conditions.... Such prisoners will have to be specially handled in order to maintain the security of the guerrillas.*[120](#)

That the model of the subversive guerrilla was closer to that of the U. S. Army's own Special Forces than that of Mao's Red Army is suggested by both the record of action and written doctrine. The general concordance between the tactics of American unconventional warfare doctrine and that ascribed to the subversive guerrilla breaks down primarily in the way in which political and ethical values are assigned in the subversive model. The model of insurgent doctrine presented in the field manuals on Aggressor-maneuver warfare provides a model for, or a reflection of, the doctrine governing America's own "guerrillas." Designed as a "training vehicle" for operations in "limited and cold wars," the 1967 edition of the *Handbook on Aggressor Insurgent War* (Department of the Army, Headquarters, FM 30-104, September 1967), provides one of the most comprehensive manuals of "communist" guerrilla tactics, as understood by the U. S. Army. It outlines "the strategy of 'Aggressor' insurgency and discusses its sociological, economic, political, psychological operations, and other military doctrines."[121](#)

Much of the manual is devoted to a practical examination of the application of Aggressor strategy and tactics in insurgent warfare. The rationale is that to fight Aggressor insurgents one must understand—and be able to mimic—their tactics. The manual purports to elucidate "insurgent activities" so that American forces can respond in kind, presenting a mirror image of Aggressor doctrine. Training in Aggressor insurgent tactics, in turn, was to be adapted to the counterinsurgency mission:

*The purpose... is to present a practical application of the doctrine outlined.... As a means of application, an "Aggressor" war is conducted in the fictitious nation of New Freeland.... An understanding of the insurgent activities presented will enable individuals or units to apply the doctrine, with modifications, to internal defense/internal development in any part of the world.*[122](#)

For "with modifications" read "turn the tactics on their heads": American were to employ the same doctrine—insofar as its tactical elements were considered effective—to further American purposes.

The importance of Aggressor insurgent doctrine to Special Forces training supports only obliquely the argument that the top American counterinsurgents were remade in the image of the enemy. The actual practice of Special Forces in operations around the world and the standing orders for specific assignments that have emerged provide more compelling evidence. The verbatim incorporation of recommended terror tactics from the 1967 Aggressor manual into the 1983 *Psychological Operations* manual issued to the Nicaraguan *contras* makes the connection more concrete. Aggressor insurgent tactics are American tactics. The image in the mirror is us.

Although first introduced in the 1950s, Aggressor warfare field manuals for guerrilla warfare continued to represent state of the art unconventional warfare as practiced by the United States into the 1990s. Aggressor doctrine provided the basis for the United States' analysis of enemy guerrilla threat, but more significantly, presented a concept of "real-world" guerrillas as a model for the United States' own guerrillas. The 1967 manual provides a model for American forces engaged in *aggressive* unconventional warfare; many

of its terms of reference appear in Special Forces literature outside the framework of Aggressor-manuever warfare. Perhaps not surprisingly, the norms of Aggressor guerrilla warfare were already adapted for instruction of Americans and their allies in real-world unconventional warfare in the 1950s. Lesson Plan 643 on “Armed Psyop,” dated April 1968, from the U.S. Army Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, like the 1967 Aggressor manual, could also have been a prototype for the *Psychological Operations* manual distributed to the *contras*.<sup>123</sup> Appropriation of Aggressor insurgent doctrine was not limited to the 1983 CIA *contra* manual; it also appeared in Special Forces training materials prepared not for manuever warfare but for American and counterpart forces, engaged in real-time operations, to take unconventional warfare into the real world.

## **Aggressor Warfare and the War on Nicaragua**

The army’s 1967 FM 30-1()4 defined “psychological operations” to include “communicative acts such as propaganda as well as physical acts of murder, assassination, or a simple show of forces which are intended to influence the minds and behavior of people.”<sup>124</sup> Aggressor’s particularly ruthless approach and its caricature of most real political insurgencies is epitomized by its prescriptions under the heading “Mob Violence “ The 1983 *contra* manual incorporates some of the text of FM 30-104; taking into account the discrepancies of translation, is almost word for word.<sup>125</sup>

The Aggressor insurgent is seen to use terror without hesitation to win the support of those who remain neutral:

*In those villages which did not desire to assist, threat, terror, and coercion cells were then employed. One of*

*the most used procedures was terrorism. A special terrorist cell would enter a village, kill the Chief, and hang his body in the village square for everyone to see. This tactic had three major accomplishments. First, the villagers were apt to change their minds. Second, news of the disaster had considerable effect on the attitude of neighboring villages. Third, it made the villagers feel totally at the insurgent's mercy and underlined the inability of the government authorities to protect them. .*

[126](#)

The *contra* manual, too, exalts the guerrilla's use of terror as a means to induce a feeling of helplessness among the population and to communicate the impotence of the government:

*Explicit and Implicit Terror. A guerrilla force always involves implicit terror because the population, without saying it aloud, feels terror that the weapons may be used against them. However, if the terror does not become explicit, positive results can be expected.... If the government police cannot put an end to the guerrilla activities, the population will lose confidence in the government, which has the inherent mission of guaranteeing the safety of citizens. However, the guerrillas should be careful not to become an explicit terror, because this would result in a loss of popular support.*[127](#)

The *contra* manual does not elaborate or quantify the fine line between tactical terror—with which to weaken the government by endangering the population's safety—and counterproductive explicit terror. The distinction might be that made by the U. S. Army between "selective" and "mass" terror, or again between terror as overt or covert action. FM 30-104, for example, attempts to do so:

*Aggressor advocates the selective use of terror as opposed to mass terror. The assassination of a government official will lead some people to refrain from seeking public office.... Likewise, the assassination of a village leader will make it difficult to obtain another leader enabling the insurgent movement to have more freedom of action. Such actions display the government's inability to protect its officials, causing the populace to lose respect for the government [128](#)*

The acceptability—or unacceptability—of terror is outlined in the contra manual, like earlier army manuals, entirely in the terms of psychological impact, without regard for ethics or international law. In general, guerrilla actions endangering the public are to provide the strategic background to other tactical initiatives to undermine the government. The manual advises the elaborate explanation of the use of armed force involving the noncombatant population: The people are to be told actions were taken “to protect them, the people.... That this action, although it is not desirable, is necessary because the final objective of the insurrection is a free and democratic society.” The necessary evil, finally, will “cease to exist when the ‘forces of justice’ of our movement assume control. “

Less attention is given to the circumstances justifying lethal force, which are sketched in broad strokes in the 19X3 manual, than to the explanation and justification of such killings whatever the circumstances:

*If, for example, it should be necessary... to have to fire on a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda... the following is recommended:*

- *Explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted the enemy...*
- *If a guerrilla fires at an individual, make the town see that he was an enemy of the people, and that they shot him because the guerrillas recognized as their first duty the protection of citizens.*

The manual provides further useful explanations for the killing of informers:

- *The commando tried to detain the informant without firing because he, like all Christian guerrillas, espouses nonviolence. Firing at the Sandinista informant, although it is against his own will, was necessary to prevent the repression of the Sandinista government against innocent people.*
- *Make the population see that it was the repressive system that was the cause of this situation, what really killed the informer...*
- *Make the population see... this death would have been avoided if justice and freedom existed in Nicaragua, which is exactly the objective of the democratic guerrilla.*[129](#)

“Armed Propaganda” teams are counseled on the use of force in towns and villages. Should the team encounter hostility from “one or two men,” the threat “can be overcome by eliminating the enemy in a rapid and effective manner.”[130](#) Should there be little opposition, the force should do, among other things, the following:

- *Destroy the military or police installations and remove the survivors to a “public place.”*
- *Cut all the outside lines of communication. . .*
- *Set up ambushes in order to delay reinforcements. .*

- *Kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government and replace them in “public places” with military or civilian persons trusted by our movement.*

The manual’s guidance on “implicit and explicit” terror is followed by a fairly explicit section on selective assassination (or execution) and propaganda; it explains what is to become of those officials kidnapped and taken to a “public place” after a capture of a village:

### *Selective Use of Violence for Propagandistic Effects*

*It is possible to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets, such as court judges, mesta judges (a kind of rural justice of the peace), police and State Security Officials, CDS [Sandinista Defense Committee] chiefs, etc. For psychological purposes it is necessary to take extreme precautions, and It is absolutely necessary to gather together the population affected so that they will be present, take part in the act, and formulate accusations against the oppressor.*

American unconventional war doctrine also figured in another text called *Psychological Operations*, which surfaced after longtime CIA asset General Manuel Antonio Noriega of Panama jumped the track and became Washington’s designated enemy. Like the manual prepared for Nicaraguan *contras* the Panamanian text became the object of criticism (and ridicule) in the 1980s. Unlike the Nicaraguan manual, its roots in American doctrine went largely unremarked. The Panamanian Defense Forces had published the eighty-page manual in 1975. Ostensibly authored by Noriega,, it may have been approved (or even ghostwritten) by the American advisers then close to defense chiefs there. The text drew extensively on American Army unconventional warfare material including Paul Linebarger’s 1948 classic

*Psychological Warfare*, which advised the student of psy-war that the problems “for the future are problems of *how better* to apply it, not of whether to apply it.”<sup>131</sup>

The Panamanian manual, drafted when Noriega was Panama’s intelligence chief, drew the attention of reporters hungry for dirt on Noriega for its peculiar treatment of another world leader known for a notoriously bad press. The headline NORIEGA’S MODEL: GENGHIS KHAN was not entirely off base. Noriega had illustrated basic principles of psychological warfare with the Mongol experience—laying open his own rise to power to later ridicule: “Genghis Khan may have been a tough man to revere. But to General Manuel Antonio Noriega, the marauding... conqueror is a mentor [ranking] as ‘the real father of psychological warfare’....”<sup>132</sup> Noriega found that the Great Khan had, by using spies and enemy agents “better than anyone, employed the technique of the rumor... and with it ensured the conquest of half the world with only a handful of men.”<sup>133</sup> Noriega also observed that one should use “‘astuteness before threats or violence,’ “ while being prepared “to ‘exterminate’ enemies in a ‘cold and calculating’ way if necessary.” The media critics appear to have been unaware that the young Noriega of 1975 had lifted the Genghis Khan analysis almost intact from U. S. Army instructional material—Paul Linebarger’s study of psy-war.

Linebarger’s classic had praised Genghis Khan for his use of “black propaganda” in his review of psychological warfare in history: the Mongols “had used espionage to plan their campaigns and deliberately used rumor and other means to exaggerate accounts of their own huge numbers, stupidity, and ferocity.”<sup>134</sup> Noriega’s reference to extermination may also be drawn from Linebarger—although Linebarger’s references to terror and extermination occur largely in the



context of ideological war. The key to success was seen as a readiness to use ruthless force and to root out “stubborn individuals.”<sup>135</sup> Clearly, this was applicable to the counterinsurgency state’s war against communism—but writ small, it might have seemed to legitimize the ruthless tactics of a two-bit opportunist concerned largely with staying on top.

Noriega had indeed himself used principles of psy-war in subduing opponents at home—and to present himself to his American friends as both compliant and rather stupid (neither of which was the case). American military experts consulted by the media when Noriega’s paper came to light shrugged it off as “a perversion of what General Noriega learned in... ‘psy-ops’ courses in Panama earlier in his career.”<sup>136</sup> In fact, Noriega’s write-up appears to have been fairly faithful to the approach taken in the classics of the U. S. Army’s psychological warfare syllabus. The real model for Noriega and other ex-alumni of American training in the counterinsurgency states was American doctrine. Although the tenets of psychological warfare set out by Linebarger and others were envisioned for wartime situations, they were tailor-made for application at home when passed through the counterinsurgency filter.

# Chapter 3: The Legacy of World War II

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

Even as revelations of German war crimes were coming out in the trials at Nuremburg, American special warfare strategists were studying the tactics of German occupation forces during World War II. In a June 1947 memorandum, psy-war chief General Robert McClure, seeing the Germans as masters of special warfare from which the fledgling U. S. special warfare community had much to learn, complained that his command's "request to interrogate Goering and his partners at Nuremburg was denied by the Judges of the IMT [International Military Tribunal]." American special warfare doctrine would draw considerably on *Wehrmacht* and *SS* methods of terrorizing civilian populations and, perhaps more importantly, of co-opting local factions to combat partisan resistance. The Department of the Army's *A Study of Special and Subversive Operations* (November 1947) was an early assessment of the lessons learned from World War II in the context of Cold War imperatives.<sup>2</sup> The study examines at length the factors involved in waging guerrilla warfare and observes that "at present there is no instruction in any service schools along SO [Special Operations] lines nor is there likely to be any Army unit which is training in such operations."<sup>3</sup> In the only point in the memorandum concerning counterguerrilla operations, the authors point to the German example:

*The means of counteracting resistance movements and activities demand special consideration. Our forces have had little experience in combating an active underground enemy. The problems which faced the Germans and the measures employed by them in counteracting partisan warfare should be studied. It is quite possible that a future war will find us occupying a hostile country in which exists an active underground. Or we might find ourselves in a friendly country, possibly the United States, facing an enemy while at the same time a hostile partisan force operates in our rear.*<sup>4</sup>

In the early 1950s, the Department of the Army's Military History Division published a series of studies of the German response to the threat of guerrilla warfare. The German armies had attempted a systematic approach to the threat of partisan warfare during Operation BARBAROSSA (the Russian campaign) in 1941, and later in the Balkans. The "German Report Series" was devised to glean lessons from the experience. As Raymond Aron has observed, these were among the lessons that Americans tried, twenty years after the war, "to codify under the name 'counter- insurgency.'"<sup>5</sup>

## **Fighting Soviet Partisans**

That German tactics against Soviet partisans would play a part in the development of a postwar doctrine for fighting communist guerrillas was perhaps a natural product of the Cold War hysteria of the 1950s. The army's 1956 book-length study *Soviet Partisans* is the last and most comprehensive of the "German Report Series" on antipartisan warfare." The Cold War rationale was explicit: "Unconventional warfare has gained in importance along with the increase in range and destructiveness of weapons." The disturbing similarity between the Nazi's view of the

world and the American stance in the Cold War apparently went by the board, although the ideological nature of the conflict was stressed. “this war was to be far more than a mere passage of arms, or as Hitler said a fight to the finish between ‘two opposing political systems.’”<sup>7</sup>

A thread throughout the “German Report Series” is the premise that would inform American counterinsurgency doctrine in later years: that the civil population supports an insurgent or partisan movement only because they are coerced into doing so. The studies consistently maintain that the Russian people saw the Germans as liberators and that partisans WOTl support through “a campaign of terror among the natives.”<sup>8</sup> The partisans are characterized as puppets of the Communist Party, forced through terror to fight and to survive by plundering the local people— a view of the revolutionary guerrilla not drastically far removed from Washington’s current view of insurgency. The partisans were seen as tactically skilled, but the U.S. Army writers were, for ideological reasons, incapable of considering motives other than coercion for their resistance. The partisans, not the Germans, were characterized as alien predators terrorizing the “civilians” into submission:

*They seldom launched a raid without previous reconnaissance, often carried out by civilians pressured into the job.... They lived off the country, forcibly requisitioning what they needed from the natives. They deliberately attempted to demoralize the local civilians with sudden raids, rumour- mongering, and general heavy-handed terror tactics.*<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, the study contends, had the Germans *not* erred in their occupation policies (through random killings and systematic brutality)—that is, had the invasion been made by Germans not led by Nazis— the people of the East

would have flocked to their banner. There were very real dimensions of terror and brutality in Soviet policy toward Nazi collaborators, as indeed in the attitudes of resistance movements elsewhere and wherever people have fallen under foreign occupation.<sup>10</sup> But the inversion of the attribution of primary responsibility for terrorizing the population—from the occupying army to the resistance movement—was an adjustment of the record according to ideological norms. The 1956 army study stresses that even the German High Command recognized that the brutality of the first year of occupation had been counterproductive, yet it unaccountably attributes the growth of resistance primarily to the German failure to “protect” the population from partisan coercion. Astonishingly, the study maintains that the *Wehrmacht’s* greatest failing was permitting the partisans to terrorize the population into “revolt” against the occupying forces: “Experience had shown that the people often fled to the forests in fear of reprisals and there became prey to the bands who forcibly recruited the men into the irregular ranks.”<sup>11</sup>

The study refers to the German Armed Forces High Command’s 18 August 1942 Antipartisan Directives as a major reform of previous brutal policies, and casts it as a policy intended to redirect security efforts toward protecting the civilian population from partisan coercion.<sup>12</sup> The modification of the policy of “reprisals and collective punitive actions” was to permit “retaliatory measures... only when the reasons for such were carefully explained to the people.”<sup>13</sup>

The line between terror tactics and legitimate measures of force in wartime was also blurred in the Cold War histories of German tactics. The term “terrorism” appears repeatedly in descriptions of the tactics of the partisans—ambushes, raids, sabotage—but another vocabulary altogether applies to the

German tactics of atrocity. The norms by which civilians were equated with soldiers or held responsible for partisan actions and so penalized by summary execution are deemed eminently fair:

*Any person belonging to a partisan formation, any person furnishing aid or comfort, directly or indirectly, to such partisans, or any person withholding information on partisans would be shot.... These directives were all legally well within the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war....* [14](#)

In fact, the terms of the laws of war during World War II had made little concession to participants in organized resistance movements, but German forces, in turn, had made little concession to the letter of humanitarian law.[15](#) The *Wehrmacht* directives, moreover, coincided with higher directives, including the German government's declaration that rules of war "were not applicable to BARBAROSSA since the Reich considered the USSR dissolved as a sovereign power."[16](#)

The 1942 *Wehrmacht* directives emphasized the still-common position that a people under occupation will accept repression more gracefully if reprisals and so on are explained fully to them. And they will blame the partisans—who are characterized as monsters deliberately setting up villagers for German reprisals—for their fate:

*When collective punitive punishments had to be exacted, it was highly important that the reasons for so doing be carefully explained to the people. This latter was considered especially pertinent. Further, the people were to be made to realize that the partisans, following instructions from Moscow, often deliberately attempted*

*to place them, even though innocent, in a position where the Germans would take reprisals—as firing on German troops from a village and then escaping, thus leaving the inhabitants to face the penalties which the Germans might lawfully impose—In order to turn them away from the invaders and into the ranks of the irregulars.*

Although the circumstances in which reprisals would be considered “absolutely necessary,” and the manner in which reprisal atrocities were to be “carefully explained” are not elaborated, the U.S. Army Military History Division does suggest convincingly that the German High Command had indeed determined in 1942 that it could no longer rely on terror alone to enforce German administrative and economic demands. The U.S. military historians appear, however, to have overstated the practical change in German “counterterror” policy, in keeping with the study’s quite extraordinary depiction of the German army as the “liberators” of the Russian people. The description of the new, moderate policy, combining ferocious antipartisan measures with fair treatment, anticipates later American counterinsurgency writing:

*[T]he destruction of the bands required vigorous, offensive action by all available military, SS and police units... and the “harshest measures” against both active and passive adherents to the movement. The natives’ confidence in German leadership was to be restored and their cooperation solicited by fair and above-board treatment....<sup>17</sup>*

The premise here—that an iron-clad distinction can be drawn between “the people,” who won’t be harmed if they keep their noses clean, and the partisans/bandits, who are seen as aliens beyond the pale, meriting whatever fate

befalls them—would eventually be incorporated into American counterinsurgency doctrine.

Of particular importance to later counterinsurgency doctrine is the emphasis placed on integration of all aspects of the administration, civil and military. The shift toward a more complex, integrated occupation policy came in the 18 August 1942 orders. The study concludes that the strategy to undermine the partisan movement “by weaning away its external support by the people” failed largely because the changes were “too little too late.”<sup>18</sup> The 1942 blueprint for antipartisan operations included most of the components that appeared later in American counterinsurgency doctrine, including counterorganization and counterterror: “The war against the bands was to be considered as much a part of general operations as the move against the front line armies.... All means of politics, economics, and propaganda were to be brought to bear.”<sup>19</sup>

Counterorganization along paramilitary lines was ordered as a means both to augment conventional forces and to imitate the partisans. A first step was establishing “a reliable net of informers” and a system to check and evaluate their information, with “all false or over-exaggerated reports punished severely.” A second was recruiting “native security units... from among anti-Soviet inhabitants and reliable former prisoners of war,” organized into local guard units around cadres from German military police battalions and German reservists (*Landesschützen*).<sup>20</sup> The orders stressed the importance of their close control “Where a composite force of German military and paramilitary units was to be committed, a clear chain of command and responsibility was to be established prior to the action.”<sup>21</sup> “Native volunteer units, wherever recruited, were to be used for reconnaissance and static guard duty only, and never committed in an offensive operation except as a last resort,



and then under close and immediate German command. ““ German concern that local security units could go renegade was occasionally borne out: the 1956 report cites one case in which a unit of 600 men guarding a rail line went over to the partisans, wrecking the line in the process.<sup>23</sup>

The new antipartisan measures of 1942 provided for “home guard” forces of both volunteers and civilians who were “drafted for static guard duty, “ and held responsible for incidents during their duty tours.<sup>24</sup> The system was not unlike the kind of “home guard as hostage” formula of such modern, obligatory “civilian self-defense” organizations as are currently in USC to control Guatemala’s highland Indian population (nonparticipation, even failure to report a stranger on the village path, are capital offenses).<sup>25</sup> Local civilians were also held responsible, under pain of death, for the implementation of population control measures not unlike those used traditionally by the European powers in the colonial dominions: “Mayors... were to be made responsible for registering all strangers, “<sup>26</sup> while local security forces were to assist in implementing travel restrictions (“any person found on the roads without a pass was to be arrested and, if not belonging to the nearest village, executed as a partisan”).<sup>27</sup> The U.S. Army report, however, emphatically casts the oppressive strategy as an attempt to provide civilians with a feeling of security from partisan terror:

*The troops... and any spare police forces were to be dispersed down to platoon size over as many villages as possible so as to give support to the inhabitants against the terror raids, deny the partisans bases and food, and prevent the natives from aiding them. Once an area was considered pacified, it was still to be patrolled and important localities and installations guarded.*<sup>28</sup>

The principal offensive forces of the rear areas were organized in a system of “highly mobile task forces. “ These rapid-response forces were formed “out of SS and alert regiments... based at strategic points” and provided the strategic backup necessary to make the light German and “home guard” garrisons defensible.<sup>29</sup> A more creative “counterguerrilla” experiment, along the lines of the British “pseudo-gangs” or the U.S.-backed “pseudo-guerrillas” of the Philippines, was also implemented. The 1956 U.S. Army report described these as “dummy bands... made up of Russian- speaking German officers and NCO’s and native volunteers passing themselves off as partisan units, to seek out the more virulent pro-Soviet elements of the population and mark them for roundup and evacuation.”<sup>30</sup> The organization of “counter” or “dummy” bands had been recommended in the August 1942 directives:

*They were to be made up of units from the security police and the security service and of the Ordnungspolizei, with a number of reliable natives, and committed in partisan-dominated areas in the manner of a genuine partisan unit. In this manner they would be able to keep a constant check on the sentiments of the population, make contact with irregular units, and often quietly eliminate the partisan leaders.*<sup>31</sup>

Propaganda was another lesson of the German example. The June 1941 Armed Forces High Command directives on propaganda, summarized in the 1956 study, explained the way in which the *Wehrmacht* itself *explained* its antipartisan actions to the population:

*The greatest emphasis was to be placed on the thesis that the enemies of Germany were not the people of the Soviet Union, but the Jewish-Bolshevist Soviet government and the Communist Party working for world*

*revolution. An especial point was to be made that the Wehrmacht was not entering Russia as an enemy of the people, but to free them from Soviet tyranny.*<sup>32</sup>

The September 1941 directives on measures “to deal with this general insurrection movement” gave as the first of its general action guidelines that “it should be inferred, in every case of resistance to the German occupying forces, no matter what the individual circumstances, that it is of Communist origin.”<sup>33</sup>

Propaganda guidelines also governed terminology. August 1942 directives added a now-familiar semantic diktat: The *Wehrmacht* ordered “that the term ‘partisan’ [*Partisanen*], which had been found to mean ‘fighter for freedom’ in Russian terminology, no longer be used,” but be replaced with “Bandit” (Banditen).<sup>34</sup> The policy was not unique. The British would later refer to the Malayan guerrillas as “Communist Terrorists” (CTs), and Peru’s armed forces today refers to *Terroristas Comunistas* (TCs). And in the 1980s the lexicon of American foreign policy would swing from usage of the relatively respectable term “guerrilla” to uniformly characterize guerrillas not under American patronage as “terrorists. “

The American critique of the German propaganda offensive in the Soviet Union centered on “lost opportunities.”<sup>35</sup> “Propaganda remained negative, and even verged on the hypocritical”; “It was designed primarily to keep the population from joining or supporting the partisans. They were promised nothing. Beyond threats, warnings, and prohibitions, the emphasis was to remain on the role of the Germans as ‘liberators’ come to create ‘a new system of social justice.’”<sup>36</sup> The Soviets, on the other hand, had the propaganda initiative: “In conjunction with the terror attacks, the Soviets launched a virulent propaganda

campaign [to the effect] that the tide would soon turn.... The people grew progressively uneasy under such psychological attacks and began to wonder at the true nature of these self-styled 'liberators.'"<sup>37</sup> Clearly, the American writers of the U.S. Army's 1950s series on partisan movements (who were working with former *Wehrmacht* officers) had no illusions but that an American "liberation" of the Soviet Union in 1941 would have been considerably more successful than the German.

The role of terror in the German campaign is discussed extensively in the U.S. Army studies, with rather contradictory conclusions. The policy of naked terror with which the German invasion was launched in 1941 was explained as a tactical option designed to crush resistance as rapidly as possible so that an occupation administration could rapidly be established. The 1956 study cites an order of 16 July 1941: "The whole of the occupied territories had to be pacified as quickly as possible. The Resistance there had to be crushed. The best method was a strict reign of terror."<sup>38</sup> This concept of terror as a shortcut to pacification, compensating for a German manpower shortage, is a classic misconception of the power of terror:

*The troops available for security... will... suffice only if the occupying power meets all resistance, not by legally punishing the guilty, but rather by spreading the type of terror which is the only means of taking from the population every desire for opposition* <sup>39</sup>

The U.S. Army assessed the mass terror of 1941 as generally counterproductive or, put another way, the failure to combine terror with positive methods of psychological warfare was "for the Germans... just another lost opportunity."<sup>40</sup> The attitude of the analysis toward the more selective use of terror tactics is rather more ambiguous. In

discussing the new, supposedly hearts and minds—oriented strategy after 1942, the authors discuss admiringly what might be described as a mirror-image approach to partisan warfare:

*To combat the partisans the security commands evolved an antipartisan blueprint founded on the basic assumption that to be successful in a rear area war they had to be as mobile and tricky as the partisans themselves, so much so that it would be the Germans who were feared, not the partisans.*<sup>[41](#)</sup>

Here the premise that the partisans (or revolutionaries) win support through terror finds its corollary in the thesis that counterterror, targeted with sufficient precision and selectivity, can win support through fear.

Similarly, while the system of massive reprisals was seen to have been ineffective, the Germans' clearance and "evacuation" of the suspect population (most of the German evacuees died) was seen as effective:

*Captured documents and interrogation of partisan prisoners conclusively demonstrated that while reprisals as means of weaning the people away from the bands, and thus weaning the support of the latter, were generally ineffective, the evacuation of all natives from partisan-infested areas and the destruction of all farms, villages, and buildings in the areas following the evacuations did much to slow up the growth of the movement and sap its strength.*<sup>[42](#)</sup>

Although the mass killings and random brutality of the German occupation were characterized as counterproductive, more selective terror methods were noted uncritically. The selective extermination tasks of the

security battalions (Einsatzgruppen), for example, were described without comment: “[T]hey were to clear the operations zone of both Jews and Communist officials and agents by liquidating all racially and politically undesirable elements seized.”<sup>43</sup> According to the U. S. Army study, operations of this kind were counterproductive only when they claimed victims at random: “The unchecked ‘clearing’ actions of the *Einsatzgruppen* and police units, during which many people were executed *without proof of Communist Party affiliation or Jewish blood*, harmed the German cause immensely...” (emphasis added).

The German officers, of course, had other orders for the total subjugation of the Russian people, and well understood that propaganda was not to be confused with reality. The “German Report Series” studies, however, tend to support the “liberation from Bolshevism” claim, if not the racial theories invoked.<sup>44</sup>

The U. S. Army’s analysis of the Soviet experience from the German viewpoint is of value today for the insights it provides into the way Ideology came to cloud American military and political analysis after World War II. It also provides a window into the Cold War laboratories of military doctrine from which blueprints for unconventional and later counterinsurgency doctrine emerged. That the German analysis also reached beyond the Pentagon is confirmed by the records of the special White House Cold War panel, the Operations Coordinating Board. A 1954 briefing of the board, using much the same argument as the studies of the “German Report Series,” cited the German invasion of the Soviet Union as an opportunity in which concerted psychological warfare could have resulted in victory: “Russian troops and civilians viewed the Germans as saviours of Mother Russia from the tyranny of the Communist Party. Had the Germans understood this deep

and significant vulnerability and exploited it, Russian resistance might well have collapsed.”<sup>45</sup>

The American doctrine of unconventional warfare was not strictly modeled on the German antipartisan strategies of the *Wehrmacht*, but it is easier to understand in light of these unique versions of the German-Russian conflict. The 1950s “German Series”—and associated documents—serve further to confirm that American officers responsible for developing unconventional warfare doctrine in the 1950s were cognizant of German antipartisan organization and tactics. The analysis of the motivations and methods of the Soviet partisan movement—in particular, the apparent conviction of the authors that the Germans were in fact “liberators,” and the partisans dominating their countrymen through terror—may also have directly influenced the emerging doctrinal view of revolutionary guerrilla warfare.

### **Lessons Learned: Germans and Greeks**

The American intervention in the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949 put some of the lessons of World War II into practice in the first counterinsurgent campaign of the Cold War. The 1954 study for the U.S. Army’s “German Report Series,” *German Antiguerilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944)* (U.S. Army Pamphlet 29-243), provides a detailed counterinsurgent’s-eye-view of the partisan movement in Greece—and insight into the American attitudes toward German tactics and perceptions.

Germany’s occupation of Greece began in May 1941, and within two years it was the object of concerted resistance by an irregular partisan National People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), some 20,000 strong (Greece’s population then totaled some eight million). ELAS incorporated many former officers of the Greek national army, including its principal

wartime leader Colonel Stefanos Serafis; its political side, the underground National Liberation Front (EAM) was dominated by the Greek Communist Party (KKE).<sup>46</sup> EDES, the small monarchist resistance movement sponsored by the British and led by Colonel Zervas, was confined largely to the Epirus Mountains in northwestern Greece, while ELAS operated throughout the rest of the country.<sup>47</sup> Like Mihailovitch's Chetniks in Yugoslavia, EDES rapidly came to an accommodation with the Germans, and put its principal efforts into clashing with the partisans that were energetically fighting the occupation forces.<sup>48</sup> Over 600,000 German troops—and thousands of irregular auxiliaries—were tied down in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece by November 1943: The Germans themselves estimated they faced some 145,000 guerrillas in the theater, with some 90,000 under Tito's command alone.<sup>49</sup> German casualty levels rose gradually throughout the occupation, peaking in the months before withdrawal began: in the July-August 1944 period the Germans recorded 936 dead, 1,235 wounded, and 275 missing.<sup>50</sup>

German antipartisan tactics in the Balkans differed little from those employed in the Soviet Union. Large forces were deployed to isolate circumscribed areas to "comb out" partisans. Veteran mobile reserves (the equivalent of today's rapid-reaction forces), including crack mountain troops (notably the First Mountain Division), stood by to go to the aid of outposts under attack, or to be "rushed to the scene of any protracted rising."<sup>51</sup> Special Forces-style operations were carried out by elite search-and-destroy/hunter-killer units:

*A highly effective offensive weapon was found in the Jagdkommando [ranger detachment], designed to seek out and destroy guerrilla bands. Personnel... were usually*



*young and combat-wise veterans of German campaigns on other fronts. Physically hardy and trained to live in the open for extended periods of time, they depended little on supply columns and could pursue the guerrillas into the most inaccessible areas.*<sup>52</sup>

*Jagdkommandos* also operated as pseudo-guerrillas: “When the situation required, the rangers would put on civilian clothing, disguising themselves as [guerrillas]....” Their principal task in such circumstances was reconnaissance. However successful the elite units were in small-unit operations, though, the 1954 U.S. Army report concluded they were too few in number “to affect decisively the outcome of the antiguerrilla campaign.”<sup>53</sup>

The Germans modified earlier tactics after 1943, seeking to improve upon the efforts of the 380,000 Italian troops that had hitherto borne the brunt of the occupation in the Balkans.<sup>54</sup> Passive defense measures introduced were much like later French measures in Indochina: they centered on a network of *Stützpunkte* (strongpoints) securing rail lines, principal roads, and installations every six miles or so, on average. “These strongpoints were actually small forts, heavily armed... and situated in the vicinity of... guerrilla targets....” Armored car patrols moved frequently between posts, while armored trains further defended rail lines.<sup>55</sup> Free-fire zones, in which civilians were shot on sight, were established in rural areas for five kilometers on either side of rail routes, and 200 meters in built-up areas.<sup>56</sup>

Terror, too, was a principal feature of German occupation policy in the Balkans. Hostage-taking, torture, public executions, and the burning of villages were carried out in accord with the principle of collective responsibility for hostile action or noncompliance with orders. Several

incidents involving mass reprisals are described in the 1954 U.S. Army study, which became one of the standard U. S. Army texts on the conflict. The horror of the actions is understated by the description of victims not as “civilians” but as “communist suspects”:

*A Communist-inspired strike in the Piraeus area in March (1944) was put down by the Germans only after security troops fired on the demonstrators killing 21.... Immediately following this, a German truck column... in the Peloponnese was attacked, and a total of 18 Germans killed and 44 wounded. In reprisal 210 communist suspects were executed, 10 villages burned, and martial law declared. . . .* [57](#)

Similarly, when a German general and three others were killed in an attack on their headquarters in the Peloponnese, “325 Communist suspects were shot in reprisals.”[58](#) Reprisal killings were just a part of the horror: deportations to extermination camps continued throughout the occupation, without causing visible concern to OSS (or the British Special Operations Executive [SOE]) personnel on the spot. OSS chief William Donovan reported to President Roosevelt on 20 July 1944 that 90,000 Jews were being “expatriated” from Greece: a word rather less alarming than the truth (and suggesting an execrable complacency).[59](#)

The withdrawal of Italy from the Axis in September 1943 had obliged Germany to raise drastically the number of its own troops garrisoning the Balkans, to bring in “Eastern” forces, and to organize local forces wherever possible, using the principle of divide and rule, which had been exemplified in Yugoslavia by the creation of a separate Croatia. “Eastern” battalions brought into Greece included Ukrainians, Poles, and Bulgarians. Minority populations were also co-opted into the security structure: In collaboration with the Bulgarian II

Corps, “home guard”-style militias were set up in areas with Bulgarian minorities (as the U.S. Army study observed, “the minorities used these armed units against their Greek neighbors, who in turn blamed the German authorities...”).<sup>60</sup> In the Pindus Mountains and in Thessaly, the Vlach minority were organized into “Legionnaires,” which ELAS head Serafis later noted had “become a real menace” in Thessaly and western Macedonia before the guerrillas—and the great majority of Vlachs, who condemned this movement”—brought about its collapse.<sup>61</sup>

The U. S. Army report on wartime antiguerrilla operations concludes with a series of “lessons learned” and recommendations to be taken into account, should similar antiguerrilla scenarios arise in future. As in the reports on antipartisan measures in the Soviet Union, the study concludes that, with minor modifications, the occupation could have been “successful.” Although it was unlikely “that German commanders” will ever be concerned with the occupation of the Balkans again,

*a review of the mistakes these commanders made would undoubtedly cause them to urge any future occupier to begin his administration with a clear-cut statement of policy, including a promise of eventual withdrawal... and self-determination for the people; a unified military command and distinct delineation of responsibility in the political and military fields; the assignment of trained, well-equipped combat troops in adequate numbers to the area; the taking of prompt and effective though not excessively harsh measures to quell disorders; and an extensive propaganda campaign to explain the purpose of the occupation and the benefits to accrue to the population with the maintenance of law and order. Finally they would most certainly recommend the troops be supplied from outside the country and*

*restrained from excesses. With perseverance, the occupation might then be able to avoid the Balkan chaos of 1941-44.*<sup>62</sup>

The final point was perhaps the most positive and the least applicable to later counterinsurgency efforts. That intervention and occupation forces should not rely on collaborationist domestic minorities to maintain control responded to the awareness from the Balkan experience that such alliances are volatile, and may trigger uncontrollable interethnic conflict antithetical to the objective of a trouble-free occupation. The authors in 1954 were concerned with suppressing partisan movements in the context of conventional warfare, and with imposing an effective occupation administration: they recognized that mobilizing ethnic minority groups against their neighbors was of limited short-term advantage, while counterproductive in the long term to the orderly life of the society.

Despite the foreign battalions and the ethnic minority forces available, by mid-1943 the German command had concluded that its forces were insufficient “for the maintenance of law and order in Greece,” and so authorized the formation of Greek “Security Battalions.” The pilot model, the 700-man “Laocoön Volunteer Battalion,” was armed in late 1943 with rifles and machine guns, and it participated in a major clearance operation in the Peloponnisos. Its successful deployment prompted the formation of further such battalions. 63 The 1954 U. S. Army report notes that the monarchist EDES, too, provided a principal source of manpower for the German effort, through arrangements by which previous informal collaboration in fighting ELAS was rationalized:

*The Germans still had some supporters from the anticommunist elements of the Greek population, among*

*them EDES. For keeping the Yannina-Arta road and a large part of the Pindus Mountains area cleared of ELAS forces, EDES was supplied with small arms and ammunition by local German commanders, a practice approved by the army group commander. According to revised German estimates, Zervas' main force at this time comprised only 2,500-3,000 men.... ELAS, in contrast, had grown to 20,000 men.... While clearing operations, restrictions on movement in the area of the rail lines, and the active assistance of EDES and the Greek volunteer forces restored a measure of security to the German supply routes, guerrilla forces increased their activities in more remote areas.*<sup>64</sup>

Another source, with a different bias, notes that in some areas EDES troops and those of the Security Battalions were virtually indistinguishable.<sup>65</sup>

The 1946 war memoir by Stefanos Serafis suggests EDES's arrangement with the Germans was common knowledge at the grass roots, even if the technical details were unknown. EDES forces, wrote Serafis, worked openly in the presence of the Germans, and continued to do so even as the Germans began their evacuation in August 1944 (the last units crossed into Yugoslavia and Albania on 2 November 1944). A letter of 25 September 1944, purported to have been from EDES leader Asterios Michalakis to the German commander in Thrace/Macedonia, set out a proposal for EDES to watch the German rear in exchange for an orderly hand-over of power—including command of the Security Battalions. The proposal, not dissimilar from the actual events, required

*1. Creation of a strong EDES force. . . with the ultimate objective of. . . wiping out the ELAS forces which are collaborating with the Russians, Bulgarians and Tito. 2. Territory to be evacuated by German troops will be taken*

*over by the EDES army.... 3. Security Battalions will be incorporated into the EDES forces.... 4. The Germans will supply a quantity of heavy equipment.* [66](#)

Although the German accommodation with EDES held throughout most of its nominal territory, EDES remained the favored British vehicle for the postwar control of a monarchist Greece. Similarly, in the Philippines, the returning American forces had recognized the Japanese puppet Constabulary and other collaborationist forces as legitimate postwar security forces, and turned them against the left-wing Hukbalahap resistance organization. The British priority in Greece was to back monarchist forces, however unsavory, who shared a hostility toward the left-wing ELAS partisans.[67](#) EDES nominally returned to the Allied side on 3 July 1944, when, according to U.S. intelligence reports, British SOE liaison officers “seized command of the Zervas organization, in conjunction with a group of anti-German commanders” and its forces attacked German troops to seize a remote coastal area adjoining the Pindus Mountains. A subsequent landing of 5,000 Greek forces from Middle East Headquarters in Egypt would serve primarily to give the British a monarchist counter to ELAS at war’s end.[68](#)

## **Unconventional Warriors: Colonel Virgil Ney**

Colonel Virgil Ney, a former U.S. “Senior Advisor, Psychological Warfare” to the South Korean army, drew on his experience in Korea and on the published accounts of partisan movements in World War II to examine U.S. “guerrilla” and “counterguerrilla” doctrine at length.[69](#) His writing is punctuated with pedantic—and seemingly admiring—references to German counterguerrilla methods, which he describes as harsh but necessary. Ney’s own widely

disseminated checklist of tactics, antecedents to the formal doctrine of counterterror, included “*direct attack* (including raids); *indirect attack* (including surveillance); *hostages*; *decimation*; *shipment*; *execution*.”<sup>70</sup> Its theoretical foundation draws on the doctrines of colonial powers and the *Wehrmacht*, but adds a new rationale: that guerrilla resistance forces *can only* be defeated by co-opting their most powerful weapon—terror.

“Direct attack,” in Ney’s lexicon, is described as conventional assault by regular troops. “Indirect attack,” the preferred method, includes the range of actions from surveillance to cordon- and-search operations, “seizing all persons in the *immediate* vicinity.”<sup>71</sup> Ney elaborates:

*Prisoners taken are valuable for interrogation or hostage purposes. Depending upon the situation there are raids which may be classed as reprisals as revenge [sic] or certain acts committed against the occupying forces. These operations are drastically brutal and no prisoners are taken alive.... based as it is on terror, the reprisal raid is one of the most effective means of controlling or inhibiting the members of the resistance.*<sup>72</sup>

To illustrate the point, Ney cites examples of German reprisals in Greece—summary executions of “the first fifty persons who happened to walk down the street, “ as well as the razing of houses and villages.<sup>73</sup> Citing *The Soviet Partisan Movement* study, Ney observes that during Operation BARBAROSSA, “as reprisal for positive partisan activity, in the Fourth Army Area two inhabitants were ordered shot for every German killed.”<sup>74</sup>

Ney’s writing also exemplifies the tendency of U.S. Army writers on guerrilla warfare to blur the distinction between what the “communist guerrilla” is purported to do and what



the American guerrilla is advised to do. The concept of the “propaganda of the deed”—including terror—much like the “armed propaganda” featured in the CIA’s 1983 manual for the Nicaraguan *contras*, was particularly attractive to Ney.<sup>75</sup> He observes,

*propaganda may be successfully spread by means of terror.... Threats, intimidation, coercion, mental and emotional stress, threatening destruction of family ties, ransom.... The very act of terror will of its own nature convert many of its witnesses or surviving victims to whatever the propagandizer desires.*<sup>76</sup>

Ney’s fascination with terror is further reflected in his premise that support for the guerrilla cause, and indeed loyalty, was readily won through terror: “Terror, the guerrilla leader’s most potent weapon, is used by him not only to demoralize the enemy and extort the support of his own people, but also to extract unswerving loyalty from the individual guerrilla.”<sup>77</sup> Unlike most of his contemporaries, Ney decried the limitation of counterguerrilla methods to conventional military means, and he became a principal advocate of fighting fire with fire:

*The old adage “It takes a thief to catch a thief” may be transposed properly and correctly into “It takes a guerrilla to beat a guerrilla....” The conventional soldier must be taught that to defeat the guerrilla he must use guerrilla methods.*<sup>78</sup>

Ney, however, proposes no major change in the kinds of forces to be deployed against guerrillas or in the general emphasis on conventional small-unit tactics, or “simple infantry patrol actions,” to hunt them down. His approach was relatively limited in practical terms, and “unconventional” primarily in its emphasis on propaganda



and psychological warfare, including the use of terror. It is in this respect that Ney's prescriptions are at once innovative and throwbacks to the methods of colonial powers of the past.

Colonel Ney may himself have had relatively little influence on the formulation of doctrine, despite the wide circulation of his writing. The substance of his proposals for counterinsurgency is most significant as an indicator of the mood of the times; Ney was less an innovator than a representative 1950s counterinsurgent.

Similar prescriptions appeared in the 1950 classic *Secret Forces*, by Lt. Col. F. O. Miksche, a veteran of unconventional warfare in occupied Europe from Czechoslovakia to France. Miksche's study outlines in elaborate detail the methodology of communist resistance organizations, and identifies "the secret forces... at the back of the many civil wars, strikes and acts of sabotage, that are so typical of our epoch, and how these are organized and conducted."<sup>79</sup> More to the point, Miksche delves into the record of German antipartisan policies to identify those that can be adapted to the present war with "revolutionary forces." "We are," he asserts, "already at war with the East today, whether we care to acknowledge it or not."<sup>80</sup>

The response to guerrilla forces, in Miksche's analysis, would ideally incorporate measures "to capture the sympathy of the great mass of the people," but he asks "is it always possible to settle disputes in a peaceful manner? ... History does not encourage us..."<sup>81</sup> That said, political measures to win sympathy and support among at least part of the population must coincide with a counterattack against the adversary:

*Secret organizations should be attacked at the roots.... Conspiracy is best met by counter- conspiracy.... Spies must insinuate themselves right into the nerve centers of the underground movement. One need only think of the numerous tricks to which the German authorities resorted in dealing with the underground movements.*

While the German secret police attracted “many doubtful elements,” Miksche added that “it is precisely they who are best suited to this kind of work.”<sup>82</sup> Secret warfare was cruel, and those combating underground movements were well justified in responding in kind:

*The deeper a secret movement goes, the more cruel the methods it employs. Any means are considered justified provided they serve the purpose. It has always been so, and I think I am speaking the truth when I say that almost every nation, confronted by similar circumstances, would act in the same way.*<sup>83</sup>

German measures to defend the railways area explained as a case in point that while ruthlessness could be effective, it was not in itself sufficient to break the spirit of the population or to meet the challenge of the guerrillas. Although putting Polish civilians into the front carriages failed to stop assaults,

*A much more effective method was to compel the local population to guard its own section of the railway.... Their lives were forfeit for the security of the sections for which they were responsible. In other cases, hostages were taken as a precautionary measure against partisan attempts.*<sup>84</sup>

In the final analysis, however, “the defender plays a losing game.” The proposed solution is to go onto the offensive,

and to fight like with like. Miksche cites Napoleon's order to Marshal Lefebvre to "use partisan methods when dealing with partisans." The German innovation, in turn, was to do the same, and whenever possible to organize counterguerrilla irregulars from sectors of the local population. A German order signed by the Chief of Counter-Guerrilla Movements is cited as a model: "Just as the uniformed police require the assistance of plainclothes police, we must have bands of our own to support the troops against the enemy guerrilla bands." Each unit was to have from fifteen to twenty men, armed with rifles and grenades. The tactics "should be the same as those adopted by enemy bands."<sup>85</sup>

## **Lessons Learned: The Emigre Card**

The influence of the war in Europe on postwar doctrine and policy was perpetuated through the medium of emigres recruited to the fledgling CIA, and the army's psy-war/unconventional warfare establishment. Unconventional warfare schemes had called for recruitment of refugees from the occupied nations of Eastern Europe to provide a manpower pool for eventual behind-the-lilies operations against the Soviets. Proposals like Eisenhower's "Freedom Battalion" had fallen through in the face of military reluctance to undertake an organizational task of doubtful value and high political risk, as well as for want of volunteers. The Lodge bill (1951), which permitted the recruitment of European émigrés into the U. S. Army, failed either to attract the numbers of qualified personnel envisioned or to overcome security concerns. But the Army Special Forces recruited a core of European emigres under the act.<sup>86</sup>

One former Special Forces officer described the emigre recruits as ‘ proven lot of hardy, versatile volunteers from Finland and other European countries.”<sup>87</sup> Another, trained at Fort Bragg in 1959, later recalled that “a good proportion” of his fellow recruits had been “Lodge Act people—men who had come from Iron Curtain countries. Their anticommunism bordered on fanaticism.” And as such, they had helped set the tone for Special Forces—and the CIA. “Many of them who, like me, had joined Special Forces to do something positive, were to leave because ‘things’ weren’t happening fast enough. They were to show up later in Africa and Latin America in the employ of others or as independent agents for the CIA. “<sup>88</sup> Their influence on Special Forces, however, was significant if only because of the close relation of the two special warfare services.

Other recruits included veterans of monarchist and other anticommunist partisan movements of Eastern Europe. Some made major contributions to the formulation of doctrine, perhaps none more than a former Yugoslav colonel who led Chetnik guerrillas against both occupation forces and communist-led partisans. Slavko N. Bjelajac, who would achieve high office within the U.S. military establishment, had already had an illustrious military career in the Royal Yugoslav Army before the German invasion of April 1941; he served four years as a General Staff Officer, taught at the military academy, and authored military textbooks. After the German takeover, Bjelajac served in the pan- Serbian, monarchist forces raised by Colonel (subsequently General) Draja Mihailovitch. Dubbed “Chetniks”—after a Serb group that had fought the Turks in World War I—Mihailovitch’s forces were better known for their fratricidal opposition to the communist-led partisans (also largely Serbs) than for their harassment of German and Italian forces.

Colonel Bjelajac's long association with the U.S. military and intelligence establishment began even before his departure from Yugoslavia at the end of 1943 to join Allied forces in Egypt. According to a Department of the Army report, Bjelajac had provided valuable intelligence information to the Allies while in Yugoslavia, and continued his cooperation with "US Headquarters and its intelligence organization" after his shift to Cairo.<sup>89</sup> After the Royal Yugoslav Army command dissolved, Bjelajac worked directly with the U.S. Army in Cairo until his transfer in 1948 to Washington. He then served in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff (G-2, intelligence) before transferring to "another government agency for a period of five years."

Although Colonel Bjelajac's curriculum vitae might appear that of a "spook," his uniqueness lies in his prolific publications and the respect accorded him in the unconventional/counterinsurgency warfare establishment. Officially described as "a consultant on unconventional and psychological warfare and on conventional military matters pertaining to Communist Bloc countries," Bjelajac had by 1971 produced over 150 unclassified and classified studies on psychological operations, unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and subversion.<sup>90</sup> His published material was in the mainstream of the late 1950s and 1960s doctrinal writing from which the United States' doctrines of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency developed.

Although the substance of Bjelajac's still-classified writing must remain a matter for speculation, the material now on the open record offers few surprises. Bjelajac had, however, experienced one of the bloodiest and most savage "small wars" of recent times, and he had served a cause notable primarily for its fanatical hatred not of invaders but of fellow Yugoslavs tainted with communism. As his official Pentagon "Biographical Sketch" notes, "the Communists killed Colonel

Bjelajac's brother and son." An obsession with the strength and ruthlessness of the communist partisan movements during World War II was shared by many postwar analysts. So too was the conviction that the United States should prepare itself to field "guerrilla" forces in the occupied territories of Europe, and the territories threatened by communist subversion around the world. Bjelajac could call on firsthand experience of the kind of "resistance" movement the Cold Warriors envisioned for the new captive nations of Europe: a guerrilla response to the communist threat his colleagues could vicariously share and could adapt in the formulation of military doctrine.

The Pentagon's biography of Colonel Bjelajac, prepared when he served as special assistant for Overseas Security Operations (OSO) at the Department of the Army, acknowledges his unique experience in the Chetnik organization as both "insurgent" and "counterinsurgent." In the former role, he was credited with organizing and commanding "a force of some 9,000 nationalistic guerrillas... and an underground of 15,000" in western Yugoslavia. "Here, besides his normal military functions of organizing and conducting guerrilla and underground campaigns, he organized a local economy and government" and "an important defensive and offensive psychological warfare campaign."<sup>91</sup> The Chetnik role under the occupation, however, was hardly that of the classic "resistance" organization.

Yugoslavia's population in 1941 was about 16 million, divided into three principal ethnic groupings. Some 6.5 million Serbs dominated the larger part of the territory in a swatch from Belgrade, the former capital of the Kingdom of Serbia, to the Dalmatian coast. Over 3.2 million Croats were concentrated in the northwest; Croatia had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I. And a Slovenian

minority of some 1.5 million was concentrated in the north.<sup>92</sup> A strong German influence was apparent at the time in northern areas among the Croatian elite, as well as the million members of German- and Hungarian-speaking minorities. When a German ultimatum obliged Yugoslav Regent Paul to sign an accord with Hitler in March 1941, a coup led by Serbian army officers briefly took power and organized resistance against the invasion that followed soon after. Divided on ethnic lines, the army resisted, but was rapidly overcome.<sup>93</sup>

In June 1941, when the bulk of the German forces withdrew for redeployment in the invasion of the Soviet Union, occupation tasks fell to the Italians. The Chetnik and partisan resistance forces emerged soon afterward.<sup>94</sup> Chetnik leaders counseled holding back attacks on the invaders, nominally to await coordinated action in conjunction with a far-future Allied landing; soon they appeared more concerned with fighting partisans than Axis forces.<sup>95</sup> That same month, partisans initiated a campaign of guerrilla warfare involving sabotage and assaults on Italian troop detachments, convoys, and police posts. In a major partisan offensive in Montenegro, on the Dalmatian coast, guerrillas on 13 July 1941 launched coordinated assaults on Italian garrisons throughout the area, forcing their withdrawal to major garrison towns.<sup>96</sup>

The partisan offensive was defeated after one year of fighting; 15,000 Montenegrins died, and 10,000 others were deported to labor camps. According to a U. S. Army study, based on contemporary German army sources, this campaign was only possible “by enlisting the aid of the Chetniks.”<sup>97</sup> In return, the Chetniks assumed many of the prerogatives of local government and undertook, using their own “guerrilla” tactics, the antiguerrilla tasks at which the

Italians had proved inept: “Stipulations in the agreement with local Chetnik leaders required the Italians to restrict themselves to the garrison towns.... In turn the Chetniks maintained control over the countryside and kept it free of Partisans, drawing on Italian stocks for arms and ammunition.”

Although details of Colonel Bjelajac’s service in the Chetnik organization are not specified in declassified material, his role in suppressing the partisans is one of his key credentials as a counterinsurgency adviser. According to Bjelajac’s Department of the Army biography,

In the second part of his WWII campaign [Bjelajac] organized and directed counter-insurgency against the communist insurgents in the area of Western Yugoslavia, for which he used his guerrilla, self-defense and underground forces, and the civilian support organizations. During this period he had to deal with the problems of insurgency and counterinsurgency, and of civil war, in addition to the guerrilla operations against the enemy forces of occupation.<sup>[98](#)</sup>

Although credited, perhaps justly, with authentic resistance work, Bjelajac’s guerrilla activities against other (communist) guerrillas was of equal or greater significance to his subsequent career with the U.S. government. While partisan forces tied up occupation troops, threatening German access to the strategic mineral resources of the Balkans, Chetnik forces were doing their best to aid Italian countermeasures.<sup>[99](#)</sup> The Chetnik experience of guerrilla tactics to combat guerrilla partisans found application in other theaters in years to come.

The classified 1947 U.S. Army report on World War II resistance movements, *A Study of Special and Subversive*



*Operations*, discussed the Yugoslav situation in considerably franker terms than did the later army histories of the height of the Cold War:

*Yugoslavia provided an example of the national political implications involved in support of guerrilla organizations. After the collapse of Yugoslavia in April, 1941, General Draja Mihajlovic, Minister of War in the loyalist government, escaped and set up a resistance organization.... Seeing in Tito's forces an incompatible and irreconcilable rival, Mihajlovic with 50,000 patriots was actively siding with the Germans fighting Tito's 200,000 partisans by the summer of 1942. Brigadier Armstrong was dropped to Mihajlovic to persuade him to renew operations against the Germans. The Armstrong Mission as well as repeated similar attempts ended in failure. Support of Tito's forces graduated from limited special operations to support of a major force.... British and US military missions were maintained at Tito's headquarters as his forces grow into an army of 300,000, by autumn of 1944. [100](#)*

The subsequent praise of Mihailovitch's joint counterinsurgency efforts with the Italians and Germans to combat *the Allied forces* illustrates the extent to which the rewriting of history (with which the Eastern Bloc was long familiar) came to the United States on the wings of the Cold War.

The Chetnik organization began to unravel in 1943, as its accommodation with the Italians and then its link with the Allies broke down. The U. S. Army's study of German antiguerrilla operations in the Balkans, using German sources, describes the Chetnik role in Operation WEISS, launched in January 1943 to clear partisans from a mountainous bauxite-producing area. The account centers

on Italian- German views on the utility of the Chetniks and plans for their disbandment after the destruction of Tito's partisan movement:

*The Chetniks became a matter of sharp contention between German and Italian commanders during the course of Operation WEISS. In fact, the Italians had been requested to disarm their Chetnik auxiliaries as part of WEISS III. However, regarded as allies by the Italians, many Chetnik units were supplied with arms and ammunition and given important missions in the conduct of operations.... Strong German protests to Mussolini finally had the desired effect, and the Italian field commanders were directed to cease delivery of arms and munitions to the Chetniks and to disarm them as soon as the partisans had been destroyed.*[101](#)

Operation WEISS was, in fact, followed by military action to break up the Chetniks. Responding to fears of an Allied invasion and doubts over the reliability of the Chetniks in such an event, crack German forces launched Operation SCHWARZ in May end dune 1943. "Achieving surprise"—having kept the Italians out of the affair—the Germans overwhelmed Chetnik forces in Montenegro and Herzegovina, capturing 4,000 .[102](#) Although Mihailovitch escaped and Chetnik forces were resupplied from Italian stocks following the September 1943 Italian withdrawal from the Axis, the Chetniks failed to serve either as effective resistance fighters or as a counter to the communist-led partisans in the last year of the war. [103](#) In late 1943, Allied irritation with Chetnik temporizing resulted in the withdrawal of Allied liaison officers from the Chetnik command, largely cutting them off from outside support.[104](#) And so by year end, when Colonel Bjelajac was sent by General Mihailovitch to meet the Allies, the Chetniks had lost the support of patrons on both sides of the conflict. This

notwithstanding, by the mid-1950s the Chetnik “counterguerrillas” were touted in the new American special warfare establishment as an example of both the way guerrillas really are and an ideal low-cost model for counterguerrilla operations.

## **The Philippines: Resistance and Betrayal**

The American role in waging resistance warfare against the occupying Japanese in the Philippines during World War II provided a principal foundation for the postwar doctrine of unconventional warfare. Army officers who had led guerrillas in Luzon and Mindanao were among the most influential in the formulation of postwar doctrine and in the organization of the army’s Special Forces. Russell Volckmann, who led guerrillas in northern Luzon, was a key drafter of the initial field manuals on unconventional warfare; he and Wendell Fertig, who commanded the American guerrillas on Mindanao, worked closely on the creation of Special Forces and helped establish the terms within which they operated. In the aftermath of the war, the American response to insurgency in the Philippines provided a crucible for counterinsurgency doctrine and a laboratory for unconventional tactics predating the American involvement in Vietnam. American officer Edward Geary Lansdale, who played a major role in crushing the insurgency, took his experience there to Vietnam and on to the Kennedy White House. The influence of both the resistance war and the counterinsurgency war continues to be felt in the way the United States responds to low-intensity conflict.

The long military occupation of the Philippines by Japan was challenged by active resistance movements throughout most of the island group. U. S. army officers took charge of Filipino guerrilla organizations in many areas. A different

kind of resistance movement sprang up in the most populous island of the group, Luzon, from among a rice-growing peasantry primed for revolt by a decade of declining circumstances. The peasant resistance of central Luzon fought a rather different war from that of the U. S.-led guerrillas, attacking Japanese troops and Filipino collaborators alike. American officers, on the other hand, pursued a policy of biding time until the return of the U.S. fleet; and in central Luzon, they dedicated considerably greater effort toward stamping out the armed peasantry than harrying the Japanese.

Japanese troops first landed in the southern islands of the Philippines on 9 December 1941, and they controlled central Luzon by the end of the month. As Japanese troops advanced in a swath of destruction, rape, killing, and looting, peasants in central Luzon fled with their families into the mountains. Resistance centered around a nucleus of peasant union activists and was well underway by the following March. Arms were stolen from landowners (who had by and large fled to Manila), collected from abandoned American army positions and battlefields, and captured from Filipino police collaborating with the Japanese. The resistance movement assumed the name “Hukbalahap,” an abbreviation of *Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon*, “People’s Anti-Japanese Army,” and developed directly from an earlier peasant movement. The incident generally identified as the first major action of organized resistance was an ambush led by a woman leader of the peasant movement, Felipa Culala, against a patrol of Japanese troops and Filipino police, in which some thirty firearms were recovered. [105](#)

The Japanese occupation of the Philippines, like their simultaneous move into Indochina, was facilitated by the co-optation of the existing administrative and security services. The bulk of the Philippines Constabulary, like the French

Vichy security services of Indochina, would serve the Japanese faithfully until shortly before the Allied return to the Philippines in 1944. The landowning elite, in turn, went along with the Japanese, in part because the Japanese made no move to dispossess them, and in part because their families retained their influence over the collaborationist government.<sup>106</sup> Landowners' dealings with the peasantry changed little with the Japanese invasion.

The official American approach during the war was to turn a blind eye to elite collaboration and to ban attacks by American-registered guerrillas on those in the puppet government. After the war, many of the same civilians were appointed to government posts. General MacArthur's close friend, sugar baron and prewar politician Manuel Roxas, was cleared of treason charges, despite having served the Japanese as minister responsible for rice production and economic policy;<sup>107</sup> the United States subsequently boosted Roxas into the presidency in 1946. American policy toward collaborators later played a major part in stimulating and sustaining the postwar insurgent movement.

The Japanese accommodation with the landowning elites was manifest in the structure of the security system; elements of the same system were later adapted for postwar counterinsurgency. The prewar Constabulary remained the principal institution of rural coercion and control under the Japanese-directed "Bureau of the Constabulary." The Japanese also supported what American counterinsurgency expert Charles Bohannon called "privately financed outfits formed to protect the estates of landowners cooperating with the Japanese."<sup>108</sup> These armed civilians—known as the "Civil-Guard" or "Civilian Guards"—remained a major feature of rural security after the war and (under the nominal authority of civil authorities) were incorporated into the postwar counterinsurgency apparatus. During and after the

occupation they provided both a ready instrument to enforce the political and economic prerogatives of the rural elites and a very real incentive for the peasants to organize themselves in self-defense.

The rapid pace of peasant organization in the decade before the war, particularly in central Luzon, reflected growing discontent among the peasantry in the decade before the war. The two largest national peasant organizations, the General Workers' Union (AMT), with some 70,000 members, and the National Society of Peasants in the Philippines (KPM} '), with some 60,000, had merged in early 1939 to present a united front.<sup>[109](#)</sup> Similarly, the peasant organizations of the 1930s were not spinoffs from, or dependent on, urban-based political parties—although some leaders of the peasant movement did belong to the Socialist Party or the small, largely middle-class Philippine Communist Party (PKP) founded in 1930 (the two parties merged in 1938).<sup>[110](#)</sup>

Aligned with the landlords in the looming confrontation in central Luzon was the Philippines Constabulary (PC), a force set up by the U. S. Army in 1901 along lines similar to those of the National Guards to be set up in the following decades by Marine Corps occupation forces in Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. The object was a national, paramilitary police force with primary responsibility for internal security and law enforcement. (The American armed forces were, until tested by the Japanese, to provide defense against foreign aggression.<sup>[111](#)</sup>) The PC provided the nucleus of the Philippine Commonwealth Army established in 1936, and although remaining a separate force, was after that date a part of the army.

As rural unrest grew in the 1930s, the estates of central Luzon employed civilian armed guards which, together with

the Constabulary, were increasingly called upon to confront the new peasant organizations. The structural response to agrarian unrest included nearly quadrupling Constabulary forces in critical areas between June 1938 and March 1 939; placing Pampanga and Bulacan Provinces under army and PC control for a time in 1938; and, in June 1941, placing the municipal police—the only strictly local component of the security system—under PC control in all of the central Luzon provinces, as part of a government campaign to crush “subversive, rebellious, and radical elements.”<sup>112</sup>

Although peasant organization continued to develop throughout the 1930s, the increasing conflict with landowners surprisingly involved little in the way of violence on the part of the peasantry. The brewing rural unrest fumed violent as a consequence of the Japanese invasion, the occupation, and its aftermath. The transformation of the nonviolent peasant movement into a guerrilla army was in part an immediate response to the death and destruction brought by the invader. It began as a movement for self-defense and revenge against Japanese atrocities, but rapidly developed into a broad-based resistance movement. The alliance between the Japanese and the peasants’ old adversaries, the rural elites, their armed guards, and the constabulary made resistance a matter of survival.

The Hukbalahap was in many ways a classic, eminently local peasant movement, tied to the land and fired by very immediate threats to hearth and home. The guerrillas—or Huks—were almost indistinguishable from the peasant communities through which they moved. The Hukbalahap or Huk movement was both a military and a political organization, providing a functioning parallel government at the local level. “<sup>3</sup> Their military tactics were a mixed bag of conventional methods learned by a few leaders with experience in the Philippine army reserve, veterans of the

last conventional battles with the Japanese. Peregrino Taruc, brother of the Huk leader Luis Taruc, a reserve officer with ROTC training who had fought at Bataan, was put in charge of training. Although some effort was made to organize training based on the Chinese experience, the principal training in guerrilla tactics was gained in the field.<sup>114</sup> Guerrilla actions centered on ambushes of Japanese/Constabulary patrols and convoys, raids on small detachments and government buildings, and the assassination of collaborators.

The objectives of the Hukbalahap, like those of the later Huk rebellion, were strictly limited and not particularly revolutionary. The Hukbalahap was initially a self-defense organization, fighting back against the Japanese occupation forces in a relatively haphazard fashion. In the course of the war it developed into a structured organization, but remained a fundamentally local, defensive movement, without the kind of comprehensive political program or ideological orientation that was characteristic of many European resistance movements. The main political goal was the expulsion of the Japanese and the removal from power of collaborationist Filipinos. The social goals were no more revolutionary than those of the peasant movements of the 1930s. The expressed desires of the tenant farmers that comprised the bulk of the Hukbalahap were simply physical security and a fair deal with the landlords in the division of the harvest.

The Huks placed considerably more faith in the return of the U.S. armed forces than in the force of revolutionary arms to expel the Japanese. The resistance fighters expected at war's end due recognition of their role and, with the promised independence of the Philippines (already pledged by the U.S. government to become effective in 1946) the



restoration of a semblance of agrarian justice in central Luzon.

The Hukbalahap's infrastructure of peasant organizations and communities was unique in the resistance to the Japanese occupation, although scores of other armed groups emerged under American direction. The U.S.-led forces were guerrillas (or partisans) organized from above, in conventional American command structures. The commanders of the U.S. Army's guerrillas view of the Hukbalahap was ideologically biased, influenced by the same elite economic interests that had generated the repression of the central Luzon peasant movement in the years before the war.

At the top of the American hierarchy, General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the U. S. Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE), was himself a second-generation American colonial officer. His father, General Arthur MacArthur, had served in the conquest of the Philippines, and in 1900 and 1901, as the American military governor of the Philippines—a virtual viceroy. The principal American commanders of USAFFE guerrillas were reserve officers, businessmen, and professionals with financial interests in the country and long-standing relations with the Filipino landholding elites. Brigadier General (reserve) Courtney Whitney, whom MacArthur made responsible for the guerrilla operation throughout the Philippines, was a Manila-based corporate lawyer known for his ferocious antiunion, antisocialist, anticommunist views.

U.S. Reserve Officer Wendell Fertig, commander of guerrilla forces on the southern island of Mindanao, was a mining engineer who had worked in the Philippines for five years—and, as a missionary there observed, he knew how to treat Filipinos.<sup>[115](#)</sup> A Lt. Col. McGee, a West Pointer who had

been a planter on Mindanao for twenty years, was put in command of a force, the 106th Division, in Cotabato in the Islamic southwest of the island. Some of the other Americans gathered under Fertig's command were appalled at the planter mentality of the mining engineers, estate owners, and old colonels incorporated into Fertig's command structure, complaining that the Old Filipinos, as the old hands referred to themselves, treated the Filipinos inhumanly.<sup>116</sup>

Four conditions were laid down by MacArthur's Far East Command (FECOM) for American recognition of guerrilla groups: the guerrillas were to

*remain united under one command...; the guerrillas must not usurp but must support the local civil government; combat activity against the Japanese was to be limited to protection of guerrilla facilities, and the leader was to faithfully carry out his responsibilities to strengthen his organization and gather intelligence.*<sup>117</sup>

Official guerrilla status opened the way to supplies of arms and equipment, pay (Colonel Fertig was authorized *to print* currency to pay troops and local leaders),<sup>118</sup> the promise of postwar veterans benefits, and exoneration of what might in normal times be considered criminal actions. The prosecution of the Hukbalahap for operations against the Japanese and collaborationist forces, on charges of banditry, murder, and other common crimes, was justified on the grounds that their actions were "unauthorized. "

Colonel Fertig was unhappy with MacArthur's orders, since he was aware that a policy of nonengagement would leave him high and dry with no Filipino supporters. He bucked the policy to the extent necessary to maintain his organization, but not so far as to appear insubordinate. (He complained in

a letter that “instructions were to undertake no offensive action against the enemy. This has been followed, but the enemy did not receive the same orders.”<sup>119</sup>) He appears, however, to have concurred with MacArthur’s view that the *purpose* of his guerrilla operation was not primarily to bleed the Japanese or drive them from the islands but to retain a foothold from which to prepare to assist an eventual return of massive, conventional U.S. military force. According to this conception, the full potential of guerrilla action was to be unleashed only on the eve of D-Day.

Colonel Fertig’s views on the “guerrilla” role in the Philippines are consistent with those he held later as the second chief of the Special Operations Division at the U. S. Psychological Warfare Center set up in 1951 (the first, whom he succeeded in July 1951, was OSS veteran Colonel Aaron Bank).<sup>120</sup> In Fertig’s view, the “guerrilla” was a multipurpose concept suitable either to resist an invader or to counter other guerrillas. In Mindanao, the American guerrillas provided the U.S. Army the services of “sabotage, information collection, reconnaissance guides, and a well-trained counter-guerrilla force.”<sup>121</sup> Colonel Fertig’s mayor part in setting up the army’s Special Forces in the 1950s built upon this experience.

In central Luzon, the U. S. Army’s efforts to organize a guerrilla force contrasted dramatically with the success of the Hukbalahap, in part because of MacArthur’s restrictions on U. S.-led units, and in part because of the quality of American leadership there. Colonel Fertig in Mindanao had at least balked at the orders not to attack the Japanese—if only on practical grounds. On the other hand, the central Luzon USAFFE commanders appear to have wholeheartedly adhered to the policy, and interpreted their own main role as that of reining in the Huks and protecting the landowning interests and associated local officials from what they

defined as “banditry.” Relations with the Huks deteriorated accordingly. Periodic attacks on Huk units by USAFFE guerrillas were later described by American sources as enforcement of the “lie low” policy; in resentment of Huk action, the hog-tied USAFFE forces “went so far as to ambush Huk units to prevent them from engaging the Japs.”<sup>122</sup>

The Hukbalahap insistence on retaining local control of their movement was based in large part on two aspects of U.S. policy. The “lie low” order banning attacks on the Japanese and their puppets perhaps made sense to MacArthur, who envisioned a rapid return to the islands with overwhelming force, but was unthinkable (if not incomprehensible) to the local people. MacArthur wanted an intelligence apparatus and irregular auxiliary forces in place for his eventual return; the Huks were protecting their families. Furthermore, the Americans insisted the Huks dismantle their political infrastructure in the villages: The orders were to protect discreetly the collaborationist civil administration and not to create potentially lasting subversive alternatives. In short, the very concept of the American “guerrilla” was out of sync with the grassroots nature of the Huks. The Americans were out to recruit a compliant mercenary force in the service of American interests.

A third concern of the Hukbalahap, intimately related to the irrationality of the American guerrilla concept, was the character of USAFFE personnel and the behavior of USAFFE units. Neither did particular credit to the American officers responsible. Benedict Kerkvliet’s interviews of central Luzon villagers and other sources suggest quite convincingly that USAFFE personnel were despised by the rural population. Many “said the USAFFE, which was much smaller than the Hukbalahap, mainly included men who either were close to

the government or were hoodlums whom the Hukbalahap had rejected. They stole food and money from villagers and seemed not to care whether they had popular support.” While the Hukbalahap was at once a political and military organization, USAFFE neither had a grass-roots base nor sought one. While preying on the peasantry for supplies, the USAFFE units of central Luzon showed no mettle in attacking the Constabulary or the Japanese, while maintaining contacts with local elites in the occupation administration.

American officers appear to have quite coolly rationalized that “guerrilla” forces—*their* forces—were not necessarily bound by either the laws of war or the rules of peace. If in need of supplies, foraging from the villagers was by necessity legitimate; and since they had no political support organization, such actions were not infrequent. USAFFE became known as “tuliSAFFE,” a pun on the word *tulisan*, meaning thief. Even in Mindanao, where Hukbalahap propaganda had no influence, a water buffalo stolen by guerrillas was said to have been “USAFFEd.”<sup>[123](#)</sup>

Charles Bohannon, a leader of USAFFE guerrillas throughout the war, concluded that successful guerrillas required rather more than professional American leadership:

- *Successful guerrillas must have a cause, an ideal. They must constantly appeal to it, must seek to make their actions conform to it, must relate them to it.*
- *Even with a cause which has widespread support, guerrillas who employ excessive terror cannot succeed against a hated enemy who makes a real attempt to win the support of the people.*

- *To enjoy continuing success and support, the guerrilla needs a civil government, even though it may be shadowy, with representation in the communities in his area....*[124](#)

The same qualitative differences between the Huk grass-roots resistance and the U.S.-directed forces later characterized American unconventional warfare efforts to organize dependent “guerrilla” forces, from Vietnam and Angola to Nicaragua. Fertig’s approach to guerrilla organization bore little relation to that of the partisans of the European theater, where American and British officers advised and assisted indigenous forces, and even less to later revolutionary guerrilla movements. The Americans in Mindanao followed a traditional colonial pattern of working to recruit indigenous peoples through local elites (notably the chiefs or *datu* of the Moros, and the *caciques*, or Christian political and economic strongmen), and combined coercion and cajolery with cash down and the promise of future advantage.

From a nucleus of American and Filipino army forces of some 200 in mid-1942, Fertig moved to take control of existing resistance forces, and claimed some 15,000 men by March 1943.[125](#) In Mindanao, in contrast to central Luzon, the guerrilla forces that emerged were subordinate to

local strongmen, even some veritable warlords, whose fighters in large part constituted personal followings. Fertig sought to win over the existing elites and, with their support, to rein in the guerrilla forces of individual war leaders, who he thought represented as much of a threat to the Filipino social order as did the Japanese. The co-opting of the Christian elite of the Misamis region on the north coast, where Fertig would make his headquarters, involved winning over the Church and the “boss” of the area, Doña Carmen de

Ozamis, the widow of a powerful politician who was said to be the “unofficial owner” of Misamis. Fertig later attributed the success of his “guerrilla” movement to a private dinner party with Doña Carmen, her house priest, and her adviser, which won their support: “[T]he Mindanao guerrilla was finally born at Doña Carmen’s supper party.”<sup>126</sup>

The Islamic elites included both the *datu* or chiefs, and wealthy landowners exercising almost feudal sway over their territories. The latter included Pendatum, a Moro lawyer and landowner in Cotabato who had organized (and presumably financed) a force of several thousand men on his own initiative—a force initially raised to protect his own vast properties.<sup>127</sup> Leaders like Pendatum were advised that their postwar political prospects would be considerably enhanced by knuckling under to American control of their guerrilla forces (the country’s civil administration was packed with USAFFE leaders after the war). As Fertig told a Moro leader in Cotabato, he could either collaborate (and receive appropriate compensation) or his force would “simply be classified as a group of bandits.”<sup>128</sup> The American approach to guerrilla organization was strictly a matter of appropriate manpower. The “supper party” guerrilla, the contracting or trading of guerrilla fighters at the whim of elite managers (tribal, economic, mercenary), would be a hallmark of American unconventional warfare in the decades to follow.

A principal objective of the American command was to bring under its control, or else to destroy, independent guerrilla forces. A major guerrilla force raised from what Fertig called “masterless men”—and which he set out to destroy—was organized by two fanatically Christian Filipino-Americans, “Captain” Luis Morgan and Lieutenant William Tait.<sup>129</sup> Fertig moved first to co-opt Morgan, sending him as his emissary to unite other independent forces; however, in

his absence, Fertig appointed new commanders and made a pact with Moro leaders and, by July 1943, had largely neutralized his influence. Confronted with united Moro opposition, Morgan was induced to suspend his revolt and depart for Australia in September 1943.<sup>130</sup> The deployment of U.S.-sponsored guerrillas against both the Japanese forces and independent guerrillas was a logical precedent for the later merging of guerrilla and counter guerrilla concepts in the American special operations doctrine of the 1950s.

Colonel Fertig's guerrilla warfare strategy eschewed the rules and usages of warfare, both in his efforts to subdue independent guerrilla leaders and in his operations against the Japanese. He apparently decided that this same "anything goes" policy applied—as a military necessity—to the civilian population. Aware that Japanese brutality provoked resistance, Colonel Fertig was not adverse to bringing Japanese reprisals down on the heads of the uncooperative natives. A case in point was an eastern coastal area in which a Japanese officer had treated people well and local leaders had refused to support Fertig's forces. The USAFFE guerillas conducted a campaign of sabotage and assassination of Japanese officers and civilian leaders in the area to provoke the Japanese into taking "the kind of reprisals that *will* put the people on our side"—the kind of deliberate provocation that American doctrine would later describe as characteristic of revolutionary insurgents.<sup>131</sup>

Colonel Fertig's rationale, like that of later counterinsurgents, was that "there could be no neutrals, no middle ground. "<sup>132</sup> "Support of the people was absolutely fundamental" and was virtually guaranteed by Japanese tactics; "as long as the Japanese were bestial, popular support of the resistance was assured. And as long as there was resistance, the Japanese would continue to be



bestial.”<sup>133</sup> Fertig told a newly arrived army officer of his satisfaction at increasing reports of Japanese atrocities:

*Well, that's fine.... If the Japs put a philanthropist in charge, where would we be? It's tough on the people, but it puts it up to them: they are either for us and against the Japanese, or they are against us and for the Japanese. If they help us, the Japs will get them. If they help the Japs we'll kill them, or plant the word that they've really been helping us, SO that the Japs will kill them for us.*<sup>134</sup>

Fertig explained that although “we have to use terror ourselves,” it was a “tricky” business, because “you have to show that the enemy is evil while you are good.”<sup>135</sup> Even Fertig’s largely sympathetic biographer John Keats, notes, “neither Fertig nor the Japanese were concerned with the truth that terror, in the long run, always fails....”<sup>136</sup>

Operations against the Japanese, while limited under the terms of MacArthur’s edicts, were unlimited in terms of the laws of war. Assassination was de rigueur when carried out in a disciplined manner, and mutilation was encouraged by the payment of U. S. bounties for Japanese body parts. “Fertig secured the loyalty of the legendary lord Datu Pino by paying him 20 centavos and one bullet for each set of Japanese ears Pino brought him. By 1945 he was delivering ears by the jar.”<sup>137</sup> Although perhaps rationalized by the Americans on the grounds that Moro- Christian feuding had long involved equally barbaric practices, the arrangement was consistent with the “anything goes” nature of the U.S. doctrine of unconventional warfare in the 1950s; similar practices would be a feature of later American counterinsurgency programs in Indochina, Central America, Portuguese Africa—and, of course, in the conflict in the Philippines today.<sup>138</sup>

The Mindanao guerrilla operation began to come apart even before Fertig's command had destroyed or neutralized the independent guerrilla leaders, when the Japanese launched their first concerted attack on his headquarters at Misamis City on 23 June 1943. Guerrilla forces (and much of the civilian population) fled for the hills almost without a fight, while Japanese troops carried out a scorched earth campaign to deny the guerrillas support by burning houses, destroying crops, and killing farm animals. When the smoke cleared, Fertig's forces were reduced to some 8,000 men and, kept on the run, rapidly declined to less than a third of that when the Americans returned in 1945. [139](#)

The Japanese occupation raised the cost of rural dissent, equating nonviolent with violent resistance and rapidly introducing measures to counter the emerging Hukbalahap. Japanese counterguerrilla tactics against the Huks in central Luzon, and elsewhere against U. S.-supported guerrillas, were not that different from the tactics used by the European powers in quelling colonial uprisings. Guerrillas were "bandits" outside the law and could be shot on sight. Punitive expeditions could act on a principle of collective responsibility, holding communities as a whole responsible for actions in their vicinities. Torture was routine, and suspects who died under torture frequently disappeared. Tens of thousands of prisoners held in internment camps died of hunger and disease. [140](#) On

Mindanao, bounties were paid for dead guerrillas. One million of the 16 million or so Filipinos at the outbreak of war with Japan are estimated to have died in the course of the occupation, a large proportion of them in the devastation of Manila and other areas in the last stages of the war. [141](#) Population control measures imposed by the Japanese included issuing identity cards and a system of mandatory travel passes for movement outside local communities. In

one basic counterinsurgency measure what the Japanese called *zona*, a strong force of Japanese troops and Filipino Constabulary would surround an area and bring all of the men into a central square:

*Like a flash... thirty or forty Japanese and PC would swoop down on a barrio or a section of town and surround the place. Anyone who moved or objected in any way could be shot, no questions asked. They were looking for people who might be in the resistance movement. Anyone whom they suspected was hauled off and detained indefinitely, frequently beaten up and tortured. . . .* [142](#)

Suspects were checked against population records and scanned by hooded informants and screened out as potential guerrillas, spies, or sympathizers. [143](#)

A Japanese effort at *counterorganization*, organizing the population for grass-roots intelligence and indoctrination purposes, was undertaken after the creation in December 1942 of Kalibapi, an official party (all others were proscribed) in which membership of civil servants was compulsory. [144](#) The local instruments of counterorganization were the “Neighborhood Associations” set up under the aegis of Kalibapi. In theory, it was much like the French system developed in Indochina and Algeria: It was intended to monitor and control the movements, and to account for the activities of, all the inhabitants. The base unit was a group of ten families: “The leader of a unit was responsible for the actions of every member of each of the ten families... for periodically reporting the exact number of individuals under his ten roofs and for explaining any additions or reductions to their number.” The Neighborhood Associations were also to be the channel for the distribution of rationed food and commodities. Although implementation of this

system appears to have been uneven, the units formed the lowest rung of a hierarchy and reported to a section, which in turn reported to a district. Reports were complemented by spot checks by Filipino collaborators and Japanese patrols.<sup>[145](#)</sup>

Although perhaps theoretically sound as a totalitarian system of population control, the system appears to have failed as a result of administrative inattention and grass-roots resistance to collaboration. In central Luzon, the system even provided a useful cover for the civilian side of the Hukbalahap resistance. In some areas of central Luzon, the official Neighborhood Associations provided the framework for the Hukbalahap Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC); in this way, while collecting “supplies, money and information for the guerrillas.”<sup>[146](#)</sup>

The American return to the Philippines began with troops landing on the island of Leyte on 20 October 1944, with major fighting continuing in Luzon until the end of June 1945. On Mindanao and more isolated islands, fighting continued until the formal surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945.

Hukbalahap forces fought in conjunction with the Americans in their advance from the north through central Luzon toward Manila, and helped to clear the Japanese from mountain redoubts. In central Luzon, American troops found some towns, as well as a military air base in Floridablanca, had already been cleared of Japanese forces by Hukbalahap military action. The Huks and their communities welcomed the return of U. S. troops with banners, American flags, music, and speeches. Hopes and expectations that this open-arms reception would be reciprocated in a postwar relation of mutual respect were soon dashed.

A 20 December 1945 U.S. Army report extolled the military assistance of Hukbalahap forces that had fought “side by side” with American troops in the drive to the south, and concluded, “In terms of value in dollars and cents and American lives saved, the work of the Hukbalahap compares favorably with that of any other guerrilla unit throughout the Philippine Islands. <sup>147</sup> Although the Huks won the respect of the American field commanders with whom they worked, higher military authorities rapidly quashed any formal recognition of the Hukbalahap role. In the view of MacArthur and the Filipino elites, the Hukbalahap were a communist organization no less dangerous than the Japanese. The American high command proceeded to orchestrate repression of the movement by the U.S. Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), the USAFFE guerrillas, and the previously collaborationist Constabulary and Civilian Guard forces. The U. S. government was also party to a postwar cover-up of the Philippine elite’s collaboration with the Japanese, and steered Filipinos who had held high office under the Japanese into postwar administrations. The American policymakers appeared determined to preserve the economic status quo ante, while coming down hard to reverse the wartime ascendancy of the peasant- based Hukbalahap.

As American troops advanced through central Luzon, American officers appointed Filipinos to posts in a temporary administration in the liberated towns and provinces. The administrations set up by the Hukbalahap stepped aside to make way for American appointees, even though these included “individuals with reputations for being pro-Japanese and prominent USAFFE personalities.”<sup>148</sup> American CIC officers scrupulously avoided appointing individuals associated with the Hukbalahap, and tended to restore local government to its prewar complexion. The new civil authorities, moreover, were provided with “armed guards”

and, eventually, a reconstituted Constabulary—called “Military Police”—raised from USAFFE and collaborationist Constabulary. As in Greece in the last days under Nazi occupation, when collaborationist Security Battalions shifted gracefully from Nazi to Allied control, the Japanese-allied Filipino forces made a fairly smooth transition to postwar respectability. The Hukbalahap (and the preexistent peasant movement) were thus excluded from the postwar administration and security apparatus, while their wartime enemies acceded to positions of privilege and power.

As early as January 1945, American CIC forces in the Philippines began to disarm Hukbalahap guerrilla forces and to arrest their leaders. The army’s CIC was charged with detecting and investigating “all matters pertaining to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, disaffection and subversive activity”—an activity aimed primarily against the Hukbalahap, as the issue of collaboration gradually went by the board.<sup>149</sup> Just as the Greek partisan leaders were confined to prison islands by the Allies after the withdrawal of the occupation forces, the U.S. Army and its Filipino trustees moved to hamstring the “communist” Hukbalahap movement. Huk leaders, including their top commander Luis Taruc were jailed on charges of “subversion, kidnapping, murder and communisnt” and held in detention camps with those Filipino collaborators too notorious to be overlooked. Some, including Taruc, were released In September 1945 in the wake of mass demollstrations of peasants who had traveled to the capital to demand their freedom.<sup>150</sup>

Many Hukbalahap members were detained and summarily (and illegally) executed. The most notorious incident of the kind was the detention and massacre in early February 1945 of 109 members of the Hukbalahap Squadron 77 returning after their participation in the march to Manila. On passing through the liberated town of Malolos, then in the control of

U.S. CIC and Filipino USAFFE guerrillas, they were surrounded by soldiers, disarmed, and forced to dig a mass grave. They were then shot on the orders of USAFFE Colonel Adonias Maclang, with the agreement of American CIC officers there.<sup>[151](#)</sup>

The arrests and murders of February 1945 were only the beginning of a campaign of repression that would drive the central Luzon peasantry into rebellion against its own government a year later. What was surprising was the slowness with which Hukbalahap leaders recognized their true position. In September 1945, upon the release of some of their principal commanders, among them Taruc, the leadership formally declared the dissolution of the organization and applied for recognition by American authorities for the services rendered to the war effort. A complete roster of Hukbalahap guerrillas was delivered to the U. S. Army's Counter Intelligence Corps by Huk leaders as a requirement for the formal recognition and veterans benefits—and as an expression of good faith. The lists, however, were used not in good faith but as a blacklist for harassment, arrest, or murder. The list was also circulated by the CIC to landlords, leading to wholesale evictions of tenant farmers. A U.S. Army report of October 1945 observed that Huk veterans were “being traced and killed by both [USAFFE] guerrillas and Puppet Constabulary and. . . are being rounded up by the U.S. Armed Forces.”<sup>[152](#)</sup>

The prelude to the April 1946 elections and their aftermath converted the anger and dismay at the postliberation repression of the Huks into open rebellion. The disbanding of Hukbalahap military units in the first months of 1945 had been followed by the resurrection of the prewar peasant organizations under a new National Peasants Union (PKM). Most of its leaders had been prominent in the prewar KPMP and AMT, and some, but by no means many,

were Communist Party members who had led the Hukbalahap.<sup>153</sup> Its main objective, as before the war, was securing a fair share of the crop for its tenant farmer membership, primarily by enforcing existing legislation.

Like the prewar organizations of central Luzon, the PKM sought a way out of the rural dilemma by means of electoral politics and fielded candidates for the 1946 elections through a reformist, anticollaborationist coalition called the Democratic Alliance (DA). After December 1945, repression of PKM/DA supporters and leaders escalated rapidly, with arbitrary arrests, attacks on rallies by “civilian guards” and Military Police, and the murder of several local leaders. In a 16 January 1946 telegram to [resident Truman, Luis Taruc protested against what he described as “partial martial law” in Nueva Ecija and gave statistics of civilians murdered, wounded, or jailed by military police there. Taruc asked for American pledges to be upheld: SITUATION DANGEROUS IF NOT EASED MAY LEAD TO CIVIL STRIFE. REQUEST ENFORCEMENT OF YOUR DIRECTIVES.<sup>154</sup> Repression notwithstanding, the six PKM/DA candidates for congressional seats in central Luzon won overwhelming majorities (Luis Taruc, candidate for Pampanga, won 39,289 votes to the 1,312 of his next closest rival).<sup>155</sup> The electoral victory of the DA turned to ashes in the course of the first session of the new Congress. Prompted by President Roxas, the Speaker of the House of Representatives “suspended” the six DA candidates, claiming they had used “terror and illegal means to win” (although the necessary resolution to suspend them was never voted).<sup>156</sup>

In the months that followed the elections, popular dismay in central Luzon at the exclusion of their elected representatives was exacerbated by a rise in extralegal violence by Military Policemen and civilian guards. Over 500 PKM supporters and leaders were reported killed within two



months, while some 1,500 others were imprisoned, tortured, or “disappeared.”<sup>157</sup> Many former Hukbalahap went underground to form what they called a “peasant army,” although top leaders continued to meet with [‘resident Roxas and other officials in an effort to negotiate an end to the killings by means of a “pacification” program. Open rebellion, however, awaited high treachery. Juan Feleo, a prewar peasant leader, Hukbalahap hero, and PKM negotiator, was traveling with a Military Police escort on 24 August 1946 to participate in the “pacification” talks. He and his party—his wife and five others—never reached their destination. His escort later said they had been “kidnapped.” A headless body identified as that of Juan Feleo was reported found in the Pampanga River two weeks later, with the bodies of four of his companions nearby.<sup>158</sup>

With the murder of Juan Feleo, members of the central Luzon peasant organization moved rapidly, although disjointedly, to organize a peasant army. Self-defense groups set up even before the elections called themselves simply part of a “peasants’ army.” This title would remain in common usage, as would their previous wartime name: the rearmed peasants called themselves “Huks. “ A number of more grandiose names

for the new “army” was introduced in the year after Feleo’s death; the name finally decided upon (and first used in June 1947) was the *Hukbong Mapagpalaya* ng Bayan (HMB), “People’s Liberation Army.” Although the movement would be known as the HMB, the guerrillas would be known as Huks from the first outbreaks of revolt in 1946 when the Huk Rebellion began in earnest.

# Chapter 4: Toward a New Counterinsurgency: Philippines, Laos, and Vietnam

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

The Philippines' counterinsurgency campaign that followed the Huk move to open revolt in 1946 was known as President Roxas's "mailed fist" or "iron fist" policy (the CIA would later describe it as a policy of "gradual extermination"). The full force of the army, the Constabulary and the civilian guards was thrown against the Huk forces when they could be found, and, more frequently, against the peasant communities associated with them. Villages were mortared, shelled, and burned, suspects were rounded up and shot.<sup>1</sup> The repression was largely carried out on traditional punitive lines, and in *many* areas it was considered worse than the Japanese occupation. Some of the counterinsurgency measures were the same as those used by the Japanese, including the *zona* and the "magic eye" (identification by a hooded informant).<sup>2</sup> Population movement was severely restricted by means of passes issued, for a fee, by mayors and provincial authorities, with imprisonment, beatings, or even death as punishment for traveling without one.<sup>3</sup>

By 1948 the net effect of the Roxas government's "iron fist" campaign was a Huk movement that probably more

than doubled in size, though retaining its local orientation and limited objectives. The death of President Roxas on 14 April 1948 (from natural causes) and the accession to power of Vice President Elpidio Quirino led, for a few months, to negotiations between HMB leaders and the new president, and to good prospects for a peaceful solution to the conflict.<sup>4</sup> The brief truce, which had never been fully effective,, ended when an amnesty period ran out. In some areas, PKM and HMB members who had presented themselves to local authorities were beaten, had their arms confiscated, or were killed; in others, Constabulary and civilian guards had continued attacking villages and seeking out subversives as usual.

The Huk Rebellion reached its high point between 1949 and early 1951, with 11,000 to 15,000 men and women in arms. The Huk combatants were organized into Field Commands (FCs) ranging from 100 to 700 guerrillas, with FC headquarters located in mountain and swamp areas and each force covering its own local area. As with the wartime Hukbalahap, the HMB moved in small groups in and out of the peasant communities of the area, and depended on “barrio organizers” for political and material support, although a complex regional infrastructure was established.<sup>5</sup> The heartland of the HMB movement remained the four central provinces of Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac, and Bulacan, although the organization had extended to areas of Nueva Vizcaya and parts of Pangasinan, Laguna, Bataan, and Quezon. Even in the central Luzon heartland, Huk military operations remained essentially defensive, a resistance movement against overwhelming external force. Huk forces carried out ambushes, raided outposts, cut roads, and “confiscated” funds and property to sustain the movement; they neither held nor sought to hold territory, and there was never any question of liberated zones.<sup>6</sup>

The stubbornly local nature of the movement, drawing on central Luzon's 1.5 million people (of the Philippines' 23 million), was only one of the reasons for its ultimate failure. The HMB movement's failure to evolve into a popular, national movement with clear objectives left it extremely vulnerable to both the aggressive, programmatic counterinsurgency initiated in 1950, as well as to highly publicized rural projects designed to undermine Huk support—including well- drilling, health clinics, military-backed courts to hear tenant-landlord disputes, and loans to peasant farmers. As in later American psy-war reform projects, from Vietnam to El Salvador, at least half of the funding for the rural development projects was provided by U.S. economic aid.<sup>7</sup> The decline of the Huk movement began in earnest after 1951, as its peasant base gradually withdrew. The “official” end of the Huk Rebellion has been dated May 1954, when Huk leader Luis Taruc surrendered after talks with a presidential emissary, Benigno Aquino, Jr. (whose murder in 1983 would precipitate the long fall of Ferdinand Marcos), although as late as 1969 groups of Huk guerrillas continued to carry out assaults on government forces and the landed elites in many areas. The back—and heart—of the revolt, however, was broken in 1954.

In 1969, remnants of the HMB and a breakaway faction of the Communist Party came together to form a new, national guerrilla organization, the New People's Army (NPA). By then, the agrarian conditions that had motivated the Huk Rebellion in the 1940s and 1950s had worsened throughout much of the nation. The emergence in the 1960s of mass organizations of students, trade unionists, slum dwellers, and multisectoral political opposition groups in the capital and other urban areas provided new and powerful allies to the previously isolated peasants. The post- Huk revolt that sputtered and flared in the 1970s would emerge in the 1980s as a full-fledged revolutionary movement active

throughout much of the national territory. The counterinsurgency methods in use today in the Philippines draw directly from both the experience of the 1950s and the later development of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and practice.

Although the influence of the Philippine Communist Party (PKP) on the rise of the HMB was relatively minor, and its later attempt to control the Huk Rebellion proved ineffective, the role of the PKP stood out in the analysis of the U. S. military. Even though the agrarian roots of the conflict were recognized, the ideological viewpoint that categorized the Huks as communists dominated practical policy. Some early CIA and military reports provided a fairly measured assessment of the Huk movement, but by 1950 the view of the Huks as a phenomenon of the Cold War prevailed. A 16 January 1946 Military Intelligence (G-2) report presented a rather fair view of the economic background of the wartime Hukbalahap, observing that they lived in the Luzon Plain, an area in which “98% of the land is owned by 2% of the people,” whereas “the majority of the people are tenant farmers who raise rice and pay 50% of their production in land rent.”<sup>8</sup> While attributing the strength of the movement to the agrarian situation, it suggested a gradual infiltration by leftist leaders:

*During the occupation by the Japanese, the Japanese took 75% of the rice production in tax. This created an opportunity for patriots to organize guerrilla bands to fight the Japanese as a means of survival.... After the Hukbalahap movement became effective, certain liberals (with communistic leanings) decided to proclaim themselves as members of the Hukbalahap and use it as a means of political power.*<sup>9</sup>

A March 1949 CIA situation report on the Huks attributed “lawlessness” primarily to “the presence of an historical and inequitable land-tenure system which results in a life of poverty for large masses of the peasantry.”<sup>10</sup> The CIA report also criticized the policy of naked repression as potentially counterproductive:

*While government suppression campaigns continue with temporary local success, the Huks, whose armed strength is 8-10,000, are loosely organized and have sufficient allies both among brigands and among the discontented peasantry to be able to melt away and regroup.... [A]ny attack on the basic problem of agrarian discontent is frustrated by the wealthy landlord class' domination of the Government. There is some indication that government policy has now settled on a gradual extermination campaign against the Huks. In point of fact, such a policy would stiffen Huk resistance and allow further Communist exploitation of Huk grievances.*<sup>11</sup>

Major Edward Geary Lansdale made a more patently ideological analysis. In a 14 March 1946 cable he maintained that the leaders of the wartime Hukbalahap were all “true disciples of Karl Marx,” hell-bent on revolution.<sup>12</sup> And, in a convoluted twist of logic that would become characteristic of U. S. policy, Lansdale maintained that the mass following of the Hukbalahap was won primarily through terror. Although Lansdale would later be known as a “thinking” counterinsurgent, aware of the injustices that promoted insurgency and anxious to see them righted, in classified documents he appears rather less sensitive and rather more paranoid vis- à-vis the Communist threat:

*[I]n the provinces of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, Bulacan and Pangasinan, they are establishing or have established a reign of terror. So ironclad is their grip and*

*so feared is their power that the peasants dare not oppose them in many localities. Upon liberation, their members were about 50,000; sources IIOW report some 150,000 tribute-paying members.... [The Hukbalahap] is now organized into trigger men, castor oil boys, and just big strong . . . ruffians to keep the more meek in line .<sup>13</sup>*

The vehemence of Lansdale's official diatribes on the Huks contrasted somewhat with the record of his more private thoughts. In a personal journal kept during part of 1947 and 1948, he expressed more respect for the Huks, although he was still convinced of their "communist" domination:

*Most of the Huks are now youngsters under twenty with "old men" in their early thirties as leaders. Most of them believe in the rightness of what they're doing, even though some of the leaders are on the communist side of politics. And, there is a bad situation, needing reform, which still exists in central Luzon. Agrarian reforms still seems to exist only on paper and I suppose armed complaint is a natural enough thing after the guerrilla heritage of most of these people.<sup>14</sup>*

But for the official record, the Huks were commies and the job was to eliminate them.

American policymakers appear to have become alarmed over the Philippines security situation in the course of 1949, as the Huk movement grew in strength and Cold War anxiety rose over developments in Asia and the Pacific. In May 1950, a Joint Chiefs of Staff study advised the Secretary of Defense that the Philippine government's strength had "seriously declined" in the previous months and warned that the trend could lead to the "early collapse" of the pro-American government. American failure to react would "inevitably result" in the rise of a procommunist regime.<sup>15</sup> A

CIA situation report dated a month later was less histrionic, the predicted crisis less imminent: If the decline continued “for as much as ten years pro-Communist forces might be able to seize power.”<sup>16</sup> There was, however, agreement that American assistance was required to roll back the communist threat.

The preparations for Philippine independence in 1946 had included American assistance in organizing and equipping the Military Police Command (Constabulary) and a trimmed-down postwar military establishment. Insofar as threats to the Philippines’ external or internal security were deemed minimal, American assistance was relatively low (it included a vast quantity of leftover war materials, of questionable utility, left behind for the Philippine army). The plan provided American arms and equipment for a 33,000-man army, with almost two-thirds of its strength (19,203) assigned to the Military Police Command.<sup>17</sup> External defense was guaranteed by the United States, if only because of the strategic position of the Philippines and the numerous base facilities retained by treaty after independence. The Constabulary, nearly twice as large as the army and technically a reserve component of the armed forces, remained close to its 1946 level and carried out the bulk of government actions against the Huks. <sup>18</sup>

Army intelligence personnel, notably officers of the U.S. Counter Intelligence Corps, worked from the immediate aftermath of the war to organize a Philippines military intelligence corps and began steps to establish a Philippines central intelligence organization in 1948. By January 1948, the welter of intelligence units included G-2 divisions of the army and the Constabulary, the Manila Police Secret Service, the Secret Service Agents of Malacañang, the Secret Service Agents of the Manila Harbor Police, the National Bureau of



Investigation (modeled loosely on the FBI), and the Immigration Bureau. [19](#)

In June 1950, American alarm over the Huk Rebellion prompted a presidential order for a program for the rapid reorganization and expansion of Philippine combat forces, funded by the diversion of \$9.3 million from other headings in Cold War aid allocations. [20](#) This emergency aid was in large part earmarked for the equipping and training of sixteen Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs); these highly mobile, semiautonomous, multipurpose command battalions, much like the *Groupement Mobile* devised by the French in Indochina (although lacking its armor and enormous firepower), were the means by which the war was to be taken to the insurgents. [21](#)

Special assistance rushed through in 1950 included the U.S.-directed reorganization of the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) and the creation of a combat intelligence school. [22](#) A second allocation of \$10 million was approved by President Truman on 9 May 1951 to permit the creation of more BCTs, bringing the total to twenty-six. Disbursement levels jumped from \$1.5 million in Fiscal Year 1950 to \$6.9 million in 1951 and \$11.2 million in 1952. [23](#) The combined army, navy, and air force personnel levels rose to 54,000 by 1953. [24](#) The combined army and Philippines Constabulary (PC) force level rose dramatically from 32,000 at the beginning of 1950 to 40,000 in 1951 and 56,000 in late 1952. [25](#) Air power, too, became increasingly important as U.S. assistance stepped up, with some 2,600 bombing and strafing runs reported between 1 August 1950 and 30 June 1952 alone (some sorties allegedly with support from U. S. planes out of Clark Air Force Base). [26](#) Requests for napalm were initially turned down on State Department advice, but from late 1951 American napalm was supplied and used

both for crop destruction and antipersonnel purposes.<sup>27</sup> A record system devised for Philippine military intelligence, which traced all known supporters of the wartime Huk resistance movement, was operational by the end of 1950; according to one source, it was used in screening operations that resulted in some 15,000 arrests in the first six months of 1951.<sup>28</sup>

There was also an important change in the largely conventional orientation of the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG). An April 1950 embassy report had criticized both the Philippine style of counterinsurgency and the orientation of JUSMAG in Manila.<sup>29</sup> The report, while warning that sending U. S. troops would be counterproductive, recommended the assignment to JUSMAG of “a substantial number of officers having actual experience in guerrilla and anti-guerrilla operations and particularly involving Communist led forces....” A special request was made for officers involved in “the recent operations in Greece.”<sup>30</sup>

The Joint Chiefs of Staff—whose chairman was then-General Omar Bradley—concurred, recommending an increase in JUSMAG strength to thirty-two officers and twenty-six enlisted men. They also agreed that U.S. troops were not called for; rather, “remedial political and economic measures” were required to remove the causes of the insurrection. In an early precedent for the 1960s Internal Defense and Development counterinsurgency programs, the Joint Chiefs urged the National Security Council (NSC) to approve “prompt and positive political and economic action to arrest and reverse the current political deterioration in the Philippines.”<sup>31</sup>

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The turning point in Philippine counterinsurgency has generally been identified as the appointment, on American advice, of former USAFFE guerrilla Ramón Magsaysay as Minister of National Defense in September 1950. Magsaysay had long been a rising star in Philippine politics and a protege of U.S. advisers. On the basis of his leadership of a USAFFE guerrilla group, Magsaysay was appointed military governor of Zambales by the U.S. Army in 1945. He was elected to Congress in 1946 and became head of the House Defense Committee. The first of his several visits to the United States, in 1948, for the purpose of obtaining veterans benefits for Filipinos, served to cement his personal relations with the American security establishment. In March 1950, Magsaysay again visited the United States, this time to seek increased military aid. As Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay presided over the reorganization of the Philippine security apparatus and a multifaceted counterinsurgency program, which would incorporate most of the elements of modern doctrine for the first time in an integrated manner.

The unconventional, “remedial political” dimension of the assistance program devised in early 1950 was to rest largely on the choice of Magsaysay as the right man for the Philippines, and on a few key “advisers” who adroitly managed Magsaysay’s every move. The management task was handled by a small cadre within the JUSMAG, now headed by the recently promoted Air Force Lt. Col. Edward Geary Lansdale. Lansdale had returned to the Philippines in September 1950) to take control of the unconventional side of the counterinsurgency. He was also the chosen companion, personal adviser, and confidant of the United States choice for Defense Secretary, Ramón Magsaysay, who took office at about the time of Lansdale’s arrival.

Lansdale became one of the most famous of the American counterinsurgents; later he was widely touted as the model

for the protagonist not only of Eugene Burdick and William J. Lederer's novel *The Ugly American*, whose heroic Colonel Hillendale was both well-meaning and intelligent, but of Graham Greene's *The Quiet American* as well—the dangerously earnest, hopelessly blinkered Alden Pyle. Greene has denied Lansdale was Pyle's sole model, but Pyle's idealistic naïveté and self-centered insensitivity closely resemble the Lansdale style of saving the world for democracy. Greene's character Fowler describes the Pyle/Lansdale persona: "[H]e was as incapable of imagining pain or danger to himself as he was incapable of conceiving the pain he might cause others.... Yet he was sincere in his way; it was coincidence that the sacrifices were all paid by others."<sup>32</sup>

Born in 1908, Lansdale's career in government began, by his own account, with his recruitment to the OSS for wartime service, and his later commission as a U. S. Army lieutenant in 1943.<sup>33</sup> (Prior to the war, he had been an account executive and copywriter for a San Francisco advertising agency.) Lansdale was on the scene in the Philippines as the war ended, and from 1945 to 1948 headed the intelligence division of the Philippines (Ryukyus) Command, where he is credited in part with setting up the military's intelligence services.

On the public side of his Philippines posting, Lansdale was described as the Philippines-Ryukyus Command Public Information Officer. A flattering full-length article in the January 1948 *Philippine Armed Forces Journal* stresses Lansdale's "winning personality and the knack for winning friends," as well as his success in handling "the public relations job for the United States Army in the Islands." Given Lansdale's flair for self-promotion, the ironic style and hype of the article suggest he may have written the piece himself ("he first displayed his ability to get along with

people by trouncing his Detroit elementary school classmates who tried to bully him and his brother . . .”).<sup>34</sup>

In his 1972 memoirs, Lansdale describes the latitude he enjoyed in carrying out his mission:

*My orders were plain. the United States government wanted me to give all help feasible to the Philippine government in stopping the attempt by the Communist-led Huks to overthrow that government by force. My help was to consist mainly of advice where needed and desired. It was up to me to figure out how best to do this.*<sup>35</sup>

A member of Lansdale’s small advisory team, then-Captain Charles Bohannon, was considerably better versed in guerrilla warfare than was Lansdale and later co-authored one of the best studies of practical counterinsurgency of the time.<sup>36</sup> “Bo” Bohannon had been one of the United States’ crack anti-Japanese “guerrillas” in New Guinea and the Philippines during World War II and had excelled as a counterguerrilla in the Philippines, Indochina, and Latin America.<sup>37</sup> After the war, he remained in the Philippines as an army counterintelligence officer.<sup>38</sup> When Ed Lansdale returned to the Philippines in 1950, Bohannon was a natural for the team he called “The Force.”

Bo Bohannon continued to be associated with Lansdale in Vietnam (and apparently Laos) in the 1950s and 1960s, and like Lansdale, appeared in out-of-the-way places at rather critical moments. In the mid-1950s, Bohannon played a key role in organizing Filipino participation in other Pacific Cold War operations, including the formation (in a meeting in Saigon) of such Filipino-American initiatives as Operation BROTHERHOOD, the Freedom Company, and the Technical Services Company. He also worked out the plans for the

training of Lansdale's Vietnamese paramilitary forces in the Philippines, at the Freedom Company facilities at Camp Batson, near Clark Air Force Base.<sup>39</sup>“ Lansdale's 1955 recommendation for Bohannon's promotion seems to confirm Bohannon's covert role in Vietnam and Laos as deputy commander of the covert “Saigon Military Mission” that Lansdale headed.<sup>40</sup>

Although JUSMAG had been established in 1947 and charged with advising, organizing, and training the Philippine armed forces, few of its members were stationed in the field. Lansdale and Bohannon had been attached to a separate U.S. Army Command from 1945 to 1949 however, which had played an operational role, working closely with Filipino officers, “supposedly in the course of their duty collecting information for the United States. In actual fact, they were the only operation advisers the AFP had. “ In 1950, according to Bohannon, Magsaysay requested the services of “two of these officers . . . as special advisers” (Bohannon does not indicate at whose suggestion).

The mission of Lansdale's new team is described as having been covert and with a virtually unlimited brief, “under a charter which said, in effect, that they could do almost anything as long as the Ambassador, the Chief of JUSMAG, and another US representative [perhaps the head of the CIA station?! did not object violently.” The team was compact and stayed so:

*[T]he senior of the party [Lansdale] acted as adviser on psy-ops [psychological operations] and everything else to the Secretary of National Defense, the other officer [Bohannon himself] acted as intelligence and unconventional warfare adviser to everybody in sight, and back-up man to the adviser to the Sec Def [Secretary of Defense]. To all intents and purpose this*

*was the advisory team on the whole conduct of the successful counter-insurgency operation, although nobody but they, a few very high-ranking persons now retired, and a few hundred (or thousand) Filipinos knew this.*<sup>[41](#)</sup>

Later, a third officer joined the team to act “as daily routine adviser to the psy-ops section.”<sup>[42](#)</sup> Lansdale later identified him as Army Captain A. C. “Ace” Ellis, a communications specialist.

“Didn’t you ever have an American friend?” was a question that Lansdale, perhaps apocryphally, claimed once to have posed to a crowd in central Luzon.<sup>[43](#)</sup> Lansdale was Magsaysay’s American friend. Lansdale—and the others to an extent—bunked with Magsaysay, ate with him, traveled with him on field inspections and operations, and held daily discussions with him—what Lansdale called “coffee klatches.” Although on Lansdale’s arrival Magsaysay was living at home with his family, within a week he was sharing Lansdale’s room in the JUSMAG compound—the two men sleeping on army cots, in an arrangement that persisted for over a year.<sup>[44](#)</sup> Bohannon, in an unpublished paper, explained the team’s operational method as total immersion, and their relation with Magsaysay, a rather peculiar blend of buddy-buddy camaraderie and cold-blooded manipulation:

*How did they operate? By working, in one way or another all the time; by spending virtually (and this is literally true) a minimum of 20 hours a day with Filipinos . . . by poking their noses into everything, and trying to act it all working in the same direction.... By never leaving the key man alone except when he went to bed with his wife, until he was thoroughly indoctrinated.*<sup>[45](#)</sup>

The American team that took charge—with Magsaysay—of counterinsurgency in September 1950 operated in an unusual political space won from a president—Quirino—dependent on U.S. funds and political support. Bohannon later observed that Quirino was afraid of the American friends, and so let them and Magsaysay operate with an unusual autonomy. The political “assets” of the team, in Bohannon’s view, were several.

- a. They were, or had been, officers of the US Army*
- b. They knew, had worked and fought with hundreds of Filipinos, had gained their respect....*
- c. They knew their business. . .*
- d. They had top-level US backing stateside, and tolerance or cooperation from local US authorities. (Note well, this cannot be assumed in future situations, it must be mandatory [that] . . . top local US authorities . . . at least cooperate with such a team.)*
- e. They were feared by the local chief of state, they had the full cooperation of the leader of the effort (the SecDef).*
- f. They were ingenious, adaptable, rather unscrupulous bastards, and one, the senior, was a master salesman.*<sup>46</sup>

In November 1951, Magsaysay would be credited with using troops to guarantee the fairness of congressional elections. After the travesty of 1949, the apparent fairness of the polls—the opposition WOLL overwhelmingly—was later cited as a major psychological blow to the Huk insurgency. A National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), established and funded through U.S. assistance, worked closely with Magsaysay’s Civil Affairs Office in promoting and supervising the election.



When Quirino opted to run for reelection in 1953, Magsaysay, although not associated with any party, was an obvious opponent, and promptly became the Nacionalista [‘arty candidate. NAMFREL, headed by Jaime Ferrer—later Corazon Aquino’s pro-“vigilante” Minister of Local Government—and other theoretically nonpartisan organizations for “good government” worked effectively for Magsaysay.<sup>47</sup> The military resources available were also considerable: Psy-war propaganda methods were used to promote Magsaysay. A Magsaysay-for-president movement was founded by Civil Affairs chief José Crisol (who, like Magsaysay, resigned for the duration of the campaign). The American role was critical throughout. A massive domestic and international publicity campaign pumped up Magsaysay’s image and assured his election, orchestrated by his American friends in the inner chamber of the military advisory group.

In his own memoirs, Ed Lansdale denies having played a partisan role, or injecting funds into the elections.<sup>48</sup> Later accounts, notably Ray Bonner’s *Waltzing with a Dictator*, cite documentary evidence on the extent of American intervention. In a 1972 interview, Lansdale himself recounts having been offered \$5 million by CIA chief Allen Dulles to arrange the election, and claims to have said he only needed \$1 million (a cash-filled suitcase was duly delivered). Lansdale later privately acknowledged having raised the principal funds necessary through “donations” from American corporations in the Philippines.<sup>49</sup> The “attraction” side of the election campaign was perhaps the less distasteful side of U. S. intervention. The “dirty tricks” side, though, according to the CIA Manila station chief, General Ralph B. Lovett, included an episode in which President Quirino was drugged before a speech “so that he would appear incoherent.”<sup>50</sup>

The outcome of the 1953 elections was not a foregone conclusion. A contemporary CIA report warned of the damage an openly fraudulent election would cause to American prestige in Asia, but it considered only *Quirino* as the potential fraudster. Preparations were also made by Magsaysay and his Nacionalista Party to dispute the election through force of arms if he lost:

*Magsaysay's impressive popularity is universally acknowledged, and many Nacionalista leaders have convinced themselves that the party can be beaten only by chicanery. Magsaysay has told his followers to avoid violence but is alleged to have asked certain trusted aides to determine the number of armed men available in case of an emergency.*[51](#)

The contingency plan—tank crews were apparently standing by for action—proved unnecessary. Magsaysay won more than two-thirds of the votes cast.[52](#) The election was a public-relations triumph.

Although Bohannon and Lansdale were unstinting in their public praise of Magsaysay's dynamism and leadership qualities in later years (they largely created Magsaysay's public image), their praise had patronizing undertones. Magsaysay was presented as the right man, the man who gets things done. The things being done, however, were those suggested by his American friends. In private and in the closed circles of the American military, Lansdale and Bohannon characterized Magsaysay as a superstitious, malleable pawn of their own creation.[53](#)

The principal thrust of the new counterinsurgency was a combination of psy-war programs designed to win the support of the population with measures to annihilate Huks more efficiently. The psy-war effort, in which Colonel

Lansdale played a major part, was threefold: aimed to influence the enemy, the public, and the armed forces themselves. A psychological warfare division—called the Civil Affairs Office (CAO)—was created under Magsaysay's direct control and was the vehicle for some of the more unusual American and Filipino initiatives in the counterinsurgency campaign.<sup>54</sup> terror played an important part in psychological operations.

The office was charged with a propaganda campaign to whip up sentiment against the Huks, which involved many of the ingredients present in the Philippines counterinsurgency today. The CAO funded student organizations and disseminated anti-Huk and anticommunist materials in schools, as well as through newspapers, leaflets, and public radio. Funds were also made available to employ or suborn independent journalists and radio announcers, while the U.S. Information Service (USIS) produced more than 13 million leaflets and other materials within two years. In the same period some 6,000 CAO-sponsored meetings were held.<sup>55</sup> The psy-war program also turned to organized religion as a medium. The Far Eastern Broadcasting Company, run by American evangelical missionaries, distributed to rural areas free radios manufactured to receive only their own broadcasts; the CAO arranged to leaven them with its own ideological messages.<sup>56</sup>

The CAO structure also provided a mechanism through which Magsaysay and his advisers could influence armed forces in the field. Civil Affairs officers were attached to most units and held both advisory and supervisory functions. Lansdale, who in his memoirs claimed credit for the concepts of civil affairs and civic action cadre, compared their role with that of the political commissars of communist armies:

They ensured that the political dimension of military operations was a permanent factor. [57](#)

The main message of the new-look counterinsurgency was a variation of the colonial maxim “firm but fair. “ Magsaysay’s slogan was “All out friendship or all-out force. “ Improving the behavior of troops and promising attention to essential grievances coincided with making the armed forces into a more efficient machine for the killing of Huks. A supply of candy and chewing gum was issued to troops for distribution to children in potentially hostile communities; troops going in were on orders to appear as innocuous as possible. (“It was hard to persuade the children that the Santa Claus with the candy was an enemy. Eventually, this rubbed off on the older folks . . .”—and, in any case, “Troops surrounded by children are not likely to be attacked by a guerrilla....”[58](#)) Magsaysay told troops their duties were first, “to act as an ambassador of good will from the government to the people; second, to kill or capture Huk.”[59](#)

There was a very real effort, with measurable effects, to clean up the behavior of counterinsurgency forces at the local level. Magsaysay was responsive to protests of abusive troop behavior (as distinguished from tactical brutality), and a remarkable public-relations effort—masterminded by Colonel Lansdale—was carried out, which enhanced and utilized to best effect Magsaysay’s very real personal qualities. Magsaysay rapidly gained a national reputation as a hands-on defense chief who made surprise inspections of troops in the field and took a personal interest in enforcing discipline and punishing the security forces for casual brutality which had been the norm in central Luzon since the war. Magsaysay was given unprecedented authority by President Quirino to make field promotions and to order courts-martial, and he used both extensively to punish

random abuses against the civilian population and to reward combat prowess and aggressiveness.<sup>60</sup>

A starting point to remedy the estrangement of the armed forces from the rural population was an anticorruption campaign within the armed forces, with the appointment of hand-picked army and Constabulary chiefs, and “lots of courts-martial.”<sup>61</sup> A 1976 U.S. Army study identifies the assignment of Civil Affairs officers to each battalion as a principal means for the enforcement of the policy.<sup>62</sup> A widely publicized arrangement by which telegraph offices would transmit complaints to Magsaysay’s office for a token fee (equivalent to five cents) was part of the public-relations effort. More important, highly publicized punishments of offending individuals or units was apparently effective in reassuring the civil population that the tenor of government had in fact improved.<sup>63</sup> Another innovation stage-managed by the CAO was the promise of land grants to surrendering guerrillas. EDCOR (Economic Development Corps), originally a proposal to provide homesteads for discharged soldiers, developed into a means to undercut Huk demands for land reform.<sup>64</sup> EDCOR put Army Corps of Engineers crews to work clearing state-owned land, primarily in Mindanao, and a pilot project received its first contingent of homesteaders (in Lanao, Mindanao) in May 1951, including fifty-six ex-Huks (“leavened with . . . retired soldiers or ex-USAFGE guerrillas”).<sup>65</sup> The psy-war return on the EDCOR program was enormous, despite the few Huk beneficiaries: The pilot program was, to all accounts, not the expected penal colony but an opportunity in which the select group of former guerrillas were indeed given their heart’s desire, a family farm. Several were subsequently taken on tours of central Luzon to spread the story of EDCOR’s beneficence, and their accounts were amplified by a massive publicity campaign.

After the first project, EDCOR was largely a propaganda exercise— a total of just 246 former Huks benefited from the program.<sup>66</sup> Bohannon himself suggests that EDCOR was a scam: “As a resettlement program, EDCOR did not accomplish a great deal. I doubt if more than perhaps 300 families of Huks were resettled under that program. But I will guarantee you that at least 3,000 Huks surrendered....”<sup>67</sup> After EDCOR’s launching, moreover, the program changed slightly: Homesteads became a reward to guerrillas not for merely surrendering, but for participating in counterguerrilla operations against their erstwhile comrades, and only a fraction of those would receive land grants. Magsaysay explained that “When they surrender, after we screen them . . . they serve in the army, helping us fight Huks . . . before enjoying any benefits. “ At the end of the day, those eligible “draw lots for farms.”<sup>68</sup> When an American journalist suggested Magsaysay’s land-grant scheme was soft on the communists—“Then you buy them off?”—his reply was unambiguous: “Oh no. You forget the most important part of the program. We kill Huks. We chase them into the jungle and kill them.”<sup>69</sup>

To that end, a widely publicized reward system (along the “wanted dead or alive” line) paid cash for assistance leading to the death or capture of Huk leaders whose photographs and biographies were posted around the country. Bounties were paid to civilians who brought in the bodies of Huks, and posters announced that all Huk “field commanders” were wanted “dead or alive” and had a price on their collective heads.<sup>70</sup> An article prepared by Bohannon for *Look* magazine (but never published) included photographs of civilians receiving awards for “helping bag” Huk commanders: In one, Magsaysay appears “giving 100,000 pesos in cash (on the table) to the killer of Guillermo Capadocia, Number Two Communist.”<sup>71</sup>

The psy-war operation also embraced a vast range of the “dirty tricks” with which the CIA was later to be identified. As Bohannon and Filipino officer Napoleon Valeriano observe, “These ranged from ‘one-shotters’ designed to destroy the credibility of a notorious opponent . . . to sustained operations designed to create distrust or enmity between the Huk and the mass base.”<sup>72</sup> Some later became standards in the repertoire of American counterinsurgency. Bohannon and Valeriano describe many, including the dissemination of cartridges “loaded with dynamite,” designed to blow up the weapon and the person holding it when fired. In their 1962 book, the authors argue that these tactics were unacceptable and at no time authorized or approved by the government—but they were, nevertheless, effective. Ten years later, Lansdale described the same tactics without qualification:

*I took up the problem [of Huks buying war materials from corrupt soldiers] with the Philippine Army’s intelligence and research chiefs.... I asked them if contaminated ammunition could be made and inserted into the stocks being delivered secretly to the Huks. They agreed.... [S]oldiers started reporting they had heard grenades . . . exploding right in the hands of Huk ambushers.... Dirty tricks beget dirty tricks.*<sup>73</sup>

The Magsaysay years also saw a major reorganization of the security establishment and the introduction of aggressive tactics for the more efficient hunting and killing of suspects. Magsaysay’s approach to guerrilla war, as described by Lansdale in a 1963 letter, anticipated the U.S. war of attrition in Vietnam:

*One of his favorite lectures to the General Staff and to troop units was to ask each of them how many Huks he had killed, pointing out that if each man in the Armed*

*Forces killed only one Huk, the Huks would be wiped out. Later, he applied this same criteria in promotions, asking "How many Huks has he killed?" when given arguments (seniority, schools attended, etc.) for the man's promotion.*[74](#)

The deliberate (and nominally selective) use of terror in psychological operations—what Colonel Lansdale called “tactical psywar”—figured prominently in the 1960s reassessment of Philippine tactics by the U.S. counterinsurgency establishment. A presentation by intelligence officer Major Medardo Justiniano to a seminar on Philippine counterinsurgency held at Fort Bragg in 1961 cited an operation in Luis Taruc’s home village, San Luis, as an example of counterterror:

*We gathered together the civilians of the region . . . and took them to the bank of the river... On the other side, 100 to 200 yards away, were my troops in uniform. In the presence of the townspeople these troops. . . began to kill about a dozen "Huk[s]". . . [O]ur troops began to bring out the "Huks" blindfolded . . . and began to bayonet them one by one. While we were killing them some were shouting out the name of the Mayor [and] the names of their principal suppliers. Seeing the Huks killed before their eyes, hearing themselves named . . . these civilians naturally expected to be next on the death lists.*[75](#)

Villagers were subsequently screened, and told, “If you confess, we will not treat you like we have these Huks. “ And of course in Justiniano’s account, “Almost all these people reported . . . practically one after the other.” And the story is rounded out by Justiniano’s explanation that the killings never really took place, “It was all a show. We used chicken blood, pig’s blood and so on, to make it look real.... But when



that pretended atrocity was followed up by psychological operations it really paid off.”<sup>76</sup> Of course, the implied lesson was that real atrocities could be even more effective—at least in the short term.

A number of similar terror operations are described (in similar terms) by Bohannon and Valeriano, including a complete six-page after-action report of a Japanese-style *zona* operation. <sup>77</sup> The village of Pulong Plasang, Bulacan, was surrounded by troops, and the inhabitants were concentrated in an enclosure. A thorough search of the area was conducted in the presence of village elders. Adult villagers were then passed one by one “under the scrutiny of . . . hooded ‘Magic Eye’ informants” and then taken for interrogation, sometimes accompanied by hooded men. The system is described as virtually 100 percent successful:

*With some villagers, it was necessary to resort to a dramatic action to shock them, to convince them that the interrogator would not hesitate to use any methods necessary to extract the truth. Lieutenant Cruz ordered one of his interrogators to resort to a tested ruse to push a particularly stubborn villager to speak frankly. The interrogating Sergeant first arranged for two individuals to be marched off. . . to the interrogation point, the villager heard loud, threatening voices . . . then a few pistol shots, then silence . . . after which he took the villager . . . and marched him off for interrogation. There, the recalcitrant one saw two bodies bloody, covered with banana leaves. What had really happened was that the Sergeant had the preceding individuals, immobilized and silent, liberally drenched with chicken blood. Quietly, the Sergeant explained that he didn’t believe in “horsing around” with stubborn civilians.*<sup>78</sup>

A similar approach described by Justiniano was the exemplary “use of dead bodies,” much as the French displayed the bodies of alleged guerrillas in Algeria. Justiniano explained its purpose as counteracting the Huk hold on “the minds of the masses” “by instilling greater fear of us.” On one occasion when “we killed a large number of Huks,” “we piled these dead Huks into a truck with the hands and feet dangling outside, a whole truck load of dead bodies, and we drove this truck clear around town, and through the area.”<sup>7</sup> A series of photographs submitted by Bohannon to *Look* magazine were identified with such captions as “Government troops pose with dead Huks dumped before them.”<sup>80</sup> In his introductory remarks to a June 1961 Fort Bragg seminar, Lansdale describes his fellow speakers as “fellow gremlins.”<sup>81</sup> The role of deception operations and psychological warfare tactics employing terror in the Philippines was a favorite topic of Lansdale’s, and the counterinsurgent as prankster, however macabre the joke, was a role he actively promoted. The vigorous claims of success for bizarre psy-war operations in the Philippines today comprise a large part of the opus of lessons learned from the Huk Rebellion.

A Lansdale discussion of psy-war tactics outlined in a two-volume U.S. Army psy-war manual published in 1976 (Army Pamphlet 525-71) focuses on this conflation of terrorism with humor and makes one wonder whether the long-term damage of the terror approach has been seriously considered. The examples given also reflect a deeply condescending assumption of the target populations’ simple-mindedness:

*When I introduced the practical-joke aspect of psywar to the Philippine Army, it stimulated some imaginative operations that were remarkably effective.... One psywar operation played upon the popular dread of an asuang,*

*or vampire.... When a Huk patrol came along the trail, the ambushers silently snatched the last man of the patrol.... They punctured his neck with two holes, vampire-fashion, held the body up by the heels, drained it of blood, and put the corpse back on the trail. When the Huks returned to look for the missing man and found their bloodless comrade, every member of the patrol believed that the asuang had got him and that one of them would be next.... When daylight came, the whole Huk squadron moved out of the vicinity.<sup>82</sup>*

As far as Colonel Lansdale was concerned, the importance of the story was to provide an example “of tactical psywar in counter-guerrilla actions . . . to indicate that psywar need not consist of putting out leaflets or using amplified sound.”<sup>83</sup> Bohannon and Valeriano concur on the efficacy of certain terror weapons, and the mutilation of bodies: “Few weapons have quite the same effect on guerrilla morale as a pair of ice picks lashed together, used to puncture a guerrilla jugular, if the guerrilla is left for his companions to pick up. Next in effectiveness is a well- presented bayonet.”<sup>84</sup>

Another Lansdale example of tactical psy-war in the Philippines was perhaps even more bizarre than the vampire operation, and was devised to terrify—and to clear the area of—an entire community. As in the previous example, there is no consideration of possible long-term negative repercussions. The operation was also seen as an unqualified success, suggesting a rather unbelievable naivete on the part of either the entire rural population of the Philippines (or Colonel Lansdale himself):

*The army unit captured a Huk courier descending from the mountain stronghold to the village. After questioning, the courier, who was a native of the village, woefully*

*confessed his errors in helping the Huks. His testimony was tape-recorded and made to sound as if his voice emanated from a tomb. The courier was killed. His body was left on the Huk-village line of communications. Soldiers in civilian clothes then dropped rumors in the village to the effect that the Huks had killed the courier. The villagers recovered the body and buried the Huk. That night army patrols infiltrated the cemetery and set up audio-equipment which began broadcasting the dead Huk's confession. By dawn, the entire village of terror-stricken peasantry had evacuated! In a few days, the Huks were forced to descend the mountain in search of food. They were quickly captured and/or killed by the army unit.*<sup>[85](#)</sup>

Psychological operations were paralleled and facilitated by the creation of a range of specialized units for special operations. They included elite units for deep-penetration operations, along lines similar to the British long-range reconnaissance patrols in Malaya, as well as units with an explicit terror role. An elite special patrol force, the Scout-Rangers, carried out long-range patrols with the primary task of spotting the enemy and calling in regular units. A Filipino captain who had served with a U. S. Army Ranger unit in World War II, Rafael "Rocky" Ileto, is credited with the concept of the Scout-Rangers and was their first chief in 1951. The Scout-Rangers operated in one-officer, four-man spotter and hunter-killer units, with one team attached to each Battalion Combat Team. The Scout-Rangers, who received training in jungle warfare, scouting, survival, and other U.S. Army Ranger skills at the United States' Fort McKinley, became the elite force of the military establishment.<sup>[86](#)</sup>

Other organizational innovations and tactics centered on measures of deception similar to those employed in the

British and French colonial campaigns in Kenya and Indochina. In a variation on the countergangs of the Kenyan insurgency, a pilot countergang was set up in 1948 by the Sixteenth Philippine Constabulary Company, designated "Force X": "The basic idea was to make this specially trained force into a realistic pseudo-Huk unit that could, in enemy guise, infiltrate deep into enemy territory."<sup>87</sup> The forty-seven initial members of Force X were dressed and equipped like Huks. They were taught in a remote rain forest base to talk and act like Huks by four captured guerrillas who had been "tested, screened, and reindoctrinated to our side and brought to the training base to serve as instructors." <sup>88</sup> The principal aim was to enable government forces to get close enough to guerrilla forces to eliminate selected targets:

*Targets can only be tentatively designated and assigned priorities in advance. Much should depend upon opportunities encountered. The killing of leading enemy personalities may be far more important than the destruction of a certain army unit. An appropriate order of priority might be: (1) killing enemy leaders or outstanding fanatics; (2) destroying enemy elite organizations; and (3) penetrating and destroying especially devoted and/or effective enemy support elements.*<sup>89</sup>

The "special" forces integrated into the Philippine counterinsurgency effort included both elite formations within the regular, uniformed branches of the armed services and a broad range of *irregular* forces organized on a paramilitary basis. Some of these could be characterized as "counterguerrillas," irregular forces using ostensibly *guerilla* organization and tactics to combat the Huks—what Bohannon and Valeriano termed "quasi-guerrilla" forces, "members of a regularly established military force or a

substantive government, assigned, volunteered, or required by force of circumstances to take up a guerrilla-like role.”<sup>90</sup>

These forces included the pseudo-guerrilla unit Force X, although its purpose was more one of deception and deep penetration than tactical counterguerrilla operations, and quasi-guerrilla *auxiliary* forces, which were described by Bohannon as “ranging from wild mountain pygmies, Negritos, to home guard and church congregation units.”<sup>91</sup> The “deputizing” of civilian gunmen—and certain religious sects—to go “Huk-hunting,” with bounties paid for successful hunters, was a clear antecedent to the “vigilante” organizations of the post-Marcos period. Press reports at the time included photographs of ceremonies in which Magsaysay handed over reward money to “consortiums” of civilian gunmen who had clubbed together to go Huk-hunting.

In an April 1954 paper, Lansdale identified as a key “accomplishment” of his team “teaching and employing paramilitary forces in the tactics of political warfare.”<sup>92</sup> In the draft of his memoirs, Lansdale lauds in particular the civilian volunteer counterguerrillas, many former USAFFE guerrillas, “who wanted to contribute their spare time from their businesses and professions towards patriotic service. They were brought together, usually in informal meetings in my house.”<sup>93</sup> One such effort to develop a “grass-roots” *political* organization with paramilitary characteristics, the *Barangay* (neighborhood) movement, progressed gradually during the Magsaysay period but assumed importance as a civilian component of the security system only in the 1970s when it was reinvigorated by the Marcos regime.<sup>94</sup>

An important innovation in the campaign against the Huks was the deployment of hunter-killer counterguerrillas: small, mobile units with seemingly total freedom to respond to

guerrilla action with assassination and terror. The “Nenita” unit was the first force that deliberately mimicked what was perceived to be the guerrilla’s no-holds-barred approach. An elite force, Nenita was built around a core of four officers and fifty enlisted men, although in action it was sometimes reinforced by two or three companies (each about ninety-eight men) of regular Constabulary.<sup>95</sup> The commander of the Nenita force was Napoleon Valeriano; its name, according to former colleagues, was that of his girlfriend of the time. Valeriano later described its origin, at the end of 1946, when he “obtained permission to form a hunter-killer team and take it into the field to ‘find and finish’ the Supreme Commander, Luis Taruc.”<sup>96</sup>

Colonel Lansdale described Valeriano’s style and some of his men in a journal kept during 1947—notes that contrast rather dramatically from his sanitized writing for the public.

*All this killing during a peace is getting rather sickening. Bondoc, the accused mayor . . . was captured by Major Napoleon Valeriano’s commando force of Philippine MPs. Valeriano is a friend of mine who heads a special headquarters intelligence team for MPC (PA) [Military Police Command (Philippine Army)]. These Filipinos run around Central Luzon with skull and crossbones flags flying from their jeeps and scout cars.... Cruelty and lust for murder are commonplace. Philippine Army MPs take but few prisoners.*

*They merely shoot their newly captured Huks, often in the back of the head. It is hard to prove sedition, the true crime, against these folks, so why waste time with legal proceedings. On the other hand, MPs live but a few agonized moments after the Huks capture them. Both MPs and Huks have told me they learned to kill during the Jap occupation.*<sup>97</sup>



Another account, by a top army officer, describes the style of the Nenita or “skull squadron” in similar terms: “The special tactic of these squadrons was to cordon off areas; anyone they caught inside the cordon was considered an enemy.... When I was stationed in the Candaba area [in Pampanga], almost daily you could find bodies floating in the river, many of them victims of Valeriano’s Nenita Unit.”<sup>98</sup> A senator wrote to the president in 1948 to demand Major Napoleon Valeriano’s withdrawal from Pampanga, “for having committed many atrocities, not only against dissident elements but against law-abiding people.”<sup>99</sup> In their book, Bohannon and Valeriano acknowledge the scattergun approach of Nenita terror tactics, and that the Huks sometimes gained supporters as a consequence. They conclude, however, that on balance the tactics were necessary for the counterinsurgent, even though Nenita’s reputation did pose a problem for the government: “It was essential to make the armed forces more effective . . . and this could scarcely be done if techniques of proven utility were summarily abandoned.”<sup>100</sup>

Major Valeriano, despite (or because of) the reputation attached to his prototype special unit, was promoted to lieutenant colonel and in July 1950 assumed command of an elite army BCT, the Seventh, that would develop a reputation not unlike that of Nenita between 1950 and 1954. Bohannon and Valeriano date the Nenita operation only to the 1946-1949 period, suggesting the units were abandoned in 1950 under a strategy of “changing the attitudes of the soldiers toward the civilians, toward the guerrillas—in fact, toward the war.” Attitudes did, in fact, change after Magsaysay assumed the Defense portfolio in September 1950, toward a more comprehensive, more unconventional counterinsurgency strategy and a reduction of random brutality against the civilian population. The



terror component of counterinsurgency and the organizational form of the Nenita group remained, but was applied in a more studied manner by the Seventh BCT and other special units after 1950. Nenita, moreover, rather than fading away in disgrace became a model for counterinsurgent organization in the 1960s.

The Magsaysay years saw a modification of the Nenita approach to combine the virtues of the “pseudo-guerrilla” Force X with Nenita’s ruthless operations. Valeriano’s Seventh BCT recruited the former head of Force X, Captain Marana, as operations chief (G-3), while Nenita’s intelligence chief (G-2) Captain Medardo Justiniano assumed the same role in the BCT. The lessons learned from Force X and Nenita were combined in the Seventh BCT’s Charlie Company, a unit of some hundred men trained in a secret jungle camp to act and fight “like guerrillas.” Unlike Force X, Charlie Company was never used for deep-cover penetration missions; as Bohannon noted, there was no way they could “link up” with Huk units after the Force X experience: the Huks were too wary. ““ Charlie Company’s true forte, however, was to provide small units of from four to twelve men for long-range reconnaissance in the Sierra Madre Mountains, “in disguise or in uniform,” or for covert intelligence operations—including secret arrests—in guerrilla disguise. [102](#)

Charlie Company’s covert action role with the Seventh BCT was performed in “collaboration with the S-2 [intelligence] Section (all ex-Nenita)” and with Military Intelligence Service “ ‘A’ and ‘B’ Teams (partly manned by Nenita men)....”[103](#) An operation to break the Huk infrastructure in Pandi, an area targeted as a Huk refuge near Manila was described by Bohannon at a 1961 Fort Bragg seminar:

*Because of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus . . . it was possible for the 7th BCT to detain suspects indefinitely... [I]t was recommended that several individuals be “snatched” and brought to 7th BCT Headquarters for interrogation.... The teams were able to snatch no less than 70 individuals from different points of the area without being detected by the inhabitants.*<sup>[104](#)</sup>

The outcome of the operation was described as “the liquidation of the Pandi sanctuary.”<sup>[105](#)</sup> It is, of course, impossible at this distance to determine the fate of all those “snatched”; in the best of worlds they would have been released unharmed, or brought before the courts. But the very nature of “disappearance” as a tactic removes from its executors the constraints of accountability: The death of a prisoner whom no one knows has been detained is a nonevent.

Charlie Company also provided highly trained personnel to serve as a link with the civilian irregulars brought into the counterinsurgency effort. In the 1960s, Bohannon described the training for this task as resembling “that given present-day Special Forces units,” and indeed the tasks they performed are virtually indistinguishable from those of the latter-day Special Forces in Vietnam and beyond.”<sup>[106](#)</sup> Twenty-four-man teams were detailed to stiffen civilian irregulars, and to carry out advisory, instruction, and operations command functions. Although some work was done with other paramilitary forces, members of the Negrito minority, and religious sects the principal irregular force at hand was the civilian guards based throughout the rural areas, a heritage of the Japanese occupation. Charlie Company and other special units worked closely in the adaptation of the civilian guard system as a part of the new, aggressive counterinsurgency system.<sup>[107](#)</sup>

In central Luzon, the part-time “civilian guards” assumed major importance in the counterinsurgency campaign. They included former USAFFE guerrillas—who had long feuded with the Huks—as well as the “private armies” of landowners and political chieftains (which are still a part of the Philippines scene). The private armies then, as now, had formal police powers, were subject to government control through the uniformed security services, and were funded in part from the public purse, in part by private employers. As such, they were inextricably bound to elite patrons and exercised on their behalf enormous, and often extralegal, discretionary powers of repression.<sup>108</sup>

Although little has been published by official sources on the institution of the civilian guards and its role in the counterinsurgency, there is evidence that it was considerable. In Nueva Ecija province alone in central Luzon, civilian guards in 1949 numbered some 2,000 armed men.<sup>109</sup> In contrast, Constabulary force levels in the provinces of central Luzon at the time could range down to as few as 100.<sup>110</sup> Civilian guards, as a locally based, paramilitary resource tied directly to local elites, provided a major manpower tool for both short-term counterinsurgency sweeps and special operations, and they comprised the majority of armed security personnel permanently based in the rural areas.

A model of paramilitary integration with conventional forces was developed by the Seventh BCT in Bulacan—after Colonel Valeriano took command in July 1950. Valeriano and Bohannon maintain that, at the time, civilian guards and municipal police—another manpower tool—were “under virtually no supervision by the Armed Forces.”” The plan augmented the about 950 men of the BCT by training, equipping, and directing civilian guard irregulars, and bringing them into the military command structure, with

“capable soldiers” assigned as “liaison (actually as instructors and commanders) for major civil-guard units.” Guards were provided with radios, and when units became capable of putting up substantial resistance to guerrilla attacks, “troops were withdrawn from the area.”<sup>112</sup>

The objective was to free combat troops from static duties so that they could seek out and destroy the adversary, and secondarily, to bring people from the trouble areas into open collaboration with authorities (“people who might otherwise be at best apathetic; at worst hostile to it”).<sup>113</sup> But the Philippine formula did not or could not overcome the basic political contradiction on which the civilian guard system was built: Although the guards took orders from military authorities, they were the employees of local elites, and the natural enemies not only of the guerrillas but of the bulk of the population. As such, they could hardly be seen as representative of “the people,” and served primarily as enforcers. One officer later described the men in the guards as “local gangsters, goons, people of bad reputations out to make good with the law avoid punishment, and make a living besides.”<sup>114</sup> Luis Taruc described them as “men easily bought by a few pesos and a promise of loot, criminals and thugs....”<sup>115</sup> Bohannon and Valeriano acknowledge some “disadvantages” to the system, but insisted they could be overcome “by careful selection of personnel and adequate supervision.”<sup>116</sup>

Although the Philippines paramilitary system was rehabilitated in the 1960s as a model, criticism in the 1950s was harsh enough to bring serious calls for disbanding the civilian guards. The response to the charges was twofold. On the one hand, measures were introduced in and after 1950 to bring the irregulars under tight military control, leavening their forces with regular cadre (the pattern prescribed by

doctrine since the 1960s). On the other (and at the same time), publicity campaigns were undertaken by then-Defense Secretary Magsaysay announcing that the civilian guards would in fact be disbanded. As late as January 1954, authorities continued to pledge a clean-up of the civilian guards (including those considered Temporary Police [TP]) and to publicize the disbanding of particularly atrocious forces. A Malacañang press release of 10 January 1954 is a model of counterinsurgent public relations:

*The President expressed the opinion that civilian guards “are not conducive to the development of a healthy democracy in this country” and cited many abuses they had committed against tenants and the poor that were denounced to him while he was secretary of defense.*

*He pointed out that many civilian guards accepted ridiculously low salaries of P150 yearly because they supplemented this by much more through royalties from landlords and abusive impositions on tenants.*

*He said civilian guards, taking orders from landlords, dictated the distribution of crops “through guns” and not according to the crop sharing law.*<sup>[117](#)</sup>

The Magsaysay critique of the civilian guards, without effective accompanying action to disband them, served to distance central authority from accountability for the abuses of these forces, while retaining an armed force at the local level that could get on with the dirty work of counterinsurgency. The Magsaysay pledge, that the system would be abolished *when* the army could keep peace alone, fell back on the argument of *necessity*: “‘The civilian guards claim that they are needed to maintain peace,’ he said. ‘Keeping the peace is the army’s business, not theirs. As

soon as we are sure that the army has the necessary men and materials to handle the job, we are going to break them up.’ “[118](#)

The brutality and injustice of the Philippine paramilitary system may be common to any system in which armed irregulars are dependent on, or responsive to, special interests. Although, in central Luzon, civilian guards responded to the incentives of economic advantage and petty authority, irregulars attached to elites elsewhere in the Philippines may have been further motivated by religious or cultural ties to their paymasters to form part of “private” armies with public powers. The introduction of ideology as a motive for counterinsurgent organization, notably the negative ideology of anticommunism, would become a very real factor in the paramilitary structures of the Philippines in the 1970s, eventually to dominate the scene even in the 1990s.

The Philippine paramilitary option, then a seemingly effective deployment of civilian irregular forces, left a clear mark on subsequent American doctrine and provided prototypes for U.S.- sponsored counterinsurgency programs around the world in the 1960s. Counterinsurgency studies stressed that paramilitary organization could significantly increase the manpower available where regular forces were few in number, that the systems were cost-effective; that they released regular forces for aggressive patrolling by undertaking static defense duties; and that they had enormous political potential, taking counterinsurgency to the grass roots and making the population part of the defense effort. The intermeshing of regular and irregular forces, a hallmark of such systems, was of particular relevance to today’s constellation of paramilitary forces (not least in the Philippines) and their role in government counterinsurgency strategies.

The general adaptation of World War II psy-war techniques for home consumption, the legitimization of “dirty tricks” and terror tactics in counterinsurgency, and above all the premise that insurgency justified and required the unrestricted tactics of unconventional warfare were further principal lessons of the Philippines experience. The Philippine experience, indeed, returns at every juncture to a lesson that guerrillas are best fought by guerrillas, or, more appropriately, by the government forces using irregular tactics that Bohannon and Valeriano dubbed “quasi-guerrillas.” This and most of the Philippine approach to counterinsurgency would be duly absorbed, first in the U.S. Army’s Special Forces training and doctrine, to appear in 1961 in the army’s mainstream doctrine of counterinsurgency. Most of its precepts remain intact in American counterinsurgency doctrine today.

## **Special Warfare Comes to Vietnam and Laos**

The deadly application of conventional military technology and firepower in Vietnam far outweighed the counterinsurgency dimension of the war. The counterinsurgency dimension, too, was skewed toward lethal force, particularly through the medium of unconventional warfare. The emphasis OTI training and operations in the tactics of unconventional warfare, as if Vietnam were an occupied country—occupied, that is, by undesirable Vietnamese—was one aspect of the approach that colored the larger counterinsurgency program. American forces were already experimenting in unconventional warfare in Vietnam as the French prepared their withdrawal and as American unconventional warfare doctrine was just beginning to gel.

The covert dimension of American involvement in Indochina began even before the beginning of aid to the

beleaguered French in the north and grew with the increasing commitment of American support to Ngo Dinh Diem. American unconventional warfare activities in Indochina during the world war had for a time thrown OSS officers together with Ho Chi Minh's underground Viet Minh in partnership against the Japanese. Almost a decade later, as the French forces faced destruction at Dien Bien Phu, a renewal of unconventional warfare began against a Viet Minh on the brink of triumph. The object was to sour the achievement of a communist-led liberation movement and to contain that movement to the northern half of Vietnam.

The American policy shift in May 1945, "hereafter the French were no longer to be kept out of Allied operations in Indochina, resulted in OSS training and assistance for a force of French-Vietnamese "commandos" for raids on Japanese forces. Although the end of the war rapidly overtook OSS plans, joint OSS-French operations were precedents for American unconventional operations against the independent north. The most successful of the OSS-French raids hit Japanese installations at Lang Son in northeastern Vietnam in July 1945, led by OSS Lieutenant Lucien Conein, a former French national and Foreign Legionnaire who had joined the U.S. Army in 1940.<sup>119</sup> After the fall of Japan, Indochina was left largely in the hands of the French—and the Viet Minh. American unconventional warfare activities there were renewed on a large scale in 1954.

In January 1954, the view in Washington was that, although little prospect of victory could be discerned, the French could continue to stave off defeat in Indochina. That month a presidential Special Committee on Indochina was established to consider options for aiding the French while still adhering to the policy of avoiding American involvement on the ground. Recommendations included the



provision of American air power (through a “voluntary” air group), an increase of the CIA presence, and a program to assist anticommunist Vietnamese to develop “an unconventional warfare capability.”<sup>120</sup> Air power was provided through the CIA’s secret air force in a futile effort to resupply the besieged garrison at Dien Bien Phu, and the CIA moved into action on the ground as well in the aftermath of the French defeat.

The American unconventional warfare mission was carried out by the CIA in the guise of the “Saigon Military Mission” (SMM), commanded by then-Colonel Edward G. Lansdale. The genesis of the SMM is pinpointed by Lansdale himself to “a Washington policy meeting early in 1954, when Dien Bien Phu was still holding out....” Its objective, even then, “was to assist the Vietnamese, rather than the French, in unconventional warfare . . . [and] to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy, and to wage political-psychological warfare.” Psychological warfare initiatives outlined in the same report included the development of a course in “combat psywar” for the Vietnamese Army and the Ministry of Information, and a number of psy-war gambits to stir up the population in Tonkin in the months before the French evacuation. These operations, in which Lansdale took much pride (and which would subsequently be cited in psy-war texts as models), included such “tricks” as spreading rumors that Chinese divisions had moved into the country in a rampage of rape and destruction (a campaign deemed successful). More significant was the SMM’s “black” circulation of bogus leaflets “signed by the Vietminh” warning of a draconian new social order, which were designed to generate a massive refugee flow to the south. Lansdale considered these a major coup: “The day following the distribution of these leaflets, refugee registration tripled. Two days later Vietminh currency was worth half the value prior to the leaflets.”<sup>121</sup>

In a 1960 lecture at a service school, Lansdale explained the rationale for psychological operations to encourage flight to what was now the South (and discourage, through another scheme, a refugee flow to what was now the North). The armistice, explained Lansdale, split Vietnam at the 17th parallel and declared that in June 1956, the Vietnamese

*would hold a plebiscite to vote on the future of their country.... There had to be an upset of Communist calculations at Geneva on how many people they would have under their control for the planned 1956 Plebiscite.... [I]t was imperative to shift the majority vote from the Communist controls in the North to the Free South.*

To this end, “many psychological operations were carried out, to give these people who desired freedom, but who loved their native soil, a last push to leave it before the Communists . . . took over.”<sup>[122](#)</sup>

There was, of course, no plebiscite in 1956. The United States would later base both its own defense of the Diem regime in the South and the regime’s refusal to take part in July 1956 nationwide elections on the United States’ not having signed the respective corollary to the Geneva Agreements.<sup>[123](#)</sup>

Colonel Lansdale’s schemes in the South were slightly less ambitious, and included hiring astrologers to produce an almanac foretelling disaster for “certain Vietminh leaders and undertakings,” and producing what he called “a Thomas Paine type series of essays on Vietnamese patriotism against the Communist Vietminh” (under the direction, respectively, of ersatz patriots, Americans Lieutenant Phillips and Captain Arundel). The essays were disseminated, through discreet inducements, to the Saigon media: “The publisher . . . is a

fine Vietnamese girl who has been the mistress of an anti-American French civilian. Despite anti-American remarks by her boy friend, we had helped her keep her paper from being closed by the government . . . and she found it profitable to heed our advice on the editorial content of her paper. "[124](#)

The special team's primary mission, after the 21 July 1954 Geneva Agreements, was defined as preparing for future "paramilitary operations in Communist areas" after the agreed withdrawal from the North.[125](#) In this context, Lansdale's team would work to prepare a clandestine stay-behind infrastructure in the North and attempt to carry out a covert "scorched earth" campaign to destroy as much of Hanoi's urban infrastructure as possible before the handover. Although neither effort was particularly successful, they would provide further luster to Lansdale's legend as a genius of covert action.

The stay-behind, paramilitary aspect of the SMM was largely delegated to Major Lucien Conein (according to Lansdale, "a paramilitary specialist, well-known to the French for his help with French-operated Maquis in Tonkin . . .").[126](#) Conein's people were based in Hanoi, and as part of the "cover" for their action—which violated the Geneva Agreements—"supervised the refugee flow for the Hanoi airlift organized by the French."[127](#) Conein's force, like French irregular forces, was based on a preexistent group, the Dai Viets, a nationalist secret society. Identified with the pseudonym "Binh" in *The Pentagon Papers*, it was meant to serve initially on a mercenary basis under U.S. control, "to come eventually under government control when the government was ready for such activities."[128](#)

In the South, the "Hag" group, or paramilitary cadre for deployment in Tonkin, was organized through the

Vietnamese Colonel Nguyen Van Vy, a veteran of Conein's 1945 commando operation (Lansdale arranged for him to be promoted to "general"). Conein, later a lieutenant colonel, would subsequently play a key role in American unconventional warfare operations in North Vietnam after the collapse of the French in 1954, and in 1963 would serve as the CIA intermediary with Vietnamese generals plotting the overthrow (and assassination) of President Ngo Dinh Diem. He reappeared in 1974 as head of the "Special Operations and Field Support Group" of the Drug Enforcement Administration— ostensibly a covert antinarcotics strike force but suspected of being a cover for Cold War covert action.<sup>[129](#)</sup>

The navy's top-secret "Task Force 98" provided clandestine transportation for trainees to a "secret training site," probably at Okinawa.<sup>[130](#)</sup> "Okinawa Station" at the army's Camp Chinen was "a paramilitary support asset," which in a crisis "could be devoted in its entirety to this mission"; "as a self-contained base under Army cover," it provided the kind of security necessary for the training of clandestine paramilitary forces.<sup>[131](#)</sup> The contribution of the United States' "Binh" and "Hag" paramilitary teams was largely limited to petty sabotage and propaganda action in the North *before* the evacuation of Hanoi in October 1954. (Although stay-behind forces were in place in 1955, their subsequent efforts at covert action were apparently short-lived.) By September 1954, covert teams were already busily engaged in "spoiling" operations intended to destroy facilities that would be useful to the incoming government. SMM agents were sent in to attempt "to destroy the modern presses" of the North's largest printer. The Viet Minh, however, had moved agents into the plant to foil the attempts.<sup>[132](#)</sup> The SMM's successes were little more than costly terrorist pranks of little military significance: for

example, contaminating the oil supply of the city buses, and the “delayed sabotage of the railroad (which required teamwork with a CIA special technical team in Japan who performed their part brilliantly).”<sup>133</sup>

As the Saigon Military Mission was wreaking minor havoc in the North and orchestrating psychological operations in both North and South, Colonel Lansdale was also playing power broker in Saigon, cultivating a rapidly developed friendship with President Diem into what he presumably believed would be a successful partnership along the lines of his work with Magsaysay in the Philippines.

Colonel Lansdale became familiar with Vietnam’s sectarian militias and private armies in the summer of 1953, while “surveying maquis, guerrilla bands, and similar units” during General John W. O’Daniel’s mission to Indochina. ‘34 In the North, Lansdale had met Catholic bishops and militia leaders, as well as leaders of the Vietnamese Kuomintang Party VNQDD with the help of French officers.<sup>135</sup> The French influenced the development first of the United States’ unconventional Special Forces programs in Vietnam, and thereby the counterinsurgency programs and doctrines that followed.

One of the most colorful of the French officers who befriended Ed Lansdale, Colonel Jean Leroy, had himself become the virtual warlord of the partly Catholic Ben Tre Province. Colonel Leroy introduced Lansdale to the leaders of the sects and assorted private armies in the South. <sup>136</sup> As Lansdale later recalled, he saw in these volatile groups future leaders of a free Vietnam:

*In those early days in Vietnam I was searching, of course, for those Vietnamese who were demonstrably able to inspire and lead their fellow Vietnamese.... If the*

*Vietnamese nationalists ever were to have a viable society of their own, they would need some remarkable leaders.... In effect, the Hoa Hao leaders were warlords, each with his own fiefdom just as were some of the Cao Dai, Binh Xuyen, and Catholic leaders. It was a strange, feudal milieu for an American believer in the precepts of Jefferson.... Somchow, all of the nationalist forces had to be brought together as a team, if the Vietnamese were ever to have a free society of their own.*<sup>137</sup>

Lansdale's plans for the warlords reflected his peculiarly simplistic vision of nation-building. Nationalism, once determined to be correct and useful in the new American sphere, was seen to require careful cultivation and occasional ruthless pruning by a sponsoring power. A colonial or imperial power, in this analysis, could readily harness the potential for nationalism to its own purpose, as had the Japanese in some of their occupied territories. In Vietnam, writes Colonel Lansdale, the Japanese intelligence force Kempeitai's use of 3,000 Cao Dai as paramilitary and guerrilla forces offered "an interesting lesson" in nationalism.<sup>138</sup> The Cao Dai were, however, nationalists considerably before the Japanese occupation, and their party militia predated the Kempeitai initiative. The lesson in the matter was to reinforce a conviction that an ostensibly nationalist group could be "brought into being" by a sponsor and induced to serve new masters, whether French, Japanese, American—or South Vietnamese.

The CIA's close involvement in the affairs of Indochina had persisted throughout the 1950s and placed the agency in a strong position to influence subsequent counterinsurgency programs. In 1970, Roswell Gilpatric, President Kennedy's Undersecretary of Defense, described the CIA's influence in an oral history interview: As Indochina became the principal Cold War arena after 1960, the CIA was first off the mark to

respond to the call for action and innovation, and Vietnam became “a sort of proving ground for both *[sic]* ideas, tactics, and equipment” of counterinsurgency.<sup>[139](#)</sup>

There was initially little conflict between the agency and the military simply because there was initially little conflict between the agency and the military simply because there was no prospect of the military undertaking the vast tasks shouldered by the CIA. As a consequence, the CIA molded the approach to, for example, paramilitary organization, in a manner that would have taken some undoing even had the military the will to do so. Gilpatrick notes:

*[T]here was a developing issue between the agency and the army over who should be training the Montagnards and the Home Guard and other military and paramilitary groups in Vietnam. But that came only after the army had sufficient people out there to take it on. Initially, the agency, I guess, had the largest staff of any of the U.S. clement. I've never seen the exact figures, but they carried more clout than anybody else did certainly through the cud of '61.*<sup>[140](#)</sup>

The CIA's “clout” ran to more than simple bureaucratic strength in Indochina. By process of elimination, the cadre for the training and leadership of the military's own counterinsurgents were often themselves veterans of covert service with the CIA. The military's specialist counterinsurgents after 1960 would be made in the CIA's own paramilitary image. As the military rapidly moved to comply with Kennedy's demand for a military capability to do the things previously left to the CIA, it naturally turned to its own unconventional warfare specialists, the Special Forces. In the first months of 1961, Kennedy's new team found that the principal innovations in the field of

unconventional warfare were being pursued in Laos, not Vietnam.<sup>[141](#)</sup>

Because the Geneva Agreements had prohibited a U. S. military presence in newly independent Laos, a military assistance program, a “Programs Evaluation Office” (PEO), was set up in December 1955 and staffed by nominal civilians: military personnel who had “retired” or were put on reserve status for the duration of their stint.<sup>[142](#)</sup> Over the next four years Laos—not Vietnam—was the principal theater of American covert action in Indochina, as the U.S. government secretly backed a succession of rightist princes and generals, brought about the ouster of pluralist, neutralist leaders and the dissolution of a troublesome National Assembly, and began the organization of Laotian Meo tribesmen as the nucleus of a secret army.<sup>[143](#)</sup>

The level of American training for the Laotian army was stepped up in July 1959, when thirteen Special Forces teams arrived “disguised as contracted civilian specialists.”<sup>[144](#)</sup> Other covert training programs of Laotians, under CIA or army auspices, took place in Thailand and in training sites in the Philippines.<sup>[145](#)</sup> Laos was apparently the first theater of operations in which Special Forces worked with both conventional troops and unconventional commando-style forces.<sup>[146](#)</sup>

In 1960, the Special Forces role changed from trainer to combat adviser, from military mission to participant in offensive, unconventional warfare. On 9 August, the government that had secretly agreed to the U.S. mission was overthrown in a coup that restored former Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma to power (the prince had been ousted, for his neutralist policies, at U.S. instance in mid- 1958). The coup leader, paratroop commander Captain Kong Le, was a graduate of “CIA-sponsored Philippine scout and ranger



school.”<sup>147</sup> (Special Forces and Ranger trained officers also surprised their patrons elsewhere in 1960, as Guatemalan officers Luis Turcios Lima and Marco Antonio Yon Sosa led an officers’ revolt on 13 November; the conspirators would provide the nucleus of Guatemala’s later guerrilla movement.)

Kong Le’s first step was to invite Prince Souvana Phouma to establish a pluralist government dedicated to strict neutrality. The French responded with support for the new government, and the withdrawal of military support to rival forces. The American response was twofold and two-faced. The military mission (PEO) remained in contact with the new government, while a second military group set up in the south organized a counterrevolt. Special Forces’ trainers turned combat advisers and led countercoup forces that recaptured Vientiane on 17 December.<sup>148</sup> The retreating neutralist forces, however, remained in control of much of the north and east of the country, and they coalesced with the nationalist—and reputedly communist—guerrilla forces of the Pathet Lao.

After December 1960, the American presence in Laos grew rapidly, **with** Special Forces continuing their principal training and advisory role. They were organized in twelve-man WHITE STAR Mobile Training Teams (the ordinary size of their “A” Detachment). Their full force of 154 men was in the country by the spring of 1961. The force rose to 300 by October that year, and reached its peak level of 433 Special Forces personnel in July 1962.<sup>149</sup> At that time, Special Forces were assigned to most units of the *Forces Armées de Laos* and, along with Thai mercenaries under CIA direction, led paramilitary irregulars among the Kha and Meo tribesmen of the Laotian highlands.<sup>150</sup> Other unconventional warfare units deployed included “a special

battalion of Chinese mercenaries under ‘General Lu.’”<sup>151</sup> A further Laotian unit, identified in *The Pentagon Papers* as an American unconventional warfare resource, was the National Directorate of Coordination, two battalions devoted to “intelligence operations,” with “a capability for sabotage, kidnapping, commando-type raids, etc.”—more or less the full range of unconventional warfare tactics then established in Special Forces doctrine.

The organization of tribal peoples in Laos for “guerrilla” warfare against the Pathet Lao and neutralist forces drew directly upon the French experience during the First Indochina War. Meo and Kha forces were organized in hundred-man “Auto-Defense *de Choc*” companies similar to the French GCMA model. The forces of the main Meo leader, yang Pao, had been part of the rear-guard action in 1954 as French forces had withdrawn from the hinterlands of Tonkin and in efforts to relieve the besieged garrison at Dien Bien Phu. By the end of 1961, Colonel (later General) yang Pao placed 8,000 Meo tribesmen at the disposal of the CIA/Special Forces, after having been attracted by a mixture of blandishment and coercion, including a provision of funds and commodities through the CIA, and the guarantee of Meo control of the region’s lucrative opium crop (with CIA assistance in transport and market in”).<sup>152</sup> Meo officers loyal to Vang Pao visited remote villagers “offering money and arms if [they] joined with yang Pao and threatening reprisals if [they] remained neutral.”<sup>153</sup>

By early 1961, the Meo communities recruited for the American plan were placed in an untenable situation: Cut off from their traditional lands and livelihood, they had to fight or perish. Although nominally a “self-defense” scheme, the Meos were to serve as cannon fodder outside their local areas. The American plan forced the evacuation of the 200 or so Meo villages involved, and the relocation of 70,000

residents “to extricate the entire population base from the enemy’s reach.”<sup>154</sup> The relocation was initially described as a short-term measure: On completion of the expected rapid defeat of the Pathet Lao, the Meo were supposed to return to their home areas. This was not to be, though, and the failure to provide for the population in their new locale made them entirely dependent on CIA air drops of rice and commodities.

After the Meo relocation the terms of the original CIA/Meo arrangement altered: The Meo could no longer afford to cut their ties without facing starvation. As Douglas Blaufarb, an admirer of the Meo and apologist of the *Armée Clandestine* program that would destroy them conceded: “[T]he striking fact is that an estimated 70,000 men, women and children were launched into the mountains to find within months that they were face to face with starvation.”<sup>155</sup> That the Meo’s predicament was not unforeseen by their patrons is suggested in the November 1961 report to the president on the visit to Vietnam by General Maxwell Taylor and Walt W. Rostow. The Meo, described as “effective guerrilla fighters,” were seen to be in an untenable situation in Laos but still useful as assets within a Vietnam scenario:

*[I]t is probable that considerable effort will be made to destroy the guerrilla potential of the Meo. As an alternative to their annihilation, the Meo might be persuaded to migrate in significant numbers to Laos-Vietnam border where there are sparsely settled highlands.... Once in the border area the Meo could be rearmed and there significantly deter Viet Cong violations of the border.*

As the Kennedy administration took control over U.S. Army operations in Indochina, it rapidly learned that the principal role there had fallen to the CIA—and army Special Forces—rather than to the conventional armed forces. Roswell

Gilpatric later observed that only after his appointment to head the first Vietnam Task Force did he become aware

*of how far the CIA was really operating as a quasimilitary organization.... That's the first time I knew they were running Meos in Laos and Montagnards in South Vietnam. And as I got further into it, I found that we were not being told anywhere in the Defense Department very much about what was happening.*<sup>156</sup>

The importance of the CIA/Special Forces experience in Laos later became apparent in reports on crash training in guerrilla/counterguerrilla operations in the first eighteen months of the Kennedy administration.

A 30 January 1962 Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, with a section on "Southeast Asia as a Training Laboratory," provides comparative figures for Special Forces levels in Vietnam and Laos, and outlines their use as training cadre.<sup>157</sup> The paper, intended to show that the military enthusiastically accepted its new brief in the special warfare sphere, stressed that since 1959 the armed forces had trained indigenous military personnel, and "actually participated in operations.... This participation has provided an opportunity to learn more about this type of warfare, to test tactics and doctrine, to refine US techniques and to develop a backlog [*sic*] of personnel with recent experience in this area of the world."

Separate statistics were provided for the military groups (Military Assistance Advisory Groups, MAAG) and the Special Forces personnel assigned to Laos and Vietnam. While the military group in Laos had increased to 253 men in 1962, the group in Vietnam had reached a total strength of 1,137.<sup>158</sup> The emphasis, however, was on those forces with special warfare experience. In Vietnam, "in addition to the

MAAG personnel, 100 Army Special Forces team members served for periods of three to six months.” And in Laos “an estimated 350 officers and 1,000 soldiers of the Army Special Forces served as Military training teams on six months tours....” The Indochina “laboratory” provided a training cadre of approximately 3,500 officers and enlisted men for the new special warfare requirements.[159](#)

A progress report on military training relating to counterinsurgency was provided to Kennedy’s advisers by Chief of Staff Chairman General L. L. Lemnitzer on 30 January 1962, explaining the deep involvement of the U.S. military departments in many aspects of the “struggles” in Laos and Vietnam since 1959, “which have thus served as an excellent training laboratory.”[160](#)

The Laotian operation also gave Special Forces direct experience in running a mercenary army in unconventional warfare: WHITE STAR was a campaign of offensive *guerilla* warfare, a campaign to disrupt order, and so was rather different in conception from the organization of a program to restore order, to *counter* insurgency in Vietnam. The contradiction went unnoticed. The high command and the administration made no distinction and lumped counterinsurgency with other specialties in the field of unconventional warfare. Experience in running Meo mercenaries in Laos and peacekeeping in Vietnam were both, in the military mind, experience in “this type of warfare.’

# Chapter 5: Waging Unconventional Warfare: Guatemala, the Congo, and the Cubans

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## Eisenhower and Unconventional Warfare

Dwight D. Eisenhower was a keen advocate of clandestine operations. As Allied Supreme Commander, Eisenhower had considerable experience with the clandestine operations of the wartime Office of Strategic Services, whose operations provided the backbone of the postwar intelligence apparatus. On assuming office, Eisenhower undertook a reassessment of the national security establishment and paid particular attention to the field of covert action. In the 1952 campaign, he had attacked Truman's containment policy as "accepting the status quo" and spoken of the need to "wrest the initiative from the Kremlin, and, if possible, 'liberate' areas from Communist control."<sup>1</sup> A feature of his administration was the liberal deployment of the new resources of the CIA overseas in efforts to regain the initiative-and the development of a similar covert capability within the regular armed services. Eisenhower was a patron of unconventional warfare, much as Kennedy would later be an ardent promoter of counterinsurgency.

The administration's activist policy of intervention put into practice the Cold War "anything goes" philosophy in a manner Truman had only contemplated. The best-known operation, the overthrow of elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz, provided a model for subsequent unconventional warfare operations-CIA and military-in its combination of political and military elements. In 1953, Spruille Braden, former Assistant Secretary of State under Truman, called for U.S. action on Guatemala in now-familiar terms:

*[D]iplomatic "finesse and patience" are all right under the Marquis of Queensbury rules, but they may bring defeat if applied in a bar-room brawl, such as we are engaged in with the Kremlin . Frequently it is necessary to fight fire with fire. No one is more opposed than I to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. But ... we may be compelled to intervene . . . . I should like to underscore that because Communism is so blatantly an international and not internal affair, its suppression, even by force, in an American country, by one or more of the other republics, would not constitute an intervention in the internal affairs of the former....<sup>2</sup>*

In the event, a high-pressure diplomatic and propaganda offensive, intended to justify intervention in Guatemala, paralleled a prototype covert operation combining psychological warfare, mercenary paramilitary forces, and sanitized air power. The elected Arbenz government had antagonized the United States through its economic policies notably land reform and labor legislation impinging on American companies-and an ideological shift away from the lockstep anticommunism required by the United States of its Organization of American States neighbors. There were economic factors as well: Just as the successful CIA joint operation with the British, Project AJAX, ousted the Iranian

government of Mohammad Mossadegh and returned the Shah to power in August 1953 as a consequence of Mossadegh's meddling with oil interests (notably his expropriation of the British owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company<sup>3</sup>), so was the Guatemalan intervention motivated in part by the expropriation of some of the United Fruit Company's fallow land.<sup>4</sup>

## **Overthrowing Undesirable Regimes: Guatemala, 1954**

The rationale of intervention in Guatemala and elsewhere during the Cold War followed consistent patterns, with actions adjusted to the constraints required by the American political system and an appearance of compliance with the international legal order. American intervention (covert or overt) was always justified (obliquely or directly) by an appeal to a higher duty: "furtherance of self-determination; opposition to aggression; protection of the principle of peaceful change; and the legality of the intervention, as provided by an invitation from the authority in power."<sup>5</sup> All of these were subsumed in the Cold War "moral imperative" to meet the communist menace, for, by definition, "communism was aggressive, violent, illegal, and undemocratic."<sup>6</sup> The United States' self imposed moral restraints on foreign policy were overcome at will by invoking the Communist Threat (in the 1980s, International Terrorism became a similar password). Convincing a skeptical world, however, required more than moral rhetoric.

Sometime in 1953, a renegade Guatemalan colonel, Carlos Castillo Armas-a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas-was selected by the United States to head an "invasion" force, and to provide a political front for American efforts to force



Arbenz's left-leaning government from office.<sup>7</sup> According to E. Howard Hunt, then a CIA official (and later a Watergate "plumber"), Armas had been selected by process of elimination, and because "our paramilitary people . . . were impressed with Castillo [Armas]'s qualities as a military leader." Indeed, Castillo Armas's leadership qualities (and personal courage) were shown to be considerable, if not during the "Liberation," in which hardly a shot was fired (there were no casualties among his "Liberation Army"), then in the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations with his fellow colonels in the aftermath of Arbenz's capitulation.

Castillo Armas's principal task in the months before military action began was to provide a psychological rallying point-or lightning rod for the United States' preinvasion propaganda offensive. A "Liberation Army" radio campaign began on 1 May 1954, and every effort was made to ensure the Guatemalan government and army were aware that, just across the border in Honduras, Castillo Armas was drilling a CIA "army"-this in order to undermine Arbenz's already shaky relation with the armed forces and to encourage their acquiescence in his ouster when the time came for action. The broadcasts were augmented by less than veiled threats from the U.S. government. John Peurifoy, the new U.S. ambassador appointed in October 1953 to supervise the operation, who was fresh from fighting communists in Greece, told *Time* magazine in January 1954 that the United States might be forced "to take some measures to prevent Guatemala from falling into the lap of international Communism."<sup>10</sup> Peurifoy would later brag that Arbenz's ouster was accomplished only forty-five minutes off schedule.<sup>11</sup>

The Guatemalan intervention was to be covert not clandestine, a distinction of both intent and method: Covert operations were "so planned and executed as to conceal the

identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.” They differed from clandestine operations “in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.”<sup>12</sup> A clandestine effort would have aimed at so subtle a change as to evade both accountability and awareness that intervention had occurred. The intention in Guatemala, by contrast, was to evade accountability while letting the whole world know that a regime that challenged the United States would suffer drastic consequences.

On the CIA end, Project PBSUCCESS-the operation’s code name set up a headquarters at Opa Locka, Florida, with a budget between \$5 and \$7 million. Richard Immerman has pointed out that PBSUCCESS was the first CIA project set up with a separate infrastructure and with virtually open-ended access to resources and funding:

*[PBSUCCESS] involved some one hundred CIA agents and contract operatives. The agency also enlisted the services of scores of recruits, mostly mercenaries, from Guatemala and the neighboring Central American nations, especially Nicaragua, Honduras, and Panama .... [T]he United States government flew personnel, aircraft, and other supplies to France’s Field, an abandoned airstrip in the Canal Zone . . . from which they could be transported under cover to opposition camps in Nicaragua and Honduras . . . . The unit received its own communication facilities, support people, cover agents, and special authority to requisition confidential funds.*

The compartmentalized setup became the norm for future unconventional warfare operations, military or paramilitary, from the Bay of Pigs to the secret armies of Southeast Asia.

On 18 June, Castillo Armas crossed into Guatemala from Honduras at the head of a force probably numbering less than 300 men. Although well-armed with Bren guns, mortars, and even flamethrowers, the unopposed “Liberation Army” halted just inside Guatemala in the town of Esquipulas, known then for its shrine to the Black Christ (and later also as a place of pilgrimage to honor the “Liberation”).<sup>13</sup> The Liberacionistas waited in Esquipulas while the real “war” was waged by American pilots and assorted mercenaries in aircraft. Those in charge included Whiting Willauer, a World War II veteran of irregular air warfare who had served as General Claire Chennault’s deputy in the Flying Tigers.<sup>14</sup> At dawn on 18 June, a group of B-26 bombers and three P-47 fighters appeared above Guatemala City, dropped leaflets, and then began strafing and bombing runs. Targets were selected largely for their psychological effect: military drill areas, ammunition dumps, oil storage tanks. One of the pilots, American Jerry DeLarm, later told NBC’s John Chancellor how he “blew up the government oil reserves and subsequently when the political situation was up in the air and required decisive action-the main powder magazine of the army.”<sup>15</sup>

Although unable to induce the Guatemalan army to fight, apart from some desultory antiaircraft fire, Arbenz held on to his precarious office for nine days. Castillo Armas and his “army” stayed put in Esquipulas unmolested, while U.S. air power continued a steady diet of harassing raids on the capital and the port of San José (sinking the British freighter *Springfjord* in the process). Despite the lack of opposition in the air, the small “Liberation” air wing suffered from attrition in the first days of the operation, with several aircraft crash-landing (some sources refer to two having been shot down, although no casualties were ever acknowledged). CIA requests for replacements required a presidential decision,

although U.S. Air Force planes were standing by in Nicaragua, apparently for just such a contingency. Rapidly “reflagged,” the aircraft were soon in the air over Guatemala City keeping up the pressure.

On 27 June, Arbenz stepped down, replaced by a junta of colonels. After considerable arm-twisting (Ambassador Peurifoy called it “knocking heads together”), Peurifoy won the agreement of the colonels to invite Castillo Armas to head a new government. And so on 3 July, Castillo Armas returned to Guatemala City in triumph. And like his Iranian counterpart, General Fozlollah Zahedi, who rode into Tehran the year before on the back of an American tank after the fall of Mossadegh, Castillo Armas came to the capital in the comfort of Peurifoy’s embassy plane.<sup>[16](#)</sup>

The key to the operation was to ensure that the Guatemalan army would choose not to fight. The gambit was explained to Eisenhower in a CIA memo of 20 June:

*The entire effort is ... more dependent upon psychological impact ... than actual military strength, although it is upon the ability of the Castillo Armas effort, to create and maintain for a short time the impression of very substantial military strength that the success of this particular effort primarily depends.*<sup>[17](#)</sup>

The same approach would be taken in 1961, in the abortive invasion of Cuba.

## **Overthrowing Undesirable Regimes: Cuba, 1959-1961**

The United States’ abortive invasion of Cuba in the early hours of 17 April 1961 brought together the paramilitary and military apparatus for unconventional warfare. An “Eyes Only” CIA paper—“A Program of Covert Action against the

Castro Regime”-had been approved more than a year before by President Eisenhower at a White House meeting on 17 March 1960, its stated objective “to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the US in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of US intervention.” The “means of accomplishing this end,” essentially, was “to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside Cuba by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative.”<sup>18</sup>

The document would stand as the “basic policy paper” on Cuba, and present the Kennedy administration with its first crisis of judgment. A 23 March 1960 memorandum detailed ways the CIA was to “intensify UW [unconventional warfare] activities in Cuba.”

CIA Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell assumed primary planning responsibility, drawing on his prior experience in the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz. Bissell himself later confirmed that the plan entailed a “protracted period of psychological and political warfare,” as in the Guatemala operation, and a gamble that the Cubans would respond like the Guatemalans: “The chance of true success—that is the chance of toppling Castro—was predicated on the assumption that faced with that kind of pressure, he would suffer the same loss of nerve” as Arbenz.<sup>19</sup> Planning and implementation incorporated basic features outlined in the armed forces’ emerging doctrine of unconventional warfare and involved the forces of the CIA, the Army Special Forces, and the conventional forces of the navy in coordinated action. David Atlee Phillips, the CIA’s propaganda chief for the operation, later identified the head of the military phase of the operation as a “dour” colonel with a reputation as “a brilliant guerrilla strategist in the Philippines during World

War II”possibly Colonel Charles Bohannon, who was based in Colombia only the previous year.”” Another source identified one of the trainers of the task force as Philippine Colonel Napoleon Valeriano.<sup>21</sup> The ideological rationale, planning, and execution of the Bay of Pigs operation provided a model for a later American adventure in UW: the 1980s war on Nicaragua.

In purely military terms, the Cuban invasion was planned as a fairly conventional military operation to establish a beachhead. The political end, the overthrow of Castro, was to be achieved in the uprisings to follow. The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s February 1961 evaluation of the plan’s military merits defined the principal task of the invasion force: “To hold a beachhead long enough to establish a provisional government, act as a rallying point of volunteers and as a catalyst for uprisings throughout Cuba.”<sup>22</sup>

The bottom line, the operational objective, was to establish and hold that beachhead: Having done so, if only in a remote corner of Cuba, the United States could then have recognized a “government” in exile and sent in (conventional) military assistance. The joint Chiefs’ February 1961 evaluation of the plan found it militarily viable ([the political conditions were as described by the CIA. Success even in the military view was ultimately “dependent on the degree of local Cuban support.” In the event, the CIA misread or disregarded that crucial indicator. There were no pro-American guerrillas waiting to link up with the invasion force; there would be neither a defensible beachhead nor a provisional government; and American intervention would be exposed in all its vainglory.

The avoidance of “any appearance of US intervention” required the creation of a Cuban exile organization, an alternative “government” to which the invasion could be

attributed. The procedure was to be repeated twenty years later with the packaging of the Nicaraguan contras. The postmortem of the operation, an inquiry headed by General Maxwell Taylor, found preliminary moves to this end had begun immediately after Batista's fall.<sup>23</sup> The ideal leadership envisioned was a group of managers not overtly inimical to the revolution but friendly to the United States:

*The general conclusion reached in the latter part of 1959 was that any group or coalition of groups which could hope to supplant the Castro regime could gain popular acceptance only on the basis of continuing the revolution, with more practical management, and less nationalist, socialist and Marxist content.*

According to the same source, the leadership was then carefully selected-by the United States: "As the project approached . . . approval on the highest governmental level, the possible composition of a junta' was discussed on the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State level." The Department of State provided "advice on personalities and substance."<sup>24</sup>

Although Batista associates were recruited for the military (and also the strictly terrorist) UW actions against Cuba (just as former Somoza henchmen provided the leadership for the contras in the 1980s), the planners were aware that the link should remain secret. The initial policy papers warned that the United States would have to publicly disassociate itself from Batista supporters, although the operations people were reluctant to reject willing recruits for the commission of mayhem.<sup>21</sup> Even the operations people, however, were aware of the political imperative: If useful in the larger strategy, the sponsors would willingly sacrifice some of their more unsavory allies. In his meeting with the president on 5 April, just ten days before jump-off, Richard Bissell outlined

a plan (later aborted) to arrest one of the more flamboyant counterrevolutionaries operating with CIA help out of Miami and impound his B-25 aircraft and several small boats: "All of this intended to show US disassociation with former Batista followers. "[26](#)

A "revolutionary" executive was duly rounded up in Miami on 11 May 1960; and on 13 February 1961, two months before "D-Day," presidential approval was received to set up a "Revolutionary Council."[27](#) Although the Bay of Pigs invasion was to be carried out in the name of the "Revolutionary Council," Kennedy warned in a White House meeting on 5 April 1961 that "the council should not be informed ahead of time. "[28](#)

Although the Cuban offensive was organized on a considerably larger scale than its Guatemalan prototype six years before (it brought in all of the U. S. armed services), its general thrust was essentially the same as that of 1954. In the face of overwhelming force, the government of a small, vulnerable state was expected to bow to force majeure. There was little sign of interest in the kind of partisan or "guerrilla" operation espoused in the Cold War literature of the time. The invasion effort mimicked not insurgency but a conventional military operation. What made this unconventional warfare exercise "unconventional" was its use of foreign nationals as cannon fodder, its emphasis on deniability, its sidestepping of the rules of war, and its limited commitment of conventional military support as a means of minimizing international censure in the event of failure.

Of course, the paramilitary planners badly misjudged the scenario. Cuba 1961 was not Guatemala 1954. The Guatemalan adventure had faced virtually no opposition; the threats and posturing of the "invasion" force were aimed



at provoking a military coup, not taking on a triumphant revolution in full swing. And while Guatemala's stolid armed forces had acquiesced in ousting Arbenz, the Guatemalan people, by mutual agreement between the opposing parties, were kept well out of the fray. The Cuban situation, by contrast, pitted a well-prepared army and militia against an American strike force, which within seventy-two hours was utterly destroyed.

Kennedy was first advised of the general terms of the plan on 28 January, just days after taking office. In a series of meetings, Kennedy insisted that the overt military involvement in the affair be toned down, in keeping with the political advice he was receiving from the CIA that the Cuban people were ripe for revolt. The CIA's summaries of White House meetings indicate the tone: The president "stated that he was willing to take the chance of going ahead; that he could not endorse a plan that put us in so openly . . . . He directed the development of a plan where US assistance would be less obvious" (11 March). "The President expressed the belief that uprisings all along the island would be better than to concentrate and strike" (15 March). "The President again indicated his preference for an operation which would infiltrate the force in units of 200-250 and then develop them through a build up" (4 April).<sup>29</sup>

Two weeks before the landing, the president was still pressing for a genuine "guerrilla" operation, which he had been led to believe was possible. What he got was altogether different. The task force was manned by some 1,400 Cuban nationals and a still-unknown number of American military and CIA personnel.<sup>30</sup> Training had been provided by CIA and U. S. Army Special Forces personnel and the army tank school at Fort Knox. An air wing of seventeen B-26 bombers was maintained by Cuban and American personnel, including six American pilots, "with

between 3 and 6,000 hours total time each, and combat time in World War II or Korea or both.” A fleet of naval vessels (thirteen transports and a flotilla of landing craft and small boats) “supported by approximately 40 Naval personnel,” was to deliver the men and supplies-including a tank platoon of five M41 tanks to the Cuban shore. The transports departed Nicaragua’s Puerto Cabezas on Friday, 14 April, escorted by two destroyers, shadowed by a submarine, and within reach of the aircraft carrier *Essex* (which five days later picked up some of the survivors).<sup>31</sup>

Although the operation was consistent with JFK’s desire for an activist approach to the Cold War and was an opportunity to implement the much-vaunted doctrine of unconventional warfare, doubts remained. The president’s concerns, however, were systematically countered by the professionals, on technical or political grounds.<sup>32</sup> Despite a stated position that the operation could be canceled even at the last moment, the president was faced with enormous pressure from his CIA and military advisers. Even a mid-March military evaluation warning of the plan’s fragility nevertheless stressed that it was really quite unthinkable that the United States back out: “The point of no return has been passed and a decision to abandon the scheme is untenable.” The evaluators warned that the United States, having created the expeditionary force, could disband it only at its peril: “In the event such a decision should be made, a revolt within the assembled force would probably occur with dire consequences both for the US trainer personnel and for US interests abroad.”<sup>33</sup> (Similarly, in the 1980s the CIA’s *contra* advocates floated dire warnings of the effects on Honduras-and the United States-of 15,000 disinherited *contras* running amok.)

As the fleet of thirteen American ships approached Cuba on the night of Sunday, 16 April, Cuba’s year-old militia

patrolled the beaches awaiting the expected invasion. Attacks on Cuban targets by United States B-26 bombers in the previous weeks (destroying over half the Cuban air force) and a rising crescendo of propaganda broadcasts from "Radio Swan" had ensured that the population was on full alert." As troops boarded thirty-six small boats and landing craft and headed for three beaches near the town of Playa Giron, dubbed "Red," "Green," and "Blue," the operation began to unravel. A contingent of troops reached Red Beach, but lost most of its supplies in doing so. Landing craft at Green Beach grounded on offshore spikes of coral, forcing troops to take to the water; they quickly abandoned the landing there when they were fired upon by militiamen waiting on the beach. Redirected to concentrate forces at Blue Beach, their landing there, too, lost the element of surprise. An American after-action report described the scene: Militiamen in a jeep switched its headlights on, illuminating-then firing on-the approaching flotilla of small boats. The militia in doing so managed to raise the alarm with guards on the dock in Playa Giron: Moments later, lights throughout the town went out when defense forces pulled the plug. Landing-support ships cleared the beach of resistance-for a time-with heavy-caliber machine-gun fire.<sup>35</sup>

At dawn on 17 April the beachhead established at Blue Beach was under assault by Playa Giron's militia, as regular troops reached the area and the first Cuban T-33 fighters appeared. Thirteen American B-26s reached the beachhead at dawn, bombing and strafing Cuban forces; four were quickly shot down. The U.S. air defense plan, which depended on putting into operation an airstrip adjacent to the beachhead, failed in the face of Cuban resistance. A Cuban T-33 trainer sank the *Rio Escondido* and incapacitated the *Houston*, the largest ship in the fleet, forcing it to go aground, and drove other supply ships to take cover with U.S. destroyers just outside territorial waters.

On the ground, the Expeditionary Force combined high-tech conventional weaponry with unconventional brutality. The support ship *Barbara J* provided “gunfire support” to assist the unloading of the *Houston* when it came under attack, while “two . . . tanks which had been sent up from Blue Beach assisted in stopping this attack.” The next night, the crew of the *Houston* captured a Cuban patrol boat and three militiamen: “Two militiamen were killed and three taken prisoners. The three prisoners were executed because of the logistical problems they made for the survivors.”<sup>36</sup>

This after-action report also justifies other apparent atrocities by the expeditionary force—including the destruction of an ambulance—by alleging Cuban treachery: “The militia at one time sent an ambulance under a white flag to pick up wounded but tried to sneak two trucks loaded with militia in behind it. The tank destroyed all three vehicles with one round and the machine guns finished the job.” In another case, some militia that were trapped in some buildings came out to surrender but when the CEF [Cuban Expeditionary Force] troops moved toward them they dropped to the ground and opened fire. All this group was then wiped out by the CEF troops.” Whether or not the ambulance was in fact a decoy, or the Cubans surrendering really pulled guns, the net result of the operation was that in three days of fighting the Expeditionary Force took no prisoners.

Although the dawn air strikes on the beachhead area went ahead as scheduled, plans to destroy Cuba’s tiny air force on the ground by means of surprise attacks on air bases (“American pilots will be used in the strikes against each of the six airfields”<sup>37</sup>) were aborted the night before the landing.<sup>38</sup> The policy decision to limit air support for the invasion was to be a matter for recrimination between the Cuban exile community (and the CIA) and the Kennedy

administration. Assistance from the U.S. naval forces had never been part of the plan. But even the partial restriction of air strikes from Puerto Cabezas radically changed the invasion scenario. Kennedy's decision not to provide U.S. air support for the nominally Cuban invasion of Cuba was understandable, if not the timing of his final decisions. The operation's inevitable failure, however, should have been a foregone conclusion. Cut off from Cuba's interior by a vast swamp, harried by crack units of Cuba's 32,000-man army and highly motivated militia, and trained and equipped only to establish a beachhead, the Expeditionary Force was doomed the moment Cuban defenses showed the resolution to resist.

An evaluation of the plan only weeks before had warned of the extreme vulnerability of the operation to Cuban air power, however effective the invaders' own air cover. Too much depended on complete surprise-an utterly unrealistic scenario-and the complete destruction of Cuban air power: "If surprise is not achieved, it is most likely that the air mission will fail"; and if the air mission failed, the operation would fail: "As a consequence [of a security breach], one or more of Castro's combat aircraft will likely be available for use against the invasion force, and an aircraft armed with 50 calibre machine guns could sink all or most of the invasion force." The assessment concluded that "the odds are about 84 to 15 against surprise being achieved in the attack against Castro's Cuba." The evaluators urged further consideration of the plan; the CIA, however, was satisfied and proceeded anyway.<sup>[40](#)</sup>

In truth the military (including the CIA) appears to have had little faith in its potential to generate a "people in arms" against Castro. While the CIA and the Joint Chiefs were selling Kennedy a plan to ignite general insurrection in Cuba, what they were planning was neither a guerrilla

operation nor a popular uprising. The forces assembled by the United States were intended to shock the Cuban regime into collapse just as Arbenz had been shaken in 1954; air power, tanks, and an amphibious landing were to provide a quick fix of the Cuban malaise.

The Bay of Pigs invasion was a case in point in which doctrine colored judgment and theory became a formula for precipitous action. Although JFK and his cabinet advisers were sold a strangely rose-colored view of the affair by the professionals of the military and CIA, all of the actors, political and military, acted on three basic premises: The Cuban revolutionary regime was ideologically unacceptable in the Western Hemisphere; action to overthrow the Cuban regime was legitimate in the context of the Cold War; and the Cuban people, the militia, and the military were, by the very nature of the regime, disaffected and eager to revolt. The collapse of the venture was not due to the details of policy, the political restrictions on available air power, but to the policy itself. In the words of Clausewitz, "Policy caused the defeats because it was mistaken; it had cast a judgment on the real war that was contrary to the nature that it assumed." [41](#)

While the invasion of Cuba was planned, discussions were underway within the armed forces and within the White House on means to bring the military farther into the sphere of covert or low-intensity intervention, which hitherto had been left largely to the CIA. A 1961 paper, from Walt Rostow's White House files, records an army Research and Development proposal for a more direct army role in unconventional warfare operations, adapting the doctrine already developed for an army "guerrilla" role in occupied Europe to deal with governments flirting with socialism: "The operation would not be in support of conventional US military operations. The guerrilla war would be political and

antiCommunist, for national self-determination. The resistance area would be a base for total US assistance (military, economic, political, psychological).” The idea was that the United States could take out unfriendly governments without the cost or political fuss involved in an invasion. As in the Bay of Pigs operation, conventional forces “would be the psychological club held cocked, prepared to prevent outside intervention. “[42](#)

## **Overthrowing Undesirable Regimes: The Congo**

As American forces moved toward Cuban beaches in 1961, another intervention was underway a continent away in the Congo. The “Congo crisis” followed shortly after the Belgian Congo’s independence on 30 June 1960, when elected nationalist Patrice Lumumba took office at the head of a coalition government.[43](#) A mutiny of the Congolese army provided the pretext required for the reoccupation of the country by Belgian paratroops, and the Belgian-orchestrated secession of mineral rich Katanga Province under a government headed by Moises Tshombe. Lumumba received United Nations assistance in restoring government control over most of the country, but the U.N. force failed to move against the Belgians and their allies in Katanga. The Belgians, in turn, gradually withdrew, after assisting in reorganizing the security system in the province, including the initial recruitment of mercenaries. The massive U.S. military action that followed was a direct antecedent to the Angolan intervention, and indeed drew upon some of the same American-and mercenary-manpower.

The American reaction to Lumumba’s nationalist stand, his close relations with nationalist leaders elsewhere in Africa, and his willingness to accept the assistance of the socialist world-including the Soviet Union-prompted U.S. efforts to

replace the new government almost before it took office. The Katanga secession issue provided just one peg for American covert intervention, while efforts to take direct action that is, Lumumba's assassination-proceeded.

The American cable traffic that followed independence reflected the near panic over the prospects of Lumumba's pursuit of an independent foreign policy: The Congo was to be the first of many countries sacrificed in reaction to the Cuban fiasco. As CIA station chief Lawrence Devlin warned in an 18 August 1960 cable,

*EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA*<sup>44</sup>

A National Security Council meeting that same day approved a first stage of a covert action plan to replace Lumumba "with a pro-Western group" (the term used in a 19 August CIA cable); and on 25 August, the NSC's Special Group (which oversaw covert operations) agreed that "planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba." <sup>46</sup>

The 1975 report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Alleged Assassination Plots first made public the top-level American plan to eliminate Lumumba, concluding that CIA chief Allen Dulles had ordered the murder.<sup>47</sup> The report documented that a CIA scientist was sent to the Congo to murder Lumumba with "lethal



biological material” (tucked in a diplomatic pouch), although it concluded that Lumumba’s eventual murder was through more conventional means.<sup>48</sup> Former CIA officer John S. Stockwell, who was based in the Congo and later headed the CIA’s Angola Task Force, adds a further snippet, a colleague’s anecdote about “an adventure in Lubumbashi, driving about town after curfew with Patrice Lumumba’s body in the trunk of his car, trying to decide what to do with it.” (“He presented this story in a benign light, as though he had been trying to help. . . .”) <sup>49</sup> Another author adds: “What he did do with it has not yet been made public.”<sup>50</sup>

The military aspects of the 1960-1963 Congo conflict with secessionist Katanga Province were complex: As a U.N. force arrived on U.S. Air Force transports to support the Congolese government, Americans were providing air power and mercenary forces to assist Tshombe’s secessionist forces and the Belgian paratroops, who had begun arriving on 10 July.<sup>51</sup> The CIA’s use of mercenaries dated from the first American involvement in the newly independent Congo. The lessons learned from the Congo crisis would influence American covert policy long afterward; Lawrence Devlin, described as the “*éminence grise* of the Congo program,” would subsequently be given control of the American paramilitary operations in Laos, return in the early 1970s to take charge of the CIA’s Africa Division, and dominate the CIA’s African operations until his retirement in 1974.<sup>52</sup>

In January 1961, Tshombe’s “government” was bolstered by a gendarmerie with a core of some 250 former Belgian *Force Publique* officers and from 30 to 40 army “officers on loan,” who had remained behind after most Belgian troops left the province in August 1960. At that time, from 50 to 100 mercenaries of varying nationalities were integrated into the gendarmerie.<sup>54</sup> By the end of February, some 200

Englishspeaking mercenaries were reportedly recruited, primarily from South Africa and Rhodesia, but including veterans of military service in Malaya. Belgian and French recruits, probably numbering several hundred more, were integrated into mixed AfricanEuropean units of the gendarmerie.<sup>55</sup>

The Katanga mercenaries were recruited both through high rates of pay and through the local information services' depiction of Katanga as a bastion of European civilization against communism. French counterinsurgent Roger Trinquier later claimed he had been encouraged to go to Katanga by French Defense Minister Pierre Messmer but was ultimately thwarted by opposition from the French Foreign Ministry (he did in fact go, but did not stay). Although Trinquier's reputation made his direct involvement in Katanga problematic for French authorities, junior officers fresh from the debacle of Algeria and extremist advocates of the theory of *guerre révolutionnaire* faced fewer obstacles in going south to Katanga.<sup>56</sup> Although conflicts with U.N. forces ensued, the principal mercenary tasks in Katanga after the death of Lumumba were to subdue ethnic groups resisting Tshombe's "independent" government. Operations in the Ba-Luba areas, where poorly armed resistance groups had emerged, took the form of traditional punitive raids and routine atrocities.<sup>57</sup> The mercenary force in place by the end of February 1961 typified the CIA-sponsored mercenaries that would appear elsewhere around the world in subsequent decades:

*[A] band of soldiers who ranged from hard-bitten professional killers to wild-eyed idealists who were convinced that they were saving the world from communism. Their motives varied from the need for money and the desire for a fight to a quite genuine feeling that they were conducting a crusade to defeat*

*communism and protect the white man in Africa ....  
Whatever their motives, these soldiers were for the most  
part ruthless, tough, and unscrupulous and they were  
known locally as “les affreux”-the terrible ones.*<sup>58</sup>

The level of terror would rise dramatically *after* the secession crisis, with Tshombe’s assumption of national leadership.

The death of Lumumba removed the primary rationale for Western support for an independent Katanga, and in January 1963, what had become a military stalemate ultimately ended. In July 1964, a U. S.-backed military initiative installed Moises Tshombe himself as prime minister of the independent Congo.<sup>59</sup> By that time, however, major revolts against the central government were in progress in the eastern regions around Stanleyville-which was captured by rebels in August 1964-and elsewhere. The three years of conflict that ensued saw the American unconventional war become “a classic counterinsurgency campaign.”<sup>60</sup>

Sometimes called “Lumumbist” the rebel movements that broke out after the death of Lumumba were armed, in part, by neighboring nationalist governments (against alleged promises of replacement by the Soviets)! However, they appeared neither national in scope nor nationalist in orientation, but rather disjointed and politically inchoate. Although not a single unified force, they did, by late 1964, dominate almost half the country. The principal rebel group, known as the “Simbas” (“Lions”), saw the expulsion of Europeans from their dominions in the northern region around Stanleyville as their principal task, to be performed with the utmost ferocity.<sup>62</sup> The American counterinsurgents turned to the same tactics employed by their Belgian colleagues: mercenary massacres and punitive bombing, strafing and shelling.

The counterinsurgency campaign was a joint operation between the United States and Belgium, and on much the same terms as the previous collaboration in Katanga. President Johnson's Secretary of State Dean Rusk approved a 7 August 1964 policy paper requiring an "immediate effort . . . with Belgians to help Tshombe raise gendarme-mercenary force along with bolstering whatever force there is to hold present strong points and to start rebel roll back."<sup>63</sup> Already in progress, however, was a CIA/Defense Department program to provide the Congolese with what the *New York Times* later dubbed "an instant air force."<sup>64</sup> Early in 1964, the CIA had begun providing Cuban exile pilots through a Miami proprietary (Caribbean Marine Aero Corporation)<sup>65</sup> "to fly armed Italian T6 training planes against 'Muleist' insurgents in the western Kwilu Province"; and by April the Defense Department had agreed to provide six T-28 fighters, ten C-47 transports, six H-21 heavyduty helicopters, spare parts, 100 technicians, as well as "several" counterinsurgency advisers!<sup>66</sup>

What one author calls "the interdependent covert-overt pattern of support"<sup>67</sup> was exemplified by the CIA's provision of covert Cuban pilots (and no doubt others) to make use of the overt grants of aircraft (by Defense)-a pattern of CIA/Defense interaction still apparent in the 1980s Nicaragua intervention and most obvious at its Honduran end. The CIA's paramilitary specialists were also augmented by regular military trainers attached to a military mission in the capital: By June 1964, the number of foreign trainers had been boosted to ninety Belgians, seventy Americans, and ten Israelis.<sup>68</sup> The CIA's assessment of their main contribution provides a telling insight into the real role of "military advisers" in insurgency/unconventional warfare situations: "As trainers, these men can have little short-term effect... but as tactical advisers they are already useful."<sup>69</sup>

The fall of Stanleyville prompted an increased level of U.S. involvement, including the prompt arrival of four C-130 military transports, a group of B-26 bombers (totaling seven or eight by January 1965), and arms and equipment for the ground war.<sup>70</sup> Fast patrol boats were provided to interdict arms shipments (and personnel movement) across Lake Tanganyika. Even maintenance was provided for, with a staff of 50 to 100 Europeans employed by another CIA proprietary, the Liechtenstein-registered company WIGMO (Western International Ground Maintenance Organization).<sup>71</sup> The Belgians also brought in supplies and a force of 300 to 400 men to provide command and logistics assistance.<sup>72</sup> Much of the buildup was directed at the mercenary dimensions of the “counterinsurgency”: The new air power and weaponry was intended to support a force of some 700 mercenaries (Europeans, South Africans, and Rhodesians) assembled by Tshombe, the CIA, and the Belgians.<sup>73</sup> A CIA officer later described the project as “bringing in our own animals.”<sup>74</sup> Not all the U.S.-backed “mercenaries” in the Congo-and later in Angola-were mercenaries per se. Marchetti and Marks’s landmark CIA study notes: “By 1964, the CIA had imported its own mercenaries into the Congo, and the agency’s B-26 bombers, flown by Cuban exile pilots . . . were carrying out regular missions against insurgent groups,” including regular bombing missions.<sup>75</sup> These authors described the Cubans interchangeably as “under contract” or as “mercenaries,” a perhaps frivolous distinction. One study of the Congo crisis defined mercenaries as individuals who were “recruited on an individual basis and owed no direct allegiance to any foreign Government a definition that would rule out forces “on loan” from second governments.<sup>76</sup> Some of the better-known of the Congo mercenaries, like the former French NCO Bob Denard, who took over command of the French-speaking Six Commando that had fought for the Katangans in the war of

secession, were later recruited by the United States to work in Angola.<sup>77</sup>

The terror of the subsequent months was reciprocal: The rebels killed thousands in a rampage apparently driven by interethnic rivalries, hostility toward Congolese officials of any kind, and a response in kind to the colonial racial policies of the past. Their adversaries combined bombing and strafing with ground campaigns of annihilation, or “counterterror”:

*[T]he Congo air force bombed villages in rebel-held areas and the white mercenary columns advanced, slaughtering wholesale those presumed to be rebel supporters. In one town alone, Kindu, the mercenaries killed some three thousand people, according to one of their numbers. [Joseph-Dsiré] Mobutu's army, which followed in the wake of the mercenaries, was considered even more brutal.*<sup>78</sup>

The campaign against the Simba rebels climaxed as ground forces approached rebel-held Stanleyville in the north. Rebels held some 1,000 white hostages, including about fifty Americans, and threatened their execution should the advance continue. The response was again a joint Belgian-American operation: Belgian paratroopers dropped on the city on 24 November 1961 from U.S. aircraft. Although some fifty of the hostages were killed by their captors as the paratroopers moved in, the operation was generally deemed successful in the West: Some of the hostages had, in fact, been rescued, and the rebel forces largely annihilated. For America's African policy, however, the effect of the affair was two-edged. African leaders like Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta, who had sought to bring about the negotiated release of the hostages and an end to the

conflict, felt betrayed by American's resort to blatant colonialist intervention.

The "insurgency" continued in the Congo for another three years before it was finally extinguished. American CIA pilots (most of the "Cubans" were naturalized Americans) and some 100 WIGMO contract pilots were still based there as of 1966, with major American involvement in operations ending around mid-1967.<sup>79</sup> A last episode of direct intervention occurred in July 1967, when, ironically, Mobutu (now Sese Seko-who had finally taken power for good in a November 1965 coup) called for help to put down a rebellion of white mercenaries. The United States graciously did so, flying in three aircraft, with "supporting personnel," to aid in crushing the mutiny. Congressional concern over possible escalation of U.S. involvement forced the withdrawal of two of the aircraft in August and the third in December, and won a pledge from President Johnson that future direct involvement in Africa would only be occasioned by "the most overwhelming necessity."<sup>80</sup> The next major covert engagement of the United States in Africa would be in Angola.

## **Defense through Development**

The 1958-1959 findings of the President's Committee To Study the U.S. Military Assistance Program (the Draper Committee) played a major part in forging a global policy view that military assistance should be provided allied forces both to counter "external aggression" and, possibly coining the expression, "internal aggression."<sup>81</sup> The Draper Committee was also partly responsible for later policies that gave military establishments (and by extension, military regimes) primary roles in Third World "development." Its report on "Military Contributions to Economic and Social

Projects” urged the United States to use military assistance to “encourage the use of the armed forces of underdeveloped countries as a major transmission belt of socioeconomic reform and development.”<sup>82</sup> In the short run, this meant the use of the military to perform nonmilitary tasks under the rubric of “military civic action.”<sup>83</sup> A new Cold War look at foreign assistance had been proposed to the National Security Council in December 1937 by the head of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), the precursor to the Agency for International Development (AID). Like counterinsurgency, the proposal was a reaction to a Soviet challenge:

Three weeks ago Mr Khrushchev issued a challenge to the US by stating in Moscow: “We declare war upon you-excuse me for using such an expression-in the peaceful field of trade. We declare war. We will win over the US. The threat to the US is not the ICBM, but in the field of peaceful production. We are relentless in this In this case there is clear evidence that Khrushchev has put his machine to work and that this effort is coordinated with Communist China .... The Soviet now has some 2,000 technicians, representing five different nationalities, working in 19 of the uncommitted countries .... The economic battle ground is far more conspicuous than the Vanguard launching pad .... Fortunately, this battle can be made to benefit mankind ....<sup>84</sup>

The Eisenhower NSC had heard earlier proposals that economic and security assistance should be augmented precisely *because* the threat of overt aggression had diminished. The Cold Warriors’ concern over the perils of peace were enunciated in a November 1954 NSC paper on “Basic National Security Policy (Suggestions of the Secretary of State),” which warned that “a prolonged period of cold war, with a reduced fear of overt aggression, will severely



test the stability and cohesion of the Free World. The United States should stress measures calculated to strengthen the political and economic fabric of the Free World.”<sup>85</sup>

By late 1954, the State Department under John Foster Dulles saw a general improvement in U.S. security, due to such developments as the “settling of disputes in Egypt, Iran and Trieste” and “the liquidation of the Communist Regime in Guatemala.” But the United States’ principal bulwark against communist domination was seen as “the maintenance of its alliances and the cohesion of the Free World,” and it was precisely this that was jeopardized by the diminishing threat of general war. The November 1954 paper, written during what then might have appeared to be a kind of *glasnost* (shortly before the Budapest uprising), observed that the Soviet shift to a “soft” line since the death of Stalin is a major new factor. It tends to allay the fears of free-world countries, to relax their efforts to build effective defenses, to foster neutralism, and to divide the free peoples. The ending of hostilities in Korea and Indochina reinforces these trends.

The remedies proposed are now familiar: Military and related programs were to be developed for “internal security” in underdeveloped areas in Latin America and Southeast Asia; a special effort was proposed to develop “sounder economies” in Latin America through economic and technical assistance; and the United States and its allies would necessarily develop a capability for a “flexible” response to aggression “in a manner and on a scale which will not inevitably broaden them into total nuclear war.”<sup>87</sup>

In 1959, the United States supported Latin American efforts for the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank, and in July 1960, Eisenhower stated as a policy of the United States that means would be sought to accelerate

Latin America's economic development. In September-not least as a response to the Cuban Revolution- Eisenhower informed Latin American foreign ministers that the United States would provide \$500 million to establish a Social Progress Trust Fund for development assistance to Latin America. <sup>89</sup> Even the Inter-American Defense Board, the Washington-based forum of American armies set up under Organization of American States auspices in 1941, followed through on 1 December 1960 with its resolution on the "Contribution of the Armed Forces to the Economic-Social Development of the Countries."<sup>90</sup>

The Department of State's Western Hemisphere Division had also, during the latter months of 1960, prepared an integrated policy proposal for military assistance programs to be redirected to encourage military involvement in both internal security and economic development. The "internal defense and development" formula of what was to become classic counterinsurgency doctrine would be adopted fairly intact by the incoming Kennedy administration. State's Policy Planning Staff paper, "A New Concept for Hemispheric Defense and Development," dated 15 January 1961, just five days before the inauguration, incorporated many of the political precepts of Kennedy's subsequent military assistance program for the Americas.' The principal thrust was that the United States should turn Latin American armies away from the out-of-date hemispheric defense role, toward looking inward and getting their own houses in order. Efforts were required to "modernize" Latin American armies so that they could play a progressive development role in undercutting communist subversion (and so that young officers would not be drawn to communist ideologies), while resources dedicated to external defense could be reallocated toward a more efficient military response to the primary concern, *internal* aggression.

*[T]he U.S. should undertake (a) to phase out programs in which Latin American forces are unrealistically associated in continental defense roles and (b) to influence Latin American military leaders towards greater emphasis on maintaining intra-hemispheric peace and contributing to the internal development of their countries . Toward this end, the U.S. should start the process of convincing the Latin American military . . . that their most patriotic role, and their true defense role, lies in executing a concept of defense through development, with all that this entails.*<sup>[92](#)</sup>

# Chapter 6: The Kennedy Crusade

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## **A Dynamic National Strategy To Defeat the Communists**

As the Eisenhower administration's Cuban and Congolese operations ground inexorably into 1961, the new president moved rapidly to make his own mark on the Cold War, building on the experience of the 1950s, but with a difference. Kennedy was not content to rely on the covert stratagems of the CIA; rather, he was determined to wage the Cold War on a far broader front. While the CIA retained its paramilitary role, despite the turn of events at the Bay of Pigs, the regular armed forces were charged with taking up the paramilitary, unconventional cudgel of the Cold War in ways almost unthinkable before. The Eisenhower emphasis on offensive, unconventional, *covert* war against undesirable governments was matched by Kennedy's overt and covert war against the *internal* enemies of friendly governments. This latter task, the counterinsurgency dimension of political warfare, became a principal public plank of Kennedy's foreign policy.

The Kennedy counterinsurgency program initially turned the foreign policy establishment upside down in a flurry of seminars, counterinsurgency courses, bureaucratic upheavals, and frantic formulation of unfamiliar policy. This counterinsurgency orientation, however, was not

implemented at the expense of its hitherto more prominent twin, offensive unconventional warfare. The Kennedy administration was virtually launched with the Cuba-bound landing craft that set out in April 1961, and efforts to meddle with standing governments there and in the Congo were lasting highlights of those three short years. It was initiatives in developing a broad counterinsurgency policy, though, that dominated the Kennedy years: A doctrine, infrastructure, and program of counterinsurgency was developed almost overnight. The counterinsurgency era, in terms of the military and the intelligence establishments, began with Kennedy and faded away with the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam. The program, drawing in part on the same resources developed for unconventional warfare, provided a new and integrated approach to a neglected theater of the Cold War.

Kennedy's preoccupation with insurgency dated from the late 1950s, and a school of thought then already gaining prominence, which "identified low-profile, 'brushfire' wars under Soviet sponsorship as a major new threat to the world balance of power."<sup>1</sup> Kennedy's personal contact with the problems involved dated from considerably earlier-most strikingly, his 1951 visit to Indochina, a congressional junket of considerable educational, and historical, impact. A combination of distaste for European colonialism with a Cold War view of the Soviet threat appears prominently in his subsequent congressional speeches. Perhaps most illustrative was a 1958 speech anticipating his famous presidential speeches on guerrilla war, in which he identified the new threat as "Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution."<sup>2</sup> By Inauguration Day 1961, Kennedy's personal commitment to a stepped up, integrated guerrilla/counterguerrilla program was clear.

Kennedy's concern to confront guerrilla warfare has frequently been viewed as a response to Nikita Khrushchev's rhetorical support for "wars of liberation." Khrushchev's January 1961 speech, just after Kennedy's Inauguration, is considered particularly crucial in galvanizing the new president into a program of action.) Khrushchev's rhetoric, however, was probably rather less important than the current concern over troubles with communists in Laos and in Vietnam, ideological doubts regarding African decolonization, and unfinished business in Cuba-where efforts were underway to slap down the first successful communist revolution in America's "backyard." Notwithstanding the public preoccupation with Khrushchev's "wars of liberation," Douglas Blaufarb observes there was little evidence that the post-Stalin Soviets were actually "fomenting or encouraging" communist parties to launch insurgencies. While those insurgencies that did emerge had Soviet propaganda support if not matériel as well, there was neither the interest nor the necessary influence to launch insurgencies by remote control: "In actual fact . . . the Soviet Union by the late fifties had no voice in determining the policies of the Vietnamese Communists or of Castro and his group, to cite the two insurgencies which caused most concern in Washington."<sup>4</sup>

The record of National Security Council meetings in Kennedy's first months in office suggests much of his thinking and that of his circle had already crystallized some time before-and indeed that the Defense Department under Eisenhower had done much of the ground work, including detailed proposals that Kennedy would adopt for the buildup of the Special Forces. The NSC meeting of 1 February 1961, ten days after Kennedy's Inauguration, discussed a (still-classified) Limited War Task Force report that provided a basis for immediate action. Preparations for a major

Eisenhower exercise in “limited war,” the Bay of Pigs invasion, were then gathering steam; the Kennedy administration followed through against its better judgment. Some of the recommendations in the Task Force report for “an expanded guerrilla program” were adopted and incorporated in a National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM 2), including budgetary provisions for “the addition of some 3,000 men to the Army’s Special Forces and a budget augmentation of \$19 million.”<sup>5</sup>

The Special Forces would undertake both its traditional offensive unconventional warfare role and a new, explicit counterinsurgency role, “for use in situations short of limited war, such as subbelligerency and overt insurgency as well as in limited war situations.”<sup>6</sup> Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was subsequently directed to reprogram \$100 million from existing defense programs “to expand and reorient existing forces for ‘paramilitary and sub-limited or unconventional wars,’ such as require guerrilla fighters with special skills and foreign language fluency.”<sup>7</sup>

On the diplomatic front, the preeminence of counterinsurgency in foreign policy was set out in the president’s May 1961 directive to American ambassadors overseas: “We are living in a critical moment in history. Powerful destructive forces are challenging the universal values which, for centuries, have inspired men of good will in all parts of the world.”<sup>8</sup> Although the universal values in question were not spelled out, the president was explicit in laying down the law on the civil-military pecking order in the counterinsurgency campaign. Ambassadors were advised that their writ extended to control of all American programs in their assigned countries except those involving “United States military forces operating in the field where such forces are under the command of a United States area

military commander.”<sup>9</sup> Although ambassadors were outside the chain of command—which went through the joint Chiefs of Staff—they were nevertheless advised to “work closely with the appropriate area commander.” At the beginning of his administration, Eisenhower, in a similar directive, exempted the CIA from the ambassadors’ authority.”

The administration moved rapidly to ensure political and budgetary support for a counterinsurgency program and to expand the limited capability for unconventional warfare, which would soon be tested at the Bay of Pigs. The president’s message to Congress on 28 March was his seminal statement on counterinsurgency, and it established the political and military terms of his policy.<sup>12</sup> He discussed guerrilla warfare in the larger context of *limited* wars. Kennedy’s definition of the threat was eloquent and more than comprehensive:

*The free world’s security can be endangered not only by a nuclear attack, but also by being nibbled away at the periphery ... by forces of subversion, infiltration, intimidation, indirect or non-overt aggression, internal revolution, diplomatic blackmail, guerrilla warfare or a series of limited wars.*<sup>13</sup>

America’s duty, Kennedy declared, was to go beyond containment, to respond to the threat in kind. He noted that since 1945, “nonnuclear wars, and sublimited or guerrilla warfare” had represented “the most active and constant threat to free world security.” Although Kennedy conceded that “the main burden of local defense against overt attack, subversion and guerrilla warfare must rest on local populations and forces,” he insisted on an American obligation to contribute “in the form of strong, highly mobile forces trained in this type of warfare.” Kennedy had in mind something more elaborate than today’s Rapid Reaction



Forces: In addition to airmobile and sealift capacity and the forward deployment of troops, the United States required “a greater ability to deal with guerrilla forces, insurrections, and subversion.”

Kennedy recognized the limitations of the armed forces' past experience with “guerrilla warfare”-a military preoccupation with guerrilla partisans (ours or the adversary's) in conventional warfare noting:

*Much of our effort to create guerrilla and antiguerrilla capabilities has in the past been aimed at general war. We must be ready now to deal with any size of force, including small externally supported bands of men; and we must help train local forces to be equally effective.*<sup>14</sup>

The counterinsurgency theme was further developed, and the policy was vigorously backed. In a speech before a special joint session on 25 May 1961, President Kennedy requested an additional \$1.9 billion: \$535 million for foreign aid to “perimeter countries directly threatened by overt invasion, almost half a billion to strengthen the army and Marines, and the balance for the space program. He defined the program thus:

*[T]heir aggression is more often concealed than open. They have fired no missiles; and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid, technicians and propaganda to every troubled area. But where fighting is required it is usually done by others, by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone . . . by subversives and saboteurs and insurrectionists, who in some cases control whole areas inside of independent nations.*<sup>15</sup>

Kennedy's push for a reinvigorated activist role in the Cold War prompted an immediate response from Congress. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 was enacted to "promote the foreign policy, security and general welfare of the United States by assisting people of the world in their efforts toward economic development and internal and external security and for other purposes."<sup>16</sup> Section 501 of the act summarized its security dimension, foreign assistance aimed at

*improving the ability of friendly countries and international organizations to deter or, if necessary, defeat Communist or Communist-supported aggression, facilitating arrangements for individual and collective security, assisting friendly countries to maintain internal security and stability in the developing friendly countries essential to their more rapid social, economic, and political progress.*

## **The Inner Circles**

The Bay of Pigs fiasco and the inquiry conducted by a special group chaired by General Maxwell Taylor led to a reexamination of the coordination of the U.S. unconventional warfare/counterinsurgency effort. Upon assuming office, Kennedy dissolved the Operations Coordinating Board, the interagency board with advisory and supervisory functions on national security affairs-with a reputation for meddling and red tape-that had monitored the implementation of NSC decisions under Eisenhower.<sup>17</sup>

The Taylor Committee, which had included Attorney General Robert Kennedy, CIA Director Allen Dulles (who resigned soon afterward), and Admiral Arleigh Burke, recommended the creation of a new high-level coordinating

committee with a special brief for counterinsurgency. The committee that emerged the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) -was established in January 1962 by NSAM 124: "To assure the use of US resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency in friendly countries."<sup>18</sup> The president's military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, who chaired the group, called it "a sort of Joint Chiefs of Staff for the control for all agencies involved in counterinsurgency."<sup>19</sup>

The Special Group (CI)'s larger task was to ensure that all agencies of government became part of the integrated reorientation toward counterinsurgency. Its brief was

*to recommend actions to obtain recognition ... that subversive insurgency ("wars of liberation") is a new and dangerous form of politico-military conflict for which the US must prepare with the same seriousness of purpose as for the conventional warfare of the past. Verify that this sense of urgency is reflected in the organization, training, equipment and doctrine of the US Armed Forces and in the political, economic, intelligence and military aid programs conducted abroad by State, Defense, AID [Agency for International Development], USIA [U.S. Information Agency], and CIA.*"<sup>20</sup>

The more specific oversight functions, modeled on previous procedures for oversight of covert actions, centered on designated target countries, which NSAM 124 initially limited to Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand. To the original list, by July 1962, the Special Group (CI) had added "cognizance" of Cambodia, Burma, Iran, Cameroons, Guatemala, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia." How were these trouble spots singled out? Gilpatric describes an ad hoc approach that was little different from that used for covert operations planning in general:

*Well, usually either State or the agency, or once in a while, AID or Defense would come up with a program which some desk officer ... had homed in on. It wasn't a very scientific process .... It really reflected what was happening in the world at a particular time and what particular area offices were interested in. And I often felt that it was too sporadic and hit or miss. No one was sitting back trying to spot in some objective, comprehensive sense, problem areas before they erupted. They just came up, and there was a reaction.*<sup>22</sup>

The membership of the group included Director of CIA John McCone, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff L. L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Undersecretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, and the chiefs of AID and the USIA. Despite its top-heavy nature and a working rule that only the principals themselves-not stand-ins-would attend, meetings were normally held every Thursday afternoon in the Executive Office Building only a short tunnel away from the White House. An additional member, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, joined the group shortly after its inception and became a principal channel for the president's own views. As Gilpatric later recalled:

*The attorney general, the president's brother, certainly took on himself the role of being the prime mover. He attended practically every meeting of this group. He had more to say. He did more prodding, and he did more in the way of critical analysis and obviously did a lot of homework in this area outside of just going to meetings. And I don't know just how this assignment came about, but it was almost a regular occurrence that after the meetings of the Group ... the attorney general would go across the street to the White House and report to his*

*brother. So we were all ... very conscious of the fact that this was an extremely high priority matter.*<sup>24</sup>

Robert Kennedy's advocacy role reflected the larger advocacy role played by the group itself. In April 1962, White House Intelligence Adviser R. W. Komer (later head of pacification in Vietnam, responsible for Operation PHOENIX) advised Bundy that the effect had already been noticeable: "This Group has already performed a real service in the pushing, prodding, and coordinating so essential to getting and keeping counterinsurgency activity underway."<sup>25</sup> And indeed the scope of counterinsurgency programs throughout the foreign policy establishment within a year of its creation was a tribute to its effectiveness."<sup>26</sup>

A principal task of the Special Group (CI) was to push the development of counterinsurgency training, civilian and military, of Americans and foreign nationals. NSAM 131 (13 March 1962) set out objectives that required training in counterinsurgency for all officer-grade personnel with potential assignments dealing with counterinsurgency in the Departments of State and Defense, AID, CIA, and USIA. Progress reports over the next six months outlined the activity in each of the agencies toward developing course material, including an interdepartmental seminar conducted by the State Department's Foreign Service Institute.<sup>27</sup>

The CIA's Spring 1962 progress report on compliance with the order illustrates the lead the paramilitary specialists had in the counterinsurgency scramble, noting that, on reviewing the present "training inventory and content," it was clear that the CIA was "in relatively good position to adjust to NSAM 131, since most of its courses already include considerable counterinsurgency material on such subjects as Communist doctrine, operations, subversion." In 1962, the CIA was considerably ahead of the armed forces in

developing doctrine and training for counterinsurgency (the CIA's field manuals, however, are still considerably less accessible than those of the military): "CIA's staff is now working to develop and add needed additional counterinsurgency content in 17 courses over broad range, such as 'Clandestine Political Warfare,' 'Air Operations,' 'Information Reporting,' etc...."<sup>28</sup>

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Another top-level Special Group had been established in 1961 as the presidential monitoring committee for covert action; at other times since its inception, this apparatus of executive control over the CIA has been known as the "54-12," "303," or more recently, the "40" Committee (taken from the numbers of the presidential directives). The membership was much the same as the Special Group (CI).<sup>29</sup> Sometimes known by its subgroup, the "Mongoose Committee" that coordinated post-Bay of Pigs efforts to murder Cuban officials and overthrow that government, Kennedy's Special Group (5412 Committee) had rather larger responsibilities. Special Group (5412) had been assigned major tasks according to the Taylor committee's recommendations, and it became to offensive unconventional warfare what the Special Group (CI) was to counterinsurgency.

As a direct consequence of the Taylor report, NSAM 56 (28 June 1961) had required an assessment of "possible future requirements in the field of unconventional warfare and paramilitary operations," and "to consider various areas in the world where the implementation of our policy may require indigenous paramilitary forces." A first step was "to inventory the paramilitary assets we have in the United States Armed Forces." NSAM 57, issued the same day, assigned the Special Group (5412) responsibility for "paramilitary operations," which, until the Special Group (CI)

was established, included some of the covert aspects of counterinsurgency.<sup>32</sup> A paramilitary operation was defined as

*one which by its tactics and its requirements in military type personnel, equipment and training approximates a conventional military operation. It may be undertaken in support of a rebel group seeking to overthrow a government hostile to us. The U. S. may render assistance to such operations overtly, covertly or by a combination of both methods. In size these operations may vary from the infiltration of a squad of guerrillas to a military operation such as the Cuban invasion.*<sup>33</sup>

For each operation, Special Group (5412 Committee) was to assign responsibilities for “planning, interdepartmental coordination and for execution to the Task Force, department or individual best qualified.”<sup>34</sup> The group would itself play the major part in ensuring the conduct of paramilitary operations “with maximum effectiveness and flexibility within the context of the Cold War.”<sup>35</sup>

Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, a member of the Special Group (5412), later described it as having been “principally concerned with what kinds of efforts could be undertaken, largely by the CIA, to undermine the Castro regime. And after the Bay of Pigs, every effort and activity by the agency was reviewed by this group and reported to the president.”<sup>36</sup> The group had, however, global responsibilities as well, monitoring CIA-sponsored activities in Italy, Brazil, Finland, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, among others. Gilpatric recalls:

*[T]hat group also took jurisdiction over the programs in other countries where CIA was putting in money or resources in support of at least a quasi-political objective*

*.... [W]herever there was the possibility of any major flak developing, any embarrassment to our government, this group had to review the program, and it had to be reported to the president with either a recommendation or-well, if it was turned down, it wouldn't get recorded, as a rule....<sup>37</sup>*

The complementary and sometimes overlapping roles of the two Special Groups provided an ideal mechanism for supervising the two-track approach to the Cold War: offensive unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. Again, Gilpatric describes its function: "There was, in effect, a split between what I would call the 54-12 group, the Mac[George] Bundy group, and the CI group, with the former having jurisdiction over what was being done directly against Castro, and the other with what was being done to forestall Castro from infiltrating or having some impact on other countries.

## **Policy into Doctrine**

Over a year after the counterinsurgency era began, the Special Group (CI) approved a thirty-page "Overseas Internal Defense Policy" (NSAM 182), a first effort at a comprehensive statement of "a doctrine for countering subversive insurgency where it exists and to prevent its outbreak in those countries not yet threatened, yet having weak and vulnerable societies." The doctrine was outlined in broad strokes, a rough statement of political and philosophical premises accompanied by an assignment of general functions to each of the relevant agencies. The CIA's role and "the tactical employment of U.S. Armed Forces" were outside its scope.<sup>40</sup> The primary task addressed was an effective response to wars of "national liberation." Communist insurgency, the paper argued, combined



doctrine and experience, hence necessitated an effective blueprint for counteraction:

*A most pressing U.S. national security problem now, and for the foreseeable future, is the continuing threat presented by communist inspired, supported, or directed insurgency, defined as subversive insurgency. Many years of experience with the techniques of subversion and insurgency have provided the communists with a comprehensive, tested doctrine for conquest from within. Our task is to fashion on an urgent basis an effective plan of action to combat this critical communist threat.*<sup>41</sup>

The political scenario sketched was that of a starkly polarized world with no room for neutrals: The proliferation of “indirect aggression through the use of subversion and insurgency . . . is related directly to the fact that the world is dominated by two overwhelmingly strong centers of power . . . [which] tend to become involved directly or indirectly in most of the critical situations that occur throughout the world.”<sup>42</sup> Because one must prevail in every theater, there could be no complacency in the free world. The strategy toward latent or incipient “subversive insurgency” in free countries-“whether they are proWestern, or basically neutral”-was to eliminate it, “lest it provide a communist foothold and escalate into active insurgency.”<sup>43</sup> In a discussion of non-communist insurgency,” NSAM 182 notes: “The U.S. does not wish to assume a stance against revolution *per se*, as an historical means of change. The right of peoples to change their governments, economic systems and social structures by revolution is recognized in international law.”<sup>44</sup> But the paper, recalling Alfred Thayer Mahan, emphasizes the United States’ right to act for or against a revolution in accord with its own interests:

*[T]he use of force to overthrow certain types of government is not always contrary to U.S. interests. A change brought about through force by non-communist elements may be preferable to prolonged deterioration of governmental effectiveness or to a continuation of a situation where increasing discontent and repression interact, thus building toward a more dangerous climax. Each case of latent, incipient, or active non-communist insurgency must therefore be examined on its merits in the light of U.S. interests.*

The chairman of the interdepartmental group that drafted the policy paper, Charles Maechling, Jr., later described NSAM 182 as “a somewhat simplistic document” precisely because of the almost knee-jerk categorization of Marxist-influenced insurgencies in a single class. Little attention was paid to the nature of the governments involved or the domestic causes of unrest: “It treated each revolutionary movement in a foreign society as if it were a clearly articulated military force instead of the apex of a pyramid deeply embedded in society.”<sup>46</sup>

NSAM 182 recommends that the use of U.S. forces abroad be “as limited as the achievements of its objectives permit and only ancillary to the indigenous effort,”<sup>47</sup> to avoid not only the appearance of neocolonialism, but, more practically, assuming the full burden of the countless wars envisioned by the United States as well. “It is important for the U.S. to remain in the background, and where possible, to limit its support to training, advice and materiel, lest it prejudice the local government effort and expose the U.S. unnecessarily to the charges of intervention and colonialism.”<sup>48</sup> Where necessary, of course, U.S. troops would themselves go in: “[A] clear demonstration of U.S. willingness to help may be an important factor in strengthening morale and local will to resist.”<sup>49</sup>

The 1962 policy characterized Magsaysay's Philippine campaign as a model for counterinsurgency and suggested a similar integration of reform measures with the use of force. The task was to create space through military means within which reforms could be carried out Magsaysay-style: "U.S. programs should be designed to make the indigenous military response as rapid and incisive as possible while parallel reforms are directed at ameliorating the conditions contributing to the insurgent outbreak.

The development dimension of the Kennedy administration's counterinsurgency doctrine was influenced by economist Walt Rostow, a principal adviser on counterinsurgency, whose theory of stages of economic growth postulated an evolutionary process through which states would achieve economic "growth" (the predecessor buzzword to "development") and political maturity.<sup>51</sup> Rostow had the opportunity to make the world a laboratory to test his theories when he served as a principal adviser on counterinsurgency to Kennedy; his economic theories, however, went out with the 1960s.

Rostow's thesis was that economic development proceeded in stages, set apart by periods of political instability when governments are susceptible to communism subversion and takeover. U.S.-backed counterinsurgency was, in Rostow's view, required to "protect the developmental process in strategically important client-states, especially during periods of their maximum vulnerability to communist takeover, which were supposed to coincide with the transition from one stage to another."<sup>52</sup> This was, of course, fully consistent with Kennan's view of a battlefield of constantly shifting pressure points, the myriad fronts of the Cold War, to which the United States had to adapt.

In accord with Rostow's "stages of growth" theory, by reinforcing threatened nations militarily at critical junctures, their economic development too would be boosted. The American government's advisory programs on "development" would become a virtual industry in the counterinsurgency states, although its "reform" component made little impact anywhere. The 1962 draft doctrine of NSAM 182, as a consequence, articulated a policy combining internal defense and development for the first time:

*Anticipating, preventing and defeating communist-directed insurgency requires a blend of civil and military capabilities and actions to which each U.S. agency . must contribute. The safeguarding of the developmental process requires carefully evaluated intelligence, the ability to penetrate the enemy's organizations, and the training of adequate and balanced military and police forces. These, as well as bilateral and multilateral developmental assistance, advice, and information programs, are all indispensable components of an effective internal defense program.*

Little thought appears to have been given to those situations in which the allies assisted were simply unwilling to go along with the script. As Maechling observes, the policy offered little political guidance as to when the United States should take action, and, on the development front, it established "no criteria laying down conditions that had to be met by the host country before the aid programs could become operative. Nor was there any reference to U.S. social and economic goals for the country concerned. "[54](#) The policy failed to enunciate what the United States wanted for the world, declaring only what it did *not* want.

The geopolitical analysis in the military's own doctrine in the Kennedy years largely matched the 1962 model approved by the Special Group (CI), although the military lagged somewhat in incorporating the new view of the insurgent guerrilla into its mainstream field manuals. The analytical model of the enemy guerrilla was based on the American "guerrillas"-and World War II partisans-as irregular forces subordinated to a great power. This model, of course, by emphasizing the significance of external sponsors, provided a convenient rationale for American intervention in guerrilla conflicts involving friendly governments. Curiously, although army doctrine downplayed the significance of guerrilla warfare conducted *without* backing by, and subordination to, conventional armies in the 1950s, it appears to have been only during the course of 1961 that doctrine came to assume as a fundamental premise that hostile guerrilla warfare was almost by *definition* an extension of Soviet power. The May 1961 field manual *Operations Against Irregular Forces*, for example, retained the 1950s view of the *unsponsored* guerrilla as a relatively minor threat, and it made no reference to Soviet sponsorship of guerrilla warfare. In contrast, the manual outlines varying factors in the "Ideological Basis for Resistance" in a fairly objective manner:

*The fundamental cause of large-scale resistance movements stems from the dissatisfaction of some portion of the population, whether real, imagined, or incited, with the prevailing political, social, or economic conditions. This dissatisfaction is usually centered around a desire for one or more of the following: 1) National independence. 2) Relief from actual or alleged oppression. 3) Elimination of foreign occupation or exploitation. 4) Economic or social improvement. 5) Elimination of corruption. 6) Religious expression.*<sup>55</sup>

In 1961, however, military doctrine was determined by political fiat. In the wake of the Kennedy speeches on guerrilla warfare as Soviet aggression, top officials, civilian and military alike, ratified the position in speeches, articles, and policy papers. In an address in February 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara took as a point of departure Khrushchev's 6 January 1961 speech: According to McNamara, Khrushchev predicted that "liberation wars and popular uprisings will continue to exist as long as imperialism exists . . . . Such wars are not only admissible but inevitable . . . . We recognize such wars. We help and will help the people striving for their independence. "[56](#) But McNamara responds: "What Chairman Khrushchev describes as wars of liberation and popular uprisings, I prefer to describe as subversion and covert aggression. "[57](#) The American response was to invert the Soviet posture: The phenomena described by the Soviets were henceforth *en bloc* inimical to the United States and deserving of an appropriate response, what McNamara called "The Third Challenge"-[W]e shall have to deal with the problems of "wars of liberation." These wars are often not wars at all. In these conflicts, the force of world Communism operates in a twilight zone between political subversion and quasi-military action. Their military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. Their political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination. We must help the people of the threatened nations to resist.[58](#)

The new analytical model of the guerrilla as Soviet proxy became the norm after 1961, appearing, for example, in a section devoted to "Unconventional Warfare" in the army's 1962 *Field Service Regulations: Operations*.[59](#) The manual emphasized the importance of offensive (American) guerrilla operations in a world of ideological warfare, while stressing the equal importance of "counter-unconventional war." Just

as U. S. unconventional warfare was defined as the conduct of offensive guerrilla operations within enemy spheres of influence, guerrilla activity in the United States' sphere was, by definition, seen as a projection of Soviet unconventional warfare. In an attitude seemingly drawing from the Korean and World War II experiences, in which guerrillas fought as adjuncts to conventional forces and shifting front lines could convert today's partisan into tomorrow's counter guerrilla, "our" guerrillas could be deployed against adversary guerrillas: "Enemy unconventional warfare operations must be countered. Measures include . . . the use of combat troops or friendly guerrillas in an antiguerrilla role."[60](#)

## **The Other Side of the Coin**

"Counterinsurgency" in the 1960s meant both measures to combat insurgency and the export of a kind of insurgency, a guerrilla threat of America's own devising. The rationale, as in the early Cold War, was that in order to stand against an enemy that fought dirty, the U.S. must take up the same methods. In his own speeches and interviews, Kennedy stopped short of affirming that Americans should "fight dirty," but posed the matter as a dilemma. In an April 1961 interview, he asked how "an open, non-conspiratorial society ... can compete with a secret, conspiratorial society using all the instruments of subversion?"[61](#) Others were less discreet.

The orientation toward guerrilla tactics is exemplified by the previously cited "think" paper circulated in March 1961 by the army chief of Research and Development (R&D), which called for greater military attention to tasks hitherto left largely to the intelligence people. The proposals read very much like the rash of "counterterrorism" proposals made by members of the Reagan administration in 1983:[62](#)



*To turn the guerrilla warfare coin over, we must find a way to overthrow a Communist regime in power short of general war and even short of limited war. I still see no reason why we should accept a tyrant government in Laos, Belgian Congo, or any Latin American country. If they can afford a million dollars on propaganda alone in Latin America, and support a Communist government in our back yard, we can support free governments in Eastern Europe or any other area dominated by Communists. Again, this can be an indigenous operation supported by the tremendous psychological prestige of the United States .... We can provide military assistance to an anti-Communist revolution. But there, too, we need a doctrine in the Army.*

The 1961 R&D paper acknowledges the doctrinal antecedents for Cold War intervention, and it envisions a doctrine integrating conventional and unconventional warfare resources to pursue unconventional objectives. Existing doctrine, which considered the role of pro-U.S. “guerrillas” as that of partisans working with conventional forces, would be modified. The proposal differs only slightly from the Bay of Pigs scenario, but the army, not the CIA, would play the predominant role:

*I would visualize the doctrine as not much different from present doctrine for special forces. Infiltrate into resistance areas; develop a military base through recruiting, training and equipment and eventually expand the operation to military action if necessary to overthrow the regime. Again, the Army could develop such a doctrine and such units as we have for the nuclear weapons. Where and when we use either is a matter of national policy decision. But the Army should have both weapons in the arsenal.<sup>63</sup>*



The doctrine of the 1960s in fact evolved away from the American “guerrilla” supporting conventional operations, and toward a concept not far from that mooted in those early days of the Kennedy administration. Primary control of army forces dedicated to such tasks, however, stayed primarily with the CIA (despite guidelines introduced after the Bay of Pigs invasion to bring in army control of large paramilitary operations). An equally important principle of army unconventional warfare doctrine developed in the Kennedy years concerned the relative roles of U. S. and indigenous forces in both counterinsurgency and efforts to overthrow “hostile” regimes. In World War II and in the Korean War, indigenous forces were deployed primarily in holding actions awaiting the arrival of U.S. conventional forces. The new approach emphasized both the practical and political advantage of minimizing the direct involvement of U.S. combat forces in unconventional warfare.

The 1961 “leak” of the army Research and Development paper provoked some Pentagon spokesmen to turn to damage control through their own media outlets. A source cited in a *New York Times* piece on 31 May declared flatly that the United States was not “embarking on a global subversion program, thus aping the Soviet Union.”<sup>64</sup> It continued, however, to express support for a U.S. “guerrilla” capability, but downplayed the importance of guerrilla warfare: “[A]lthough guerrilla capabilities for meeting guerrilla tactics in remote areas of the world undoubtedly are desirable, there should be no confusion about the Communist threat of subversion and guerrilla harassments and the Communist threat of real military takeovers.”

It was perhaps natural that the Kennedy administration would welcome a secret “unconventional” weapon with which to confront “Communist subversion” in the 1960s, much as Truman’s had opted enthusiastically for a

paramilitary CIA in 1947-1948. In a sense, the two periods shared a similar lack of confidence in facing world events. The Kennedy administration's response to the success of the Cuban Revolution and revolutionary trends elsewhere was much like Truman's early Cold War experiences with Greece and Korea; indeed, in a haunting speech, the Pacific Commander, General Collins, said in September 1962 that "Kennedy's decision to 'support as necessary' the South Vietnamese against Communist insurgency [was] to Asia 'what the earlier decision on insurgency in Greece was to Europe.'"<sup>65</sup> In both cases, the mobilization of overt military force was combined with a reassessment of the options for the extension of military power through covert means. Not long before Kennedy found himself faced with the responsibility of command, Harry Truman spoke up in a manner that should have rung alarm bells about the CIA's tilt toward operations (State Director of Intelligence and Research Roger Hilsman's memoirs suggest Kennedy was well aware of Truman's hindsight):

*For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at times a policy-making arm of the government .... Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue .... We have grown up as a nation ... respected for our free institutions and for our ability to maintain a free and open society. There is something about the way the CIA has been functioning that is casting a shadow over our historic position and I feel that we need to correct it.*<sup>66</sup>

Similar, rather more specific qualms over what the CIA had become were expressed by George Kennan in the 1980s:

*In the years immediately following the Second World War the practices of the Stalin regime ... were so far-reaching and presented so great an apparent danger ... that our government felt itself justified in setting up facilities for clandestine defensive operations of its own .... As one of those who, at the time, favored the decision to set up such facilities, I regret today, in light of the experience of the intervening years, that the decision was taken. Operations of this nature are not in character for this country .... [S]uch operations should not be allowed to become a regular and routine feature of the governmental process, cast in the concrete of unquestioned habit of institutionalized bureaucracy. It is there that the dangers lie.*<sup>67</sup>

Kennan, who had long before criticized the implementation of his “containment” concept as a primarily *military* doctrine (as contrasted with a doctrine of political balance), was responding to the Reagan administration’s threats of “counterterrorism” retaliation in the 1980s.<sup>68</sup> The 1980s, like the 1960s, found governments tempted to use unacceptable means to achieve seemingly desirable ends: Kennan noted, “It is not surprising . . . that among the reactions evoked has been a demand that fire should be fought with fire, that the countries threatened by acts of this nature [terrorism] should respond with similar efforts.” In Kennan’s analysis, however, by forsaking moral standards even temporarily, “we are deprived of our strongest armor and our most effective weapon.”<sup>69</sup>

The Kennedy administration, despite qualms over the political costs of covert operations (a lesson rubbed in at the Bay of Pigs), decided to make no significant change in the

CIA mandate or structure, restricting its autonomy solely with respect to certain paramilitary operations involving predominantly Defense Department resources. The failure to rein in the CIA's operational role was compounded by a deliberate policy to bring the regular armed forces into the unconventional theater on a grand scale. The result was a fusion of the two: The CIA's paramilitary specialists working in a more integrated fashion with the military's own multipurpose unconventional warriors.

# Chapter 7: The Apparatus in the Field

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## The Special Forces

While Kennedy's advocacy of aggressive counterinsurgency was not entirely out of line with existing trends in the foreign policy establishment (and the geopolitical view of the time), the memoirs of White House insiders suggest his fascination with this type of warfare included a considerable element of pure romanticism. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., later described Kennedy's reading of Mao, Guevara, and the army's own guerrilla warfare manuals, and his fascination with the Special Forces as the kind of counter guerrilla force to match Mao's and Che's models.<sup>1</sup> Roger Hilsman, similarly, recounts conversations in which the president described the need for development of new tactics, "which he hoped the Special Forces would do,"<sup>2</sup> while Charles Maechling later observed that "both he and his brother tended to see them as the prime ingredient of the counterinsurgency recipe."<sup>3</sup> Roswell Gilpatric refers to Kennedy's delving into the subject as having been stimulated by his reading "some Marine magazine about Green Beret type activity."<sup>4</sup>

Several insiders have remarked on Kennedy's virtual adoption of the Special Forces, getting personally involved in assessing their training and even their basic equipment. The new president's relationship with the Special Forces

began when he discovered, to his dismay, that it numbered only 1,000 men.<sup>5</sup> the spring of 1961, he ordered its forces doubled, its resources accordingly augmented, and he approved that the commandancy of Fort Bragg's Special Warfare Center (and of the Special Forces) be held by a general officer (the high command had consistently resisted such proposals in the 1950s).<sup>6</sup> As a consequence, Fort Bragg's commander, William P. Yarborough, became a Brigadier General (and apparently a close friend of the president as well).<sup>7</sup> Theodore Sorensen described the level of personal interest as having extended to every aspect of the Special Forces: Kennedy "personally supervised the selection of new equipment—the replacement of heavy, noisy combat boots with sneakers, for example, and when the sneakers proved vulnerable to bamboo spikes, their reinforcement with flexible steel inner soles."<sup>8</sup>

The president's personal advocacy of Special Forces perks was clinched by his visit to Fort Bragg in the fall of 1961.<sup>9</sup> That December he clashed with his Joint Chiefs on the seemingly minor point of whether the Special Forces should wear distinctive green berets like those of the elite British Commandos. The army said no, it was not regulation headgear, and elite units were undesirable; but Special Forces got their berets anyway." They also won the honor of being the first American troops to play an operational role in South Vietnam.

The fascination with commando-type units showed by Kennedy Churchill, and other leaders has been a continuing factor of military organization—indeed, its influence has increased over time, as international conflict on other than a limited scale became largely a matter of management. Elite units provided their civilian leaders with a kind of heroic relief from the base reality of waging war:

*Elite Units appeal to the romantic's conception of war because they present to him a picture not complicated by the thousands of dreary tasks required to field an army or fight a war. The unit's tastes seem heroic, for they require hand-to-hand combat rather than mere button-pushing. The requirements demanded of the unit's members are heroic, for they emphasize stamina, coolness under fire, and audacity—not technical virtuosity. The elite unit cultivates a romantic image through its eccentricities of dress and custom—colorful berets, special insignia, and so forth.*<sup>[11](#)</sup>

It was in this context that Special Forces, “a hitherto obscure collection of East European emigres now elevated to elite status,” became Kennedy’s “favorite unit.”<sup>[12](#)</sup>

Romantic or not, it was perhaps logical for Kennedy to choose one of the most elite—and secretive—of military units as the cornerstone of his counterinsurgency program. Kennedy’s visit to Fort Bragg, his orders for the force’s immediate expansion, and his permission for them to wear the green beret show just how attractive this rough-and-ready approach to “unconventional” warfare was to him. Although much has been made of the president’s conflicts with the military over counterinsurgency, there appears to have been little dissent over the pivotal role of the Special Warfare establishment in the new policy.<sup>[13](#)</sup> Dissent in this regard arose only over the Special Forces’ privileged status in the military.

It is significant that the army’s Special Forces—elite practitioners of violence, not diplomatic civil affairs officers—were the crux of the counterinsurgency realignment. It is also significant that, despite the army’s privilege of fielding the prime counterinsurgency force, it was content to place its forces in Indochina under CIA command, well insulated

from army regulars. The modification of the CIA/Special Forces arrangement in Indochina began after the Taylor Committee's report recommending a shift of major responsibility for training and directing paramilitary forces from the CIA to the Pentagon.<sup>14</sup> The phased transfer of the Special Forces' major program in Vietnam from CIA to Defense Department control, called Operation SWITCHBACK, was agreed upon in July 1962 and completed one year later.<sup>15</sup> The Special Forces continued, however, to provide a manpower tool for CIA paramilitary training and operations in Indochina and elsewhere in the Third World.

The president also clearly saw a second, more complex dimension to counterinsurgency beyond Special Forces "tactics." observing (in Roger Hilsman's account) that "new political tactics also had to be devised, and. . . the two—the military and the political—had to be meshed together and blended."<sup>16</sup> But this was the long-term objective; the Special Forces were the immediate answer.

It was over the political dimension of counterinsurgency that Kennedy's fervor—and advocates like Edward Lansdale—clashed with military reluctance to take on "unmilitary" tasks or to see insurgency as a problem that could not be dealt with through strictly military means. A 7 November 1962 speech by General Earle G. Wheeler, later army chief of staff and, under President Johnson, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, exemplifies the military's acceptance of counterinsurgency's *military* side alone. Vietnam, said Wheeler, was a matter for "military action": "Despite the fact that the conflict is conducted as guerrilla warfare . . . it is nonetheless a military action.... It is fashionable in some quarters to say that the problems in Southeast Asia are primarily political and economic rather than military. I do not agree. The essence of the problem in Vietnam is military."<sup>17</sup>



## The Counterinsurgent Rush

There was some discussion in the Kennedy White House over whether the unconventional warriors' approach to counterinsurgency was indeed the best (or only) road to travel. There was also an element of interservice competition for a share of counterinsurgency appropriations. In a July 1962 report on the military response to the president's call "to add 'still another military dimension' to our national arsenal," Joint Chiefs chairman L. L. Lemnitzer described the creation "of a procession of units . . . for counterinsurgency purposes":

*Special forces units comprised of selected and highly skilled volunteers, trained and targeted on specific threatened areas; psychological warfare units; sea-air-land unconventional warfare teams; counterinsurgency aviation forces designed for rapid world-wide deployment. . . and naval technical assistance teams. In all, a total of 41 special organizations of 12 different types, involving about 7,500 men, have been created expressly for the counterinsurgency task.*<sup>18</sup>

The Marine Corps in particular responded to the call for a beefed-up counterinsurgency program by maintaining that its experience and organization made it uniquely qualified to take the lead in the effort. As Gilpatric observed, "The marines—certainly in terms of public relations—made the most noise, were most covalent in their concern about this, and they were most insistent that they had more proficiency in this area than the army units."<sup>19</sup> The official Marine position, according to Lt. Gen. Munn, USMC deputy commandant, was that there was no need to become "guerrillas" to fight guerrillas: "Counter-guerrilla operations are neither new nor sensational to the Marines.... Probably

no force in the world is better equipped and organized for counterinsurgency operations than the U.S. Marine Corps.”<sup>20</sup>

The Marines’ say in counterinsurgency, however limited, was facilitated by the appointment of Major General Victor Krulak in 1961 to fill the new post as Joint Chiefs’ Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities.<sup>21</sup> Once it became clear that counterinsurgency was to stay, the Marines fought in vain to fully recover their former counterinsurgency role, while the navy and air force moved rapidly to carve out their own role in the field and ensure a slice of the new budget as well. The navy produced the SEALs, combat paratrooper frogmen who could do everything the Special Forces could do and more. The air force was rather more ambitious, establishing its First Air Commando Group in April 1961, and inaugurating its own Special Air Warfare Center at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida the following year. General Curtis LeMay, then air force chief of staff, described the center’s role as “the mission of training and developing techniques for counterinsurgency forces . . . [building on] our experience with this kind of operation over the past 20 years in Korea, the Philippines, World War II, and South Vietnam.”<sup>22</sup> A First Combat Application Group at Eglin was assigned “the development, testing, and evaluation of new tactics and equipment for counterinsurgency use.” The Air Commando Group provided training for just the kind of covert operations the CIA would require:

*low-level drop techniques for both personnel and cargo, close air support—in daylight or dark—for counterinsurgency forces, rapid deployment . . . the use of flares . . . the cutting off of retreat routes by use of antipersonnel weapons, the staking out from air of areas of suspected enemy activity, interdiction raids, destruction of supply points, and the use of*

*psychological operations such as harassment and counter-information programs.*<sup>23</sup>

Although the air force, navy, and Marine Corps continued to play a role in the counterinsurgency sphere, the realities of the military pecking order ensured that the army promptly moved to take the lead as the discipline became fashionable. The army Special Forces continued to provide the principal manpower pool for unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, while the Special Warfare Center retained military responsibility for the formulation of doctrine (a task shared with the Special Group [CI]). The army reinforced its preeminence through the creation of a top-level bureaucratic infrastructure to deal with the three sisters of special warfare: counterinsurgency, unconventional warfare, and psychological operations. A Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Special Warfare Activities was appointed; a Special Warfare Division under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations was raised to Directorate status; and finally, the commanding general of the U.S. Army Continental Army Command (CON ARC) was given responsibility for the Special Warfare Center and all Special Warfare training and doctrine.<sup>24</sup>

## **The Foreign Service**

A July 1962 (secret) interagency cable for action to seven U. S. diplomatic posts (and for information to all others), announcing the creation and function of the Special Group (CI), outlined its view of “subversive insurgency or indirect aggression”:

*The history of insurgent movements makes clear that their effectiveness has been in large part related to 1) their ability to obtain support from part of the*

*population; and 2) their ability to employ minimum force to create widespread insecurity. In some cases, communists' so-called "wars of Liberation" have emerged from a base established by earlier subversion and infiltration. In others, the communists have captured nationalistic revolutionary movements.*

The remedies proposed were two-tracked, but for practical reasons were presented as long- and short-term. Reform was ultimately required, but for immediate action the imperative was to reinforce police and military institutions:

*[T]here are at least two lines of defense: a) the development of measures designed to eliminate causes of discontent or to immunize the population from appeals to conspiracy and violence; and b) the development of effective police and/or military capabilities to maintain internal security.*

*Actions pursuant to a) above are largely long-term in character, and usually involve correction of basic social, political and economic injustices. However, in a country confronted with an internal security threat shorter-range actions may reduce both the effectiveness of insurgent and subversive operations and communist appeals to the population for the instigation or support of violence. <sup>25</sup>*

The security-now, reform-later approach would continue to the present. The July 1962 cable instructed embassy "Country Teams" in Caracas Guatemala, Phnom Penh, Quito, Rangoon, Tehran, and Yaounde to prepare "Country Internal Defense Plans" through which "US internal defense programs and activities are integrated and unified . . . or which provide long-range guidance for assisting such countries in maintaining their internal security."<sup>26</sup> A two-page model outline for the plans included "a definitive

statement of subject country's vulnerabilities," an overall statement of "Policy and Objectives," and detailed breakdowns elaborating on "Course of Action" and "Resources Requirements" in the fields of development, civic action, and security assistance.<sup>[27](#)</sup>

## **The Military Schools Expand and Adapt**

The military's training schools responded to Kennedy's initiatives with "substantial adjustments to the curricula," including the introduction of new courses, and the introduction of officers' study tours "to areas where counterinsurgency actions are underway."<sup>[28](#)</sup> A 21 July 1962 Joint Chiefs' paper on "Counterinsurgency Accomplishments since 1 January 1961" reported nine new specialized officers' courses, from which 2,099 students graduated, and the introduction of "freshly prepared counterinsurgency instruction" in all military curricula.<sup>[29](#)</sup> Over 1,000 officers were detailed for language training with an explicit counterinsurgency purpose, while sixty-three senior officers had been sent on tours of "areas of active or incipient insurgency." For the enlisted man, twenty-five new courses had been created (from "training in guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, underwater demolitions . . . to language training") in which more than 510,000 troops were trained.<sup>[30](#)</sup>

The development of counterinsurgency training for foreign personnel also advanced considerably. The Joint Chiefs reported more than 14,000 students from sixty-five countries had attended U.S. military schools during the previous eighteen months, "in the process of meeting the counterinsurgency education and training requirements of our allies."<sup>[31](#)</sup> Training took place in scores of continental U.S. bases and schools, as well as at overseas facilities in the

Philippines, Okinawa, and Germany. The curriculum, however, was generally based on the Special Forces' previous field, unconventional (that is, guerrilla) warfare; the first explicitly *counterinsurgency* course opened at Okinawa in May 1962, with the first course in Vietnamese starting the following August.<sup>32</sup> Latin American students studied guerrilla tactics at the U. S. Army Caribbean School (renamed the "Army School of the Americas" on 1 July 1963) at Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone.<sup>33</sup> A ten-week counterinsurgency course was being taught at Fort Gulick at least as early as July 1961, and possibly before.<sup>34</sup> Some 1,400 students graduated each year from the School of the Americas in the early 1960s, most of them Latin Americans.<sup>35</sup> 45,000 Latin Americans—including the leaders of many subsequent military governments—would graduate before the school was transferred to Panamanian control in September 1984.<sup>36</sup>

Overseas counterinsurgency training was undertaken largely by the army's Special Forces: In 1961, only the CIA and the Special Forces were prepared with a rudimentary doctrine and the requisite gung ho readiness U.S. training of foreign personnel alternated between "guerrilla tactics" and "counterguerrilla tactics," skills that in practice became indistinguishable..

Fort Gulick was host to a battalion of the Seventh Special Forces (SF) Group in 1961; by the end of 1963, the activation of the 1,100-man Eighth SF Group provided a manpower pool for both training and covert operations in the Americas. The First SF Group, established on Okinawa in 1957, with detachments from the Fort Bragg-based Seventh, covered the Far East, including training detachments in Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, and elsewhere. The Tenth SF Group provided training in

Germany. The Fifth, established in September 1961, became the Southeast Asia specialists, conducting the bulk of on-the-spot counterinsurgency/guerrilla warfare training in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.<sup>37</sup>

The primary Special Forces training establishment was the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg. The center provided Special Warfare training for foreign officers, as well as for personnel from the United States' four service branches. More than 800 foreign officers graduated from courses there between 1952 and 1963.<sup>38</sup> A January 1962 paper reports the expansion of the student capacity at the Special Warfare Center from 527 in 1961 to 1,212 in 1962. An outline of the school's counterinsurgency courses reflected a continued 1950s emphasis on "guerrilla" warfare as resistance movements and offensive operations:

*a) The Counterinsurgency Operations Course (6 weeks) is a comprehensive study of resistance movements to include analysis of causative factors . . . and the doctrinal principles, theories, tactics, and techniques applicable to military actions in countering or nullifying the development and spread of insurgency.... b) The Special Warfare Staff Officer Course (2 weeks) provides orientation on the same basic organization for Special Forces operations and the tactics and techniques of guerrilla force organization, development utilization, operations, and demobilization; psychological operations, guerilla and counterguerilla practical exercise. c) The Special Forces Officer Course (6 weeks) includes organization of the Special Forces effort; guerrilla forces development; air and amphibious operations; guerrilla tactics....* <sup>39</sup>

The new counterinsurgents remained concerned primarily with what they did best: the *organization*, of tame guerrillas

for unconventional warfare. There was no question that such forces would suffice to combat revolutionary insurgencies as well as to combat standing governments and conventional armed forces.

The Special Forces training of foreign forces was performed largely abroad, in host countries. The Special Forces developed a structure and a program that was seemingly effective in imparting their own peculiar skills and doctrine on the indigenous forces. The principal medium of instruction was the Mobile Training Team (MTT), generally comprised of ten enlisted men and two officers; also called the combat/training "A" Team, this remains the standard operational unit of the force. The July 1962 Joint Chiefs' project report said a total of seventy-nine counterinsurgency MTTs (made up of "1512 US military men," not all of them Special Forces) were then operating in nineteen countries "threatened by insurgency situations." Fifty MTTs were in Southeast Asia and twenty in Latin America.<sup>40</sup> At the same time, 3,327 officers and men had been deployed to Vietnam as part of the military assistance program, and 367 to Thailand.<sup>41</sup> The military trainers worked with both conventional forces and the civilian paramilitary irregulars that would become a mainstay of counterinsurgency.

A country-by-country breakdown of "counterinsurgency training personnel" in the field, provided to the Special Group (CI) in June 1962, offers insight into U.S. priorities, although the report does not make clear whether MTT personnel were included in the tally. In the Near East and Africa regions personnel were in place only in Iran (7) and Turkey (12).<sup>42</sup> In the Far East, in addition to trainers in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, small contingents were present in Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan.<sup>43</sup> In the Americas, trouble spots included Bolivia (16 advisers), Colombia (16), Ecuador (5), El Salvador (X), Guatemala (9), and Venezuela



(7).<sup>44</sup> The numbers of training missions by short-term teams may be the most significant guide to quantifying overseas training during that era; one source reported that between 1962 and 1967 more than 600 Special Forces MTTs were dispatched in Latin America from Fort Gulick.<sup>45</sup>

The Secretary of the Army described the potential of the Special Forces MTTs in 1963 in terms of training foreign “guerrilla” forces: “[A] detachment . . . consisting of ten enlisted personnel and two officers can effectively organize, control, and assist in the operations of a foreign guerrilla force of more than one thousand melt.” The total number of foreign trainees through all parts of the military counterinsurgency effort as of July 1962 was estimated at “several hundred thousand.”<sup>47</sup> How well, and at what they were trained, were matters not addressed.

## **The CIA and OPS**

A December 1954 National Security Council Action Memorandum ordered a study both of U.S. programs designed to “strengthen the internal security forces of friendly foreign countries” and of the development of a coordinated effort to assist foreign police as the “first line of defense” against subversion.<sup>48</sup> NSC 1290-D provided the basis for an “Overseas Internal Security Program,” and the rationalization of the then-disjointed Defense Department police programs in Iran, Korea, Costa Rica, and the Philippines; CIA programs in Turkey, Thailand and Indonesia; and a small program of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA). A reordering of tasks placed principal civil police programs under ICA auspices (although Defense retained major roles with paramilitary police forces), the creation of ICA’s Public Safety Program, with other police

assistance tasks remaining in the purview of Defense and CIA.<sup>49</sup>

The first of Public Safety's programs was set up in 1955 in Sukarno's Indonesia and followed by the end of that year with programs in South Korea, Iran, and Cambodia.<sup>50</sup> By 1958, programs were in place in twenty-one countries; and by mid-1961, twenty-seven, with ten in Latin America and eight TTI the Far East.<sup>51</sup> Low budgets and lack of bureaucratic support (and lack of sustained executive enthusiasm) limited the scope of the program, and its budget actually declined between 1958 and 1961 to less than 514 million.<sup>52</sup>

Rather more substantial programs during the 1950s were run by or cloaked, covert activities by the CIA (including a \$25 million project with Michigan State University to run a covert police training program in South Vietnam between 1955 and 1959).<sup>53</sup> A secret 1962 report described long-standing unilateral CIA police programs and participation in interagency assistance: "The Agency has personnel integrated in AID police programs in ten of the 17 countries...." Its tasks since the 1950s had covered areas of police assistance subsequently brought under the counterinsurgency brief: "CIA has the responsibility? implicit in its charter, for strengthening the countersubversive capability of foreign police forces . . ."; "CIA provides the latest information on developments in Sino-Soviet strategy and techniques to its personnel in the AID police programs who are working as advisors in the counterinsurgency, Counterespionage, counterguerrilla, and other countersubversive fields"; "CIA financed and directed police assistance programs in Turkey, Thailand and Indonesia which had overt as well as covert aspects and which sought to develop investigative mechanisms capable of detecting

subversive individuals and organizations, collecting and collating information . . . and neutralizing their effort.<sup>54</sup>

Although the Eisenhower administration's overseas internal security programs emphasized old-style military assistance, and, secondarily, the covert programs of the CIA, a foundation for a beefed-up police assistance program was established in the 1960s. The boost in police assistance after 1961, however, coincided with a conceptual shift in the role of the military itself. The 1950s view that the police were best suited to confront subversion shifted in the 1960s to a view that only the military—backed by the police—could completely meet the subversive challenge. A 1959 report to the National Security Council had stressed that the functions of the police programs were quite different from the military: “The Overseas Internal Security Program meets a separate and distinct countersubversive need . . . insofar as it is directed toward the objective of countering Communist subversion. “ In the 1960s, subversion was defined as just another form of external aggression.

The series of NSC Action Memoranda with which the counterinsurgency era was launched in 1961 required the evaluation of U.S. capabilities to deal with all aspects of foreign internal defense, from economic assistance to police and paramilitary requirements. Major initiatives to create a high-energy police assistance program awaited NSAM 114 (November 1961), which set into motion a review and reorganization of Public Safety, and NSAM 177 (August 1962), which assigned to AID principal responsibility for a new, integrated program; the new-look Public Safety Program was run by a semi-autonomous Office of Public Safety (OPS) within AID.<sup>55</sup> By 1968, its peak year, OPS fielded 458 advisers in thirty-four countries, with a budget of \$55.1 million.<sup>56</sup> From its inception in November 1962 to its demise in 1975, the program trained some 7,500 senior

officers in U.S. facilities, and anywhere from 500,000 to over a million foreign police overseas.<sup>57</sup> NSAM 177 set out the basic policy through which police assistance was declared an essential contribution to “the freedom and viability of Third World countries.”<sup>58</sup> The policy was based on a study prepared by an interagency working group chaired by Byron Engle, identified in the final report as the representative of the CIA. Engle, who later vigorously denied charges of CIA influence on police assistance, headed OPS from its inception in November 1962 until April 1973.<sup>59</sup> The objective of police assistance was defined as twofold: to help friendly governments maintain law and order, and, more to the point, to counter “Communist inspired or exploited subversion and insurgency.”<sup>60</sup>

Public Safety’s formal brief provided for direct grants of security equipment, from weaponry to communications equipment; for training overseas and in the United States; and for stationing Public Safety advisers overseas to organize training programs and provide advice and technical assistance to foreign counterparts.<sup>61</sup> Secondary programs included assistance in prison design, management, and building programs—including the infamous Vietnamese Con Son prison of the “Tiger Cages.”<sup>62</sup>

The Public Safety Program did not entirely neglect assistance in conventional law enforcement; but its emphasis tended toward counterinsurgency doctrine. As a consequence, it became best known as a conduit for CIA training, assistance, and operational advice to foreign political police, and for linking the United States to the jailers, torturers, and murderers of the most repressive of “free world” regimes. Public Safety would reach the headlines through congressional inquiries in the 1970s into programs in Latin America and Southeast Asia and into

evidence of its instruction in torture (which was inconclusive) and the fabrication and use of terrorist devices and assassination weapons (which was proven beyond doubt), as well as its key role in the best-known assassination program of them all, Vietnam's Operation PHOENIX.

The training dimension was filled by both advisers based in or sent temporarily to, the target countries and programs in U.S. facilities. In September 1961, the president had instructed AID to set up a police academy in Latin America; bureaucratic delays had been cleared away by Special Group (CI) intervention so that an Inter-American Police Academy was opened in July 1962 at Fort Davis in the Panama Canal Zone, and in its two years of existence graduated 725 officers.<sup>63</sup> The Canal Zone School was phased out after the establishment in Washington of the International Police Academy (IPA), in 1963. The IPA's seventeen-week General Course was followed by four-week courses in specialized areas, from VIP protection to the "Technical Investigation Course." All IPA students also attended a session at the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg (renamed Institute for Military Assistance [IMA] in January 1969). A twenty-two-hour curriculum for the Fort Bragg end of IPA covered "Counter guerrilla Tactical Operations," "Subversive Insurgent Methodology," "Population and Resources Control," and other areas, including an "'A' Detachment Demonstration."<sup>64</sup>

An AID insider offered his own impressions of the school to Brookings Institution analyst Ernest Lefever in 1972, as Lefever began an AID-commissioned study of Public Safety:<sup>65</sup>

*Atmosphere of the I.P.A. One gets the same feel about the I.P.A. that one gets at a social function at the South*

*African Embassy when the conversation turns to apartheid. All the people with whom I came in contact are professionals.... The over-all AID/USDS [Department of State] attitude to IPA/OPS has these men puzzled. An example referred to was that of Brazil. One of the largest programs, the Brazilian program of instruction was terminated with the rise of the famous "Death Squads," the fear was obviously a political one in this case, but these men would have been happier if the U. S. had sent them in to help the Brazilian police "clean up."*

The same observer suggested that the attitude of Public Safety advisers toward the internal affairs of the countries in which they work must be a consequence of their civilian, police backgrounds—a suggestion that could equally hold for CIA officers:

*Could it be that the ethic of the military man not to become embroiled in such matters [as the Brazilian "death squads"] does not obtain in the case of police officers? I got the impression that these are men who like many of their counterparts in this country are not too particular about legal niceties when the going gets rough.*<sup>66</sup>

In practice, OPS advisers were in large part—at least outside Southeast Asia—real technicians in the more mundane skills of law enforcement, from fingerprinting to traffic control. But the worm was in the apple: The CIA retained its normal use of police programs as cover for its own advisory personnel and skewed the overall impact of Public Safety by far toward the political police side of law enforcement. The role of CIA advisers within OPS contingents in Central America and Vietnam, where they advised the top intelligence and political police agencies responsible for programs of "death squad" killings, was a

decisive one.<sup>67</sup> Similarly, the CIA instructors in the OPS training programs in the United States and Panama played a major role in instilling a counterinsurgent orientation among foreign police.

The revelations in 1971 of the “counterterrorism” aspect of the CIA’s Operation PHOENIX, launched in Vietnam in 1967, funded in part by Public Safety, further fueled pressures for the closing of Public Safety— and the change in attitude toward the Vietnam War.<sup>68</sup> PHOENIX was an intelligence and operations apparatus and action plan designed to identify and “root out” the insurgent infrastructure in Vietnam; part of the system was a network of provincial interrogation centers built with OTIS funding. In 1971, CIA Director William Colby testified before Congress that 20,687 purported members of the “infrastructure” were killed under PHOENIX; the South Vietnamese government later cited a figure of 40,994 killed.<sup>69</sup> Ex-CIA officer Frank Snepp described the original program as the violent end of an integrated rural program developed by analyst Robert Komer to combine development with repression; its “Rural Development” PHOENIX would “root out” the Vietcong political apparatus through counterterrorism.”<sup>70</sup> Former PHOENIX adviser Wayne Cooper described it bluntly as an American program in which CIA officers “recruited, organized, supplied, and directly paid CT [counterterror] teams . . . to use Viet Cong techniques of terror— assassination, ambushes, kidnappings, and intimidation— against the VC leadership— the ‘fight fire with fire’ rationale.”<sup>71</sup>

Publicly, however, AID officials maintained that state terror was the exclusive province of communist bloc nations. In his testimony to Congress in 1972, Public Safety chief Byron Engle stated:

*There are nations, the governments of which use their police force as an instrument for political control and to repress the freedom of the people. I have in mind Communist bloc countries. Countries of the free world however, must use their police forces to protect the lives, property, and rights of the people.*<sup>72</sup>

Another controversial CIA/OPS program exposed by congressional investigations in the early 1970s was the two-part “Technical Investigations Course” with CIA instructors who trained students in making coal terrorist devices and in assassination methods, sponsored by the IPA in Washington, the principal training establishment of OPS.<sup>73</sup> A four-week “practical” session took place at the remote Border Patrol

Academy at Los Fresnos, Texas, in which AID taught a curriculum including “Terrorist Concepts; Terrorist Devices; Fabrication and Functioning of Devices; Improvised Triggering Devices; Incendiaries” and “Assassination Weapons: A discussion of various weapons which may be used by the assassin.”<sup>74</sup>

During congressional investigations led by Senator James Abourezk in 1973, AID officials admitted that the Los Fresnos sessions—what the press would call the “Bomb School”—offered lessons not in bomb disposal but in bomb-making: “The course is not designed to, nor does it prepare the student to be a bomb or explosive disposal technician....”<sup>75</sup> “The thrust of the instruction ... introduces trainees to commercially available materials and home laboratory techniques . . . in the manufacture of explosives and incendiaries.... Different types of explosive devices and ‘booby-traps’ and their construction and use by terrorists are demonstrated.”<sup>76</sup>



An account citing former students in the course made plain its orientation toward the operational use of terrorist devices.<sup>77</sup> The ostensible counterguerrillas were taught to use *guerilla*, or more accurately terrorist, tactics in carrying out their counterinsurgency missions back home. The “Bomb School” provided the same kind of training in unconventional warfare to civilians that the Special Forces provided military and paramilitary forces overseas; and indeed, according to one source, the CIA instructors of the course were actually Army Special Forces on CIA secondment.<sup>78</sup> As in Special Forces training, “the students were called guerrillas, and they were told, This is what guerrillas do.” Also, “students were required to sign oaths of secrecy, and to live at the camp, under permanent guard.”<sup>79</sup> The largest number of graduates was from Colombia (19), Guatemala (18), Uruguay (16), Thailand (10), Panama (7), and El Salvador (7); a total of 165 trainees was acknowledged by AID. <sup>80</sup>

According to one ex-student, instructors acknowledged a combined counterinsurgency/unconventional warfare rationale behind the training; the United States wanted “stay-behind” assets inside threatened countries who could be turned against subversives at need: “The United States thinks that the moment will come when in each of the friendly countries, they could use a student of confidence—who has become a specialist in explosives; that is why the different governments have chosen their favorite persons.”<sup>81</sup>

It is apparent that IPA students were hand-picked at the home country end and systematically cultivated in the United States, considering the career patterns of many of them (although not the “bombers” in particular). The principal leaders of El Salvador’s intelligence establishment

for example, including Major Roberto d'Aubuisson, are IPA graduates IPA graduates played prominent roles both there and in Guatemala in the that introduced counterterror "death squad" campaigns after 1966. Even in Honduras, where "death squad" killings are a recent phenomenon, an IPA connection has emerged. Amnesty International reported that from 1981 to 1984 killings and "disappearances" were carried out "selectively but systematically by the armed forces," primarily by a Unit known as 3-16 Battalion headed by IPA graduate Major Alexander Hernandez.<sup>82</sup> The 3-16 Battalion was set up in 1981 with American funding, assistance, and training.

The Main IPA establishment came under further criticism at the congressional discovery of "theses" (generally a few pages in length) written by IPA students on the theme of torture.<sup>83</sup> Madhar Bickmun Rana of Nepal offered a casual, if not cheerful, endorsement of torture's efficacy:

*[A]ttributions of the third degree are: hitting, slapping, preventing sleep, thumb screws, removal of finger nails, tightening metal bands around a person's head.... [T]he advantages of torture are that it is quick, easy, no talent is needed, and it is very effective. The disadvantages are: even an innocent man will confess to a crime . . . [and] the interrogator could find himself in hot water if the victim dies.*<sup>84</sup>

Colombian officer Gonzalo Wilches Sanchez (1965) wrote that both moral pressure and coercion were necessary in "innumerable cases . . . to obtain the truth the person knows," and that it was in fact "more immoral to not carry out that duty, which in the end harms no one, or if so, harms only a person who owes something to society and justice. " Wilches Sanchez asks rhetorically whether it would not be immoral "by not employing such coercion, to leave some

innocent person condemned, or to free a delinquent who has placed himself outside the law?"<sup>85</sup>

Vietnamese police officer Lam Van Huu, in a 1969 paper on torture, distinguishes between interrogations intended to result in court cases and tactical interrogations in counter guerrilla warfare. In the former, "we have time to try a whole range of techniques and methods." In the latter case, however, the ends justify the means: "What will be the fate of 100 men in our company if a battalion of enemies were ready to welcome us in the next village. It's like sacrificing our 100 men in order to be humane towards an individual."<sup>86</sup>

Lam Van Hun continues by outlining his "favored tortures": "a. drugging (*la narco-analyse*): intravenous injection of [sodium] pentothal or scopolamine (sodium amytal) making the suspect lose his judgment. He is in a state almost without consciousness... .b. Hypnotism.... c. Polygraph or lie detector."<sup>87</sup>

Perhaps the most damning essay was that of Vietnamese student Nguyen Van Thieu (1965), offering his special thanks to the United States for having "assisted the national police in technical and equipments aid to help an interrogator in his interrogation of communist prisoners to be more effective."<sup>88</sup>

An investigation by the staff of syndicated columnist Jack Anderson found no direct evidence of the teaching of torture at IPA, but found evidence of what it called "an ambivalent attitude toward torture."<sup>89</sup> A Lesson Plan on interrogations taught police to question suspects in "soundproof, windowless rooms with 'bare walls,'" and instructed them "to use such interrogation techniques as 'emotional appeals,' 'exaggerating fears,' and psychological 'jolts,' " and to

“observe the physical state of the subject.” “ The curriculum included a film shown to all students which might have provided an opportunity for a less formal exchange of views on torture: “A film is shown and serves as a basis for discussion of improper, inhumane techniques of extracting information. OPS doctrine, which is unequivocally opposed to such techniques, will be clearly expressed.”<sup>90</sup>

The implication was that torture was encouraged tacitly, even as it was formally discouraged; moreover, a predilection to torture was reinforced by out-of-class bull sessions, along with the doctrinal message hammered home at every opportunity that subversion was to be fought with no holds barred.

The phasing out of the Public Safety Program began with the amendment of the Foreign Assistance Act in December 1973 (Section 112) to ban overseas training of foreign police personnel, with all Public Safety advisers to be recalled by 30 June 1974. And the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (30 December 1974), Section 660, “Prohibiting Police Training,” banned the use of funds as of 1 July 1975 “to provide training or advice, or to provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad.”<sup>91</sup> The loopholes in the law, and the creeping restoration of broad-spectrum police training in the 1980s— in precisely the area of *political* control with the catchphrase “counterterrorism” replacing “counterinsurgency,” which had occasioned the worst abuses of the earlier system—is discussed in chapter 16.

# Chapter 8: Edward Geary Lansdale and the New Counterinsurgency

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## Lansdale in the White House

Even before his inauguration, Kennedy had access to extensive policy planning studies on Vietnam through unofficial channels; according to one former Harvard classmate (then the State Department desk officer on Vietnam), the president-elect had even reviewed and approved a Saigon embassy “shopping list” for Vietnamese counterinsurgency.<sup>1</sup> Kennedy also received one or more of Edward Lansdale’s “think” papers on Vietnam and was roundly impressed by his advocacy of a “nonbureaucratic” approach to counterinsurgency.<sup>2</sup> Kennedy’s prompt approval just ten days after taking office of a new “Counterinsurgency Plan” for Vietnam—a shift away from a prior emphasis on a Korea-style threat to South Vietnam—suggests a more than casual acquaintance with the issues involved. The Vietnam reappraisal had been developed after the 1 September 1960 appointment of a new American commander there, Lt. Gen. Lionel C. McGarr, who determined to “redirect . . . training and operations emphasis towards a greatly improved counterguerrilla posture.”<sup>3</sup>

Although the means proposed in the Vietnam plan to readjust to insurgency were not particularly innovative, the

plan represented a departure from the previous emphasis on assistance in developing a strictly conventional military establishment in Vietnam. Although the Special Forces were assigned for the first time a counterinsurgent role in Vietnam in 1960, their purpose there was only to provide Ranger training. The doctrine with which General McGarr proposed to develop the “counter-guerrilla posture” was essentially traditional, based on the U. S. military’s long experience as an occupation or peacekeeping force. Only in 1961, when a presidential demand was made for a purpose-built *counterinsurgency* establishment, was the Special Forces/Special Warfare Center development of unconventional warfare adopted across the board as the foundation of a military doctrine of counterinsurgency. The military core of unconventional warfare, the organization, tactics and techniques of America’s covert CIA and Special Forces “guerrillas,” provided a nucleus for the new doctrine of counterinsurgency. The trimmings of economic development, social and political reform, and sophisticated formulations of Ed Lansdale’s “decency and brotherhood” approach merely embellished that nucleus of unconventional tactics and techniques.

To the incoming Kennedy administration, there were few Americans more eminently qualified to advise on unconventional warfare and the American role in Indochina than Edward Geary Lansdale. Although Lansdale’s reputation as a practical, sensitive counterinsurgent would be tarnished in the 1960s, his public legend would endure. General Lansdale was, in any case, one of the most influential of American counterinsurgents, and important if only because his role as a principal spanned the formative years of the doctrine, from the Philippines of the 1940s to Vietnam in the 1960s.

Lansdale was pulled out of Saigon in 1956, after two years as President Diem's house guest and confidant, and kicked upstairs back in Washington to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1957, to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Special Operations. Over the next four years Lansdale would quietly participate in both covert operations and military diplomacy. Although he generally operated under an appropriate cover, his reception by cronies and counterparts overseas occasionally made the nature of his activities quite transparent. Through his own flair for publicity, by 1960 he had become a celebrity-particularly in the Pacific. In January-February 1959, for example, Lansdale traveled to Saigon and Manila with the President's Committee on Military Assistance (the Draper Committee). His reception in Manila-where he was universally considered a top CIA officer-was of considerable embarrassment to the committee: A memorandum between his colleagues said he was going "officially" under Draper aegis to his "old-stomping grounds.... Covering points of tourist interests such as Manila, Saigon, etc. of South-East Asia."<sup>4</sup>

As the end of the Eisenhower administration approached, General Lansdale continued to play a part in U.S. policy on Indochina with a series of influential memoranda. Although Lansdale was almost unique in pressing for the development of unconventional warfare capabilities there, his analysis of the nature of the insurgency in Vietnam was not particularly unique. The official army history of the period observes that the military's major 1960 Indochina policy report portrayed the people of Vietnam as "apathetic, pliable, and willing to obey any authority which held superior power"; in the degree to which it ignored political change and the insurgency's revolutionary nature, the report could have been written "by an American consular officer in Indochina during the 1920s and 1930s or by a French colonial administrator."<sup>5</sup> An 11 August 1960 report by General

Lansdale expressed a similar view: “Most farmers, he believed, helped the Viet Cong either because of anger at the government—mostly attributable to the misbehavior of troops on counterinsurgency operations—or because of fear of Viet Cong terrorism.”<sup>6</sup>

He still saw a Philippine-style solution for Vietnam—that is, winning over the people merely by ensuring troops behaved decently (although twenty years later he would acknowledge this was easier said than done).

The assessment put forward in Lansdale’s memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in January 1961, a few days before the inauguration of John F. Kennedy, reiterated his earlier views: The Vietcong had been imposed on the South Vietnamese; the insurgency depended on sustained support from outside South Vietnam; and President Diem was indispensable to counter the communist threat.<sup>7</sup> He differed from the military establishment primarily in recognizing that there was indeed a problem of *insurgency* in Vietnam, and not only the threat of a conventional invasion from the North. Lansdale’s memorandum was considered deeply profound by the incoming administration, and it cemented the general’s position as an in-house Indochina counterinsurgency expert.

Upon taking office, Kennedy brought Lansdale to the White House for a meeting of top Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Officers, and—apparently to their horror—intimated there that Lansdale could be the next U. S. ambassador in Saigon.<sup>8</sup> The new administration’s Undersecretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, reminiscing on his dealings with Lansdale years later for an archive oral history project, explained that although Lansdale was an outcast with his military peers, and perhaps even less



esteemed by the State Department, the White House was impressed with him:

*Lansdale was not in favor . . . during my period, with either the military or with the State Department. He was in the doghouse with both of them. And I was convinced they were wrong. I was convinced he was not a wheeler dealer; he was not an irresponsible swashbuckler, and I finally succeeded in getting him his star as a general—very difficult . . . he was the object of some distrust. I thought and still think he was a very able person.... Anyway, he remained active, both in connection with Southeast Asia and Cuba, up until the time I left in January of '64.*<sup>9</sup>

A key to Lansdale's influence, as noted by Gilpatric, was a peculiar ability to relate to policymakers, if not to his own military colleagues:

*[H]e was an unusual military type in that he was completely uninhibited in dealing with politicians and civilians. And he apparently set out on his own to educate the new team. But since he was in my office, the office of deputy secretary, I had the most contact with him. And within a matter of weeks I'd been asked by the president to head up a task force, the first task force on Vietnam, and I made Lansdale my project officer. So he was the one on the military side, other than the uniform people on the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs themselves, that we were exposed to.*<sup>10</sup>

Lansdale's personal experience clearly carried a great deal of weight with both Gilpatric and Kennedy himself: "He'd been out there a great deal. He'd been personal advisor to [Ngo Dinh] Diem. Previous to that, he'd been advisor to the Philippine government in its guerrilla problems.... I may

have gotten a somewhat biased view, but I at least got a very concrete, specific one...."[11](#)

Lansdale did not get the ambassadorship, but in April 1961, his reputation was such that the Kennedy administration's program to "turn around" the Cuban Revolution in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs was put under his direction. Operation MONGOOSE, which was to become the largest clandestine operation since the Bay of Pigs, was intended to replace the Castro government and included elaborate plans to expedite the operation through Castro's murder. Lansdale later mused to a Harvard researcher about how Kennedy's more ambitious plans for him had been scotched by the bureaucrats of State and Defense: "This 'crazy'

Air Force general with a CIA taint had been for two years safely institutionalized as a special assistant. . . and was about to be retired."[12](#) Lansdale's eccentricities apparently failed to detract from the appeal his imagination exerted on influential members of the Kennedy circle, even though his views on "practical counterinsurgency," while simple, were rarely practical. Lansdale remained a principal adviser on counterinsurgency during Kennedy's administration and upon his own return to Vietnam in 1965.

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General Lansdale's position in the Defense Department made him a natural pole of attraction for the counterinsurgency dignitaries of allied nations and an intermediary through which counterinsurgency innovations were considered and disseminated through the American establishment. Congressmen, journalists, and publishers concerned with the United States' posture in the Cold War naturally gravitated to Lansdale, and their interest occasionally gave resonance to the new concepts of

counterinsurgency and special warfare. Publisher Frederick Praeger, already the publisher of military texts used in the military schools, visited General Lansdale in May 1961 to talk counterinsurgency, and expressed his interest in publishing “texts on guerrilla warfare.” Over the next years, Lansdale corresponded with Praeger and advised him on “retired U.S. [officers] and officers in foreign armed forces” as likely authors. Praeger, in turn, churned out a virtual counterinsurgency library within a few years.

A proposal to use Israeli trainers to establish strategic “military-economic self-defense” communities in Laos crossed General Lansdale’s desk in June 1961; it prompted both an exchange of memoranda on the theme with Walt Rostow and Lansdale’s OWTI close examination of Israel’s methods. The initial response to the scheme suggested his already considerable familiarity with Israeli counterinsurgency:

*I do want to comment on Sander’s premise that Israeli trainers should play a major role in engineering such defense groupings. We must always recognize that the skill of the Israelis in their own program was really secondary to the terrific motivation which drove them onward to success. Lack of this motivation prejudiced the programs in Burma and Algeria.*<sup>13</sup>

General Lansdale subsequently met the new Israeli military attache to Washington, Colonel Yehuda Prinhar. In a 30 August memo to Defense Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Lansdale reported on an initial meeting with Colonel Prihar, and stated his intention to take up an invitation from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to visit Israel to study “antiguerrilla concepts.” General Lansdale (and Major J. K. Patchoell) arrived on 15 October 1961: His hand-annotated itinerary records meeting with the IDF

intelligence and operations chiefs, the commander of the NAHAL organization and visits to NAHAL outposts, and “a settlement organized for self-defense” under the Territorial Defense system. Training establishments visited included the Gadna (Youth Battalions) Center near Tel Aviv, and the Airborne Center (“the Special Warfare Organ here”).

General Lansdale had previously arranged a briefing by Colonel Prihar for top American defense officials in September 1961 in the Defense Secretary’s office (to which he invited General Maxwell Taylor and CIA chief Allen Dulles). Memoranda concerning the briefing suggest the respect Israel’s counterinsurgency skills were accorded and an awareness of Israel’s earlier overseas advisory missions:

*The Israeli [sic] are real experts at unconventional warfare. Colonel Prihar himself is one of the best, and was an advisor to the Burmese army in its counter-insurgency campaign. I had hoped to arrange a seminar session for him at the Counter-guerrilla School at Fort Bragg, but Lebanese officers in the class might have proved embarrassing and there was no diplomatic way of eliminating them. I am now arranging a seminar for Colonel Prihar in the Pentagon. We will tape this, so that we can produce a case study similar to the “Anti-Huk[balahap] Campaign in the Philippines ... and then disseminate a written version.... [T]his should prove of value to the U. S. military.<sup>14</sup>*

Colonel Prihar was himself a classic transnational counterinsurgent, having served in the British army in World War II, joined the Israel Defense Force in 1948, and subsequently heading the IDF Infantry School and Joint Command and Staff Schools. He had also participated in what may have been one of the first of Israel’s overseas advisory missions, the “Israeli Survey Team” to advise “on

ways and means to cope” with Burmese insurgency. In his Pentagon lecture, Colonel Prihar discussed

*Israeli concepts of the military’s role in nation building, with emphasis on the methods the Israeli Government has developed to protect national borders from infiltration (the so-called “strong village” concept) and other measures of strengthening rural areas from inroads by hostile guerrilla and other paramilitary forces.*<sup>15</sup>

General Lansdale’s scope also extended to the Americas, with visits to both the U. S. Caribbean Command and Venezuela in March 1963.<sup>16</sup> The Bolivian Special Forces were the next to host General Lansdale in May 1963 (four years before their duel with Che Guevara). On 28 May, General Lansdale accompanied Caribbean Command chief General Andrew O’Meara to the inauguration of the Bolivian’s new Counterinsurgency Center-*Centro de Instrucción de Tropas Especiales* (CITE) at La Chimba.<sup>17</sup> Lansdale’s first assignment in the Americas, however, was to complete the task that the Bay of Pigs invasion had begun-Operation MONGOOSE.

## **Operation MONGOOSE**

Both the president and his brother Robert made it clear to the CIA and the military that “they wanted Castro out of there, “<sup>18</sup> and that “no time, effort or manpower” was to be spared in removing Cuba’s revolutionary government. The CIA’s response was the largest of its clandestine operations of the time. From 1961 to 1964, MONGOOSE pitted the covert forces of the United States against Cuba, until President Lyndon Johnson reportedly called it quits.

The Special Group Augmented (SGA) was established under McGeorge Bundy's chairmanship in November 1961 to supervise the operation. At Kennedy's request, the group appointed General Edward Lansdale as operations chief. Lansdale chose the code name MONGOOSE for the Cuba campaign. His initial plan was in keeping with his reputation for imaginative counterinsurgency, and as such was utterly unrealistic: He "drew up an elaborate scenario with a precise timetable calling for a march on Havana and the overthrow of Castro in October 1962. It was all worked out on paper."<sup>19</sup> Although the CIA rapidly learned (or knew all along) that there were no tangible prospects of a general uprising in Cuba, it proceeded with a program of covert operations similar to the harrying raids conducted against Nicaragua in 19811983: "Mongoose gradually shifted its emphasis from resistance-building toward sabotage, paramilitary raids, efforts to disrupt the Cuban economy by contaminating sugar exports, circulating counterfeit money and ration books, and the like. 'We want boom-and-bang on the island,' Lansdale said."<sup>20</sup>

Lansdale's own role was to be both coordinator and idea man, although, as Thomas Powers recalls, "He was uneven in judgment. Nutty ideas sometimes seemed to strike him as imaginative and plausible."<sup>21</sup> One such idea was to exploit the alleged Cuban wont for "superstition":

*Cuba was to be flooded with rumors that the Second Coming was imminent, that Christ had picked Cuba for His arrival, and that He wanted the Cubans to act rid of Castro first. Then, on the night foretold, a U. S. submarine would surface off the coast of Cuba and litter the sky with star shells, which would convince the Cubans that The Hour was at hand.*<sup>22</sup>

Lansdale himself may have been prepared to ride a donkey into Havana as the climax to the show. In 1950, a Lansdale scheme to dress a U.S. submarine in Soviet livery in order to lure Philippine guerrillas into an ambush was scuttled by higher-ups; Lansdale later complained that the request “seemed only to arouse their suspicions that I had gone insane.”<sup>[23](#)</sup>

As Lansdale dreamed up new scenarios for Cuba, a considerable proportion of the operation was directed toward a single objective: the assassination of Fidel Castro. The plot to murder Castro had apparently been initiated in 1960, and involved the now-familiar recruitment of organized crime figures as contract killers, and the development of poisons by the CIA’s Technical Services Division. Efforts were reportedly redoubled in the fall of 1961 after covert action chief Richard Bissell (Deputy Director for Plans) “was chewed out [for] sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime.”<sup>[24](#)</sup> The CIA subsequently organized a unit with its Task Force W, the ZR/ RIFLE group, to carry out “Executive Action”—that is, assassinations—and on 16 November 1961 discussed its use for killing Castro.<sup>[25](#)</sup> Assassination teams, again linking the CIA with organized crime, went into Cuba in 1962, while more bizarre schemes continued until shortly after [President Kennedy’s own murder: Among them were attempts to eliminate Castro with such devices as exploding giant clams (while he was skin-diving) and poisoned cigars.”

Colonel Lansdale may have been deliberately kept in the dark, but not because of any particular squeamishness on his part. Thomas Powers discusses Lansdale’s role in the light of the CIA’s silence regarding assassination in both interdepartmental meetings and memoranda, and describes

the reaction of William Harvey, head of Task Force W, to a Lansdale memorandum on assassinations:

*Harvey was doubly astonished . . . on August 13 [1962], when he got an official memo from Edward G. Lansdale. . . which explicitly requested Harvey to prepare papers on various anti- Castro programs "including liquidation of leaders." Harvey . . . told Lansdale in plain terms what he thought of the "stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document."*<sup>27</sup>

Ten years later Lyndon Johnson bluntly assessed the whole affair: "We had been operating a damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean."<sup>28</sup>

Rather more important than the colorful eccentricities of Lansdale and the Technical Services Division was the significance of Operation MONGOOSE as a prototype destabilization or "bleeding" campaign. If the United States could not remove and replace the Cuban government, it would make the Cuban people suffer-by destroying its sugar economy, power plants, its peace of mind. Gilpatric recalls:

*The agency was allowed to put agents into Cuba for purposes of sabotage, for purposes of trying to disrupt the strengthening of the regime's control [and] of keeping the Castro regime so off stride and unsettled that it couldn't concentrate its activities to harmful ends elsewhere. And so the agency . . . was very aggressive in coming forward with schemes, some of which were really quite fantastic and never got off the ground. Others made a lot of sense, some of which did prove to be effective and successful.*<sup>29</sup>

MONGOOSE involved both American agents and Cuban exiles, although the latter comprised the bulk of the forces



sent in on raids and sabotage missions. According to Gilpatric, forces sent in “varied from teams of four or five individuals put in to sometimes several times that, “ with every detail of each operation closely monitored by the Special Group Augmented (which Gilpatric refers to as the 54-12 group).<sup>[30](#)</sup> Gilpatric also suggests that Cuban exile terrorist groups, like Alpha 66, which were allegedly renegades beyond CIA control at the time (and gunning for the president himself after the “betrayal” at the Bay of Pigs), were in fact a part of the ongoing

after the “betrayal” at the Bay of Pigs), were in fact a part of the ongoing American government effort to harass Cuba.<sup>[31](#)</sup>

A thread of continuity runs from the covert American programs against Cuba in the 1960s into the covert operations in Africa in the 1970s and in Nicaragua in the 1980s, in the persons of Cuban exiles recruited for the Bay of Pigs and subsequent MONGOOSE offensives. As in the 1950s, when the Lodge bill facilitated the recruitment of East European emigres for the army’s new Special Forces, legislation in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs permitted the regularization of America’s Cuban “paramilitary assets” as U.S. government personnel.

Details on the careers of some Bay of Pigs veterans have emerged as a consequence of both the October 1986 downing of American flyer Eugene Hasenfus in Nicaragua and the “Contra-gate” investigations. Hasenfus and Nicaraguan authorities claimed that two of the link men in the *contra* resupply operation in El Salvador were Cuban exiles, already well known for their service with the CIA; these allegations were subsequently investigated and confirmed by the news media and congressional aides. Among these link men were the apparent head of the

operation at San Salvador's military airport, Illopango, Felix Martinez (under the pseudonym Max Gomez), and another Bay of Pigs veteran, Luis Posada Carriles (under the name Ramon Medina).<sup>32</sup> Congressional aides were particularly outraged at the discovery-just as American counterterrorism proposals were taken to Congress-that one of the resupply officers had previously been detained in Venezuela as an international terrorist. Posada Carriles had escaped from a Venezuelan jail on 17 August 1985, after nearly ten years' imprisonment for the bombing of a Cuban civil airliner.

The 1976 bombing killed all seventy-three people aboard, including most of Cuba's 1976 Pan American Games team-a slaughter as terrible as that of the Munich Olympics (this was to date the only terrorist bombing of its kind of a Latin American airliner). Subsequent inquiries confirmed that Posada Carriles had served in the Bay of Pigs invasion as an explosives expert and was later commissioned in the U.S. Army. The State Department reported to Congress that

*[Luis Clemente] Posada-Carriles was appointed as a 2Lt [Second Lieutenant] in the US Army in March 1963 under the Cuban exile volunteer program. He served in the US Army until September 1966. Records of the Department of Army reflect that an extensive investigative file exists on Posada- Carriles subsequent to his entry on active duty. The investigation was predicated on information . . . pertaining to his alleged involvement in Cuban exile activities in Florida and elsewhere in the Americas which reportedly included possible violations of US federal statutes.... Posada-Carriles' Army investigative file was requested (by name) and was furnished to the House Select Committee on Assassination in 1978.*<sup>33</sup>

The CIA, in turn, could not-or would not-provide information on Posada Carriles (or Ramon Medina), and

stated that “it did not provide any assistance, direct or indirect, to facilitate the escape of Luis Posada from jail in Venezuela, or his entry into El Salvador.”<sup>34</sup>

The Kennedy administration’s Operation MONGOOSE began to fade soon after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. At the height of the crisis, an order went down to halt the raids on Cuba, but it was disregarded: A raid led by Eugenio Martínez (later of Watergate renown) was in progress on 21 October as Kennedy announced a blockade of Cuba.<sup>35</sup> In the following months, the Special Group Augmented was disbanded, General Lansdale moved on to other projects, and the CIA’s own professionals were left to get on with the Cuban unconventional warfare campaign of sabotage and assassination. Major operations continued to be mounted throughout 1963 and into the next year. But with the assassination of John F. Kennedy on 22 November, the heart went out of the offensive; Lyndon Johnson, never a fan of unconventional warfare, ordered a halt to the Cuba campaign on 7 April 1964.<sup>36</sup>

## **Nation-Building and “Pax Americana”**

In the 1960s, Lansdale was also an enthusiastic advocate of the political side of counterinsurgency. His writings are replete with advice to aspiring counterinsurgents on the need to understand the potentially insurgent people and to win their sympathy with decency and principles of fair play. American advisers-presumably decent by nature-are counseled to impart their own fair but firm principles to their foreign Counterparts so that troops in the field will cease their age-old practices of plunder and casual brutality and get on with the job of counterinsurgency. Magsaysay’s ostensible reform of the Philippine army was commonly cited as a model for moderation and civic action in

counterinsurgency Lansdale pointed out in a 1957 War College discussion that the policy was only common sense:

*If the people fear and hate the army, they will fear and hate the government . . . Col. Lansdale cited communist military occupation policy to emphasize communist understanding of the above point. When a communist army or guerrilla unit initially enters a village . . . individual soldiers . . . lay aside their arms and offer their help in chopping wood plowing, etc. They scrupulously respect property . . . and take nothing by force.... This is in marked contrast with the normal performance of governmental soldiery.... [In] the Philippines before 1950, government troopers probably killed more civilians unnecessarily than the Huk[balahap] did, despite the accusation that Huks obtained civilian support only through coercion and terrorism.<sup>37</sup>*

The means to achieve the prescribed change in behavior, however, remained elusive. In a 1979 letter, he acknowledged the failure of the effort in Vietnam:

*Civic action was essentially brotherly behavior of troops along lines taught by Mao and [Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen] Giap to their troops. Admittedly the Americans never succeeded in teaching this to the Vietnamese Army. Up to the very end of the Vietnam war the army was still stealing from the population.<sup>38</sup>*

Although Lansdale encouraged humane treatment of civilians by the military, he insisted at the same time that “anything goes” in the field of psychological warfare—a contradiction in which, more often than not, the latter notion prevailed.

Lansdale's reputation as a sensitive counterinsurgent, concerned with the nonmilitary aspects of reform and development, is belied by his actual record as well as his unpublished speeches and writings. Psychological warfare was his particular metier, and he was fascinated with its possibilities: "Psychological warfare is probably man's oldest weapon, aside from bare hands. In using it in today's dirty, secretive wars, or in the future, the important thing to remember is that it is a *weapon*-and that a weapon has its own unique use and its own effect."<sup>39</sup> Lansdale was a prime example of the counterinsurgent who convinced himself that he *understood* the people he was working with and that, as a consequence, he could outthink and manipulate them. Psy-war, in Lansdale's view, was trickery; and trickery was to be employed even in so-called political reforms-for example, the Philippines' largely bogus program of land grants for guerrilla surrenderees.

Lansdale embraced the role of trickster, and it emerged as a prime tenet of psy-war in his lectures at the military service schools. He clearly relished the use of "dirty" tactics, especially those that contained an element of humor:

*As a footnote . . . remember humor-even if it is a grim practical joke that only you can afford to smile at. Humor is often the test of a good psychological operation, since humor is constructed on the frailties of mankind-and skilled playing on these frailties increases the effectiveness of the psychological weapon. Those of you who know of Admiral Miles' operations in China should recall the risks his Chinese agents took to wall-paint slogans poking fun at the Japanese. In some instances, the main motivation of volunteers who risked death doing this was the appeal of playing a prank.*<sup>40</sup>

The Lansdale “trickster” approach to psy-war had a lasting influence on the American military, not least through the inclusion of his exuberant accounts in military training materials long after his retirement. The Department of the Army’s two-volume reference tome on psychological warfare published in April 1976 (Army Pamphlet 525-7-1) reproduced several Lansdale texts on the theme. “Practical Jokes, “ an article excerpted from Lansdale’s autobiography *In the Midst of Wars*, concerns a “whole new approach” to psy-war, including such examples as the distribution of free hot chocolate and coffee to demonstrators “laced generously with a powerful laxative.” Lansdale ignores the long-term political effects of such a prank, as well as the possibility of detection by the victims. (Similar anonymous “pranks” were played in 1969 against demonstrators in the March on Washington, when hot drinks laced with LSD were distributed: The rumor-perhaps false-that the villains were from army intelligence rapidly spread.)<sup>41</sup> A free rein in devising and implementing such schemes, of course, is another aspect of the Lansdale approach. Other Lansdale psy-war pranks cited in Army Pamphlet 5257-1 and other army training manuals involve exemplary criminal violence-the murder and mutilation of captives and the display of their bodies.

Lansdale’s method for confronting Third World insurgencies was based exclusively on his success in the Philippines. It revolved around small elite teams of Americans placed in close and influential contact with indigenous personalities who would make the best puppet leaders. In the Philippines, the chosen instrument was Ramón Magsaysay, a soldier shepherded from the defense ministry to the presidency by Lansdale’s elite team. In Vietnam, the instrument was Ngo Dinh Diem, sustained in power through his troubled first two years under the protective shield of another elite team. 42 Lansdale

continued to put forward formal proposals to continue to pursue this approach in Vietnam well into the late 1960s.

Although Lansdale's view that problems of insurgency were resolvable by small teams and Machiavellian intrigue was most frequently expressed in his papers on the Philippine experience, a more comprehensive approach appears in an 18 June 1963 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from adviser Gordon Chase.<sup>43</sup> The paper, "A High-Level Look at the Cold War, " summarizes yet another Lansdale "think" piece calling on "the need for a precise strategy which will give the U.S. the win it seeks in the cold war," and proposing as the way to do this the creation of a small strategy group (to be headed by Bundy). Of the seven topics to be discussed by such a group, two are of particular relevance.

*The Human Factor-The group may want to study the feasibility of forming and deploying a super-elite (under 100 persons) in such a way as to bring about a decisive change in the outcome of the cold war. One method of deployment would be to send some of the elite into a critical area, as a replacement for a complete Country Team and with simple orders to win U. S. goals. When the elite had won, it would leave behind a blueprint for follow-up actions and return home for deployment elsewhere or for splitting up into cadres.*

*School for Political Action-The group may want to study the feasibility of setting up a school for political action which would create skilled free world leadership capable of competing with graduates of the Lenin and Sun Yat Sen Schools and of completely defeating Communism. However, with or without such a school . . . there is a need for a good political textbook-a modern case history text of democratic leadership in the Free World, for use*



*at leadership levels as a sort of U. S. version of “The Prince.”*

To propose “simple” solutions, of course, is far easier than to bring about simple solutions; and despite his access to information, General Lansdale, surprisingly, took relatively little interest in the practical details of counterinsurgency beyond his own experience. Lansdale was better known among the Kennedy circle for his “expertise” on “the political aspect” of the Cold War. As Gilpatric recalls, “Lansdale was fascinated by the political scene.... And he didn’t take the same degree of interest or concern in what his military colleagues were doing on the counterinsurgency training program and development of new techniques, equipment, weapons, and so forth with guerrilla-type activities.”<sup>44</sup>

In a rather garbled paper drafted in April 1954, Lansdale described his endeavors as directed toward a political object, one that smacked of neocolonialism—a “Pax Americana.” However, the U. S. empire would impose not “thugs” on its satellites but such decent people as Ramón Magsaysay (and Ngo Dinh Diem):

*The U. S. political warrior is actually extending the Pax Americana when he works effectively. In his basic plan of operation, then, he must consider the historic nature of world leadership by one nation, including the Pax Romana with its legion and the Pax Britannica with its navy, plus the social and economic factors, in comparison with the power plays of Genghis Khan, Tamerlane or Hitler (which some of our warriors are tempted to imitate when they give power to unprincipled thugs merely because they are anti-Communist). Thus, the skilled U.S. political warrior does not picture himself as a lone gladiator. He understands that he is part of a*



| *team that has other members, even if the other members do not understand this as clearly as he....*[45](#)

## **Fade-Out in Saigon**

In June 1964, Lansdale proposed in a twenty-two-page paper, "Concept for Victory in Vietnam," to reunite his old Philippines team—"The Force." In his inimitably chipper style, Lansdale reiterated his fundamental belief in the power of a few individuals to influence events: "This is a concept for victory in Vietnam, a victory won by the free Vietnamese with American help . . . a 'first team' of men who have proven their ability to defeat Asian Communist subversive insurgents, before it is altogether too late."[46](#)

As in the comprehensive *guerre révolutionnaire* approach of the French theorists (but without their depth), Lansdale's "concept for victory" begins with measures to influence the people at home, to mobilize "the great 'will to win' of the American people [which is] still largely missing."[47](#) His concept for the conduct of the war, however, is one of vast generalities, and peripheral-or downright harebrained-schemes: expanding minority counter guerrilla forces ("montagnards, the sects and the ethnic Khmers"); bringing in "voluntary" forces from neighboring countries in private enterprise "Freedom Companies"; and organizing battalions exclusively for night-fighting ("changing reveille to evening and the duty day to the hours of the night"). Lansdale's proposed "Command Action" to implement pacification, guaranteeing "aggressive action against the Viet Cong, and positive action to help the people" (however the two are distinguished), typifies his approach to counterinsurgency:

| *Order, simultaneously issued by GVN [government of South Vietnam] and U.S. commands, military and*

*civilian: The armed forces, and the civilian personnel of government, have a primary mission to protect the people of South Vietnam; their secondary mission is to help them. Failure to accomplish these missions will be punished by death, or such other punishment as the court-martial may direct.*<sup>48</sup>

Although General Lansdale's boundless self-confidence that a small nucleus of bold, brave, brilliant Americans led by himself could "turn around" a subversive insurgency survived the long decline of his protege Ngo Dinh Diem, Lansdale would not return to Vietnam until the Johnson administration's buildup of U. S. ground forces was well underway. Although publicly acclaimed for his counterinsurgency savvy, by 1964 the military's professional counterinsurgents began to tire of Lansdale's simplistic approach. General Maxwell Taylor, who had replaced Henry Cabot Lodge as ambassador in June 1964, shared McGeorge Bundy's low opinion of Lansdale's schemes, and together they refused to have Lansdale in a position of authority in Saigon.<sup>49</sup> In 1961, Taylor had been asked by President Kennedy to pick up the pieces after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and he chaired a committee of inquiry that was brutally critical of CIA incompetence. Lansdale's handling of his post-Bay of Pigs assignment to kill Castro, in the same gung ho spirit as the invasion, may have been perhaps too much for Taylor to stomach.

In September 1965, Henry Cabot Lodge-no doubt mercifully unaware of MONGOOSE-returned as ambassador to the Saigon embassy. At his request, General Lansdale followed shortly afterward with his handpicked "team"-most of whom had worked with him before. Lansdale's stint as chief adviser to the pacification effort then underway-"Revolutionary Development"-was, however, short-lived. The consensus, as enunciated by Frances

FitzGerald, is that Lansdale was simply adrift in this last posting to Vietnam: The Saigon bureaucracy “effectively cut him off from the mission command and from all work except that of a symbolic nature.” “Living in his grand villa,” Lansdale would until 1968 “spend most of his time in talk with Vietnamese intellectuals, a few ex-Viet Minh officers, and his own American devotees.” Lansdale would become “a hero to idealistic young American officials who saw the failure of American policy as a failure of tactics.”[50](#)

As a believer in the potential of the individual leader or operator, the isolated surgical action, the showcase project, and above all the power of psychological warfare, Lansdale was prototypical of the counterinsurgency era. He had neither the patience nor the wisdom to contemplate comprehensive programs of undramatic police work or in-depth development or reform; his vocation was for the spectacular, the theatrical. In the Philippines, Lansdale’s advisory effort was seen as relatively successful: There, psychological warfare had indeed made a contribution to the defeat of an insurgent movement, although skeptics could attribute the defeat to the insurgency’s own inherent weaknesses. Moreover, the psy-war tricks of terror and manipulation, which he emphasized in his lectures, do not appear to have played a significant part in defeating the Huks. Lansdale’s advocacy of special operations, “practical jokes,” and individual initiative was, however, shared by the creative counterinsurgents of the 1960s and continues to inform the doctrine of low-intensity conflict in the 1990s.

# Chapter 9: The Heart of Doctrine

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

The U. S. Army's doctrine of counterinsurgency existed at two levels on the eve of the Kennedy presidency, distinguished by the degree of specialization of the forces it was intended to address. The army's 1951 *Operations against Guerrilla Forces* (FM 31-20) remained in general use in its field manual series. A series of more specialized texts, prepared at the Psychological Warfare Center, provided guidance for U.S. Army Special Forces "guerrilla" and counterguerrilla operations. The Special Forces manuals and guidelines in 1960 eschewed ethical limits on conduct in guerrilla warfare and reserved the use of terror as a legitimate and highly effective-tactical tool of unconventional warfare. Although counterinsurgency rapidly became more sophisticated under the Kennedy administration, the basic premise that guerrilla warfare is best combated with "guerrilla" tactics remained central.

The 1960 Special Forces manual, *Counter-Insurgency Operations* (unnumbered), combined the traditional approach to counterinsurgency, as applied by colonial powers and occupying armies alike, with guerrilla tactics. The cover of the manual, which was part of the collection of counterinsurgency materials President Kennedy kept in his office, depicts the Soviet menace incarnate, an aggressive leering death's head in a Soviet uniform.<sup>1</sup> Its content, too, is considerably less bland than that of the numbered field manual series. The organization and conduct of "punitive

operations in the guerrilla/terrorist suppression campaign” is outlined, incorporating elements of some of the tactical and organizational innovations used by the French in Indochina and North Africa and the British in the pacification of Malaya.<sup>2</sup>

The organizational side does not differ dramatically from the doctrine of the following decade and incorporates lessons from the British and French strategic hamlet and “self-defense” forces concepts, as well as the American experience in the Philippines, Korea, and Indochina. The terminology used is that of the British/French colonial experience: The insurgents are characterized as “guerrilla/terrorists” and “dissidents” and the suspect population is liable to “resettlement” and “punitive” action. A detailed section on the utility of helicopter transport and gunships suggests a familiarity with the French experience in Algeria—where the concept was pioneered.<sup>3</sup>

The military was assigned the primary responsibility in “the conduct of punitive operations” in the “guerrilla/terrorist suppression campaign,” with support from indigenous “police, paramilitary unit, and civil agencies.”<sup>4</sup> Army trained “Civilian Self-Defense Forces,” a feature in (British) Malaya and (French) Indochina, were to provide security surveillance and intelligence “at the town, village and hamlet level.”<sup>5</sup> Paramilitary forces, designated as “Special Police” or “Special Constables” (both terms applied in British Malaya), were to be recruited from experienced trackers, “hunters-poachers,” or “primitive indigenous personnel from sparsely populated areas with specialized area knowledge,” and trained for special tasks.<sup>6</sup> “Special Intelligence Personnel” (another British term), for “intelligence, counter-subversion and Psychological purposes,” included “Agents; Informants; ‘Galvanized Guerrillas’ (reformed personnel working for the

government); Smugglers; Black market operators; Defected red personnel; Captured red personnel.”<sup>7</sup>

The basic formation prescribed for small-unit actions was “Hunterkiller Teams,” units of twelve-the size of the standard Special Forces “A” Detachment-including local personnel. In the Korean War, U.S. Hunter-killer Teams (highly mobile conventional light infantry) had played a significant role as mobile strike forces against Korean and Chinese regulars and behind-the-line guerrillas. The Hunter-killer Teams described in the 1960 manual differ from the Korean War model in their size and makeup. The Hunter-killer Teams, like the Philippines Nenita units, the British countergangs in the Kenyan Emergency, and the French counterguerrilla irregulars of Indochina and Algeria, dressed and operated as “guerrillas”: “Personnel wear local indigenous civilian clothes or nondescript military attire and possess items of Red insignia on uniforms for use when appropriate.” Their mission was to conduct long-range reconnaissance and to “hunt down and destroy” the adversary.<sup>8</sup>

The counterinsurgency program was envisioned as a process of four general, often overlapping phases. Phase I entails the organization of local auxiliary counterinsurgency forces, local “pacification committees” and the beginning of population control measures (“stringent food rationing and control measures over commerce”). Offensive operations follow in Phase II, the “all-out attack to exterminate large guerrilla forces in the field”; isolation of the guerrillas through control of food supplies and the forcible relocation of suspect elements to “secure” resettlement areas; and the creation of no-go “sanitary zones,” “specific areas from which the population is restricted and in which all nongovernmental personnel encountered can be considered guerrilla/terrorists.” Phase III, “Destruction of the Guerrilla/terrorist Military and Support Elements,” includes

more of the same, including intensified efforts to isolate guerrilla forces (“Operations to destroy small garden plots, fields and cattle stock held or used by guerrilla elements in remote or sparsely populated regions are pressed”). And Phase IV, “Rehabilitation,” is to restore “normalcy” through “firm but fair” administration.<sup>[9](#)</sup>

The elements of the counterinsurgency program mapped out in 1960 were not in themselves innovations. The innovation was in the generalized subordination of the tactics and techniques of counterinsurgency to the fundamental principle of fighting like with like. The extralegal element of the approach was justified only on the grounds of expediency-and the expectations of the adversary: “Basically the guerrilla/ terrorist mentally acknowledges and accepts his status as an illegal person whose life is forfeit if apprehended.” And in a further departure from the post-Korea manuals of the 1950s, the 1960 manual explicitly prescribed the use of guerrilla and terrorist methods: “Principals [*sic*] of Operation: Stress maintenance of the initiative by prompt offensive action, economy of force and employment of suitably organized and trained troops and police in all weather field operations *utilizing guerrilla/ terrorist tactics*.”<sup>[11](#)</sup>

A principal message of the 1960 manual was the need to react unconventionally to insurgency: The normal rules and conventions of war went by the board (“No rote, drill or other rigidly defined tactics or techniques can be prescribed in the conduct of suppression operations”). Action prescribed ranged from classic small-unit engagements to the deliberate use of terror: “The majority of government operations can be classified into one or more of the following general types: a) Meeting engagements; b) Attacks; c) Defense; d) Ambushes, ‘Q’ Operations and Provocative actions; e) Raids; f) Pursuit actions; g) Interception actions;

h) Terror Operations.”<sup>12</sup> “Q” operations are defined as those “in which an ostensibly lucrative target is offered to lure the guerrilla/terrorist to attack” (as with the “Q”-ships of World War 11-gunboats disguised as merchanters), while “Provocative Actions” are those “initiated by the government to provoke the guerrillas to attack.”

There was no mention of hearts and minds, of development, reform, or sophisticated propaganda. The Special Forces were specialists in warfare at its most primitive; whether using the knife, the noose, or C-4 plastique (a plastic explosive), their trade was the violent end of war, however elaborate the larger strategy of warfare. No further elaboration of the “Terror Operations” prescribed appears in the 1960s manual, but references to punitive actions and the use of “guerrilla/ terrorist” tactics suggest a no-holds-barred approach. The prescription of terror for American counterinsurgents-and unconventional warriors-remained a feature of American doctrine in the 1960s and afterward, although such terror was generally described through the more oblique term counterterror (counterorganization described the paramilitary forces). “Terror Operations” would take the form of campaigns of assassination, “disappearance,” and mass executions in many countries in subsequent decades, and would remain a hallmark of the counterinsurgency state in the 1980s.

The tactical application of unconventional warfare doctrine to counterinsurgency after 1960 continued naturally after a counterinsurgency program was designated as a national policy. The guerrilla was to be fought with a mirror image of guerrilla tactics and organization, a model constructed from the U.S. Army’s own experience in, and preconceptions about, offensive “guerrilla” warfare. The reflection was hardly a faithful replica of the guerrilla warfare of Mao or the Vietnamese strategists: The image in



the mirror was in large part that of the United States' own "guerrillas," the U.S. Army Special Forces, the CIA's paramilitary assets, and their indigenous recruits. ' Doctrine prescribed tactics and organization in a mélange inverting Special Forces unconventional warfare practices and parodying the style of revolutionary guerrilla warfare. The terror of the guerrilla-and the unconventional warfare arsenal-was opposed by the "counterterror" of the counterinsurgent. The organizational models of the guerrilla forces and sympathizers (and the Special Forces' partisan guerrillas) were matched by a model "counterorganization" for counterinsurgency. Terror and counterorganization in the formal doctrine of the United States' military is discussed further below ([see Chapter 10](#)).

Although to an extent counterinsurgency was the converse of unconventional warfare, the former was in practice a subordinate discipline of the latter, distinguished not by its tactics or organizational forms but by its operational scenario. Unconventional warfare came into play whenever operations took place in enemy territory-or in territory counterinsurgents considered to be under enemy influence. The relative success of the insurgent in dominating a territory, in addition, could serve to justify doing away with the distinction altogether. In theory, counterinsurgency *becomes* unconventional warfare whenever the operational area is considered to be under enemy influence: Offensive counterinsurgency forces, as a consequence, were ideally organized and trained to be indistinguishable from those raised to conduct covert cross-border raids. Terror tactics, in unconventional warfare, became counterterror in counterinsurgency.

## **Counterinsurgency and Unconventional Warfare Merge**

The doctrine of the early 1960s addressed the potential for indigenous irregulars to be organized and trained for guerrilla (not counterguerrilla) warfare, as if tasked to carry out a resistance campaign against a foreign enemy. The rationale was that such forces were required against the possibility of government collapse in the face of foreign aggression. They were to have provided a nucleus of stay-behind (or “stand-by”) forces in the event of an enemy victory. Doctrine subsequently provided for the employment of such “guerrilla” forces in counterinsurgency, as assets through which to deny victory to foreign aggression (read: subversion and insurgency) through the methods of unconventional warfare-proposals described below in the Latin American context. A capsule description of the procedure appears in the 1962 U. S. Army field manual, FM 33-5, *Psychological Operations*:

*In cold war situations, special forces personnel are invited by legitimate foreign governments to train and develop indigenous forces in the doctrine, methods, and techniques of guerrilla warfare. A two-fold purpose underlies this cold war training: one, to enable the allied force to oppose an invader successfully; two, to counter and nullify organized subversive armed forces within the country.*

A U.S. Army Special Warfare School document from the 1961-1963 period, “Concepts for U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Activities,” surveys the development of a Counterinsurgency advisory program that uses indigenous unconventional warfare cadres for covert actions to overthrow undesirable revolutionary regimes:[14](#)

*Indigenous special-forces-type units should be trained for operations within their own country as stay-behind forces in seizing control of the government. These forces*

*would be a nucleus upon which to develop a large-scale irregular force for the overthrow of the hostile insurgent or occupying government.*<sup>[15](#)</sup>

The document further suggests that such programs could be introduced to develop American unconventional warfare assets in advance of a client's collapse, with or without that government's consent. The irregulars would not even necessarily be nationals of the country involved a policy of particular relevance to CIA and U. S. Army operations in Latin America and Indochina: "If the US Army does not have agreements for training within the country, unconventional warfare forces of *a similar ethnic grouping* could be trained in adjacent countries, within the United States, or in some other host country. These forces would be a deterrent to indirect aggression by hostile political forces."<sup>[16](#)</sup>

The provision for offensive operations against hostile governments stressed the primary role of indigenous forces backed by U.S. Army unconventional warriors. As proposed in the 1961 "think" paper cited above, U. S. conventional forces were envisioned as playing a largely political role, rattling sabers and blocking conventional support for the target government. Provision is made for the senior U.S. military commander to assume primary political responsibility vis-à-vis "sponsored" parallel leaders (a two-tiered system of covert diplomacy no doubt applied in Laos in 1960 to remove Souvanna Phouma, and in the long campaign against the Nicaraguan government in the 1980s):

*[Conventional] US military forces should only be employed in the hostile area when local forces are not adequate. The US military role is primarily one of advice, assistance, and logistical support. When US forces are committed, the US military commander in the hostile*

*area should be the US President's representative in the sponsored underground government . . . . At such time as a friendly government regains control of the country, the normal US Country Team relationship should be restored. Until this takes place, coordination of the executive agencies of the US Government should be under the direction of the senior US military commander. At any time outside intervention by another power seems possible, U.S. Combat forces should be deployed in a show-of-force role prepared to intervene in support of the friendly resistance movement. Any open conflict between opposing regular military forces raises the operations to limited war which is beyond the scope of this discussion.*<sup>17</sup>

The organization of irregular forces was to be undertaken by “a nucleus of special-forces type detachments” set up in accordance with U.S. Special Forces doctrine. Training was to take place in “a secure base area,” with U.S. Army trainers instructing indigenous irregulars “in guerrilla warfare, propaganda, subversion, intelligence and counterintelligence, terrorist activities, civic action, and conventional combat operations.”” Suggested phases for the conduct of operations included “Organization or capture of an underground movement; Formation of an underground intelligence system, clandestine propaganda, terrorist activities, and political cells; Movement of U.S. military forces in a show of force to an area near the hostile country”<sup>20</sup> (each of these phases should be familiar to observers of the offensive against Nicaragua in the 1980s and the U.S. Army's frenzy of military training, base-building, and maneuvers in neighboring Honduras). Direct involvement of U.S. (unconventional) forces is also prescribed in everything from propaganda to acts of terrorism:

*Military intelligence units should be organized to develop within the area. Agents can be infiltrated into resistance areas . Psychological warfare specialists can work with the underground in the production and dissemination of clandestine propaganda. Special-forces type personnel who are demolition specialists can work with the underground in destroying government facilities, in terrorist activities, and in tying down internal security forces to protect government installations.*[21](#)

As the destabilization of the hostile government progresses, the level of the activity is to intensify: "Direct movement by guerrilla forces within the country to seize control of the government. These guerrilla forces should be supported by strikes, riots, and intensified sabotage and subversion." Once the hostile government is overthrown, the U.S. role shifts abruptly to counterinsurgency assistance and political counseling-that is, "Consolidation of control by friendly political forces and expansion of internal security operations; Assistance in organization [presumably of government] so that the purpose of U.S. efforts is not lost to new totalitarians."[22](#)

The merging of the two strains of special warfare, offensive "guerrilla" warfare and counterinsurgency (first apparent in the evolution of the U.S. Army Special Forces) had, after 1961, become an integral part of army doctrine and practices. Special Forces training schedules, in particular, stressed the interchangeability of the skills required, with consecutive practical exercises alternating from guerrilla to counterguerrilla scenarios. The training arrangements at Fort Bragg for non-Special Forces Americans and foreign officers followed a similar approach to what was seen as a single military discipline. Brig. Gen. William Yarborough, commander of the Special Warfare Center and school during

the Kennedy administration, described the training offered in 1963:

*The Unconventional Warfare Course and the counterinsurgency Course are two sides of the same coin. The UW Course emphasizes the problems of creating an effective guerrilla force in enemy territory during a hot war situation; the CI Course deals with the reasons behind dissident movements and the techniques used in combatting guerrilla forces and revolutionary movements. Thus the UW Course teaches how to help defeat an enemy by developing guerrilla forces, and the CI Course teaches how to prevent Communist inspired dissident movements and guerrilla forces from succeeding.*<sup>[23](#)</sup>

The specialists in these two fields both before and after the Kennedy years remained the U.S. Army Special Forces, whose tactical doctrine set the norms for counterinsurgency forces in much of the Third World. The model for the “guerrilla” and “counterguerrilla” roles depended to a large extent on the American view of the enemy, with perhaps its most explicit elaboration in the “Aggressor” guerrilla doctrine devised for maneuvers (see chapter 2, “Aggressor-Maneuver Warfare”). The glossy 1963 U.S. Army booklet, *Special Warfare*, is illustrated with photographs of men “enrolled in the Unconventional Warfare Course” at Fort Bragg who were “acting as Aggressor Guerrillas during a field training exercise.”<sup>[24](#)</sup>

## **A Visit to Colombia**

The overlap of offensive “guerrilla” tactics and organization with their counterguerrilla analogues can be illustrated in written doctrine and in historical experience-

examples from Colombia and Vietnam are particularly relevant. A proposal to organize indigenous irregulars with the twofold function in Colombia was made by a top-level U.S. Special Warfare team from Fort Bragg during a two-week visit there in February 1962.<sup>25</sup> In a secret supplement to his report to the joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Warfare Center commander General Yarborough, who headed the survey team, pressed for a stay-behind irregular force and its immediate deployment to eliminate communists representing a future threat:

*[A] concerted country team effort should be made now to select civilian and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance operations in case they are needed later. This should be done with a view toward development of a civil and military structure for exploitation in the event the Colombian internal security system deteriorates further. This structure should be used to pressure toward reforms known to be needed, perform counter-agent and counter-propaganda functions and as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents. It should be backed by the United States.*

As a telling afterthought-hinting at the lack of coordination between the military and the CIA-Yarborough adds: "If we have such an apparatus in Colombia it should be employed now ...."<sup>26</sup>

General Yarborough's 1962 report included recommendations to the Colombian military and the civil police to improve intelligence and population control capabilities through "an intensive civilian registration program . . . so that [everyone] is eventually registered in government files together with fingerprints and

photographs.” Interrogation procedures and techniques, including regular questioning of rural villagers “who are believed to be knowledgeable of guerrilla activities” were also advised. When dealing with guerrillas-or “bandits”- interrogations were to be particularly thorough: “Exhaustive interrogation of the bandits, to include sodium pentathol and polygraph, should be used to elicit every shred of information. Both the Army and the Police need trained interrogators.”<sup>27</sup> In a country with a long tradition of police violence and torture in the wake of a long civil war, encouraging techniques to “elicit every shred” of information suggested at best an indifference to torture, at worst an endorsement of it. Pentathol, for example, while in medical practice used to induce relaxation, was reportedly used in Latin America in the early 1970s in conjunction with other drugs, notably derivatives of curare (or its synthetic form suxamethonium, or “Scoline”), which induces paralysis, agony, and terror.<sup>28</sup>

The brief of General Yarborough’s survey team was to prepare the way for the first of a series of Special Warfare Mobile Training Teams due to arrive in Colombia in early March 1962. It was to evaluate the insurgency/counterinsurgency situation, the country’s assistance and training needs, and the Colombian counterinsurgency effort “with a view toward integrating viable Colombian doctrine and techniques into counterinsurgency instruction presented at the US Army Special Warfare School [part of the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg].” Its paramilitary prescription, a virtual blueprint for the Colombian army “death squads” that are still active, was apparently implemented at once. Although the U. S. embassy intelligence officers there informed Yarborough’s team that the “some 8,000 communists” in Colombia were “inept bumbler” and posed no real threat to the government,” the team recommended the assignment of



five twelve-man Special Forces “A” detachments to four Colombian counterguerrilla brigades as well as an administrative detachment and psychological warfare specialists.

The principal recommendations of the 1962 mission were subsequently adopted in the Colombian military’s comprehensive counterinsurgency plan, the *Plan Lazo*, adopted at the end of 1962 and continued through 1965.<sup>29</sup> The programs that followed combined guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare, and involved both counterterror and counterorganization. The banditry of the early 1960s, a heritage of *La Violencia*, the period of civil war that began in 1948, was transformed into organized revolutionary guerrilla warfare after 1965, which has continued to date. In the 1990s, Colombia is racked with political-and criminalviolence perhaps unequaled at present even in El Salvador; the “death squads” of the army, police, and their civilian collaborators claimed over a thousand lives in 1987 alone, in the name of counterinsurgency.<sup>30</sup> Colombia’s doctrine of counterinsurgency today seemingly differs little from that of the United States in the 1960s. The Colombian army’s 1969 counterguerrilla manual, *Reglamento de Combate de Contraguerrillas*, is based on U. S. field manuals and training texts, which it lists in an appendix.<sup>31</sup> Texts cited include anthologies of *Military Review* articles and the writings of three of the French *guerre révolutionnaire* theorists who most openly advocate counterterror and counterorganization: translations of Roger Trinquier’s *Modern Warfare*; David Galula’s *Counterinsurgency Warfare*; and Colonel Gabriel Bonnet’s *Insurrectionary and Revolutionary Wars*.<sup>32</sup>

## **Vietnam: Unconventional Warfare or Counterinsurgency?**

The changeable application of the norms of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare became most apparent during the course of the Vietnam War. The illogic of the conventional war waged on friendly territory against an ostensibly allied population in Vietnam was more than matched by that of the unconventional war in the South. Both the air war of ARC LIGHT raids by B-52 bombers and helicopter gunships and the war in the shadows of sabotage and assassination were waged in the South as if in enemy territory against an enemy people. The various, sometimes bizarre experiments in conducting unconventional war were permissible in the United States' obtuse, secondhand conceptual foundation of counterinsurgency doctrine itself. As both the doctrine and practice of counterinsurgency had been developed as an offshoot of the unconventional warfare doctrine of the 1950s, counterguerrilla warfare was considered almost interchangeable with that of unconventional warfare.

On 9 March 1961, Kennedy's NSAM 28 instructed Defense and CIA to launch offensive operations against the guerrilla opposition in Vietnam, termed in the memorandum "Viet Minh." Significantly, the order called for "*Guerrilla* action in Viet Minh territory." The army Special Forces complied, organizing covert operations in the South and raids into border areas of the North and into Laos. McGeorge Bundy asked Defense and CIA for a rapid response on action plans "in view of the president's instruction that we make every possible effort to launch guerrilla operations . . . at the earliest possible time...."<sup>33</sup> In May 1961, NSAM 52 called for the deployment of the first contingent of Special Forces—about 400 men—to Vietnam's Nha Trang training center to accelerate the training of Vietnamese Special Forces in guerrilla warfare." Counterguerrilla warfare in 1961 was seen by the new counterinsurgents as a variation on *guerrilla*

warfare. Significantly, the Special Forces units deployed to Vietnam were to operate covertly, under CIA control.<sup>35</sup>

The confusion of guerrilla warfare with counterinsurgency was in evidence from the inception of the American effort to wage counterinsurgency in Vietnam. What is extraordinary is that very little thought appears to have gone into the distinction. The army's official history of the Special Forces suggests that the Green Berets generally went about the task of counterinsurgency *as if* engaged in guerrilla operations behind enemy lines. During the 1961-1965 period, the force was "capable of waging unconventional war under conventional war conditions," although "the war in Vietnam ... never fell smoothly into the conventional category." This, however, did not deter their use of the behind-the-line tactics developed for occupied Europe: "In Vietnam, 'enemy or enemy-controlled territory' was the countryside of South Vietnam, the government of which had invited U.S. military presence. The enemy insurgents were guerrillas themselves."<sup>36</sup>

The merging of unconventional warfare with counterinsurgency hinged on the definition of the former: Unconventional warfare was waged within a host country whenever and wherever territory was considered to be "enemy-controlled." The special tactics of behind-the-lines operations, then, could be introduced into a domestic conflict at will. Special Forces operations with irregular counter guerrillas in Vietnam epitomized the overlapping functions. A 1967 Fifth Special Forces "Operational Report" describes the development of the irregular "Mike Force" and Mobile Guerrilla Force program. Operations are described as "guerrilla" and "unconventional" warfare when conducted in areas dominated by the enemy:

*These operations were of significant value in restricting the VC [Vietcong] use of safe havens in areas in which he had been previously unmolested .... The guerrilla force is designed as an "Economy of Force" effort intended to project into remote isolated areas ... to strike against enemy forces who have heretofore operated with seeming impunity.*<sup>[37](#)</sup>

Project DELTA, perhaps the best-known employment of "special operations" forces in Vietnam, and its lesser-known counterparts, SIGMA and OMEGA, also placed indigenous forces under Special Forces command for unconventional warfare operations within Vietnam's borders (DELTA was an "in-country" force, its operations categorized as "internal guerrilla activities").<sup>[38](#)</sup>

A 1966 Special Forces assessment describes the unconventional warfare/counterinsurgency distinction as a largely subjective matter depending on an assessment of conditions in an operational area. In any case, whatever the Special Forces' tasks, the rules of engagement applying to the Special Forces were "special" because the force was "special."<sup>[39](#)</sup> Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) irregulars were trained equally "for employment as guerrillas or counter-guerrillas," and CIDG Strike Forces were also called "CIDG Guerrilla Company, Light."<sup>[40](#)</sup> The report, in recalling that after 1964 the Special Forces were charged to employ their CIDG forces in offensive operations, suggests little concern on the part of the high command over whether they operated as unconventional warriors or counterinsurgents: "Whether or not CIDG forces so employed could be described as being internal guerrilla or counterguerrilla depended primarily on the extent of enemy control in the particular area of operations."<sup>[41](#)</sup>

Even in the 1960s, however, the army did distinguish between counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. The 1967 document cited above, for example, refers to plans and directives “concerning 5th SFG CI and UW missions.” The army itself appears to have been aware that sometimes the distinctions were thin, and was concerned to assess the transition of Special Forces from its 1950s role as a strictly unconventional warfare force. In 1965, a Department of the Army evaluation team looked at the Special Forces record in Vietnam:

*The US Army’s responsibilities for organizing and equipping forces for counterinsurgency operations and for conducting research and development in support of unconventional warfare, psychological warfare, and counterinsurgency operations pointed up the desirability of evaluating the employment of a special forces group in a situation where the stress was placed on counterinsurgency operations rather than on unconventional warfare operations, which was the original raison d’etre.*<sup>42</sup>

The evaluation report also examined the progress of “the reorientation . . . towards a civil-military counterinsurgency program, as opposed to a purely tactical attempt to destroy VC units.”<sup>43</sup> The limited progress toward this goal was a consequence both of circumstances and immediate tactical imperatives defined in standing orders. The report appends Letter of Instructions Number 1 (LOT 1, dated January 1965), which defines Special Forces objectives and operational concepts. The program in Vietnam was defined as “a phased, and combined militarycivil counterinsurgency effort” intended (in sequence) to destroy the Vietcong, establish security, establish governmental control, and finally to “enlist the population’s active and willing support of and participation in the government’s programs.”<sup>44</sup> The

“concept,” however, was defined as that “essentially [of] a clear, secure, and develop operation.” Even where the population was considered neutral, the civil-military dimension was to come fully into play only *after* the insurgency had been annihilated:

*No population which is “uncommitted” or which has been Viet Cong dominated can be won to the government of Vietnam until:*

- a. The Viet Cong have been cleared from the area.*
- b. The Viet Cong organization and infrastructure have been neutralized or eliminated.*
- c. The GVN [government of South Vietnam] infrastructure, to which the populace is committed, has been established to replace that of the Viet Cong....<sup>45</sup>*

Standing orders issued to Special Forces in January 1965 (in LOI 1) and described by an army evaluation team as their “most important mission statement”-exemplified the ambiguity between unconventional, guerrilla warfare tactics and counterinsurgency. The Special Forces and CIDG’s tasks in the border areas were: “establish rapport with local population”; “initiate guerrilla type operations within operational zone against VC controlled areas”; “assist in establishing population control”; and, among other things, “conduct operations to dislodge VC-controlled officials, to include assassination.”<sup>46</sup> The same Letter of Instructions ordered terrorist actions to interdict “interior infiltration routes”:

*CIDG will conduct clear and hold, patrol and ambush type operations to seal off, interdict and pacify areas . . . . Concurrently with the above, small and highly trained units, utilizing counterinsurgency techniques will be operating out of the camps . . . ambushing, raiding,*

*sabotaging and committing acts of terrorism against known VC personnel .<sup>47</sup>*

The permissible targets of U.S.-run terror squads were ambiguously defined; in any case, distinguishing Vietcong “supporters” and members of the guerrilla infrastructure called for skills for which assassins are not particularly well known. The army’s official history of Special Forces in Vietnam notes the pride Special Forces personnel took in their unconventional operations, and that “in fact most of the troops were originally attracted to the Special Forces by the nature of these operations. “<sup>48</sup>

## **A Doctrine for the Future**

By the time of John F. Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, the counterinsurgency establishment had become a driving force in American overseas policy. The military had boosted its capabilities for unconventional and counterinsurgency warfare and was actively engaged in the secret wars in Indochina. Its training apparatus was preparing Third World officers for the next generation of conflict in Asia, the Americas, and Africa, and helping to build the first of the model counterinsurgency states. The strategic doctrine of the politicians had been refined and made operational through a revision of the military’s own doctrine. The tactical and operational norms of unconventional warfare and special operations forces were adapted to fill the new strategic requisites. The framework of doctrine developed by the end of 1963 would provide the foundation of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare into the 1990s.

The military’s role in the development and reform side of counterinsurgency was to be channeled largely through civil

affairs officers and military civic action, as Lt. Col. Lunsford Thying of the Special Warfare School stated, “to enhance the stature of indigenous military forces and improve their relationship with the population. “<sup>49</sup> The army acknowledged the primacy of politics in counterinsurgency and made provisions to reinforce the political power of allied military institutions—a muchstudied topic—and, at the operational level, to ensure that integrated civilmilitary programs were directed by the military. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations Slavko Bjelajac summarized the latter approach:

*[T]here should be only one “Commander in Chief” at the head of a unified counterinsurgency command structure ..... He must be in the command of all the civil and military organizations of the critical area .... [I]n some underdeveloped countries, the military, particularly the army, may be the best suited, or the only organization capable of directing a counterinsurgency effort. The other parts of the government may be too weak and lacking in confidence.*

Political guidance offered by unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency doctrine would be unevenly applied in the countless theaters of operations over the next three decades, but it remained largely unchanged until the first years of the Reagan administration. The tactical and organizational prescriptions of the 1960s remain largely intact as well, despite occasional semantic changes. The U.S. Army Special Forces continues to be promoted as the answer to (other peoples’) domestic insurgencies and the means to conduct international covert intervention. In the decades since the 1960s, the ways unconventional and counterinsurgency warfare were taught and the way they were waged were determined by two doctrinal prescriptions: that terror is a legitimate and (when used correctly) effective



weapon of unconventional and counterinsurgency warfare; and that both specialties are best pursued through guerrilla/terrorist organization (necessitating both elite special warfare adepts and local paramilitary militias). In counterinsurgency doctrine, the two disciplines were termed counterterror and counterorganization.

# Chapter 10: Counterterror and Counterorganization

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## The Terror Option

Nonnuclear terror in the 1950s was a feature of the army's doctrines of psychological warfare and the related fields of unconventional warfare and special operations, but it had yet to find formal application to counterinsurgency. The *study* of terror had, of course, long been a concern of Brigadier General McClure's psychological warfare establishment (the OCPW) and the object of specialist research contracts throughout the 1950s. Memoranda of discussions in May 1951 between McClure's aides and the Operations Research Office (ORO)—a research office at Johns Hopkins University on exclusive contract to defense agencies—report agreement “that an investigation of methods for inducing terror should have high priority.”<sup>1</sup> A discussion on Project POWOW's schedule for 1952 observes the limitations on ORO's capabilities for supervising “the developmental phases” of research on terror with existing facilities, and it recommends the recruitment of “properly qualified social psychologists for... this work.”<sup>2</sup>

The army's psychological warfare establishment continued its efforts to quantify terror in subsequent decades, both in the context of counterinsurgency and in conventional warfare. The 1965 U.S. Army manual *Psychological Operations, US Army Doctrine* (FM 33-1, May 1965), for

example, provides explicit instructions on the role of psychological operations in counterinsurgency. The selection of weapons exclusively for their “fear effect”—those particularly effective in inducing terror—is a particular psy-ops role, and had been a long-standing object of research.<sup>3</sup> Specialists would counsel tactical commanders on selecting appropriate weaponry, with these guidelines:

*Insurgents are sensitive of their own lack of heavy ordnance and have great respect for that usually available to the friendly forces. Napalm, aerial bombs, rockets, and artillery are examples.... In many situations, the tactical commander may select the type of ordnance to be employed solely based on the psychological effect it will have on the guerrilla force. historically, the employment of napalm has produced psychological effects on guerrilla forces.*<sup>4</sup>

The assessment of terror weapons is also systematized. The manual includes a guide in the form of a checklist for the interrogation of captives “to determine fear effects” of a long list of ordnance available, from napalm to white phosphorus mortar and artillery shells, to strafing from the air. Respondents are invited to indicate “Weapon Attack Observed”; “Experienced”; and “Feared Most.” But the terror/counterterror equation of unconventional and counterinsurgency operations was distinguished in doctrine from the larger issue of terror raised by modern ordnance and aerial bombardment. “Terror” and “counterterror” generally referred to the more personal terror of the operative on the ground, the terror of assassination and abduction, the knife and the gun. The latter was an outgrowth of unconventional warfare and embraced skills and tactics forbidden under the rules of war, from assassination to hostage-taking.<sup>5</sup> The assignment of counterinsurgency training and responsibility to Fort Bragg’s

Special Warfare School in the mid-1950s effectively isolated counterinsurgency from the mainstream of military tradition in peacekeeping (a tradition that was itself problematic). Counterinsurgency was left to the elite commandos of the Cold War, the rationale being that guerrillas were best fought by (our) guerrillas.

Army field manuals on psychological operations provide considerable insight into the role of terror as employed by U.S. guerrillas in unconventional warfare. The 1962 *Psychological Operations* manual (FM 33-5), for example, defines unconventional warfare as “inherently psychological,” so that “planning for special forces operations” must include a psy-war dimension at each stage. Psy-war has a particular role to play visa-vis “enemy civilians”:

*Civilians in the operational area may be supporting their own government or collaborating with an enemy occupation force. An isolation program designed to instill doubt and fear may be carried out, and a positive political action program designed to elicit active support of the guerrillas also may be effected. If these programs fail, it may become necessary to take more aggressive action in the form of harsh treatment or even abductions. The abduction and harsh treatment of key enemy civilians can weaken the collaborators' belief in the strength and power of their military forces.*<sup>6</sup>

The potential political repercussions of such tactics are acknowledged: “This approach, fraught with propaganda and political dangers, should be used only after all other appeal means have failed. And when used, they [*sic*] must be made to appear as though initiated and effected by the guerrillas themselves to reduce the possibility of reprisals against civilians.”<sup>7</sup>

The 1965 *Psychological Operations* manual (FM 33-1) notes that unconventional warfare operations against the enemy should aim at multiplying the impact of each action and creating an atmosphere of fear: “The elusive hit and run guerrilla can be built into a phantom image that is far beyond his actual potential. Care should be taken not to overplay ferocity.”<sup>8</sup> Officers are warned, however, against “temptations [that] might arise to secure quick, local successes at the expense of national policy and established directives.” In addition to terrorizing enemy guerrillas, psy-ops personnel are instructed to reassure the rest of the population, “through a well thought-out propaganda effort,” of their benevolence: “US forces must be clothed in the cloak of respectability, and be pictured as being the champions of a just cause.”<sup>9</sup>

The imagery of fear presented in FM 33-1 could well fit the description of a clandestine “death squad”; indeed, a similar reference to terror operations—as a “phantom image”—appeared at about the same time in the journal of the army of El Salvador’s School of Command and General Staff, but in the context of counterinsurgency.<sup>10</sup> Major Roberto Monge, in his article “Guerrillas and Counter-guerrillas,” similarly describes army terror and counterterror actions as designed to create uncertainty and fear, “creating a kind of phantom presence,” with precisely the same warning that “counter—guerrilla” forces should be “cloaked in respectability”: “[I]t is... important that the army itself should not openly appear to be an instructor of guerrillas, because demagogues would take advantage of this to ascribe distorted ends to the army.”<sup>11</sup>

Over the next decade, the Salvadoran armed forces would put into practice the counterterror formula and build a model counterinsurgency state.

By 1960, army Special Forces doctrine had already begun to crudely adapt unconventional warfare doctrine to counterinsurgency; in the decade to come, a more sophisticated rationale for counterinsurgent terror emerged. No longer confined to the shadowy world of the CIA and covert Green Beret operations, a hygienic concept of counterterror—terror to fight terror—emerged in the service magazines, in a rash of books on counterinsurgency, and in the training materials of the mainstream military.

The theorists of the Cold War established the philosophical justification for terror and counterterror that would be unleashed on the Cold War world. The theorists of the Kennedy administration extended the philosophical rationale of terror from the international arena of unconventional warfare to the domestic theaters of insurgency/counterinsurgency. The essential premise was the same: The adversary had a virtually unbeatable formula—and timetable—for world domination, and he fought dirty. The United States, in order to survive, had to respond in kind.

The military journals of the 1960s, notably the Army Command and General Staff College's *Military Review*, were replete with arguments for a "special" response to the new threat of insurgency. Although most of what is published in the *Military Review* appears as signed articles, the journal was described by Fort Leavenworth's commander as a medium "for the dissemination of Department of the Army doctrine" and as "a sounding board for new ideas."<sup>12</sup> Similar to the long series of French articles on *guerre révolutionnaire* published in American journals through the 1950s, the army's articles centered on unconventional, counterinsurgency, and political warfare. A March 1961 *Military Review* article, "A Proposal for Political Warfare," is representative: It describes the means to "conclusively deter

all-out aggression, parry limited war gambits, cope with guerrilla activity, and... to mount counterrevolutionary offensives in countries subverted to [sic] communism”:

*Political warfare is a sustained effort... to seize, preserve, or extend power, against a defined ideological enemy, through all acts short of a shooting war by regular military forces, but not excluding the threat of such a war. Political warfare, in short, is warfare—not public relations.... It embraces diverse forms of coercion and violence including strikes and riots, economic sanctions, subsidies for guerrilla or proxy warfare and, when necessary, kidnapping or assassination of enemy elites.*<sup>13</sup>

A 1966 *Military Review* article outlining the theoretical framework of “counterterror” was reprinted in the Guatemalan army’s own *Revista Militar de Guatemala* in October that year, just as a state of siege was declared and the army launched the first of its (since ceaseless) waves of political killings.<sup>14</sup> Military commentators called the 1966—1967 Guatemala campaign “*el contra-terror*”: Some 8,000 people were slaughtered in two provinces alone over the next six months.<sup>15</sup> As antiterrorism experts Brian Jenkins and Cesar Sereseres later wrote, “the objective of the ‘counterterror’ was to frighten everyone from collaborating with the guerrilla movement.”<sup>16</sup>

In “To Beat the Guerrillas at their Own Game” (*Military Review*, December 1963), intelligence officer (Naval Reserve) Albert L. Fisher outlines the premise of counterinsurgency terror at its most basic level:<sup>17</sup>

*This is the tactic of intimidating, kidnapping, or assassinating carefully selected members of the opposition in a manner that will reap the maximum*

*psychological benefit. It is an activity which, if used at the wrong time and the wrong place for the wrong purpose, will probably have serious negative results.*

A key role for a mirror image of the terror of “armed propaganda” had, in fact, become a part of U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine, reflected both in the routine tactics of U. S. “guerrilla” forces, and in written doctrine. The most recent manifestation of unconventional warfare doctrine to reach the public was the 1983 *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare* manual issued to *contra* forces by the CIA. Its content confirms the continuing acceptance of counterterror tactics by U.S. military and paramilitary forces specializing in psychological, political, and unconventional warfare.<sup>18</sup>

## **Selective versus Mass Counterterror**

The army’s stated position was that terror was useful and legitimate so long as it was selective and discriminate. The 320-page *U.S. Army Handbook of Counterinsurgency Guidelines* (1966) outlines an imaginary counterinsurgency scenano—complete with maps and population profiles— and specifies the range of counterinsurgency tactics available, including terror.<sup>19</sup> Perhaps prophetically, the maps of the apocryphal republic of “Centralia,” host of the simulated insurgency, show an area very much like the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua. Its population combines the characteristics of several Central American countries, but is closest to that of Belize: Some 50 percent of the people are black, English-speaking Creoles in the coastal area, while 25 percent of the population are Spanish—speaking *ladinos*, people of mixed ancestry (Nicaragua also has a large Creole population on its Atlantic coast). A large Indian population speaks Kekchi (a Guatemalan language). Inland of “Centralia” is the



revolutionary state of “Montanya.” <sup>20</sup> In the scenario, the Creole population dominate the economy, higher education, government, and the armed forces. Ladino immigrants from Montanya form the focus of the insurgency, with cross-border support; the “Indigenes” are exploited and recruited by the insurgents.

To guide the counterinsurgency planner, the army handbook outlines model counterinsurgency programs based on interviews with twenty-one experienced counterinsurgents. An analytical breakdown of “solution concepts by nature of operations” found that all but one of the respondents opted for “Military/Civil Control” measures to improve internal security, enforce control measures, and carry out military engagements. Five, in contrast, also chose to carry out “Political” operations, defined as those concerning legislation, administration (including population records), and the judiciary.<sup>21</sup> All of the experts opted for “Psychological” operations, defined as including “Persuasion (Positive Attitude Actions)” and “Harassment (Intimidation, Terroristic Threats).”<sup>22</sup>

The range of approaches by the twenty-one experts to the intimidation and terrorism side of psychological warfare are not specified in the 1966 study. Only one respondent advised “prohibit[ing] government counter-terror.”<sup>23</sup> Others propose terror operations that could be blamed on the insurgents. An intelligence officer with Vietnam experience proposed to test a theory that pseudosubversive terrorism would induce the local population to seek government protection:

*Using a pseudo-insurgent force, the government generates incidents among the population. These incidents are used to indicate to the people the need for government-sponsored population control for protection*

*of the villagers. By doing this the government establishes their representatives in the areas to enable destruction of the insurgent force and carrying out longer—range objectives.*<sup>24</sup>

To support the strategy, the proposal went on, a specialist in propaganda was needed “to handle possible charges by the insurgents that the government is causing the incidents.”<sup>25</sup> The organization side of the operation was to progress from a “pseudo-insurgent” force of twenty to the establishment of self-defense corps, the “hiring” of a covert, mercenary counterterror squad, and the posting of “bounties for insurgents.”

In the meantime, our side could use and teach terror tactics to foreign irregulars without particular concern over the selectivity with which the lessons were applied. A 1962 Special Warfare School text, “Concepts for U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Activities,” outlined the training curricula for overseas allies: “guerrilla warfare, propaganda, subversion, intelligence and counter-intelligence, terrorist activities, civic action, and conventional combat operations.”<sup>26</sup>

The counterinsurgent rationale for terror assumed two things: that terror was expedient, and terror was the primary weapon of subversive guerrillas. The latter consideration provided an added moral dimension to the former: Our side could use terror to rapidly and efficiently overcome the greater terror of the adversary.

The argument was based on a doctrinal understanding of the role of terrorism in guerrilla warfare. The description of (enemy) guerrilla tactics in the May 1961 field manual *Operations Against Irregular Forces*, from hostage-taking to counterfeiting, differs relatively little from the range of

tactics available to American guerrillas as of 1961. “Overt irregular activities” included

*terrorism by assassination, bombing, armed robbery, torture, mutilation, and kidnaping; provocation of incidents, reprisals, and holding of hostages; and denial activities, such as arson, flooding, demolition, use of chemical or biological agents, or other acts designed to prevent use of an installation, area, product, or facility.*<sup>27</sup>

Covert irregular activities included

*espionage, sabotage, dissemination of propaganda and rumors, delaying or misdirecting orders, issuing false or misleading orders or reports, assassination, extortion, blackmail, theft, counterfeiting, and identifying individuals for terroristic attack.* <sup>28</sup>

Although the 1961 manual departs from 1950s concepts of the guerrilla as a partisan working directly with an external, conventional armed force, the range of actions—from arson to chemical and biological warfare—was beyond the capabilities of any insurgent movement other than the Special Forces “guerrillas.”<sup>29</sup> The 1961 manual also fails to consider the political side of guerrilla organization, assuming the recruitment of insurgents to be entirely through coercion and deception. Under-grounds, we are told, attempt, “through nonviolent persuasion, to indoctrinate and gain the participation of groups of the population who are easily deceived by promises and, through coercion by terror tactics, to force others to participate.”<sup>30</sup>

A 1969 manual, *Civil Affairs Operations* (FM 41-10), depicts terrorism as central to every aspect of guerrilla activity:

*Persuasion, indoctrination, and organization are all reinforced with the use of terror. The murder of a village chief or a tax collector can serve the insurgent cause in several ways. First, it demonstrates its power to kill selected individuals of its choice, which may help to persuade people that safety lies with adherence to the insurgent cause. Second, each such act weakens the government.... Third, it causes fear in other functionaries.... Mass terror is used to demonstrate the weakness of the government, its inability to protect its people, or to incite blind and brutal reprisals by government forces which may drive the uncommitted to the side of the insurgents.*<sup>31</sup>

In a 1962 article, Franklin Lindsay argues that counterterrorism is essential to defend a suspect population against the terrorism of the enemy. In Malaya and the Philippines, he recounts, a political program was needed to win back the civil population, one that would protect them from communist violence and reprisals, and “match force with force”<sup>32</sup> (which he explains in his analysis of communist methods): “[T]he Communists go far beyond political indoctrination. Once they have a fanatically dedicated minority, they begin the application of systematic terror to ensure that the masses of the people will be brought under, and kept under, complete Communist control.”<sup>33</sup> Lindsay, like the French theorists of *guerre révolutionnaire*, also observes that government and adversary alike “must try to organize the civil population into a tightly disciplined force, and, through propaganda and police activities, try to break the grip exercised by the adversary.”<sup>34</sup> In this battle, Lindsay, like many of his contemporaries, maintained that terror was the decisive lever of the insurgent, and that force must be met in kind: “[W]hen two forces are contending for the loyalty of, and

control over, the civilian population, the side which uses violent reprisals most aggressively will dominate most of the people, even though their sympathies may lie in the other direction.”

As in the army doctrine of the 1960s, Lindsay prescribes a counter-terror that is selective, and indeed morally discriminating, punishing only the “guilty.” But the basic premise remains that terror is effective: The most violent reprisals *are* indeed the most effective weapon in *gaining control* over the population. Lindsay—and other Cold Warriors—pegged their analysis to the effectiveness of *communist* terror, which, they argued, had to be met in kind.

The emphasis on selectivity was a principal qualifier in writing by American counterinsurgents—and American allies—that served to legitimize terror. The standard argument was that American terror would be used only to suppress or preempt a greater systematic terror—understood to be intrinsic to the communist system. The utilitarian terror of the counterinsurgent was a means to an end, an unpleasant solution to a greater problem. For the counterinsurgent apologists, terror was like Drano, nasty stuff for clearing drains, to be used only when necessary. This approach was taken by Douglas Pike, the director of U.S. psychological warfare programs in Vietnam, and considered the leading American authority on “terror” during the Vietnam War.<sup>35</sup> In his widely read booklet *The Vietcong Strategy of Terror*, he acknowledged that terror is not unknown to our side, but

*there is an essential difference in such acts between the two sides, one of outcome or result.... [T]error is integral in all the communist tactics and programs and communists could not rid themselves of it even if they wanted to. Meanwhile, [our] side firmly believes, even though its members do not always behave accordingly,*

| *that there is a vested interest in abstaining from such acts.*<sup>36</sup>

The army's emphasis on selectivity raises one question: How can standard operating procedures of U.S. forces—or of their protégés abroad—quantify an “acceptable” measure of terror in domestic affairs (if such a measure exists)? The difficulty of drawing the line on terror tactics once they have been initiated is illustrated in the 1966 *Army Handbook of Counterinsurgency Guidelines*. Expert counterinsurgents who were requested to prepare a model program to defeat insurgency in “Centralia” were limited by three constraints:

1. You must select those objectives most likely to successfully counter the insurgency while leaving your government in power....
2. You may not employ mass counter-terror (as opposed to selective counter—terror) against the civilian population, i.e., genocide is not an alternative.
3. You must maintain, to the greatest extent possible, production on the area's plantations, because continuation of this production is vital to Centralia's economy.<sup>37</sup>

But where does one draw the line between selective terror and genocide?

## **Terror as a Practical Discipline**

Some of the most explicit instruction in the American techniques of terror are provided in the U.S. Army's training materials on psychological warfare. The Department of the Army's two-volume reference work on psychological warfare, Army Pamphlet 525-7-1 (April 1976), brings together a vast

collection of psy-ops lore, including descriptions of classic counterterror techniques and analyses of the practical application of terror. Some of the more dramatic terror techniques described are attributed to General Edward Lansdale. Further insight into the practice of psy-ops terror can be found in the private papers of General Lansdale.

Some of the classic counterterror “pranks” outlined in DA Pam 525-7-1 are described by Lansdale as examples of the use of humorous “pranks” in psychological warfare. Lansdale’s accounts are particularly disturbing for the gratification he takes in describing macabre tactical psy-war (terrorist) techniques. The lesson for the Philippine army, of course, was that the murder and mutilation of prisoners, if carried out for psychological effect, was a legitimate tactic in a dirty war. Lansdale believed, above all, that the ends justified the means, and that risks were to be taken; and his psy-war tactics continue to be taught.

One common tactic attributed to Lansdale, the “Eye of God,” dated from his experience in the Philippines in the 1950s, but found application in the 1960s in Vietnam. The method varied from aircraft equipped with loudspeakers, through which known guerrilla personnel would be addressed by name, to marking the homes of suspected insurgent sympathizers to show they were potential targets. For the latter method, Lansdale was inspired by “the ancient Egyptian practice of painting watchful guardian eyes over the tombs of the pharaohs. . . to scare away grave robbers”:[38](#)

*I made some sketches until I recaptured the essence of its forbidding look, and I handed over the final drawing to the Philippine Army with suggestions for its use. It was mainly useful in towns where some of the inhabitants were known to be helping the Huks secretly. The army*

*would warn these people that they were under suspicion. At night. . . a psywar team would creep into town and paint an eye on a wall facing the house of each suspect. The mysterious presence of these malevolent eyes the next morning had a sharply sobering effect.* [39](#)

A similar tactic emerged in Vietnam in the early 1960s and was more overtly an instrument of official terror: those marked with the “Eye of God” were the victims or potential victims of army “death squads.” The United States Information Services (USIS) obliged with the necessary printing services. A description of the operation, dubbed Operation BLACK EYE, appears in a September 1966 Department of the Army study (Army Pamphlet 550-104). The 1966 account suggests a modus operandi remarkably similar to one only then emerging in the repertoire of Central American “death squads,” where the “eye” would be substituted with the mark of a “white hand” on the doors of suspected dissidents:

*Selected Vietnamese troops were organized into terror squads and assigned the task of working with rural agents in penetrating Viet Cong— held areas. Within a short time Viet Cong leaders—key members of the clandestine infrastructure—began to die mysteriously and violently in their beds. On each of the bodies was a piece of paper printed with a grotesque human eye. The appearance of “the eye” soon represented a serious threat. The paper eyes, 50,000 copies of which were printed by the U.S. Information Service in Saigon, turned up not only on corpses but as warnings on the doors of houses suspected of occasionally harboring Viet Cong agents. The eyes came to mean that “big brother is watching you.” The mere presence of “the eye” induced members of the Viet Cong to sleep anywhere but in their own beds. It was an eerie, uncertain threat.* [40](#)



The 1966 army study cited Operation BLACK EYE as an example of the “phrasing of a threat” in psychological warfare. The tactic, in contrast to the emphasis on specific targeting in Ed Lansdale’s examples, exemplified “generalized or uncertain threat” intended to disconcert the populace at large:

*The generalized threats do not delineate behavior or specify demands and consequences; these are left to the imagination of the threatened individual. Uncertain threats are used to create terror among the populace.... The threatener captures attention at a point when persons under stress are desperately searching to eliminate uncertainty and ambiguity. He may suggest escape routes and alternatives, and make compliance demands which are readily accepted in order to eliminate the uncertainty of the threat and reduce terror. Occasionally, terrorists do not even seek compliance to specific demands, but rather hope to cause “flight” or psychological and morale breakdown of a population.<sup>41</sup>*

The study also observed that generalized terror “seems to have limited effectiveness over a period of time,” reaching “a point of diminishing returns” when the population either “breaks” or “focuses hostility on some objective it perceives, correctly or not, as the source of threat.”<sup>42</sup> In the absence of Filipino vampires—the medium of another Lansdale gambit—the army origin of the threat (if not the USIS role) in Vietnam’s Operation BLACK EYE presumably became common knowledge rather promptly.

One “practical” risk of dirty war, whether “black” psy-war tactics or the too—public proliferation of torture and murder, is that the use of these tactics neutralizes any conceivable effort to win hearts and minds, while the influence exerted through sheer terror alone is limited in time and scope. In

practice, a scenario in which an army patrol enters a village, interrogates suspects under torture, and then distributes chewing gum and shows civil affairs films is not that far-fetched—variations have occurred from the Philippines in the 1950s to Central America in the 1990s. Some of the more astute French *guerre révolutionnaire* theorists have recognized the problem. Galula, in his study *Counterinsurgency Warfare*, suggests a way out through speed and specialization. The counter-insurgent operation to wipe out the guerrilla infrastructure in a civil population “can not fail to have unpleasant aspects” and so should be undertaken by forces unassociated with the normal pacification forces. Although Galula does not define “elimination” as murder, the formula might be interpreted as a rationale for covert “death squads”:[43](#)

*[E]limination of the agents must be achieved quickly and decisively. But who can ever guarantee that mistakes will not be made.... All these reasons demand that the operation be conducted by professionals, by an organization that must in no way be confused with the counterinsurgent personnel working to win the support of the population.*

But how to disassociate the various parts of the whole? The Galula formula, like Colonel Lansdale’s penchant for playing on superstition, overestimates the gullibility of the civil population. Colonel Lansdale, moreover, fails even to address the problem of army identification with “counterterrorism,” while advocating unbridled innovation in tactical psy-war methods that need not stop short at selective, exemplary violence and murder in the development of tactical psy-war ideas.

## **Counterorganization for Counterinsurgency**

The concept of counterorganization, like counterterror, ostensibly mimics communist insurgent methods.<sup>44</sup> The counterterror concept is simplicity itself, that is, the ends justify the means: Fire is best fought by fire. Counterorganization, in contrast, was a concept rather more complex. The colonial (or neocolonial) antecedents of U.S. counterterror doctrine can be found in the use of terror by colonial regimes and invading armies: There was an essential conviction that the punitive violence and terror of “occupying” powers was effective. The antecedents of counterorganization could be more openly acknowledged. A range of options based on historical experience could be set out with less dissimulation by the counterinsurgency planner.

Counterorganization along insurgent lines was composed of three distinct elements. Voluntary civilian counterguerrilla irregulars were most frequently employed in counterterror, and were able to mimic and match local guerrilla forces. Elite Special Forces—style commandos were to be organized to match elite guerrilla forces and to organize and lead indigenous irregulars. The third element was an incorporation of the (ostensibly passive) population into local, defensive forces through which they could be isolated—and alienated—from the insurgents. All components of the new counterinsurgency apparatus were to be tied together through improved, centralized intelligence and command structures.

Although the potential of U.S. forces was stressed, the objective in counterinsurgency was to assist the host country’s own nationals to wage the war with the insurgents. Counterorganization provided a blue-print through which the local civilian population could be integrated into the host country effort. Civilians could be organized into elite covert strike forces using “guerrilla” tactics, into

paramilitary formations performing static guard duty, or vast organizations combining political and paramilitary aspects. Participation could be voluntary or obligatory, enforced by a range of coercive alternatives. The doctrine provided for the mobilization of sympathetic social sectors on the counterinsurgent's behalf and an organizational basis through which a neutral—or suspect—population could be regimented and controlled. The military definition of “paramilitary”—forces or groups “distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission”—was itself rather vague.<sup>45</sup> In practical usage, it came to apply to everything from home guard—style militias to the counterguerrilla “death squad.”

Organizational methods drew on the United States' past experience as an occupying power and in situations comparable to modern guerrilla—counterguerrilla warfare: the American Revolution, the Indian wars, the Civil War and the perennial wars of expansion and intervention into Mexico, Central America, and the Pacific. The lessons learned were capped by the army's experience as executor of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations during World War II and its aftermath in Greece, Korea, and the Philippines. Counterorganization planners drew also on the experience of the other great powers, from the colonial experiences of France and Britain to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, where modern armies were confronted with the largest guerrilla partisan movement in history.<sup>46</sup> The adoption of Special Forces and CIA paramilitary tactics for counterinsurgency brought with it the organizational formulae applied to offensive “guerrilla-style” operations in the first decades of the Cold War.

The influence of U.S. doctrine on military organization could be observed in the internal security systems of allied

counterinsurgency states around the world, from South Vietnam to the Philippines to Central America.<sup>47</sup> The doctrine also provided for its implementation by allied governments:

*Even when the military forces of the host country are not organized in accord with the United States military system, the doctrine developed and tested by United States agencies can prove useful in many of the world's nations. The Chiefs of Mission and brigade commanders should encourage the military chiefs of the host country to adopt organizations similar to those that have been proven to be efficient in countering guerrilla forces.*<sup>48</sup>

## **The Elite Option**

Although the Special Forces were the army's preeminent specialists in paramilitary, sabotage, and terror operations, until 1961 these forces served primarily as a manpower pool for covert operations directed by the CIA. Since the first proposals for military training in unconventional warfare in the 1940s, which coincided with the CIA's development as a *military* (although technically, paramilitary) agency, there were predictable territorial disputes between the CIA and the military. The CIA's institutional clashes with the armed forces were particularly acute at the time of the creation of the psychological warfare and Special Forces establishment at Fort Bragg, over the presumption of CIA chiefs that the agency in effect constituted a fourth (and autonomous) military service.<sup>49</sup> (A perhaps obvious suggestion that the armed forces *should* have a fourth, unconventional branch has since then been a perennial but persistent nonstarter.)

While the Kennedy administration sought to bring the armed forces more fully into control of the unconventional

side of war, which hitherto had been left to the CIA, there was no actual shift in general responsibilities for the waging of special warfare. Although the military would provide the manpower, its special warfare adepts would in the majority of cases be on detached duty, under CIA operational control.

An alternative to increased reliance on (and resources for) special operations forces as a multipurpose resource would have been to recognize the Special Forces for what they are: elite warriors, not masters of hearts and minds. To do so might have relieved some of the conventional military establishment's concerns over the Special Forces' role as an elite, political corps (a problem exacerbated by their association with the CIA). Commandos and elites (like the French *Paras*) are less menacing when used as a tool applied to circumscribed operation—rather than administrators of open-ended political programs—with as little scope for deliberation possible. This was not to be the case. Counterinsurgency in the 1960s was to rely largely on elite forces and the CIA's paramilitary specialists: the covert gravy train of semiprivate contractors, reservists, and temporary duty specialists in the guise of mercenaries. The aim was to attain the tactical objective, regardless of political complexities. This concentration of counterinsurgency responsibilities with special operations forces would be reaffirmed and increased in the 1980s, and it continues unchallenged on into the 1990s.

The Special Forces were the guerrilla and counter guerrilla model. Their primary tasks were to “train, advise and provide operational support to Special Forces units of the host country,” and, with them or unilaterally, to organize, train, advise, and support paramilitary forces. The Vietnam role of Special Forces, adapted from earlier operations in Laos, established the prototype: They were “primarily committed to providing training, operational advice, and

assistance to indigenous paramilitary forces” [50](#) while also providing manpower for covert cross-border operations—’  
◆special operations”—into Laos and Cambodia, and for the Project DELTA counterguerrilla force.[51](#) Confidence in the potential of Special Forces—style units to “turn around” a sticky situation waxed and waned as counterinsurgency moved in and out and again into fashion from the 1960s to the 1990s.

In the 1960s, Special Forces doctrine, like the larger counterinsurgency doctrine, emphasized a combination of military and political dimensions. The political dimension in both was secondary. Although the need to teach “political skills” was stressed,[52](#) the counterinsurgents remained stuck—like other advocates of special warfare to date—in a mindset whereby political “skills” of dissimulation, cosmetic artifice, and manipulation take the place of meaningful governance or reform. The political dimension of insurgency was viewed as a challenge to be met through mimicry and neutralized through the multipurpose skills and tactics of psychological warfare. Fundamentally, this (still-current) approach requires only the cosmetic skills to make the counterinsurgent less obnoxious at the local level (and tolerant of imperfect allies): language training, cultural awareness courses, and rudimentary sociology. The political aspect was reduced to interpersonal skills, tactics, and strategies that could be adapted to any scenario.

The practical use of Special Forces’ political skills was in their organization of local civilian counterguerrilla irregulars. These forces and their immediate families were the primary object of their limited “hearts and minds” effort.[53](#) To a large extent, however, in Vietnam and elsewhere, Special Forces and their local allies acted as unilateral U.S. assets oblivious to the larger political dimensions of counterinsurgency

(beyond those essential to keeping their particular units viable).

The Special Forces' emphasis on the shadowy, sharp, and deadly side of counterinsurgency at the expense of its civil dimension was neither widely observed nor the object of particular criticism. The fiction that Special Forces can be both Rambo-style warriors and sensitive development workers who can diagnose and defuse internal unrest through civic action has yet to be dispelled. Some of the counterinsurgent theorists of the late 1960s even suggested an increased deployment of Special Forces as strictly tactical antipersonnel forces, jettisoning even the theoretical responsibility for "hearts and minds" work with the population. In a 1967 Hudson Institute paper, Raymond Gastil proposes a new look at defeating insurgencies with "small numbers of troops with low firepower," and suggests using "elite Special Forces—type units which operate like guerrillas." Ideally, "such units might be completely free from responsibilities to protect anything or to train or help anybody. Their mission might be only to find, destroy, or capture enemy units and their logistics."[54](#)

Gastil suggests two alternatives for the integration of special units into the overall counterinsurgency program. The more conventional one would have the forces "develop contacts with the people, or some people," providing medical or food aid (described as "simple civic action projects") as a means of inducing them to cooperate with local intelligence sources. This approach, however, was seen as coming "dangerously close to taking on responsibility for the defense of the local people," resulting in "the perhaps overly static employment of Special Forces which has characterized Vietnam."[55](#) In practice, Special Forces responsibilities for the protection of local populations in Vietnam were limited almost exclusively to the defense of



the Montagnard communities that provided their irregular troops and adjoined their fortified camps.

Gastil's preferred alternative is for Special Forces to serve as a lethal shadow force that drifts through the contested territory, "keeping out of the sight of the people as much as possible." Gastil posits the counterguerrilla strike force as a somehow aloof and antiseptic monitor at the grass roots that, without difficulty or compunction, would identify and eliminate the guerrillas. The political, or public relations, dimension of counterinsurgency disappears altogether, much as in the 1980s operational doctrine of low-intensity conflict. Better training, logistics, provisions for rest periods, and traditional American "professionalism" would give the special units the edge over the insurgents and the preferably neutral population. In Gastil's scenario, "elite units would treat the local people with respect, but be friends to no one. If necessary, they might occasionally demand intelligence from the people as might seem a natural prerogative of an armed band."

Isolating U.S. forces from the corruption and intrigues of the host country, moreover, was seen as an advantage to their taking over a major role in "pacification." Gastil observes that the South Vietnamese army had "always been poor at pacification and fairly good in major battles, and I think this may characterize many developing nations.... The national forces of underdeveloped countries are often poorly or irregularly paid, and have traditions of general exploitation." The elite American formula, consequently, is the easy alternative to cleaning up the host country forces. By Gastil's analysis, Americans are, for the most part, professional and impersonal in war: "American troops are well— paid, and do not need to exploit the local people, *except perhaps sexually.*"<sup>56</sup>

## **The Paramilitary Option: Controlling the Counterorganization**

The counterorganization formula required civilian irregular forces, placed under the command and control of the regular armed forces. Guidelines on command, control, and recruitment were intended to ensure that the civilians armed and organized for counterinsurgency would not ultimately turn against their sponsors. The recruitment base was a prime consideration: The counterinsurgent sought recruits among social sectors that could be trusted. American doctrine (like that of the French and British) stressed the selection of locals known to be loyal to the government; military reservists and veterans were considered most preferable.

Regarding paramilitary organization, American doctrine since the advent of the Cold War had always reflected a traditional military distrust of armed civilians, of any ilk. The paramilitary TEA battalions of Cold War Greece, the counterguerrillas of the Philippines, and the diverse paramilitary formations of Latin America since 1961 all used active and reserve military personnel to control civilian irregulars. In Colombia, where the irregular forces are an integral part of the national defense establishment, officers or NCOs command and train paramilitary units.<sup>[58](#)</sup>

Once recruits passed security checks, their training was to cover three areas: combat tactics, regional defense tactics, and “psychological indoctrination”<sup>[59](#)</sup>—if only to ensure that they did not go renegade and become indistinguishable from subversive guerrillas. Paramilitary commanders were to be chosen from prominent locals, “whose loyalty [to the host government] is unquestionable.”<sup>[60](#)</sup> Forces required for an offensive role as counterguerrillas had to meet special

criteria. Counterguerrillas were expected to have local knowledge of the territory and special skills associated with carrying out guerrilla operations. Equally important for the counterguerrilla, however, was motivation. Recruits preferably had either a preexistent motivation to join the counterinsurgent effort or a disposition to *become* motivated, whether by financial incentives, long-standing ethnic, religious, or class antagonisms, or other inducements.

After 1966, field manuals distinguished between *paramilitary* forces, which included nationally organized but locally based self-defense forces, and *irregular* forces, which were smaller, composed from a more select recruitment base, more motivated, and more adaptable to offensive deployment.<sup>61</sup> The paramilitary/irregular distinction continues to be drawn in 1980s manuals: The 1981 manual on *Command, Control, and Support of Special Forces Operations* (FM 31—22) discusses advisory assistance for “host country” paramilitary and irregular forces.<sup>62</sup> Despite the nominal distinction, either could serve as the nuclei of offensive coun—terguerrilla, counterterrorist forces.

The 1967 *Stability Operations* manual (FM 31-23) characterized irregulars as being organized from groups or agglomerates that generally already exist and can be co-opted, such as “political parties, trade unions, fraternal organizations, and isolated ethnic minority groups.”<sup>63</sup> “Tribal groups,” in particular, were found to be particularly useful “for limited tactical operations, such as patrolling, trail watching, border surveillance, and... ambushing and raiding insurgent forces and bases.”<sup>64</sup> Special reference was made to the necessity of central control of “irregular” forces, precisely because of their tendency to operate outside normal lines of command:

*Irregular forces are not standardized and their structures generally parallel those of the multiple groups from which they are formed. In view of the many types of organizations represented in irregular forces and [their] varied capabilities the training, assignment, and supervision of these forces must be centralized to prevent confusion, duplication of effort, and their possible misuse.*<sup>65</sup>

As with other forces, command and control, ideally, was to be bolstered, “whenever feasible,” by the recruitment of “former military, paramilitary, and police personnel... to form cadres for these units.” The system required, however, a delegation of considerable authority “at the lowest levels”: “When situated in remote areas, hamlet, tribal, or village chiefs normally command these forces. Broad, general missions are assigned by HG [host country] authorities and operations are coordinated within... the Area Coordination Center.”<sup>66</sup> A caveat on decentralized control, however, contrasts the advantages of using homogeneous, close-knit social groups as irregulars with the dangers of infiltration:

*In conducting their operations, irregular forces must be particularly security conscious.... [M]any of these forces are organized around societal groups which have been targets for insurgent penetration.... On the other hand, since members of irregular forces usually are more closely united through common group interests, they can more effectively detect and prevent subversion and espionage than can armed or paramilitary forces. For the same reason they are in an excellent position to collect information regarding local insurgent activities.*<sup>67</sup>

The manual, however, overlooked another possibility: that a social group incorporated wholesale into a counterinsurgency campaign— whether a political group or

a tribal community—may opt to pursue its own interests by defecting *en masse* or otherwise following its own agenda in the conduct of its counterinsurgency campaigning.

The primacy of control was a lesson well learned from the experiences of colonial powers. Although the French in Indochina had some success with essentially mercenary tribal irregulars, and in Algeria with Muslim auxiliaries, the limitations of this kind of counterorganization were also duly noted by American counterinsurgents.<sup>68</sup> The French propensity to recruit anyone from gangsters to warlords led in 1956 to an arrangement in Algeria with Muslim leader Bel Haj—"Kobus"—who was to operate as a "counterguerrilla" at the head of his own force, initially of 200 and later 600 men. Known as "Force K" (for Kobus), the unit was organized for clandestine operations through the head of the Special Administrative Section at Lamartine.<sup>69</sup> Initially backed by 100 paratroopers as operational support and guarantors of good behavior,"<sup>70</sup> Force K was largely on its own in an area southwest of Algiers after August 1957. Although Force K was considered a cost-effective force that could compete with the National Liberation Front (FLN) in its limited area, its political reliability was less than satisfactory. Two years after its formation, on 28 April 1958, Kobus and his principal lieutenants were murdered, and most of the force went over to the FLN (some 145 men escaped and returned to the French side).<sup>71</sup>

Another Muslim leader, Mohammed Bellounis, at the head of over 3,000 men, was recruited in May 1957 to provide the French with intelligence and fight the FLN in the southern Atlas Mountains in exchange for arms and supplies.<sup>72</sup> The force, designated the "Southern Algerian Commandos," was highly rated as a means to fight the FLN on its own terms. Although in January 1958 Bellounis was honored with the

rank of “Brigadier General” (much like the leader of Saigon’s Binh Xuyen), the agreement began to fall apart that spring of 1958 as Bellounis pursued his own agenda, renaming the force the “National Army of the Algerian People.” In July 1958, a French army offensive dispersed the “National Army.” Although hundreds were killed, the majority appear to have gone over to the FLN, along with some 1,500 rifles. Mohammed Bellounis was captured alive by the French but was “shot while trying to escape.”<sup>73</sup>

The lesson learned by American analysts was that local counter guerrilla forces could be effective in “fighting fire with fire” and in dominating sparsely populated areas, but that political unreliability could neutralize any advantages they might offer: Marine Corps analyst Lt. Col. John McCuen concluded in his 1966 study, however, that with adequate safeguards, groups such as those raised in Algeria could represent significant assets:

*The military and political potential demonstrated... seems sufficiently important in the domination of underpopulated areas that the governing authorities should devise some effective means of political control. A cardinal rule is that close military and political supervision must be maintained.... The leadership for counter-guerrillas must be carefully chosen for their proven reliability....*<sup>74</sup>

The 1960s organization of U. S.-led Montagnard irregulars in South Vietnam did not depart dramatically from the French pattern. The constitutional fragility of such arrangements, too, was reconfirmed in the series of revolts by the Montagnard forces.

## **Counterorganization for “Self-Defense”**

The premise that revolutionary insurgents won support through terror and intimidation logically encouraged a “self-defense” dimension to counterinsurgency. A stated rationale of counterorganization was that local people, if armed and organized, would play a major part in defending themselves from guerrilla depredations.<sup>75</sup> This remains a feature of the doctrine of counterinsurgency. The 1984 report of the Kissinger Commission on Central America reaffirms as a basic tenet of U.S. doctrine that “local popular militias must be formed throughout the country (with whatever minimal training is feasible and with only the simplest weapons) to prevent the insurgents from using terror to extract obedience.”<sup>76</sup> (That local units of El Salvador’s government militia, the Civil Defense groups, came to be known popularly in many areas as “death squads” for using “terror to extract obedience” in precisely the manner ascribed to the *other* guerrillas goes unaddressed in the commission report.) A more recent joint-services study also stresses “the importance of building self-defense forces,” and that any U.S. doctrine should adequately reflect “the role of civil defense issues and the requirement to involve the population in its own defense.”<sup>77</sup>

The “self-defense” rationale is certainly unquestionable in situations where an adversary does in fact prey on the general population. This, however, has rarely been the case. Because simply arming the masses was generally ruled out, given the very nature of insurgency, a fallback position was to arm a *segment* of the population—those minority sectors that could be readily mobilized and discretely controlled. Although the “self-defense” principle has been cited in many counterinsurgency states as the rationale for paramilitary organization, the grass-roots, community wide systems of self-defense were the exception rather than the rule. The organization and arming of “the people” was

inconceivable to elites dedicated to keeping the people at bay. The armed and motivated paramilitary forces were generally composed of social sectors quite distinct from the mass of the population. For elite and other minority sectors, there was often a very real element of “self-defense” involved.

The counterguerrilla, the friendly guerrilla to combat subversive guerrillas, was often distinguished in doctrine and practice from organizations set up on a home guard or political militia basis. The May 1961 field manual *Operations Against Irregular Forces* (FM 31—15), for example, distinguishes between local civil self-defense units—for strictly defensive purposes—and “friendly guerrilla units” with which to wage guerrilla offensives.<sup>78</sup> Maximum use was to be made of “local individuals... sympathetic to the friendly cause” and subject to “suitable screening to satisfy security requirements.”<sup>79</sup> Those with “experience or training as soldiers, police, or guerrillas, should be organized into auxiliary police, and village self-defense units,” while counterguerrilla guerrillas “may be effectively employed in extended combat patrol harassing missions.”<sup>80</sup>

The 1963 manual on *US Army Counterinsurgency Forces* (FM 31-22) distinguished between “Self Defense Units,” “normally... the primary paramilitary force” charged with local security, and “Civil Defense Groups,” which were to play the counterinsurgent role. The two groups differed in their “origin, status, and method of management and support”; the latter were recruited from “primitive tribes in distant and remote areas, people in rural areas, minority ethnic groups, and miscellaneous groups such as workmen’s militia, youth organizations and female auxiliaries.” Special attention was given to the utility of “primitive tribal groups” as resources for “hunter-killer teams.”<sup>81</sup> Another manual, the 1963 Special Warfare School *Guide for Counter-*



*Insurgency Planning* (Special Text, ST 31-176), retains the self—defense/civil defense distinction, although both are envisioned as carrying out limited offensive actions; in practice, the distinction, and the “self-defense” role itself, often went by the board.

ST 31-176 was one of the key counterinsurgency training papers of the 1960s.<sup>82</sup> The Colombian army’s 1969 counterguerrilla combat manual cites ST 31-176 in a syllabus of counterinsurgency texts and incorporates similar detailed recommendations on how to “organize the civil population militarily, so that it can protect itself against the actions of the guerrillas and support the combat operations.”<sup>83</sup> Counterorganization included civil defense networks on a national scale, with local contingents responsible for counterguerrilla action where necessary and prepared for other emergency situations such as natural disasters. The self-defense group (*junta de auto-defensa*) was described as “an organization of a military nature made up of select civilian personnel from the combat zone who are trained and equipped to carry out actions against groups of guerrillas.”<sup>84</sup> In line with the advice of U.S. Army Special Forces chief General Yarborough, preventative action was part of the Colombians’ counterinsurgency brief: Groups could “be organized in areas in which no problems of violence have arisen [so as] to prevent the formation of armed groups, or where insurgent groups have been destroyed... to repulse them should they reappear.”<sup>85</sup>

## **Forbidden Zones**

The norms of unconventional warfare and prescriptions for special organization were sometimes invoked in accord with a concept of forbidden zones or “remote areas.” McCuen’s *Art of Counter-Revolutionary War* suggests rough and ready

“guerrilla” organizations were particularly appropriate in sparsely populated areas.<sup>86</sup> U.S. doctrine by the mid-1960s defined “remote areas as those remote from government control, as well as areas that are geographically remote—mountains, swamps, or border areas. The 1967 *Stability Operations* field manual (FM 31-23) distinguished “remote areas as particularly appropriate theaters for operations for Special Forces-style units and civilian irregulars working with them—an approach consistent with the then-current experience of Special Forces work with minorities in Vietnam.<sup>87</sup> The objective is described in unconventional warfare terms as organizing “resistance” to the insurgency:

*The remote area campaign is undertaken in contested areas to establish HG [Host Country] strongholds or in areas under partial insurgent control. These areas usually are populated by ethnic, religious, or other isolated minority groups; however, remote area campaigns may be conducted in areas devoid of civilian populations. Remote area operations are conducted by specially trained and selected units.*

Special Forces—type host country forces—or U.S. Army Special Forces operating unilaterally—are recommended as the principal means of conducting operations, with offensive stages defined in terms similar to those of the 1965 Special Forces standing orders (see p. 227).<sup>88</sup> Having established a secure base, the force goes about successively “destroying, dispersing or clearing insurgent tactical forces from the area; neutralizing or destroying the insurgent infrastructure; and establishing or re-establishing the government.”<sup>89</sup>

The remote area formula depends ultimately on singling out a section of the local population to be organized and turned against the insurgent. The tactical force required was to be recruited typically from “tribal, religious, racial, or

political minorities. “<sup>90</sup> In Vietnam, border and mountain areas were inhabited by indigenous peoples available for cooptation, while other ethnic and religious minorities provided a recruitment pool for civilian irregulars elsewhere in the country. Throughout the Vietnam War, much of the country could to an extent have been considered remote areas. The political ramifications of minority recruiting for unconventional operations went undiscussed in the 1967—and later—manuals:

*Success of a given... operation is more assured if there is a segment of the resident population willing to support the remote area program.... Operations can best be undertaken in areas under insurgent control if the remote area force contains personnel indigenous to the operational area who can influence the local population.*<sup>91</sup>

A final variation on the remote area concept, adapted from the experience of the European colonial powers, was the designation of certain areas as “forbidden zones or no-go areas.”<sup>92</sup> These were to incorporate elements of counterorganization and to serve as theaters for unrestricted unconventional warfare. McCuen defines the concept as involving the clearance of an area of civilians, systematic population control to prevent their return, and the subsequent deployment of mobile counter guerrilla forces with “complete freedom of action”; without having “to worry about killing or wounding innocent people. . . [government forces] can destroy anything that moves.”<sup>93</sup> A 1965 field manual refers to areas “typified by a population that openly supplies and willingly supports the insurgent.” These were subject to clearance through fear alone, what Vietnam planners called “generating” refugees:

*They are called free areas to indicate that free use may be made of aerial bombs, artillery, and other ordnance on targets of opportunity.... [Psyopsi themes should inform the population that guerrilla activity is the cause of their hardship. Stress should be placed on the desirability of relocating to government-controlled areas.]*<sup>94</sup>

The clearance of a zone could also be selective, with those left in place vetted for political loyalty and integrated into irregular paramilitary formations. Population groups could be relocated in order to isolate those “of doubtful sympathy” and to create a “friendly population buffer” of civilians “sympathetic to host country and U.S. forces.”<sup>95</sup> Loyalists relocated to the contested area could then provide friendly “self-defense” forces.<sup>96</sup> Guatemala in the 1980s again serves to illustrate the full potential of U.S. doctrine: Large expanses of the highland areas of the northwest were designated forbidden zones for the Indian population during the first years of the decade; the government systematically cleared them out by either killing or confining them, or driving them across the border into Mexico. The consolidation phase of the operation was characterized by the creation of “friendly population buffers.” Peasants from other regions were brought into depopulated areas and authorized to take over the abandoned lands and communities of the former inhabitants—in return for political support and participation in “civilian self—defense patrols.”<sup>97</sup>

## **Arming Some of the People**

Counter guerrilla forces, as distinguished from those dedicated to static defense, would be the elite of the counterorganization. As a rule they would be recruited from

social sectors set apart from the majority by economic privilege, ideological disposition, religion, race, or ethnic origin. They would either be predisposed to react against communist insurgency, receptive to American indoctrination, or simply mercenary.

How to assess and mobilize the human resources available to be turned against the adversary? The 1967 *Stability Operations* manual suggests that the social sciences hold the key to counterorganization and stresses the deep religious, ethnic, and other divisions (“cleavages”) to be found in most “developing countries”: “[A]n attempt must be made to isolate the actual or potential ‘units of cleavage’ which are to be found in the country under survey. Generally, the vulnerabilities which develop from population cleavages arise from suspicion, rivalry, and antagonism on an intergroup level.”<sup>98</sup> That done, the counterinsurgent must then guard against the insurgent’s own exploitation of existing divisions while himself adapting social tensions to counterinsurgent purpose.

Counterorganization often involved the more reactionary social sectors that felt threatened by the insurgency (or by the social, racial, or religious group identified with the insurgency) and needed little encouragement to exercise violence against their social adversaries. In numerous counterinsurgency states, the composition of the counterorganizations—the political groups, local elites, religious or ethnic minorities who took on special tasks and powers—served to exacerbate the violence of government operations. Counterorganization could serve to ignite simmering passions of class, race, religion, or ideology, and turn the energies released to counterinsurgent purpose (with the consequent intercommunal violence sometimes spinning out of control). The combination of counterterror

with counterorganization could result in enormous levels of violence.

In theory, the counterorganization was often defined explicitly as appealing naturally to local elites—or those who enjoy the good life. Even in situations such as in Vietnam, where rural elites showed little disposition to put their own lives on the line, American planners saw the ideal counterorganization as elite—based, with “counterterror” as its natural function. A secret June 1964 directive on combined U. S./Government of South Vietnam pacification efforts laid down the counterorganization objective for eight critical provinces:

*The first priority after the military have cleared an area is to bring about the selection of an able man for that area, who will in turn go about creating a basically civilian counter—terrorist organization on the precinct level precinct” is the smallest practicable political subdivision, just above the block or the apartment house in numbers of people. Selected military, paramilitary and governmental persons must support this organization. It will be created from among the young elite which exists everywhere; those who have a stake in the community because they have a family, own a house or a piece of land, are ambitious to get ahead in business, profession or politics.*

In practice, however, South Vietnam’s local militia forces were rarely elite-based. The principal offensive counterterrorist organizations of Vietnam were typically composed of members of ethnic and religious minorities, reinforced by members of Saigon’s criminal underworld.<sup>[100](#)</sup> Ideally, the counterorganization was to have been manned by right-thinking patriots eager to fight back against the communists; reality was often quite different. A booklet for

Vietnamese “cadre” of the American “Rural Reconstruction” program outlines operational guidelines through which “action cells” were to set up village self-defense militias.<sup>101</sup> Cadre were to conduct “secret investigations to select good elements” as militia leaders: individuals who were free of corruption, above political suspicion, physically fit, and “bearing hatred against the communists out of personal spite or interest.”<sup>102</sup>

The American elite, or “petty-elite,” formula is remarkably similar to that made by French *guerre révolutionnaire* theorist Roger Trinquier in his *Modern Warfare*:

*First, we designate an energetic and intelligent man in each city who will, with one or more reliable assistants, build the projected organization with a minimum of help from the authorities... . The designated leader divides the city into districts... [and] sub—districts.... The essential quality of a potential sub-district leader is that he have firm attachments in the sub—district (a business or shop, affluence, a large family).<sup>103</sup>*

Trinquier’s formula for counterorganization did not depend exclusively on the well-to-do: The counterinsurgent could appeal equally, and with perhaps greater success, to fortune-seekers eager to improve their lot. Rather than being drawn from an elite class, militias often recruited the outcasts, the d❖class❖, the lumpenproletariat:

*We need cadres first, and they are easy to find.... They are doubtless more attracted to the benefits they expect than by our country itself, but this attachment can be unflagging if we are resolved to accept it and are firm in our intentions and objectives. We know also that, in troubled periods, self-interest and ambition have always*

*been powerful incentives for dynamic individuals who want to move out of their rut and get somewhere.* [104](#)

In Trinquier's plan, the government would organize cadres within receptive sectors of the population, while forcibly subduing the majority through intimidation: "We will limit ourselves to forming an active elite and introducing it as leaven into the mass to produce action at the desired moment."[105](#) The formula could be applied either in counterinsurgency or in unconventional warfare. It required recruits who were not motivated by high idealism, but rather by the sheer desire to get ahead in life.



# Chapter 11: Tactical Totalitarianism

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## Population Control

The structures of counterorganization were sometimes established in concert with elaborate police measures outlined in doctrine under the rubric of population control. In the immediate postwar period, secret studies considered the legitimacy of the full range of tactics employed by the Germans in World War II, from hostage-taking to systems of safe-conduct passes.<sup>1</sup> The methods of population control prescribed in doctrine were gradually refined to eliminate the more blatantly criminal procedures (hostage-taking was eliminated from published texts rather late). The emphasis remained, however, on cutting the guerrilla off from popular support by methods that were virtually indistinguishable from those of the colonial powers, as set out in the 1961 FM 31-15:

*The close relationship between the civil population and the irregular force may demand enforcement of stringent control measures. In some cases it may be necessary to relocate entire villages, or to move individuals from outlying areas into population centers. It may be necessary to relocate those who cannot be protected from guerrilla attack, and those who are hostile and can evade control.*<sup>2</sup>

The same manual outlines territorial control measures by which town and country were to be parceled into clearly defined subdivisions, where “police-type measures” were to be implemented.<sup>3</sup> No-go areas (“restricted areas”) could be designated to protect lines of communication and critical installations.<sup>4</sup> It also recommended a block control system, similar to that used by the French in Algiers, which depended on a local counterorganization:

*Block control is the constant surveillance and reporting of personnel movements within a block or other small populated area.... a. Block control is established by dividing each block or like area into zones, each of which includes all the buildings on one side of a street within a block. A resident zone leader is appointed for each zone, and a separate resident block leader is appointed for each block. Heads of households and businesses in each zone are required to report all movements of people to the zone leader; [this is] to include arrivals and departures of their own families or employees, neighbors, and strangers.... b. The cooperation of leaders is secured by appealing to patriotic motives, by pay, or through coercion. C. Informants are established separately within each block to submit reports as a check against the appointed block and zone leaders.*<sup>5</sup>

“Controls and restrictions” included bans on political meetings, registration of all residents, regular inspection of identity documents and passes, restrictions on movement, curfews, censorship, and control of “the production, storage, and distribution of foodstuffs and protection of food producing areas... [and the] possession of arms, ammunition, demolitions, drugs, medicines, and money.”<sup>6</sup> Enforcement of the control measures was to be carried out through patrolling, roadblocks, search and seizure operations, and the organization of informant nets at the

neighborhood level. These basic ingredients—control of identity, residency, movement, organization, communications, and commodities—remain elements of population control in counterinsurgency in the 1990s.<sup>7</sup>

The basic elements of population control could be adapted to the various scenarios of counterinsurgency. The relocation of vast numbers of suspect Vietnamese from contested areas was undertaken both through structured resettlement programs and efforts to deliberately “generate” refugees. General William C. Westmoreland described the strategy to clear the suspect population from the countryside in 1965 as a response to “a substantial majority of the population remaining neutral.” The escalation of the air and land war was calculated to

*bring about a moment of decision for the peasant farmer. He will have to choose if he stays alive. Until now the peasant farmer has had three alternatives: he could stay put.... He could move to an area under government control. Or he could join the VC. Now if he stays put there are additional dangers.... If the peasant becomes a refugee he does get shelter, food, and security.*<sup>8</sup>

By 1972, almost a third of South Vietnam’s 17 million people had fled to the refugee camps and cities.”

U.S. doctrine also called for psychological operations as part and parcel of population control. Operations were at minimum to be “designed to influence the attitude and behavior of the civilian population in favor of operations against the insurgents.”<sup>10</sup> Psy-war efforts did not extend to the organization of comprehensive indoctrination programs for the uprooted Vietnamese, however, perhaps reflecting what a RAND Corporation author called “the typically short-

term U.S. approach.”<sup>11</sup> In practical terms, mass indoctrination of captive populations was hardly the United States’ forte: Although the captive populations were available and the idea was acceptable, full-scale psy-war required a kind of long-term commitment at odds with the U.S. counterinsurgent’s conviction that a rapid solution to internal war could be achieved through simple means.

A corollary to the argument that guerrillas won support through terrorism and organizational skills was that governments fell prey to insurgency through no fault of their own. Roger Hilsman, a principal State Department theorist of counterinsurgency during the Kennedy years, for example, emphasized that the guerrilla’s “need for popular support” could be satisfied largely through coercion (a view based in part on his own experience as a “guerrilla” in Burma). Guerrillas achieved support through their methodology, and not because “a government was either popular or unpopular”; thus, the guerrilla could not be defeated by making the government popular, but only through a shrewd combination of political organization and military and police tactics.<sup>12</sup>

U.S. doctrine on the political dimension of counterorganization differed little from that of the French, although it was the French who practiced the concept most comprehensively. The operative premise was that a suspect or disaffected population could be brought to heel through a combination of indoctrination and the right organizational forms. If the revolutionary guerrilla could oblige collaboration, then so could the counterguerrilla. As Roger Trinquier wrote in his *Modern Warfare*, the way to influence the population was to organize them in support of your own cause:

*the conduct of modern warfare requires close collaboration with the population. We must first assure ourselves of its support. Experience has demonstrated that it is by no means necessary to enjoy the sympathy of the majority of the people to obtain their backing; most are amorphous, indifferent.*<sup>13</sup>

The French used the full range of techniques of psychological warfare on the civilian population in Algeria, with the *regroupement* as a locus for intensive ideological indoctrination—a measure unimaginable to American counterinsurgents in the 1960s. U.S.-backed counterorganization in Guatemala in the 1980s and 1990s, however, approximates or exceeds the totalitarian nature of the Algerian campaign. French psy-war was geared toward four aims: counter the effect of enemy propaganda on their own forces; attack the enemy's political network; aid in the destruction of enemy forces; and, most extraordinary, to organize and reeducate the suspect population as a whole—which involved the relocation of at least one million Algerians.

In a 1960 analysis, American historian Peter Paret warned of the extremes to which psychological manipulation and indoctrination—whoever its proponents—can lead, stressing the development of psychological warfare by wartime Germany, and its use by the Chinese and North Koreans on Americans.<sup>14</sup> Paret argues that French psy-war tactics which... have achieved some degree of *success* in Algeria, seem at first sight unexceptionable, and indeed rather matter-of-fact. However, experience shows that their implementation has brought physical and psychological brutality in its wake. By this is not meant occasional indiscipline in the field, which is unavoidable in war, but institutionalized terror, employed above all in two areas: interrogation and reeducation.<sup>15</sup>

In a critique that could well be directed in the 1990s at Guatemala's militarized Indian highlands and "model villages," or Peru's Andean "Emergency Zones," Paret warns that the psy-war programs directed at discrete population sectors tend to have a far broader effect. Torture in particular, is characterized as symptomatic of psychological warfare when waged against a captive population, and costly to the institutions responsible for its use. Given the French's habitual use of torture in Algiers, Paret asks whether "the doctrine of psychological warfare, developed by the European and Asian totalitarian systems, and now in the ascendant in France, does not—all disclaimers to the contrary—necessarily entail torture." Paret concludes that inflicting "various forms of maltreatment" on a civilian population brings with it a breakdown of relationships of respect and authority "far beyond the small, isolated groups of specialists... until they finally infect the entire society in whose name they are employed."<sup>16</sup>

## **A Counsel of Caution**

The mirror-image approach to insurgency was not accepted without some challenge. Some of the more eminent American commentators on the developing counterinsurgency program addressed fallacies underlying the "counterterror" formulation and warned of the practical and political costs that would go with its adoption. Chalmers Johnson in a 1962 article, refutes the arguments of the French theorists of *guerre révolutionnaire* and Americans like Korean War psy-war specialist Virgil Ney that "the principal tactic employed by [insurgents] in 'conquering' the population is *terrorism*," or that "counterterrorism" is an effective response:

*An emphasis upon guerrilla terrorization of an allegedly passive population leads directly to policy failures. It is supposed that successful counter guerrilla operations involve the use of specially trained commandos who are, in effect, authorized to counter-terrorize the same population....*

*Unfortunately, neither Mr. Ney nor French Army writers can point to a single case in which the principle of counter-terrorization has been effective in ending a guerrilla war. [17](#)*

In discussing the role of guerrilla terror in garnering *support*—an essential premise of counterterror—the experience of revolutionary guerrilla movements can be contrasted with that of U.S. Army “guerrilla” leaders of behind-the-lines forces during World War II. In Burma, for example, U.S. Army analysts concluded that a successful “guerrilla” effort was possible with the support only of a small ethnic minority, the Kachins, representing less than 1() percent of the population. Similar operations based on the co-optation of ethnic minorities would be put into operation in Laos and South Vietnam. The World War II concept of induced guerrilla warfare would provide an analytical model consistent with the U.S. Cold War doctrine that assumed all communist guerrillas were Soviet-backed agents taking over a hitherto passive population. But, Johnson notes, actual examples of guerrillas winning support through coercion are rare:

*There are, to my knowledge, no cases in which guerrilla operations have been successfully based solely on intimidation of the population. When guerrillas resort to indiscriminate terrorism, this indicates they do not have broad mass support, without which their movement flounders. Only a losing or degenerate guerrilla force will*

*risk the loss of all mass supports by forcing civilian cooperation at gunpoint.*<sup>18</sup>

Having challenged the premise that *guerillas* win support through terror, Johnson concludes that “counterterror” was not effective either in achieving submission or in winning loyalty: The United States’ village-burning and depopulation in the Philippines at the turn of the century, the German occupation in the U. S. S.R., and the Japanese in China during World War II are cited as cases in point.<sup>19</sup> State terror, he adds, may tend to generate resistance rather than quell it: “[O]ne can conclude... that anti-guerrilla terrorism will more than likely *spread* the mass mobilization upon which guerrilla movements thrive....”<sup>20</sup>

Other theorists agreed that indiscriminate state terror could backfire. Although they distinguished between selective and nonselective counterterror, they argued that state terror was precisely what guerrilla leaders hoped to provoke. In a 1962 article, J. K. Zawodny observes:

*[T]he greatest contribution of guerrillas and saboteurs lies in catalyzing and intensifying counter- terror.... This is what sophisticated political leaders of guerrillas may expect. There is no better way to alienate a regime in power from the population than to incite it to apply nonselective terror. Guerrillas and saboteurs serve this purpose eminently.*<sup>21</sup>

Mass counterterror is described as the cement of resistance: When people’s lives are threatened without regard for their allegiances, their guilt or innocence, active resistance ensues. Zawodny argues:

*The rate of recruitment is directly related to the intensity of terror applied by the enemy in suppressing*



*the movement. Any counter-terror by the enemy brings to the ranks of the unconventional fighters new recruits who are escaping from the reprisals or who wish revenge.... Unless the guerrillas are also using terror against the population, the more terror the enemy applies, the more fighters he produces.*<sup>22</sup>

Other American writers warned of the moral and political costs implicit in methods of counterinsurgency and psychological warfare involving terror and coercion, and they challenged the assertion that internal war had become indistinguishable from the larger Cold War. Paret, for example, argues: "Although modern war has blurred the dividing lines between internal and external operations, these still exist."<sup>23</sup> And like some British theorists, Paret finds upholding the rule of law (at home and abroad) a tactical and strategic imperative, what he calls "the boomerang effect of extreme coercion" was cause enough for the Western powers to "stick to more conventional psychological weapons."<sup>24</sup> Paret complains:

*[I]t cannot be overlooked that techniques of extreme moral and physical coercion... may help defeat certain types of opposition, but it is hard to see how their widespread employment could fail to modify and eventually destroy such institutions as the rule of law on which a free society is based.*<sup>25</sup>

Paret disputes the French army argument that they did not *choose* terror tactics but were obliged to meet the enemy on his own terms (the same rationale for U.S. counterterrorism): "[O]bviously, subversion and psychological aggression cannot be stopped by machine-guns, on the other hand, while it is sometimes necessary to fight on ground picked by the enemy, no one is ever forced to use the enemy's weapons."<sup>26</sup>

The French, like the Americans, Vietnamese, Guatemalans, Indonesians, and others to come, refused to accept the fact that by adopting the tactics of the enemy, they were essentially no different. The distinction between the two sides, they insisted, lay in their respective intentions. Paret observes:

*Psychological warfare officers argue... that an essential difference exists between the aim of their operations and those of their opponents, and that this difference makes the similarity of methods unimportant. As a favorite axiom has it, form and content of psychological warfare —le contenant et la contenue—are distinct and must not be confused.*<sup>[27](#)</sup>

Or as Douglas Pike, head of psychological warfare in Vietnam,<sup>[28](#)</sup> claims in his booklet *The Vietcong Strategy of Terror*, terror is not unknown on our side, but “there is an essential difference in such acts between the two sides, one of outcome or result.”

Critics of U. S. doctrine also examined the tendency of policymakers to evade responsibility for terror and ignore its consequences. An essay coauthored by the French Indochina expert Bernard Fall, a bitter critic of National Liberation Front terror, and Marcus Raskin eloquently rebutted claims that American terror was somehow accidental (so-called collateral terror), indirect (executed at one remove, by its allies), or in any manner excusable:<sup>[29](#)</sup>

*Now that American units are actively engaged in combat in Viet-Nam, it is specious and immoral to argue that this is not “their” war and that they are not responsible for the indiscriminate killing or maiming of civilians.... This applies equally to the use of torture and other forceful*

*means of interrogation, and the deliberate killing of captured combatants.* [30](#)

Although the United States announced in 1965 that the norms of the Geneva Conventions would be adhered to in Vietnam, Fall and Raskin note that in fact they were not.[31](#) Furthermore, they found the detachment with which American managers ran the war ominous: “There is another point to the sadism and torture. Bureaucracies may involve themselves in such matters almost antiseptically. That is a dangerous trend in government.”[32](#)

One of the British advisers to the U. S. effort in Vietnam, Sir Robert G. K. Thompson, also warned that terrorist methods of counterinsurgency were ultimately self-defeating.[33](#) For Thompson, effective counterinsurgency depended on the legitimacy of the institutions involved; the role of the counterinsurgent was primarily one of law enforcement. The laws could be as harsh as necessary, “but... each new law must be effective and fairly applied.”[34](#) In Malaya, he notes, where stringent laws and restrictions were enacted to deter support of the insurgents, the laws “were seen by the population to be effective and were applied equally to all. The population knew what the law was, and because the government itself functioned in accordance with the law... the population could be required to fulfil its own obligation to obey the laws.”[35](#)

Thompson insists that both the public and the counterinsurgent must remain within the limits of the law. The shortcut of extralegality is, in Thompson’s view, a shortcut to disaster:

*There is a very strong temptation in dealing both with terrorism and with guerrilla actions for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the*

*processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for an insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot expect its people to obey the law. Functioning in accordance with the law is a very small price to pay in return for the advantage of being the government.*<sup>36</sup>

But wherein lies the legitimacy of the *foreign* counterinsurgent? The British, like the French and the Portuguese, were fighting insurgencies on territories they claimed as their own and administered on their own authority. U.S. forces were nominally “guests” of counterinsurgency states, while pursuing the same ends as their colonialist counterparts. Some of the contrasts—and similarities—of the counterinsurgency doctrines of the European powers and the new U.S. doctrine were, as a consequence, inescapable.

## **The Decolonization Conundrum**

A main thrust of the United States’ post-World War II activism was to devise new means to influence the governments that emerged as the old empires were dismantled. The approach to policing the internal affairs in its expanding spheres of influence departed both from the United States’ own policy of intervention from 1898 until 1945, as well as from the Imperialism of the European powers. Although it incorporated many of the same tactics and principles employed by the European colonial powers, essential and not always pernicious elements of the colonial

equation were absent from U.S. Cold War foreign policy. Lip service was paid to democratic principles, while laws and civil institutions were neglected and conventional armies were frantically raised, as if foreign administration could only be supplanted by strong local armies subject to covert manipulation. The emphasis was on order, not law, and the means to that end was not law but military force.

The Cold War provided the international framework and ideological rationale for the new U. S. role. Counterinsurgency doctrine would provide a substitute for the Europeans' imperial policies and an alternative to repetition of the United States' own neocolonial experience in the Philippines and Latin America before World War II. U. S. doctrine presumed that in a world of limitless menace, internal disorder reflected external aggression, and so legitimized an unlimited response. The unilateralism of colonialism would yield to joint action on the invitation of "host" governments, thereby relieving the United States of responsibility for actions taken. The ease with which intervention and illegal action could be plausibly denied, or hived off on the indigenous "host," encouraged its proliferation.

Because the United States was ostensibly a partner in counterinsurgency, not its unilateral executor, it could not adopt wholecloth the approach of the colonial counterinsurgent. The partnership arrangement had certain advantages over overt colonial domination: It permitted executive military action that the political restraints of the United States' democratic system would not have permitted under other circumstances. It also masked U. S. colonialist interests under the guise of neighborliness, and so maintained the United States' image at home as the international good guy, as well as the new international legal order that served as a shining lamp of U. S. postwar

policies. Finally, the partnership arrangement cleared the United States of responsibility—or, more correctly, accountability—for actions undertaken jointly with the host government, or unilaterally in all but name.

But as merely a concerned neighbor, the United States could not take overt military action to subjugate the indigenous population as a whole, bring to trial and hang subversives, engage in mass deportations, relocations, or punitive expeditions in its own name—that is, undertake the kind of restrictions and transformations that were the very stuff of colonial policy. Nor could the United States fall back on the law of the land to either guide or justify its actions, because the law was not actually theirs to lay down or to enforce. Indeed, the law of each host government differed dramatically in the countries where the United States became involved.

It was above all this matter of law that distinguished the United States as enforcer of order from its colonial counterparts. U.S. policy provided no consistent framework of law on which to peg the means and end of counterinsurgency—because, unlike a colonial regime, the United States did not presume to govern, or to legislate, but only to advise. While it is true that the law of the colonial powers was that of the conqueror, it nonetheless provided the context within which public order was maintained—a powerful lever for its enforcement—and it stated the objective of counterinsurgency operations: upholding the legal order (not to be confused with justice or democracy). Some observers saw an advantage to the forthright, if brutal, colonial approach. A U.S. officer, writing on the French theory of *guerre révolutionnaire*, commented that it was particularly problematic that most guerrilla wars would “be conducted inside the border of another sovereign state. The French, at least, were in the position of a colonial power

with initial access to the area and some degree of administrative control.”<sup>37</sup> Most American observers, however, have preferred to wage counterinsurgency at arm’s length.

The United States’ alternative to blatant colonialism was an assortment of military tactics that were (and are) seemingly lawless, though couched in the ambiguities of democratization. While U.S. assistance was aimed at enforcing the host country’s laws, it was not considered necessary or appropriate to assess, influence, or attach primary importance to the nature of the laws. The law was a matter for the host government; the tactics and norms of counterinsurgency were presumed applicable anywhere, by virtually any government. The rule of law in the new counterinsurgency was secondary to the immediate task, the restoration of order; in American doctrinal writing, law was often described as a barrier to action. The substitute for the imperial promise of order and progress was the American promise of democracy, development, and prosperity. Both promises offered assurances that privilege and repression today would inevitably lead to equality, peace, and prosperity tomorrow. But while the colonial approach was predicated on a long-term view linking the fortunes of the colonized and the colonizers, for the U. S. counterinsurgent, quelling disorder was merely a sideshow to a larger conflict, a cool exercise in geopolitics.

Unlike the European colonial warriors of the past who went clear-eyed into campaigns of subjugation, U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine allowed for intervention only in an international context, in the name of freedom, and, ultimately, self-determination. Thus, counterinsurgency doctrine was conceptually incompatible with the repression of the authentic *levée en mass* (rising in mass) or the lesser, spontaneous expression of genuine grievances. Douglas Pike

illustrates the problem in *Vietcong*, his 1966 study of Vietnam's NLF organization. Pike's explanation that "revolutionary guerrilla warfare should not be confused with older concepts of a similar nature" was necessary to make intervention consistent with U.S. goals, and exemplifies the mindset that informed all aspects of U. S. intervention abroad. Here, he elaborates on the distinction:

*[T]he object was not the ordinary violent social protest, nor the usual revolutionary stirrings NVC have seen develop around the world with which we sympathize because they reflect inadequate living standards or oppressive and corrupt governments. Revolutionary guerrilla warfare was quite different. It was an imported product, revolution from the outside; its stock in trade, the grievance, was often artificially created; its goal of liberation, a deception.* [38](#)

On the other hand, U. S. counterinsurgency doctrines, unlike their colonial predecessors, at least acknowledged a difference between disjointed, short-lived revolts and national upheavals such as the Chinese Revolution. ON the doctrinal level, the consideration of ideology and an appropriate *political* response suggests an awareness that the TICW revolutionary insurgency was indeed more than a matter of tactics and maneuver, as in the small wars of the past. This attention to the primacy of politics contrasted with the colonial powers' brute suppression of their subject peoples through coercive violence. U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine introduced the idea that *success was contingent upon winning the support of the people in the very process of their suppression.*

The counterinsurgency recipe mixed moral and material ingredients: "Moral support" was seen in the same quantitative terms as was material assistance. Specialized



manpower units and technological packages were available for any situation. A moral deficiency in counterinsurgency campaigning could be dealt with by the injection of X number of “Civic Action” and “Civil Affairs” teams among the target population; and psychological operations would deal, too, with the *morale* factor among the armed forces—and the population back home.

United States’ doctrine provided little guidance for the confrontation of the third category of colonial law enforcement: the suppression of intercommunal violence not directed against the government. On the contrary, as noted in the previous chapter, intercommunal differences were exploitable. Intercommunal violence would not be suppressed, or sublimated, but stimulated and fumed to counterinsurgent purpose. The cost of fueling the fires of communal violence for short- term advantage in Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Latin America will be outlined below.

## **The Problem of Administration**

Just as the rule of law is a keystone of political legitimacy, a functioning administrative system provides a necessary foundation for the rule of law. Both would appear essential to the successful pursuit of counterinsurgency. A comparative study of British counterinsurgency in Malaya and U.S. counterinsurgency in Vietnam by Robert Komer found that inadequate administration crippled U. S. counterinsurgency efforts. Komer, himself an arch-administrator of U.S. counterinsurgency, concurred with British critics that a key drawback to the U.S. side of the Vietnam War was the “sheer lack of adequate administration to carry out [counterinsurgency] programs under a firm rule of law. “ He attributed this failing to the United States’

strange partnership with the government of South Vietnam.<sup>39</sup> Komer also lamented that the unified British/Malayan “management” of civil and military affairs alike—“on a scale of which the United States never even sought in Vietnam”— provided an enormous advantage to the counterinsurgents.<sup>40</sup>

Although U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and programs adopted many of the same techniques and premises of the contemporary colonial doctrines of the French and British, American counterinsurgents like John Paul Vann, Edward Lansdale, and Charles Bohannon frequently expressed their distaste for overt colonialism. Colonial counterinsurgents, unlike the Americans, they maintained, were concerned not with “democracy” but only with order. To achieve this, they introduced measures affecting whole populations—like the British “resettlement” (virtual incarceration) of the Malayan Chinese—which the Americans found “totalitarian.” A March 1964 U.S. Overseas Mission paper from Vietnam credits Gerald Templar with calling the British counterinsurgency effort in Malaya “‘a war for the hearts and minds of men’... perhaps cynically, if one considers some of his actions. “4’

Bohannon’s boss in Southeast Asia, Edward Lansdale, is also on the record as critical of the long-haul, hands-on British approach to pacification. The army history of the early years in Vietnam, for example noted that in 1960, Lansdale, the Pentagon’s “principal expert on guerrilla warfare,” summarily rejected the British approach to insurgency in Malaya.<sup>42</sup> Malaya was different, yes, but Lansdale’s principal objection apparently was not to the totalitarian aspect of certain British methods (including their scale of application) but to the amount of time it involved. The British and Malaysians “had been fighting the Communists for eight years at a cost which the Vietnamese government could hardly afford,” wrote Lansdale, whereas

the United States could manage matters better (and presumably faster and more economically) on their own, putting into practice “the lessons we learned in the recent past.” While insisting that “a sound political basis first” was of fundamental importance to counterinsurgency, his prescription to that end sounded rather less than democratic. To establish the “sound political basis” would, in Lansdale’s words, “require something *extra* and *special* by both Vietnam and the United States.”<sup>43</sup> Colonel Lansdale’s “special” approach to Vietnam in the 1950s had been to prop up President Ngo Dinh Diem, as well as a range of cloak- and-dagger schemes that did a great deal to abort any prospect of political development. In the 1960s, Lansdale remained an advocate of swift, decisive action of an unconventional nature.

In another 1964 paper from a Vietnam posting, Charles Bohannon takes issue with colonial methods of counterinsurgency as totalitarian and potentially counterproductive: “Mass arrests, wholesale searches, and other seemingly easy methods of ‘population control’ can only strengthen opposition to the government.” Like Lansdale, however, Bohannon seems more concerned with logistical difficulties of total suppression, rather than its moral ramifications: “Only unabashedly totalitarian governments, Communist or colonialist, with relatively unlimited resources, can seriously think of, or attempt, killing or capturing most of the insurgents and their supports.”<sup>44</sup>

The alternative to totalitarian methods is a shortcut, made possible by democratic principles and the strategic application of force. The colonial approach is distinguished from the American largely in terms of the American presumption of a democratic consensus on the legitimacy of

laws, on the guilt and punishment of malefactors, and the benevolent role of government. Bohannan writes:

*As said before, government can legitimately act only against those who seek its overthrow (or violate laws clearly approved by the people). Even then, especially in political matters, and especially in Southeast Asia, forgiveness for those who repent is usually the wiser justice. Former VC supporters in an area under pacification should not be punished for past offenses, (unless these are common crimes where proof of guilt satisfactory to the community is available) nor should they be deprived of the protection and benefits of the government.*<sup>45</sup>

Democratic fairness, as opposed to colonial oppression, in Bohannan's view, should result in the attenuation of the bulk of opposition. Only the clearly guilty would remain to be eliminated through means of appropriate ruthlessness: "[N]inety per cent of the infrastructure will rot away. The remaining ten per cent will be exposed by intelligence actions, and legally (or, occasionally, covertly and extralegally) eliminated" (emphasis added).<sup>46</sup>

The American critique of colonialist counterinsurgency theory was perhaps fueled equally by the twin attitudes of impatience and "can-do" confidence. A corollary to the "can-do" ethos was the conviction that an ad hoc approach to counterinsurgent problem-solving was more practical than the institutional approach of the colonial administrator. In their 1961 book on counterinsurgency, Bohannan and Valeriano suggest that the formalities of the colonial administration of counterinsurgency were effective only in uniquely colonial circumstances:

*The British have evolved a system... of formal committees, chaired by the civilian executive, including military, police, and intelligence chiefs of the area, augmented by civilians. This is undoubtedly effective under the conditions of respect for law and mutual trust found in their territories. In many parts of the world, such a set-up would be almost a guarantee of delay and ineffectiveness.*[47](#)

The American alternative cited by Bohannan and Valeriano—what could be called the “Magsaysay solution”—was to rely on the discretion of good leaders. The American approach was based on a kind of market force theory of individual initiative and inspiration: The combination of the efforts of creative-minded counterinsurgents would naturally succeed through the very justness of the American cause. Things would work themselves out without cumbersome institutional regulation. Given the tactical options and the prescribed range of forces, as well as the counterinsurgents’ dual political/military role, the tactical operation and the administrative program could be left to the men on the ground. Bohannan and Valeriano conclude:

*Who does what, and how the activities are organized (in counter guerrilla or guerrilla warfare), is far less important than understanding the mission and being determined to accomplish it by means not inconsistent with the mission. So long as a sufficient number understand the mission and what it implies, seek to accomplish it with a dedication and an intelligence not substantially inferior to that of the enemy, and receive adequate political support, the counter guerrilla effort should not usually be difficult.*[48](#)

The influence of the “Magsaysay model” continued in Vietnam even after the demise of the Ngo brothers and

could be seen behind the United States' support of such vaguely charismatic pro- U.S. figures as El Salvador's Napoleon Duarte.

However, a 1965 USOM [Overseas Mission]/Vietnam discussion paper addressed the problem of implementing the Lansdale/Bohannon ideal of strong leadership and grass-roots brotherhood:

*No matter how desirable it might be to create a feeling of brotherhood and common purpose between the armed forces of Vietnam and the rural populace, the fact remains that such rapport does not yet exist and will not until the emergence of at least the simulacrum of "Magsaysay-type" leadership. In the meantime concepts of rural area defense often differ widely between the purely military-oriented armed forces and the civil-military oriented province chiefs. The military in a given action, concerned mainly with killing as many of the enemy as possible, is likely to give little consideration to the psychological impact of an action on surviving civilians.... The fact that today no rural area of Vietnam may be considered safe from devastating VN/U.S. military action, is considered a major hindrance to pacification.*<sup>49</sup>

The same rather plaintive note appears in other documentation from the civilian side of "pacification" in Vietnam, along with a recognition that strong leadership alone was not enough. Rufus Phillips, one of the more brilliant of the USOM/Vietnam "pacification" experts (and an unsung mentor to both Lansdale and Bohannon there), confirmed in a 1964 memorandum that the problem was not only the intransigence of the Vietnamese military, but of the U. S. military as well. Phillips found U. S. command headquarters at the corps and Saigon level to be bound by

“conventional military thinking”: The American command was guided by neither a British-style dedication to a political objective— however abusive the measures used to achieve it—nor any particular interest in the nonmilitary side of U.S. counterinsurgency. He noted: “Everybody talks about civic action and psychological warfare, but little command emphasis is placed on it and it is not understood. The major emphasis remains on ‘Killing Viet Cong’ and anything that gets in the way of killing Viet Cong. Unfortunately, the regular Vietnamese Army reflects the same tendencies.”<sup>50</sup> Counterinsurgency somehow combined both the arrogance of colonial power and the unlimited violence of modern warfare; the methods and firepower of a conventional war were combined with the strictly military side of the unconventional, without regard for the consequences.

Although authors Bohannon and Valeriano submit the Philippines as a model counterinsurgency, their strategy, of course, depended on having the *right man* on top and situations in which being *right* turned the tide. The planned and structured interchangeability of leadership in modern military, political, and other bureaucratic institutions is considered impractical for the “underdeveloped” world: The quick fix is achieved by selecting the *right men* and giving them nearly autocratic authority to act decisively. Their model leader, Ramón Magsaysay, “was not interested in organization or theory; he wanted, and he got, results.”<sup>51</sup> Perhaps surprisingly, this facet of the anticolonial argument returns us full circle to the nineteenth-century European doctrine of conquest. The great French theorist Lyautey, who enunciated the essential combination of force and politics in conquest and pacification, also stressed the role of the individual in such situations:

| *[I]f in the metropolis administrations that are traditionally organized function automatically, and could*

*at a stretch function without men—for a time—in the colonies, to the contrary, where the unexpected is the rule and where decisions are a daily necessity, one formula dominates all others, and that is the right man in the right place.*<sup>[52](#)</sup>

Lyautey, of course, had more in mind than leadership qualities: he specified that the “*right man*” must be chosen not by his status as a civilian or a military man but on the basis of “qualities that are both military and civilian, or, to be precise, administrative.” The *right man*, then, was an administrator of laws, not an autocrat who led by fiat.



# Chapter 12: The Problem of Ideology

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## **Ideology for Export**

The relation of ideology to war and conflict was an obsessive theme of the Cold War. The theorists tried to make ideology an operational weapon in the 1950s, through the medium of psychological warfare, and later through counterinsurgency. A 1952 summary of the objective of psychological warfare centered on measures to negate the enemy's ideology (or doctrine) and to inculcate one's own:

*First, to demoralize the enemy, i.e., to destroy his faith in his own side; second, to exdoctrinate him, if I may coin a word—to eradicate the doctrines in which he has been taught to believe by his own side; and third, if possible to indoctrinate him with positive doctrines which we wish him to possess.*<sup>1</sup>

The ideological dimension of the Cold War was a principal concern of the National Security Council's Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the Truman administration. The PSB, set up in April 1951 to be a "sort of a general staff to plan and supervise the cold war,"<sup>2</sup> was responsible for a program of what it called "Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare." However, the board's official definition of ideology demonstrated a characteristically American uncertainty about the very concept:

*Ideology: A system of ideas, whether consciously organized or not which explains various aspects of life, justifies the social structure, and provides a ready-made meaning for human existence.*

*Doctrinal (Ideological) Warfare: A planned attack against the basic hostile system conducted concurrently with a positive advocacy of basic Ideas of our own system.*<sup>3</sup>

The PSN was interested in studying past accomplishments in “doctrinal warfare” and the “methods employed by the Soviets, by the United States, and by other groups,” in order to determine “the most exploitable vulnerabilities” of the enemy ideology, while identifying elements of “American doctrine which can be most effectively exploited” to counter the “Lenin-Stalin ideology.”<sup>4</sup>

The problem in 1951, as well as in 1961, was making a coherent package of American “ideology,” as many Americans had never been particularly clear whether the American way was an economic circumstance or a philosophical ideal. As a 1983 *Military Review* article observed: “If asked what this country is all about, Americans will not answer ‘capitalism’ or express US interests in negative goals such as containment.”<sup>5</sup> An example of the casual or simply naive American approach to the force of ideology can be found in point one of Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge’s 1965 “Ten Point Program for Success” in pacification: “Saturate the minds of the people with some socially conscious and attractive ideology, which is susceptible of being carried out.”<sup>6</sup> A 1964 “think” piece from the U. S. mission in Vietnam suggests a similar approach; the ideology in question, moreover, was to be formulated as a direct response, a challenge, to that of the enemy: “The first action of a government faced by a

developed insurgency should be the establishment of a credo, a declaration of the government's purpose, which should at least cast doubt on the validity of the insurgents' announced causes."<sup>7</sup> How one shops for an ideology or how an ideology can be "carried out" defies explanation. Moreover, the Cold War uncertainty on the meaning of ideology (ours) was combined with a simplistic conviction that a "hostile" ideology (theirs) could be destroyed, leveled like a city:

*Doctrinal (ideological) warfare. . . exposes the basic vulnerabilities of the hostile system and exploits the beneficial or favorable aspects of one's own system. . . [T]he practitioner of ideological warfare should attempt to develop an acceptable ideological faith to replace the one he hopes to weaker' and destroy.*<sup>8</sup>

The French took the concept of ideological, or political, warfare to its logical extreme: For them, revolutionary warfare, being primarily ideological in nature, assumed the characteristics of total war. As General Nemo wrote in 1956: "There is no true war other than religious war."<sup>9</sup> Enemy ideology was a disease or an infestation; the cure was to be provided in reeducation camps, where prisoners were to be "disinfected by being educated clearly and objectively in the French ideology."<sup>10</sup> The importance of an attractive ideology to counter revolutionary warfare was a persistent theme in French writing on *guerre révolutionnaire*. Roger Trinquier, writing on the use of indigenous cadre, stressed the importance of mixing ideology with material rewards to make such service worth their while. Material self-interest was the prime motivator to be manipulated in organizing guerrilla/counterguerrilla forces from "dynamic individuals who want to . . . get somewhere."<sup>7</sup> But, he notes, counterorganization of the populace is more complex: One

must combine the people's immediate self-interest with ideals. The trick, then, is to identify a palatable ideal, "capable . . . of constituting adequate motivation for the assumption of necessary risks." <sup>12</sup>

Why, then, did the French fail to win the minds of the Algerians? Perhaps by their emphasis on short-term material gain, which overestimated the malleability of the target population (as well as the universal appeal of "French ideology"), while underestimating the drive of nationalism and revolutionary spirit. When journalist Joseph Kraft asked Algerian villagers at a meeting, "What made them think they were going to win?" a woman retorted: "We fight for principles. The French fight for the price of tomatoes." <sup>13</sup>

A similar advocacy of short-term, specially targeted incentives and tailor-made ideals appears in some of the Department of the Army's "German Report Series" on German antipartisan methods employed in the Soviet Union. The conclusion of *Rear Area Security in Russia* (1951) asks: "What then are the methods by which the indigenous population can be won over?" The answer is a counterpropaganda campaign based on a "thorough knowledge of the Bolshevik doctrines and methods." <sup>14</sup> The report advises that any ideological counteroffensive should be above all practical. The study contends that the "full confidence of the population . . . can be created by a sound, straightforward, and factual propaganda prepared and disseminated by individuals who are familiar with the Russian language, the population, and local living conditions." Tangible, immediate concerns are to be emphasized over lofty, abstract rhetoric. The study stresses that

| *[e]xtraneous ideas are to be avoided; whatever the people are told must be expressed in their own everyday*

*language, on their own intellectual level, and concerned with their own immediate problems.... The immediate aim must always be in the foreground; no more than a general outline should be given of the long-range goal.* [15](#)

The matter of ideology and wars of ideology was also addressed by Paul Linebarger, one of the U. S. Army's principal wartime theorists of psychological warfare, in his classic 1948 study *Psychological Warfare*. Linebarger maintained that the clash of ideologies in the past provided "a clue to the future," as the two world wars reflected "an increasing emphasis on ideology or political faith as driving forces behind warfare rather than the considerations of coldly calculated diplomacy."[16](#) The result is warfare that is "more serious, and less gentlemanly," with the loyalty of the soldier going beyond the army to something more abstract: "Warfare thus goes back to the Wars of Faith. " As a consequence, the analyst must reassess the past experience of religious wars "with a view to establishing those parts of their tested experience" that can be applied today: for example, "How fast can converts be made from the other side? How can heretics [today read: 'subversive elements'] be uprooted?"

The options in ideological war are reduced to two—conversion or annihilation—and two rules of long-range psychological warfare to this end are extrapolated from past experience for modern application. The first, quick and dirty, approach suggests the model of anticommunism subsequently adopted in many counterinsurgency states. The individual infected with the forbidden ideology either converts or dies, freedom of expression is curbed to throttle its proponents and halt the spread of infection. Linebarger even recommends a baptism of sorts that entails a test of potential converts' "faith":

*A people can be converted from one faith to the other if given the choice between conversion and extermination, stubborn individuals being rooted out. To effect the initial conversion, participation in the public ceremonies and formal language of the new faith must be required. Sustained counterintelligence must remain on the alert against backsliders, but formal acceptance will become genuine acceptance if all public media or expression are denied the vanquished faith.* [17](#)

An alternative, when “immediate, wholesale conversion” would require an inordinate use of military power, would be to reward the faithful. Grudging toleration of the “objectionable” faith is contrasted with genuine privileges for the “new, preferred faith.” The conquered people are not forced at gunpoint to change their ways, but “all participation in public life, whether political, cultural or economic, is conditioned on acceptance of the new faith.”[18](#)

Linebarger notes that the two approaches to ideological warfare were successfully applied by the Nazis. The root and branch, covert or die, approach was the instrument of the Nazi domination of Poland, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia; the longer-term system of reward and privilege was used in Holland, Belgium, Norway, and elsewhere in the West. [19](#) The two principles, according to Linebarger, were being applied “by present-day Marxists” and offered foolproof guidance for the West as well. Linebarger advocates the use of psy-war techniques—to mimic communist (and Nazi) tactics—because, he asserts, they reflect universal principles. His amoral, technocratic analysis, like that of later Cold War scholars, underrates the potential of the individual to resist even the most skillful and overwhelming campaign of psychological warfare (witness the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe): “If Christians, or democrats, or progressives—whatever free men may be called—are put in

a position of underprivilege and shame for their beliefs, and if the door is left open to voluntary conversion. . . the winning side will sooner or later convert almost everyone who is capable of making trouble. "[20](#)

The ideological framework of the Cold War continued to inform the doctrine of the 1960s and later years. The 1962 *Army Field Service Regulations: Operations* prefaced its chapter on "Unconventional Warfare" by noting, almost apologetically, that the "ideological nature of modern conflict gives an important role for [*sic*] all forms of war"; and that in the Cold War in particular "the struggle for influence over the minds of men makes unconventional warfare a key element . . . in achieving national objectives."[21](#)

Ideology as counter and commodity in foreign policy was to be a factor in all of the postwar administrations. In the 1960s and again in the 1980s, the use of ideology as a commodity was the lifeblood of foreign policy. Declassified documents on the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion for example, record discussions in which presidential speeches on democracy were proposed as feints to draw attention from the operation— or to justify it. At a 17 February 1961 planning meeting, when Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed concern that there would be a "charge of aggression" leveled at the United States, Kennedy "asked if there was anything he could do to develop a political position to support action, such as a speech on traditional liberalism in the Western Hemisphere."[22](#) Kennedy also asked his advisers "if there was any way the build up of jets and rockets in Cuba could be linked" to the Bay of Pigs operation foretelling the logic of the missile crisis in the fall of 1962.[23](#) In the 1980s the Reagan administration's ideological sales pitch was directed largely toward the U.S. public alone. The Grenada intervention, the shelling of

Lebanon, the bombing of Libya, the war in El Salvador, and the long-running unconventional war against Nicaragua were sold to this public wrapped in the flag of an ad man's ideology.

Ideology, as a marketable commodity for political capital, remained a factor in the policy and practice of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare from Vietnam to Central America and southern Africa. In the arena of conflict of the counterinsurgency states, however, the role of ideology was largely negative in character. Rather than attractive ideology, what was offered was anti-ideology: The carefully nurtured ideology of anticommunism would provide the motor of counterinsurgency and set the terms of foreign policy. This crusading aspect of anticommunism as a factor in international relations and internal affairs has already been discussed.

Ideology—anticommunism—played a particularly important role in motivating and controlling the diverse military and paramilitary structures of the counterinsurgency states. The Greek army's organization of civilian paramilitary forces during the Greek Civil War and afterward was notable as an early instance in which the United States supported a system that had political indoctrination in anticommunism as a primary task. Ideology served both to motivate recruits to combat communism through indoctrination (and collaterally, to further polarize the society) and to establish the criteria for screening recruits. In the 1960s, highly politicized paramilitary organizations would be set up in most of the counterinsurgency states receiving U.S. security assistance, from Vietnam to El Salvador.

Among the more bizarre spinoffs of American fascination with communist ideology and methodology were efforts to



introduce systems of “political commissars” into U.S.-backed counterinsurgency systems. Efforts centered on using ideology to counter a historical tendency of civilian paramilitary forces toward disaffection. A 1962 article by a U.S. naval officer cited “the Cuban Communist technique in militia formation” as a potential model, with its political dimension seen largely as a means to ensure central control over the population:

*The para-military forces . . . must fill the gap in the countryside, in remote villages or mountain settlements, between the conventional military and the people.... It must be carefully screened for enemy agents.... Let us not be shy or reticent in providing a political officer system in such an organization.*<sup>[24](#)</sup>

The same author elaborates on the mirror-image approach: “Every personal movement will be rigidly controlled.... [A]ll Iron Curtain countries use this system, developed by long years of internal police practice, and find it most effective. If they can do it, so can we, especially in one place, for one limited period.”<sup>[25](#)</sup>

A practical example of the “political commissar” approach in Vietnam was described in a *Military Review* article by Monte R. Bullard in 1969, which was anthologized in the Department of the Army’s 1976 handbook on psychological warfare.<sup>[26](#)</sup> Bullard describes the “political warfare (POLWAR) system” as “an organizational attempt to solve deep-rooted, noncombat military problems involving loyalty and civil-military relations”; its principal objectives, “to create and maintain an allegiance to the Republic of Vietnam or destroy the allegiance to North Vietnam.” He notes the system in Vietnam was set up by Nationalist Chinese advisers, although the original concept did “in fact, come from the Soviet political commissar system.”<sup>[27](#)</sup>

A team of Chinese specialists first gave courses in POLWAR to Vietnamese officers during a 1960 tour in Vietnam, and in 1964, American and Vietnamese officers studied the system in Taiwan. On their recommendation, a South Vietnamese POLWAR program was launched in October 1964 and directed by Chinese advisers in association with the new “POLWAR Division, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.”<sup>28</sup> Bullard acknowledges that some Americans were uncomfortable with the “mission of creating and maintaining loyalty of the RVNAF [Republic of (South) Vietnam Armed Forces] to their leaders and nation,” a function that went considerably beyond the conventional field of counterintelligence; however, he stresses the political role as “the most important function of the POLWAR system. It includes placing a POLWAR officer or staff in every military unit, school, training center and other military organization.”<sup>29</sup>

The South Vietnamese army already had considerable experience with politicization; the POLWAR system was intended to create an institution that would provide the levers for political monitoring and control of the troops without either the advantage of an “attractive” ideology or the disadvantage of a politically partisan military network. One of the principal bugbears of the American military in the early years in Vietnam was the interpenetration of the South Vietnamese army command and Diem’s Can Lao party—not through commissars, but through skewed recruitment and appointment policies. A commissar system loyal to an individual ruler, of course, has the potential to both politicize and corrupt a military institution, thus to convert an army into an effective arm of despotism. Vietnam scholar Gabriel Kolko observes:

*Nominally personalist in ideology, the Can Lao was a combination of private political machine and mafia, and*

*membership in it was a prerequisite to advancement to higher posts in the government and military... Can Lao members of the army were at times able to give orders to their nominal superiors.... The Can Lao also served as a secret police, modeled after the system the Japanese used in Vietnam during World War Two—which Diem had studied in detail.*<sup>30</sup>

The political task of the POLWAR cadre combined counterintelligence with anticommunist indoctrination, civil affairs with psy-war. Although its influence on the course of the war was nominal, its promotion represents a significant benchmark in the evolution of U.S. doctrine and an antecedent to the kind of political indoctrination, vetting, and purging of the armies and paramilitary forces of Central American counterinsurgency states in the 1980s and 1990s. The POLWAR officer was tasked with “providing the troops with a political or ideological direction through motivation and indoctrination programs [and] detecting and neutralizing individuals whose activities are prejudicial to the best interests of the unit,” while—somewhat incongruously—raising morale and building esprit. Outside the military, POLWAR was to monitor relations with civilians in operational areas and conduct psy-war activities.<sup>31</sup> The POLWAR officers at the unit level were backed by a noncom and “the POLWAR Fighter Organization . . . made up of one soldier from each squad in the unit, and formed into teams, one in each platoon,” through which the loyalty of all personnel was to be monitored for potential subversion or desertion.<sup>32</sup>

The Vietnam POLWAR system by 1969 was described as “so extensive that, sooner or later, every US advisor will come into contact with at least a part of it.”<sup>33</sup> The American advisers’ unease with POLWAR’s ideological indoctrination, monitoring, and control duties was perhaps predictable,

since Americans in general are uncomfortable with the very concept of ideology. The disturbingly totalitarian aspects of the POLWAR system bore little relation to the ideal of an “attractive” democratic ideology. But it was entirely in keeping with the counterinsurgency ethos of “anything goes.”

## **Ideology and Insurgency**

The marriage of the United States’ strategic theory to its reactionary Cold War ideology was matched at the operational level with an inability to recognize insurgency’s political element. The tactical side of counterinsurgency doctrine assigned little importance to the sociopolitical forces driving a people to insurrection. In pursuing a mirror-image response to insurgency, the doctrine largely disregarded insurgency’s ideological basis: The net result was an assortment of military tactics largely divorced from the political context of insurgency, with many of them prohibited by the rules of war.

The doctrine of the 1960s did introduce a political—and economic— dimension into counterinsurgency, but it did not fully acknowledge the ideological dimension and internal dynamics of *revolutionary* insurgency. And in practice, the purely military tactics of counterinsurgency overshadowed the United States’ myriad programs of economic development and advice on political reform. A 1984 critique of counterinsurgency doctrine by former Kennedy counterinsurgent Charles Maechling, Jr., contrasts the 1960s efforts to develop a broad-spectrum doctrine incorporating military, political, and economic factors with the more facile approach of the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Maechling argues that precisely because there was more to revolutionary guerrilla warfare than external intervention,

mere counterintervention using “guerrilla” tactics was clearly an inadequate response:

*There is no secret about the ingredients of guerrilla warfare—at the purely tactical level it so closely resembles its parent, irregular or partisan warfare, that to the uninstructed there seems to be no distinction between them. It is the injection of ideology into guerrilla operations that transforms partisan warfare into revolutionary war.*<sup>34</sup>

American military planners were not unaware that politics added new dimensions to insurgency, however. USMC Brig. Gen. Samuel B. Griffith had, for example, published the first translation of Mao Zedong on guerrilla warfare in the service journals in the 1950s and in book form in 1961. But Mao’s lessons never really stuck.<sup>35</sup> A 1962 article in U.S. Navy review was typical of specialist articles warning that guerrilla warfare “was different”:

The most basic characteristic of guerrilla war... is its political nature. It must not be confused with banditry, which is sometimes resembles superficially. It is warfare for political objectives, commonly revolutionary objectives. All war, of course, is political effort by means of armed force, but guerrilla war is more intensely political. <sup>36</sup>

Vietnam’s General Vo Nguyen Giap would have concurred, having observed that “bandit gangs have all the characteristics of a guerrilla army: homogeneity, respect for the leader, valour, knowledge of the ground, and, often, even good understanding of the tactics to be employed.... The only thing missing is support of the people; and, inevitably, these gangs are captured and exterminated by the public force.”<sup>37</sup> The same lesson of the political imperative of the self-starter guerrilla would be brought

home with the intermittent career of the United States' Nicaraguan unconventional warfare allies. Without overwhelming American support, the *contras* *threatened* to dissipate like the wind (or turn their firepower on the Hondurans); the lack of political cement a coherent political vision beyond "anticommunism" and "prodemocracy made the force little more than a party of bandits—or mercenaries. The threat in the spring of 1988 that, without American support, the contra chiefs would withdraw from the war was accepted philosophically by *contra* troops. There was, after all, little to the war for many beyond U.S. rhetoric and U.S. dollars. A *contra* fighter was quoted in 1988 as saying that "without leaders, we're just bands of raiders.... Leaders are what makes us an army. We have to follow their orders."<sup>38</sup>

### **As an Automaton to a Man**

The United States' emerging doctrine of counterinsurgency placed guerrilla warfare in the context of a *global* conflict, and assessed its nature and its strengths essentially on the basis of its tactical options and capabilities rather than substance. Mirror-image counterinsurgency warfare mimicked a model of guerrilla organization and tactics based largely on the United States' own experience in organizing guerrillas. The theorists of American unconventional warfare were either oblivious to, or disdainful of, both the revolutionary insurgent's popular support and his political will, as well as the need for clear objectives in any insurgency. The American guerrillas were simply conventional military forces no longer bound by conventional rules: like the commandos, skirmishers, and scouts that armies have fielded for centuries to perform tasks on the margins of military propriety.

The political dimension of insurgency could only be parodied by counterinsurgents; in fact, a basic premise of doctrine is that the ideology of insurgency is, at its core, a fraud perpetrated upon a malleable people. Counterinsurgency doctrine makes no allowance for “people’s” war, for the authentic *levee en masse*. For the American counterinsurgent there are ideological strictures that preclude U.S. involvement in such wars: Unlike the European colonial forces who unashamedly waged campaigns of conquest and subjugation, the doctrine requires the counterinsurgency to be waged in the name of freedom and even self-determination. The counterinsurgent is usually in a “host” country at the “invitation” of some national of that country, for the ostensible welfare of that country.

In conventional warfare, political authorities, military leaders, and a people can be identified as elements of military belligerency. The assessment of the opposing military forces, their moral and material strength, draws heavily on each of the factors. In counterinsurgency, the political and military leadership cannot always be distinguished, and misanalysis may be a consequence of ideological biases. Insofar as the war is *defined* as a small theater of the larger war with the Soviets (setting aside for the moment the Chinese), the “sovereign” government and the “military leader” are nowhere to be found except in Moscow. And while the counterinsurgency theorists do not write off the role of “the people” in insurgency, the people are reduced to puppets manipulated by outsiders. As such they are also presumed to be susceptible to manipulation by the counterinsurgent through the psychological warfare techniques of propaganda and indoctrination, through incentive programs, and through fear.

The waging of war, then, is aimed not only at forcing the submission of the people (understood as useful idiots), but at influencing their foreign masters. In the best-known case, the Vietnam conflict, the massive bombings aimed at obliging the North Vietnamese to “call off” the insurgent war in the South may have even dominated the strategy of MACV (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) if only in the cold arithmetic of ordnance employed. The nature of the conflict was misread in several ways, not least of which was the identification of an all powerful “sovereign” of the insurgency, whether the North Vietnamese politburo or the Kremlin. The recent debate in American military journals over whether the United States failed in Vietnam because it overemphasized the counterinsurgency war (failing to resolutely take the war to the “sovereign” in the North) or vice versa (failing to put its heart into the war against the guerrilla infrastructure in the hamlets) misses the point. Counterinsurgency doctrine assumes that insurgency is foreign-sponsored and can be stopped when that sponsorship is suspended (the Nicaraguan *contas*’ fragility in this respect is a case in point). The doctrine also, of course, prescribes an intensive war against the insurgents proper, to annihilate them. But unlike the efforts to influence the extraterritorial “sovereign,” to convince and compel the sponsor to call off the war, there is no negotiation with the insurgent proper. It is as if they were not parties to the conflict but only puppets.

The essential difference that distinguishes revolutionary insurgency from the simple tactics of guerrilla warfare has been recognized by some of the theoreticians of the U. S. security establishment. J. K. Zawodny warns that U. S. planners were unduly optimistic about the exportation of unconventional warfare.” He stresses that the strength of the phenomenon lay not in the range of its tactical options but its historical circumstances, and, more importantly, in its



utility for the masses: Unconventional warfare was used not by elite technicians of violence, but by ordinary people with extraordinary motivation. Zawodny explains:

*The outstanding feature of unconventional warfare is that it is carried out by people of all ages and backgrounds and of both sexes. It is a "People's Warfare. A warfare of masses who have lost patience, it is an unremittingly violent way of saying to the enemy by all possible means, "We hate you; we are everywhere; we will destroy you!" Unconventional warfare is the effective weapon of the weaker adversary.*<sup>39</sup>

Unconventional warfare doctrine attempted to provide a recipe for ready-made "people's war" for export.

The distinction between the "unconventional" operations of special units of regular armies and the unique characteristics of "people's war," however, has been a feature of classical military theory since the nineteenth century. The French theoretician Jean Frederic Auguste Le Mièrre de Covey observed the combined moral and material factors of the unconventional warfare of his time. Le Mièrre was the author of an 1823 study of partisan warfare, based on the Spanish guerrilla resistance to Napoleon's armies, and his own experience as a lieutenant in the young French Republic's quelling of the rebellion that broke out in the Vendee in 1793. Le Mièrre differed from his fellow officers in viewing the tactics of the Vendee as "essentially novel"—not "primitive and atavistic"—and urged their careful study (much as did Clausewitz), noting that "traditional military doctrine was of little use in combating the partisans. Who were the leaders of the Spanish guerrillas, who defeated the brave French generals in Spain? A miller, a doctor, a shepherd and curate and some deserters."<sup>40</sup>

Le Mière further pointed out the extraordinary circumstances that drove civilians to fierce resistance and “put great, perhaps decisive, emphasis on psychological factors” in this kind of warfare:

*That a guerrilla had to be courageous went without saying—once he was attacked he could not look back. Above all, guerilla warfare faut un peu de fanatisme [requires a little fanaticism], for this was a war of extermination; the enemy armies would use reprisals and treat the partisans as mere brigands. Though the author very much regretted this—for guerres d’opinion (ideological wars) had terrible consequences—he accepted this change in the character of war as an unalterable historical fact.*<sup>41</sup>

The critical role of psychological—or moral—factors in war has been recognized by other theorists of revolution and counterrevolution alike. In Karl von Clausewitz’s “Classifications of the Art of War,” war is broken down essentially into combats, and combat in turn to “a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter.” In his treatise *On War*, Clausewitz stresses the weight of moral strength: “Psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war”<sup>42</sup>

Clausewitz also looked carefully at the psychological factors in what was then termed “people’s war.” In “The People in Arms,” he writes: “In civilized parts of Europe, war by means of popular uprisings is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century. It has its advocates and its opponents. The latter object on political grounds, considering it as a means of revolution....”<sup>43</sup> Clausewitz warns that partisan war and “the people’s war” (which he points out are not quite the same) were innovations in war that could be ignored by the strategists of Europe only at their peril. People’s warfare

was to the Napoleonic wars what the “wars of liberation” were to the Cold War; Napoleon was seen to have harnessed the whirlwind of “people’s war.” Clausewitz’s brief chapter examines the phenomenon of popular insurrection as a force to be channeled for the purposes of national defense. His insights into the very stuff of popular insurrection, which he found to be a new force in his age, remains of value to the study of revolution—which is arguably a kind of national defense—and to the military doctrines developed for its execution and for its defeat.

Clausewitz’s writing on “people’s war” drew on contemporary experience of “the people in arms”: the French Revolution’s proclamation of the *leveé en masse* (involving “mobilization of the whole population against the enemy and the counter-revolution”); the counterrevolt of the French Vendée; the Russian and Spanish resistance to Napoleon’s armies; and “the experiences of an officer who fought against the victor until 1815.”<sup>44</sup> But he acknowledged that the very newness of the concept permitted “less an objective analysis than a groping for truth”<sup>45</sup> Although Clausewitz’s analysis of “people’s war” anticipated or even informed the writings of Lenin and Mao,<sup>46</sup> his intent was not to encourage revolution but to acknowledge it and to find use for its forms and energies. As he explained in his introduction to the theme, “it can be argued that the resources expended in an insurrection might be put to better use in other kinds of warfare.”<sup>47</sup> His system of analysis remains valid, however, for examination of later theories of guerilla—and counterguerilla—warfare. Michael Howard, another Clausewitz scholar (and with Peter Paret, translator of *On War*), makes the point “that *guerilla*, or *kleinkrieg*, or *guerr des postes*, originally meant simply the small-unit actions fought by outposts and patrols in the course of regular warfare, and did not necessarily have

anything to do with ‘People’s War’ at all.”<sup>48</sup> The point, of course, is well taken, and it has direct bearing on current military conceptions of guerrilla tactics as models for mirror-image counterguerrilla operations. In Clausewitz’s world, a primary characteristic of guerrilla warfare was the limited size of its operational forces. In his own lectures on guerrilla warfare (*kleiner Krieg* or *petite guerre*, “little war”) at the Berlin War Academy (1810-1811) he defined it as follows: “By *little war* we understand the employment of small units in the field; actions involving 20, 50, 100, or 300 or 400 men belong to the *little war*, unless they form part of a larger action.”<sup>49</sup>

Clausewitz himself vividly distinguishes between the traditional deployment of irregulars in combat—the skirmishers and scouts, who used such tactics as outriders of conventional forces—and a people in arms. They are similar, but the popular irregulars have strengths the trained and disciplined soldier can only caricature. In cutting roads or blocking narrow passes, writes Clausewitz, “the means available to outposts or military raiding parties and those of an insurgent peasantry have about as much in common as the movements of an automaton have with those of a man.”<sup>50</sup> In confronting a superior force, “peasants in arms will not let themselves be swept along like a platoon of soldiers . . . [who] will cling together like a herd of cattle and generally follow their noses.” Rather, they “will scatter and vanish in all directions, without requiring a special plan.” Their will-o’-the-wisp nature makes conventional forces vulnerable to ambush. Even in an area considered secured, “a band of peasants that was long since driven off by the head of the column may at any moment reappear at its tail.”<sup>51</sup> In recounting the Spanish uprising in the Peninsular War (1808-1813), Clausewitz describes the “people in arms”—independent of a regular army—as a force in and of

itself: "In Spain, [where] the war is primarily waged by the people, it will be understood that we are dealing not simply with an intensification of popular support but with a genuine new source of power."<sup>52</sup>

The guerrilla concept in Clausewitz's "people's war" is further described as an almost natural force: It can perhaps be channeled, but it cannot be made out of its time. It can be encouraged in its course, but it cannot be mobilized like a conventional brigade or battalion with money and gunpowder alone.<sup>53</sup> Clausewitz likens guerrilla uprisings to the phenomena of precipitation and fire:

*Its effect is like that of the process of evaporation; it depends on how much surface is exposed. The greater the surface and the area of contact between it and the enemy forces, the thinner the latter have to be spread, the greater the effect of a general uprising. Like smoldering embers, it consumes the basic foundations of the enemy forces.... A state of tension will develop while the two elements interact. This tension will either gradually relax if the insurgency is suppressed in some places and slowly burns itself out in others, or else it will build up to a crisis: a general conflagration closes in on the enemy, driving him out of the country before he is faced with total destruction.*<sup>54</sup>

Although Clausewitz approaches popular warfare as it applies to the defense of a nation against a foreign invader, the terms "insurgent," "insurgency," and "insurrection" are used freely. His metaphors of storm and conflagration for popular uprisings imply their unpredictability: While they may benefit the prince and the state—in the particular circumstances of foreign intervention—they may just as easily bring them down. Although Clausewitz rules out

discussion of the social implications of a “people’s war,” he treats the phenomena as a consequence of social disintegration (which is itself the fruit of war)—“an outgrowth of the way in which the conventional barriers have been swept away in our life-time by the elemental violence of war . . . a broadening and intensification of the fermentation process known as war.”<sup>55</sup>

In Clausewitz’s time, as in our own, popular risings did not necessarily mean an effective force of people in arms: Farm tools were as patently inadequate then as now in confronting firearms. Who or what then, armed the people, if not the state itself, or the regular army, or elements thereof? The revolutionary interludes of 1789 and 1848 notwithstanding, it was in the twentieth century that the motors of nationalism and socialism (not necessarily in that order) brought forms of popular organization through which the people, in a sense, could arm themselves. There was certainly more than a shadow of doubt among Clausewitz’s contemporaries over the wisdom of seeking to channel people’s war,” a concern that uncontrollable forces would be released. To critics who warned that a people in arms was “a means of revolution a state of legalized anarchy” that can spin out of control, Clausewitz responds: “The . . . objection does not concern us at all: here we consider a general insurrection as simply another means of war. “ Clausewitz was aware that whether a popular uprising was spontaneous or required coaxing, the people in arms were a potent and volatile force.<sup>56</sup>

Raymond Aron suggests Clausewitz’s brief treatment of “people’s war deserves more attention precisely because it is so consistent with most twentieth-century revolutionary writing, both in substance and imagery—particularly that of Mao Zedong.<sup>57</sup> Mao recognized, as did Clausewitz, that even when acting in concert with, or subordinate to, conventional

armies, the forces of a “people’s war,” guerrillas or partisans, would add a new dimension of passion, political will, and imagination to the basic tactics of warfare. Clausewitz’s imagery of the “people’s war” as an unquenchable fire was also used by a near contemporary, French Baron Lacuée—in 1831, the first year of France’s forty-year campaign to subdue Algeria. Lacuée—in foresaw a colonial people’s war as the inevitable fruit of empire:

*As long as you keep Algiers, you will be constantly at war with Africa; sometimes this war will seem to end; but these people will not hate you any the less, it will be a half-extinguished fire that will smoulder under the ash and which, at the first opportunity, will burst into a vast conflagration.*<sup>[58](#)</sup>

Counterinsurgency doctrine’s essential premise, which assumes revolutionaries are foreign proxies, neatly equated the *insurgent* forces to a foreign force of occupation. The assumption served a twofold function. First, it provided a justification for unconventional and exceptional offensive measures against insurgents and their sympathizers—as the counterinsurgent armies were engaged in a last-ditch resistance movement against a force of occupation, when anything goes—and collaborators got short shrift. Second, it provided, ironically, a rationale for calling in military help from outside; so when U. S. troops went in, they did so to fight the “aggressor.” American advisers—or what in Vietnam effectively became a kind of occupation force—were nominally deployed to oust a foreign presence. The moral basis notwithstanding, there is a real qualitative distinction between grass-roots, home-based guerrillas and foreign or foreign-backed forces acting like an army of occupation.

Counterinsurgents generally justify their roles as that of the defenders of the nation and the society, defenders of principles and territory, or indeed conservators of the patrimony of the nation. But just what is being defended? Who is on the defensive and who on the offensive? In a grass-roots revolutionary situation, who is defending the people and the territory from whom, for whom and for what? At what point do the army and police and the foreign forces brought in by a government perform the offensive role of an army of occupation, and the insurgents play the classic role of partisan resistance movements? Classical military theory's analysis of the defensive and offensive aspects of war helps to illustrate some of the strategic virtues of grass-roots insurgency and the misanalysis inherent in the United States' ideology-bound doctrine.

Clausewitz's dialectical pair "defense and attack" are key concepts in that in the words of Raymond Aron they "substitute for the apparent symmetry of fighters each wishing to overthrow the other a dissymmetry that is political (one wishes to alter the status quo) and military (one takes the initiative in invading the other's territory)." <sup>59</sup> A factor in strategic planning then was the relative advantage of the force resisting change over the initiator of change. Insurgent- counterinsurgent warfare however tends to confuse the attack/defense distinction. Rather than it being the *insurgent's* role to invade the territory of the counterinsurgent in a way comparable to conventional international warfare the resurgent obliges the *counterinsurgent* to take the offensive in what is nominally his own territory. The insurgent on the other hand holds the initiative of attack and the advantages of defense. Rooted in a particular people and territory the insurgent has the special moral advantage in both attack and defense of the defender of the status quo of hearth and home.



Insurgency can also be distinguished from other forms of warfare through the attack/defense equation (in a manner bearing on the United States' paramilitary assault on Nicaragua). In a 1962 paper on unconventional warfare J. K. Zawodny distinguishes insurgent warfare from its strictly offensive governmental imitation in which "one government promotes the overthrow of a foreign government or a change of its political elite": "[T]he recent invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs is an example."<sup>60</sup> Partisan or insurgent conventional warfare is at once defensive and offensive:

*It is defensive when a frustrated political group structures itself into a disciplined organization to apply violence against the government of its own nation or when a people fight the occupational forces of an invading army. This classification does not preclude both types from being (and they usually are) strategically and tactically offensive.*<sup>61</sup>

The political motor of revolution further converts the (insurgent) attackers of the political status quo into the defenders of a visionary idealized homeland: The objective of the insurgent is to defend the vision by making it a reality; the insurgent defends the patrimony of a tangible present and a credible future. The insurgent retains the tactical and moral advantages of the defender of a territory and a people's physical and spiritual existence. It also holds the initiative to attack military economic or other pillars of a status quo, which ill effects are superimposed on the country but in the ideal revolutionary situations are without the moral allegiance of the majority. The coffee barons and dependent armed forces of El Salvador might illustrate such a status quo.

The "status quo" advantage too has often fallen to insurgents as defenders of traditional values and forms.

Governments representing political economic, and military power—but inimical or oblivious to the country's traditions and norms—may be superimposed upon this far more pervasive status quo, with which an insurgency may be identified. In a lecture to civilian advisers en route to Vietnam in 1966 Indochina scholar Bernard Fall contrasted the Ngo Dinh Diem government's rupture of the fabric of Vietnamese society at the local level with the strategy of the National Liberation Front.<sup>62</sup> Fall observed that semiautonomous local government in Vietnam dated from the fifteenth century and recalled the saying that "the power of the emperor stops at the bamboo hedge of the village." When the system was abolished on 20 June 1956 by Ngo Dinh Diem it was "the single greatest stupidity committed in Vietnam in 500 years.... Even the French colonels were smart enough not to tamper with local government." The "Viet Cong " then served as defenders of tradition. Fall observed:

*The incredible part is that the VC does have village elections. They take over a village; they have an election and elect a hamlet chief. Who is the hamlet chief? The old hamlet chief! And whom did the VC assassinate in '57 '58 and '59? The government-appointed hamlet chiefs. It was great stuff! The Vietnamese loved it! They got rid of the appointees whom they didn't like—the northern refugees the northern Catholics. They wanted local boys.*

Fall also illustrates the sometimes illusory nature of the "status quo " observing that for many Vietnamese the local administration of the NLF (or "VC") represented stability and reliability but the government a threat of uncertain change:

*One of the things about the Vietnamese situation is that we have never really appealed to what we like to*

*call the higher feelings of anybody. We sort of say, 'stay with us George you will get the big pigs and you will act the better crops you will get the bag of fertilizer every year.' What do you think the other side is selling? The other side says, "Remember how little your taxes were before the war started, before American imperialists came in with their troops and napalmed everything? Remember how little taxes you paid? Stick it out with us. It's going to be tough but after the Americans leave, comes the revolution and you go back to eating cake.!" You see the trouble with them is that they are now selling nine or ten years of past performance. Whereas, we have got to sell ourselves on promises alone.*<sup>63</sup>

Counterinsurgent reaction may further disrupt the nominal status quo through conventional means wholly contradictory to its stated ends: A disaffected, or suspected populace may be relocated into camps or "protected" villages to achieve a military objective, but the strategic goals are thereby lost beyond recovery. The relocated—who may have been driven to armed insurrection precisely because of their attachment to the land and the landscape—can with difficulty be made either to accept their status as refugees or to blame their fate on the insurgents, who may number themselves among them. But their situation, in any event, will undoubtedly disrupt the traditional economic activity on which the status quo may depend.

In the long run, the ostensible defender of the status quo may play the greater role in its destruction, for example, through acts of genocide or bombing a country "into the stone age" (or turning it into "a howling wilderness," as General Jacob Smith pledged in 1901 in the Philippines—in order to resist a change in the status quo.<sup>64</sup> Less drastic responses to revolutionary insurgency, however, also may occasion enormous disruption to a traditional social and

political fabric on a scale disproportionate to the disruption intended by the insurgents themselves. The incarceration of much of the Algerian Muslim population in concentration camps and the regimentation of the rest through administrative systems to tightly monitor and control the population permitted the French Army to claim military victory over the Algerian nationalist movement, but the old regime would never be the same independence was inevitable. Similarly, the extermination of a large fraction of Guatemala's Indian peasantry and the confinement of many of the survivors behind the wire of army-administered "villages" perhaps irreversibly altered the semifeudal relationship between the peasantry and the coffee planters of the Guatemalan highlands—though to what result remains to be seen.

As a tactical imperative, the dissymmetry of insurgent guerrilla forces and a government's conventional forces—particularly when foreign assistance comes into play—further influences the peculiar pattern of insurgent attack that characterizes both the classic "small war" and the evolving "people's war." Raymond Aron observes the affinity of Clausewitz and Mao, both concerned with "people's war" of a kind, in their theses of "the intrinsically greater strength of the defensive."<sup>65</sup> Aron observes that Mao was the first theorist to take up Clausewitz's ideas on both the arming of the people and the combination of defensive strategy and offensive tactics, to "create a progressive reversal of the relation of forces up to the annihilation of the enemy by a defender who passes over to attack." Aron considers the concept with respect to both internal war and international conflict—and perhaps, by extension, third-party (foreign) intervention in a civil war:

*Mao Tse-tung grasped all the Clausewitzian themes, including the annihilation of the enemy as the goal of*

*defence: a logical interpretation of the prolonged conflict, at the end of which one side or other in a civil war must seize power. Transposed to the rivalry between nuclear states, this same interpretation would lead to a fight to the death.... At this point, the other interpretation returns: it is enough for defence to succeed in destroying, not the armed forces of the enemy, but his intention of destroying.*<sup>66</sup>

The offensive/defensive dichotomy may acquire particular significance in revolutionary war precisely because, as a war analyst described Vietnam, it is a “war without fronts.”<sup>67</sup> As such, the identity, location, and even the identified objectives of the attacker and the defender, unlike conventional international warfare, may become blurred or interchangeable. In September 1978, ten months before the defeat of Nicaragua’s Somoza government, the major towns that had gone over to insurgents, Estelí, Leon, and Chinandega among them, suffered devastating bombing and rocket attacks by government forces; their defense was undertaken by the insurgent forces. The destruction wrought by government forces, and the terrible slaughter of suspected insurgent sympathizers that followed, gave the Somoza regime a string of tactical victories, but precluded any chance for “peace” with the aggrieved population. The regime’s assault also irreversibly converted the insurgent from attacker to defender, and thus made the defeat of the defender-turned-attacker inevitable.

In the conceptual sphere, as an insurgency persists, it becomes increasingly muddled as to who is the attacker, who the defender. On the grand scale, the insurgency remains on the attack against an entrenched government. But simultaneously the insurgent obliges the government to counterattack on the insurgent’s own terms; the insurgent has all the classic advantages of the defense, while at the

same time enjoying the attacker's privilege of electing the time and circumstances of action. The popular insurgent, then, although the underdog, may hold an edge both by retaining the initiative of attack and by virtue of a kind of defense that can be mimicked, but not reproduced, by a counterinsurgent state.

The *defensive* aspect of a revolutionary insurgency differs from the conventional formula for war with respect to its relation to space, to the people, and, indeed, even to tactical operations. In the larger view, the insurgency may have a presence throughout enemy-held territory unlike the conventional scheme of fortified garrisons and strong points the aim of the insurgent is, indeed, to be everywhere and nowhere at the same time. Perhaps more significantly, the successful insurgent not only moves among, but is rooted in, and belongs to, the same population in which the enemy moves and from which it conscripts its counterinsurgent forces. The classic oppositions of war—two respective political readerships, military organizations, and populations—in revolutionary insurgency draw upon the same people. A doctrine of counterinsurgency based on mimicry of tactics and a skewed conception of insurgent organization was no answer to an authentic “people’s war.”

Clausewitz’s discussion of the means of defense, although in the context of international conflict, is also relevant to insurgencies with the characteristics of a “people’s war.” The means of defense are found to have a natural superiority over those of attack (notwithstanding “the absolute strength and quality of the forces”), and they include the advantage of terrain and the theater of operations, as well as the support of the populace and the harnessing of moral forces. Clausewitz observed: “[T]he *collective influence* of the country’s inhabitants is far from negligible, even when we are not dealing with popular insurrection”;<sup>68</sup> popular

collaboration with the revolutionary movement and noncooperation with the adversary plays a critical role:

*Nothing, major or minor, is done for the enemy save under force majeure which the troops must apply at the expense of their own strength and exertions. The defender can get all he wants. It may not be freely given.... But voluntary collaboration born of genuine attachment is. . . always of great value.*<sup>69</sup>

Similarly, the matter of information becomes a crucial factor, as “the defender’s close relations with the population give him a general superiority. “ However small the unit, “all have to turn to the local inhabitants for news of friend or foe.”<sup>70</sup>

The picture could apply equally to the territories of Europe occupied by foreign armies in Clausewitz’s day, or to the behavior and *mood* of the rural—and much of the urban—population in counterinsurgency states from El Salvador and Guatemala to Vietnam. With their positive efforts for change, anticolonial or revolutionary movements combine both defense against, and resistance to, an occupying power or a repressive government. The degree to which the populations of counterinsurgency states must be coerced to work on government projects, provide food, shelter, or information to government troops, vote in packaged elections, or fight as conscript soldiers provides a measure of the resistance, and so of the defensive and domestic nature of the conflict. Similarly, the pattern of offensive action by insurgents, like that of the homegrown partisans of conventional warfare, is to pursue victory through tactics of resistance. If the insurgency is broad-based and ubiquitous enough to wage an essentially defensive war of calculated attacks from its home ground, it may prove effective not

only in waging a war of attrition but in achieving periodic military successes and eventual victory.

Beyond an interpenetration of the insurgency and the people, the ideal insurgency takes on some of the characteristics of total war, where the insurgent is indistinguishable and interchangeable with the mass of the population; where, as the counterinsurgents acknowledge in the indiscriminate nature of their campaigns of extermination, the people are all insurgents, contributing in one way or another to the downfall of their adversary.

In a revolutionary insurgency, where the insurgents are of and among the people, the counterinsurgent's attempts to isolate the insurgents from "the people" must almost inevitably take on the same characteristics as the tactics of an occupation force in conventional warfare. Alternatively, as shown by the British in Malaya and the French in Algeria, occupation takes the form of proven colonial methods of subjugation, concentration, and regimentation of the target population. The insurgency, in turn, assumes some of the characteristics of a partisan resistance force confronting an armed invader. But in a revolutionary war, both contenders must raise their armies from the same people; the counterinsurgent, unlike the invader, cannot draw indefinitely on a people distant from the conflict; at best, the counterinsurgent can draw on the resources of another people, another army. But then the analogy of the invader and the resistance movement becomes even more apt, and the insurgency becomes more a classic "people's war," a struggle not for abstractions or duty but for survival.

The idea of insurgency—and counterinsurgency—as real war or total war faded from the forefront of U. S. military doctrine after 1975. Counterinsurgency, as a distinct military discipline, was placed on a back burner, relegated



to the armed forces' special warfare elite, which had fallen distinctly out of favor. Five years after the fall of Saigon, however, a revival of the idea of special warfare and of the special warfare establishment began to eventually take off during the first term of Ronald Reagan. The new buzzword was "low-intensity conflict," which subsumes counterinsurgency and the whole range of special warfare. The theorists of low-intensity conflict revived the idea that the United States could "make" a revolution, a "guerrilla" movement to overthrow an undesirable regime in mimicry of the Cold War adversary. The idea of insurgency and counterinsurgency as total war in microcosm, as low-intensity total war, became a part of the U.S. military's rationale for a newly aggressive doctrine of intervention around the world.

# Chapter 13: The Carter Years

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

In 1977, the Carter administration set out to make human rights a centerpiece of U. S. foreign policy—to show the world that America could stick to its guns on the moral plane as well as the military. The election of Jimmy Carter responded to an American yearning for a simpler world and some old-fashioned virtue in government. The debacle of Watergate and the unravelling of many of the country's cherished shibboleths during the Vietnam War had been deeply hurtful.

The post-Vietnam disillusionment was felt both by those Americans who rejected the withdrawal as an unwarranted loss of nerve and resolution and by those who believed that the country had been duped into waging an immoral war. The common denominator was uncertainty over the United States' future direction. The majority of the American people were neither humiliated by defeat nor ashamed for having fought the wrong war; but they were shaken out of their complacent belief that their leaders and their armed forces would only do the right thing by America and the world. The post-Vietnam years were marked by a loss of confidence that had to be met by a new look at American policy and a reaffirmation, not of hollow self-confidence but of the strengths on which American confidence had been founded. Jimmy Carter himself referred to the malaise as “a crisis of confidence made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our own leaders.”<sup>1</sup> A first step toward rebuilding

American self-respect (and confidence) was to reaffirm American virtue.

At the United Nations General Assembly in March 1977, Jimmy Carter announced to the world that henceforth the United States would put the promotion and protection of human rights in the forefront of its foreign policy. His U.N. speech was important because it notified both the more atrocious of America's allies and the American establishment itself that human rights was henceforth to be a real counter in the game of world affairs. As every signatory of the U.N. Charter was pledged "to observe and to respect basic human rights," said the new president, member nations could no longer "claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibility to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world."<sup>2</sup> In the event, deeds did not really match words. The spirit and energy of Carter's stated intentions were not consistently reflected in the policies and practices of the government he led—or, to be perhaps more accurate, the government whose entrenched bureaucracy and foreign-policy establishment the outsider president could never fully grasp and so never fully change, much less control.

While the Carter administration may have brought a refreshing wholesomeness to Washington and to foreign policy, the world was, if anything, more complex and no less dangerous than in the years of the Vietnam War. Carter eventually found he had less than complete control over the means to put ideals into practice: The White House depended on the great bureaucracies of the state for information and guidance and for the implementation of policy. The human rights advocates Carter brought into the State Department came up against the reluctance of the

foreign-policy and defense establishment to undertake fundamental changes in the conduct of foreign relations.

## **Turning a Blind Eye**

The efforts of Carter administration human rights advocates ran up against many of the same institutional constraints that had faced like-minded bureaucrats in previous years. Although State Department researchers were denied access to CIA and DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) reports not tailored for their use, concealment of government sponsorship of state terrorism in the counterinsurgency states had never been completely effective. Efforts by State Department insiders to blow the whistle on gross human rights abuse, however, had long been overwhelmed by the concerted opposition of the activist agencies—and undermined by the inadequacy of their own intelligence resources. The policies and attitudes of the foreign-policy establishment before Carter would become apparent at the height of the efforts to build a vigorous human rights policy.

The levels of awareness of the theory and practice of counterterror among the civilian bureaucrats who shape and monitor the larger policies of foreign affairs have differed dramatically. There is some evidence that the level and programmatic nature of counterterror in the counterinsurgency states, from Guatemala to Vietnam, were never brought home to most of those not directly involved in its administration. The civilians who were aware of the counterterror operations, in turn, appear to have made no particular effort to keep abreast of the gory details or their consequences. This willful ignorance was facilitated by the constitutionally covert nature of counterterror.

Agencies engaged in counterterror assistance would invoke the same norms of secrecy applied to the episodic covert action for which the CIA is better known—so-called one-off special operations using cut-outs, proxies, and smokescreens. One-off operations, however, were subject to oversight procedures—from the NSC to Congress—which considered each episode on its own merits. Each operation was distinct and more or less finite in the resources required, the objectives defined, and the political (and other) costs anticipated. By contrast, the counterterror concept in counterinsurgency was programmatic and open-ended. CIA and Defense were to introduce the concept to foreign counterparts and facilitate its implementation. Because it was both covert and open-ended—and above all because it was largely implemented at one remove through host country forces—oversight failed: Intelligence oversight considered *operations* and general policy, while defense oversight focused on the larger issue of defense planning, spending, and geopolitics.

The greatest barrier to the whistle-blower inside the foreign-policy establishment was the CIA and military stranglehold on information on the covert aspects of counterinsurgency. There was a conscientious effort by the operational agencies, from CIA to DIA and the Pentagon's military assistance programs, to shield host country counterterror programs from unwanted attention. Embassy and State Department officials who independently stumbled on the reality of counterterror programs came up against determined efforts by CIA and Defense to dispute and neutralize their evidence—often by impugning civilian information sources while claiming their own information was simply insufficient to confirm allegations. The record of interdepartmental discussions on Guatemala from 1967 to 1972—the years counterterror became entrenched there—exemplifies the tension between U. S. counterterrorists and

professionals concerned with its counterproductive aspects (if not necessarily its moral dimension).

The obfuscation and perpetuation of counterterror was not solely a product of the covert instincts of the specialists. Civilian policymakers at the top of the policy pyramid, including those of the Department of State, cynically dismissed reports of coresponsibility in counterterror and dissuaded whistle-blowing subordinates from making waves. Counterterror complaints were viewed as annoying and inconsequential human rights concerns, and as such significant only in terms of public relations. The occasional embassy reports attacking counterterror moreover, reflected the isolation of the embassies' diplomatic staff from independent information sources. Most of the diplomatic staff may well have been outside the "need to know" circle involved in the unconventional aspects of U.S. security assistance; those within the circle were bound by the norms of secrecy and pledged to implement U. S. policy, however disturbing.

However strong the signal that something had gone badly wrong, that selective counterterror had become mass counterterror, the efforts from within to oppose mass killings were stymied by the covert information monopoly and the confidence of the defense establishment in its long-standing doctrine. Even if the 1980s U.S. ambassadors to El Salvador had gone renegade and protested the Salvadoran counterterror to Congress, they would still have been hampered by their weak information. The declassified records from the U.S. embassy at the height of the terror in the early 1980s, including the weekly "Grim-Gram" statistics on political killings, offer little in the way of sensitive information on the Salvadoran army's role in the slaughter, and indeed little on the U. S. military and intelligence operations there beyond the budget figures of overt military

assistance. The frankness of former ambassadors on the United States' role in the terror was further tempered by the record of their own past statements in defense of El Salvador's human rights record and U. S. policy.

In the event, the U.S. ambassadors to Guatemala and El Salvador during the worst years of state terror have never publicly acknowledged that provision for counterterror terrorism had formed a part of the doctrine that had been exported to these allies. Although some top officials, notably former Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White, broke ranks to denounce the Salvadoran armed forces for mass political killings, none have gone so far as to publicly elaborate the extent to which such practices drew upon U. S. military doctrine and assistance. The focus of the outrage has been on the United States' misguided association with unsavory personalities (like Salvador's Roberto d'Aubuisson, whom White described as a pathological killer) or, at best, groups of army officers deemed corrupt and vicious at the head of an otherwise responsible military establishment. The options posed by White and other insider critics of such unsavory allies have generally been limited to the use of aid as a weapon to bring military institutions into line.

What little criticism of the United States' own policy did go forward largely did so internally, outside the purview of the public, through the dissent channels of the foreign-policy establishment itself. Diplomatic personnel who were aware of, and appalled by, counterterror tended to accept it as a given in the counterinsurgency equation. They generally either acquiesced wholeheartedly, vicariously sympathetic to the robustly primeval side of "tit for tat" terrorism, or, if critical, they urged adherence only to the letter of U. S. doctrine—that is, that counterterror remained legitimate only if used selectively on a limited basis. Declassified reports that acknowledge the introduction of counterterror

also tend to conclude that while disagreeable, it seemed an effective solution to insurgency; it could be lived with until a more wholesome alternative turned up.

Retired U. S. Ambassador C. Allan Stewart's secret survey report on "Public Safety" in Central America in the fall of 1967 provides one mildly critical overview.<sup>3</sup> Stewart saw a certain rough justice in the Guatemalan counterterror, finding it "patterned after US far west frontier justice of the days when courtrooms were few and far between." Informed sources, observes Stewart, believe "guerrillas . . . were captured, summarily executed, their bodies removed from the immediate area and left to be discovered by the peasants." Stewart concedes that the tactics "present a problem to democratic government, especially if there turn out to be innocent victims," but terror tactics against actual subversives appear to meet his approval. He cites the frequent discovery of bullet-riddled bodies "in areas where guerrillas were said to be operating" as an indicator of the effectiveness of the methodology—as both a crime-fighting technique and for its prophylactic effect.<sup>4</sup> Ambassador Stewart might have been authentically appalled had he reamed the full extent of the Guatemalan counterterror—or of the U.S. military and CIA involvement in organizing and launching counterterror in Guatemala—but he clearly agreed with the Guatemalans' immediate objective (eradication of the subversives) and was not overly fastidious about their ethics.

As noted earlier, the law enforcement advisory programs of the Office of Public Safety often provided cover for assistance to host countries' political police and counterterrorists (see [chapter 7](#)). Nominal police training programs focused, for the most part, on the doctrine and techniques of political repression, of defeating the communist threat. Military and CIA technicians posing as



Public Safety advisers worked with their counterparts in the esoterica of torture, bomb-making, and selective assassination. The Public Safety problem was part of a larger dilemma which is perhaps still present in the foreign assistance equation. The managers of the diverse aspects of the foreign assistance program seem to have been congenitally incapable of fencing off their programs from the unconventional programs of the covert agencies. Many ostensibly Innocuous programs ended up incorporating an unconventional warfare dimension, which dramatically distorted their overall impact. While counterinsurgency programs were reasonably predicated on a full-spectrum approach, the net result was that every aspect of U.S. assistance was also touched by the covert, unconventional side of a secret war. Whether, like Public Safety, a program provided personnel places for covert unconventional warriors, or, like USIS, it provided a propaganda shield against inquisitive and critical outsiders, all agencies played a part in the covert side of the counterinsurgency offensive.

However distressed the civilian specialists of the foreign-policy establishment may have become as they sniffed out the details of counterterrorism, their higher allegiance tended to be to the policies of their respective agencies. High-level institutional priorities required straight-faced defense of client armies (let alone the United States' own programs), and these took precedence over matters of ethics. The critical insiders' approach to counterterror, then, was by necessity an oblique one, a critique of the consequences, the body count, and the potential repercussions in Congress. Perhaps the greatest handicap was posed by the inability to speak of counterterror in blunt language—because the very notion of counterterror *as terrorism* was forbidden, while circumlocution was the norm. Insider critics could not attack head on the legitimacy of the counterterror concept without going the whole hog and

revealing the substance—and sequelae—of past counterterror policies. And while considerable information could be gleaned by studious observation, the hard details of these covert programs were held closely by the CIA and the Defense Department.

Where the level of terror became too enormous to shrug off, embassy critiques deflected the blame to the local civilian sectors—as in El Salvador—that most enthusiastically supported counterterror. There could be no reference to the views of CIA and military unconventional warriors on the legitimacy of counterterror. Investigation of the matter was stalled by larger policy issues and institutional inertia. Bringing human rights into the foreign policy equation bruised the interests of too many more powerful departments and challenged the viability of larger lines of policy. The whistle-blowers found, moreover, that the larger the interdepartmental forum and the higher its level, the greater the apparent inertia behind existing policy, however mismatched. Its concept and implementation. To challenge its basic premises—that security assistance moderated foreign governments' tendencies to abuse rights, that influence with foreign armies was an end in itself, that counterinsurgency was compatible with democratic values—was almost unthinkable.

The Department of State was aware of the reliance on illegal methods of counterterrorism in the unconventional war and was not openly opposed to these measures per se. State's concern then as now focused on the use of these methods in generalized repression—outside the legitimate war against terrorists. State, if no other agency, was concerned with the letter of the doctrine as a practical matter. As the agency responsible for U.S. foreign policy, it was concerned that if approved doctrine entailed counterterror, it must be done selectively and covertly. To

the policymakers at the top, counterterror was intended to be a program solely for use against highly select and clearly defined targets.

A 1972 Public Safety memorandum on Guatemala posed the dilemma as the number-one issue facing the assistance program. “How can the USG[overnment] best assist the GOG[uatemala] to keep insurgency in check, while at the same time encouraging it to minimize use of illegal methods and use of repression against non-insurgents?”<sup>5</sup> There was no resolution and could be no resolution to the dilemma so long as terrorism remained a prescribed remedy for dealing with insurgency in any of its aspects. The CIA and the unconventional warriors of the U. S. Military Group, in contrast, never saw a dilemma at all—that is, beyond the defense of their prerogatives for achieving the prime objective: eradicating the subversives.

To the diplomats, then, there was a very real danger inherent in the proliferation of counterterrorism—whether state-sponsored or not wholly or partially. Shortly before Guatemala’s arch-counterterrorist General Carlos Arana Osorio took office, in a June 1970 memorandum the State Department’s desk officer characterized Guatemala’s internal security situation as being “threatened by insurgency and counter terrorism.”<sup>6</sup> The U.S. ambassador’s March 1972 overview of the security situation reiterated this warning, although the threat of “counterterrorism” is defined in terms of its adoption by the “extreme right.”<sup>7</sup> The consistent refusal to recognize any direct governmental *responsibility* for counterterror would provide the baseline from which the U.S. establishment dodged congressional criticism of the Guatemalan situation on into the 1980s—and evaded its own accountability.

The declassified record on Guatemala also illustrates the rather different analyses of terror there—and security needs—by CIA and State. Interdepartmental discussions on the future of Guatemalan security assistance, held in the spring of 1971, considered the record of counterterrorism in the context of proposed assistance programs. State's May 1971 independent survey of "Repressive Counter-Terrorism" by government security forces was on the table, and the principal issue was to measure Guatemala against criteria that would "trigger reduction of U.S. security assistance or supporting any regime that reaches a point of international infamy."<sup>8</sup>

State's 1971 efforts to quantify and assess governmental terror were however, roundly derided as insubstantial by CIA and other agencies. There was no documentation, no proof of governmental involvement was the CIA rejoinder. The same arguments would emerge in the 1980s, regarding Central American and Philippines "death squad" campaigns: that is, the information was insufficient to draw conclusions to that effect, autonomous paramilitary groups were responsible for the bulk of the violence, and the government itself exercised scant control over the country. The CIA/Office of Public Safety apologists for Guatemala argued that government "should not be held wholly accountable" for the killings and "missing persons" cited in the survey without far more detailed evidence, and that there was "not yet enough good evidence to confront the government of Guatemala and point out their excesses.""

The CIA made more emphatic arguments—which would later be picked up by the Reagan administration—against suspension of assistance, regardless of the atrocities. Withdrawal of personnel from the country would result in "loss of leverage and would incur serious loss of major interests."<sup>10</sup> Termination of assistance would be "an

admittance that we have failed and would cause more severe repercussions.”<sup>11</sup> Indeed, any backtracking from the prime objective—combating subversion—was seen as a signal that would destroy the United States’ credibility and influence. State Department official Robert Hurwitch argued that

*if the US Government were to withdraw or reduce assistance . . . [the guerrillas] would probably read this as having the GOG on the run and that the US was not supporting GOG efforts in suppressing terrorism. This would result in serious political consequences . . . and erode any political influence we have in the country.*

Cuts in security assistance would come only “after Congressional pressures were raised to a point where we had to react” or if assistance was deemed counterproductive to the security objective itself.<sup>12</sup>

## **Human Rights and the Law**

The systematic monitoring of human rights observance was a necessary step in Carter’s human rights agenda. Human rights had been the object of occasional congressional hearings on foreign affairs since the turn of the century; congressional hearings and new legislation on human rights had proliferated in the dog days of the Vietnam War.<sup>13</sup> In 1974, two amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 provided the foundation for regular monitoring reports to be made as a requisite for foreign assistance. Section 502B, concerning security assistance, stipulated that “except in extraordinary circumstances,” the president was to substantially reduce or terminate aid to any government “which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” In

order to exempt nations from this stipulation, the president was obliged to advise Congress of the “extraordinary circumstances” requiring continued aid. Section 116(d)(1) introduced a similar human rights component, with rather broader exemptions, into bilateral economic assistance.

The language of the law was later toughened, although the loopholes remained. After 1976, Section 502B stipulated that “no assistance” was to be provided countries whose governments grossly violated human rights, and it elaborated upon the means through which exceptions were to be explained to Congress. Later amendments required the president to *certify* the reasons for which human rights provisions would be waived (1987), while allowing presidential certification of *improvement* in the human rights record to justify renewal or continuation of assistance (1979).<sup>14</sup> The first paragraph, as restated in 1978, reinforced the legal foundations of the Carter administration’s human rights plank:

*The United States shall, in accordance with its international obligations . . . and in keeping with the constitutional heritage and traditions of the United States, promote and encourage increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world.... Accordingly, a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.*<sup>15</sup>

Fine words aside, the most positive contributions of Sections 116(d) (1) and 502B were to set out a firm legal basis for curtailing assistance to tyrants, and to require structured reporting through which an administration’s compliance with human rights restrictions could be measured. Section 116(d)(1) required the Secretary of State

to provide Congress each year with “a full and complete report” on “the status of internationally recognized human rights” in countries receiving bilateral economic assistance; it was to take into account, among other things, the “relevant findings of appropriate international organizations, including nongovernmental organizations . . . [and] the extent of cooperation by such government in permitting an unimpeded investigation by any such organization of alleged violations.”<sup>16</sup>

The first annual report of the Department of State to Congress was published in 1977. Its quality was so abysmal that a congressional subcommittee prepared a critique based on its own country reports (commissioned from the Congressional Research Service). The result was both scathing and constructive: The congressional report considered the “adequacy and usefulness” of the submissions, examined the larger issues involved in executive reporting on human rights, and set out an analytical framework of criteria to improve human rights reporting.<sup>17</sup> Congressional attention would be sustained into the 1980s, with oversight hearings held each year on the State Department’s preparation of the reports.

Now entitled “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices,” the reports, which are published each February, force the administration to put on the record an assessment of the human rights practices of its clients. Although the quality and bias of the reports varies in accordance with the politics—and significance—of the government in question, the reports have been important. Executive policymakers are obliged to go on record accounting for a long list of human rights criteria, in a manner facilitating informed criticism and congressional review. At worst, official reports attempting to whitewash or conceal violations, when contrasted with independent reporting, provide an insight

into the policies of deception governing relations with that country.

The principal testing place for Carter's human rights campaign was Central and South America. The scene had been set for a showdown in Central America during the Ford administration, with congressional hearings in June 1976 on human rights in Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Acting Assistant Secretary of State Hewson A. Ryan's response to the compelling testimony on gross human rights was an intransigent denial: "[A] review of all hard evidence . . . did not yield that there had emerged a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights."<sup>18</sup> The June 1976 hearings were perhaps most significant insofar as they provided an early opportunity for congressmen to press the administration on its implementation of the new statutory obligations to bring human rights considerations into the foreign assistance process. Assistant Secretary Ryan's testimony provided compelling evidence only that the Department of State was working hard to evade the human rights provisions. In response to questioning, Ryan answered that he was unaware of interviews of alleged victims by U.S. missions and provided a variety of excuses for this apparent negligence:

*"Our political sections are, as you know, very limited. We have one officer who is assigned as a political officer...."*

*"We try to ascertain these allegations, but we have rarely found people who are willing to talk."*

*"We have limited ability to go out. We have no authority under international law to go into an investigatory phase, of course."*



*"We cannot conduct investigations in a foreign country. This is sovereign country..."<sup>19</sup>*

The most trenchant critique of Ryan's testimony was leveled by Donald Fraser, chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations, who told him: "You have been unable to ascertain the statutory foundation for the continuation of aid to these three countries. You speak of charges and countercharges canceling out each other. You state that you are understaffed, and that you have no authority to investigate. You ought to just quit."<sup>20</sup> Had Congress not pursued the issue, and Jimmy Carter not come into the White House in January 1977, it is likely that the State Department's posture on human rights abuse in client states would have remained much the same, whatever the letter of the law. In 1976 alone, however, tough congressional hearings were held into human rights in Chile, Indonesia, the Philippines, the U. S. S. R., and on human rights issues germane to the annual General Assembly of the Organization of American States.<sup>21</sup> As a consequence, the congressional foreign affairs committees were equipped with the information necessary to challenge the Ford administration's whitewashes and to press for implementation of the law. Carter's election provided the added political clout required to oblige even nominal compliance with the law by the foreign policy establishment.

The Carter administration immediately began to shore up basic institutional mechanisms to meet the human rights requirements. The State Department officer responsible for human rights, including the preparation of the reports required by Sections 116(d)(1) and 502B, was upgraded from Coordinator to Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. State also created an independent Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in 1977.<sup>22</sup> Patricia Derian whose reputation was made as a civil rights

worker in Mississippi, was appointed to head the bureau as Assistant Secretary. The formal rank was important, as it ostensibly put the new human rights supremo on an equal footing with the department's regional bureau chiefs, with access to top-level cable traffic, a chair at high-level meetings, and a direct line to the Secretary of State.<sup>[23](#)</sup>

Carter also required the appointment of human rights officers in each overseas mission (although these officers also wore other hats) and the development of a bureaucratic procedure for the preparation of annual reports under Sections 116(d)(1) and 502B. The embarrassment of the April 1977 report on human rights practices surely reinforced efforts by the Carter appointees to bring reporting into line with statutory requirements over the next year. The appointment of human rights advocates to the new top posts at State, and the new machinery for human rights monitoring at least went some way toward putting human rights on the policy agenda. But the monitoring process and the linkage of rights to foreign assistance was still subject to the exceptions, qualifications, and the opportunities for dissimulation (through certification) built into the law, and the influence of the human rights advocates within the system, as outsiders, was limited.

The actual suspension of assistance on human rights grounds, also found prompt, if limited, application. Security assistance to Chile, Ethiopia, and Uruguay was cut off, although without formally declaring that their governments were guilty of gross and persistent patterns of human rights abuse. The Secretary of State announced, however, that South Korea and the Philippines would be exempted from cuts in assistance on the grounds of national security.<sup>[24](#)</sup> The surprise development, following the publication of the April 1977 report, was the unilateral “renunciation” of security assistance by the governments of Brazil and Argentina—on

the grounds that the publication was an affront to national sovereignty. The aid renounced, however, was by 1976 already at a relatively low level; and, as with Chile and Uruguay, intermilitary relations (and economic aid) would continue. El Salvador and Guatemala, which were relatively unscathed by the 1977 report, rapidly followed suit in renouncing security assistance.<sup>[25](#)</sup>

Assistance to Guatemala and El Salvador would, in fact, continue on a gradually diminishing basis for several years as previously earmarked funds were disbursed. U. S. military missions remained in the two countries, behind the scenes, throughout the Carter years. Intermilitary relations continued on a discreet professional basis seemingly designed to evade congressional oversight, and guaranteed to telegraph to the U.S. officers' counterparts unconditional, unlimited support from the United States however outrageous their internal affairs. This notwithstanding, even symbolic aid cuts served a political purpose at home, sending a misleading (but reassuring) signal to the American people, that they, through their government, would not be drawn in to fuel distant holocausts.

## **The CIA and the “Halloween Massacre”**

The Carter efforts to shake up and “moralize” foreign policy (and the State Department) were paralleled by efforts to clean up the CIA. Responsibility for the latter task fell largely to a fellow navy man, Admiral Stansfield Turner. President Ford had already made a step toward requiring greater CIA accountability in February 1976, by limiting the function of intelligence in Executive Order (EO) 11905. Ford's order was best known for its ban on assassinations—a direct response to the Senate's hearings on the subject.<sup>[26](#)</sup> An August 1976 CIA briefing for candidate and then-

Governor Carter stressed that EO 11905 spelled out guidelines for “the conduct of intelligence operations within Constitutional limits,” while creating the “Operations Advisory Group” to replace “the NSC subcommittee known under various Administrations as 54/12, 303, and 40 (taken from the numbers of the presidential directives).”<sup>27</sup> Carter restated the prohibition on assassinations in the 1978 EO 12036 and exercised greater prudence authorizing major covert action initiatives overseas. The NSC covert action group under Carter remained largely unchanged but was renamed the Special Coordinating Committee.

The new order at CIA under Turner was best known for what the clandestine services would call the “Halloween Massacre” of 1977, a purge attributed in part to budget cuts, but which also reflected a change of emphasis from paramilitary action to intelligence collection and analysis. Former CIA covert action chief Theodore Shackley has claimed that over 2,800 intelligence officers, many of them paramilitary specialists were fired or forced out of the CIA.<sup>28</sup> Turner himself has given a figure of 820 staff positions cut from the clandestine service, but maintained that the tightening up of personnel policies had actually improved both human and technical intelligence collection capabilities.<sup>29</sup> Turner’s critics also tended to be vociferous about the relative decline in the strength and status of the army Special Forces—the CIA’s partner in paramilitary action—which in fact began during the Nixon administration. Special Forces had diminished in number since their withdrawal from Vietnam in 1971, from a peak of 9,000 to about 2,000 in the late 1970s.<sup>30</sup> The paramilitary side of covert action was indeed curtailed, if not to the extent suggested by Shackley and other ax-operatives.

Despite the purge at the CIA’s Langley headquarters, the covert side of security assistance continued, through the CIA

and the various mechanisms by means of which covert personnel could be drafted in from the military. At the same time, Israel and Argentina stepped in to fill overt advisory and materiel requirements that could not be met by the United States as long as the formal estrangements over human rights persisted. At the height of President Carter's human rights offensive, Latin American armies exercised a form of "import substitution," replacing U.S. automatic weapons with Israeli Galil and Uzi submachine guns and assault rifles, and World War II-vintage American aircraft with state-of-the-art Israeli STOL [short take-off and landing] aircraft, tailor made for counterinsurgency! ' Argentine and Israeli advisers, in turn, provided field assistance in intelligence and unconventional warfare to the Central American armies whose U.S. military trainers were overstretched or withdrawn. Neither arrangement could have gone forward without a green light from Washington. Even as U. S. security assistance to the Somoza dynasty was curtailed in 1978, when the regime turned to the destruction of Nicaragua's cities to save itself, shiploads of Israeli arms, ammunition, and aircraft arrived to ensure there would be no interruption of supplies to Somoza's National Guard.

There is some evidence that the civilian policymakers, and notably the president, were not kept fully informed of the ongoing assistance to governments that were nominally on the United States' list of villains. The flood of arms and the backdoor training in special warfare seems too patently a mockery of his foreign policy for the president to have been aware of it. But the level of covert training and arms procurement going on at the height of Carter's human rights offensive was too extensive to have continued without a go-ahead at high levels at the Pentagon and from CIA headquarters in Langley. The Reagan administration would later reveal, if unwillingly, some of the ways through which legislative prohibition of covert action could be

circumvented through clandestine action orchestrated from within the White House itself. The *contra* supply operation of the 1980s would be insulated from the CIA's conventional mechanisms of covert action, albeit imperfectly, by calling in contract personnel like General John K. Singlaub and by handling procurement and logistics through second governments and the same human and commercial "proprietarys" more commonly under direct CIA supervision and control.

The supplementary measures to the aid cuts, whether involving further sanctions or positive inducements to promote human rights, largely failed to materialize. In this the human rights advocates in the administration were, in the final analysis, little more empowered than were their counterparts of previous years in Congress. Even before January 1977, congressional committees had the power to stop military assistance on human rights grounds, and had indeed taken steps to do so. The human rights officers, like their congressional colleagues, found their role limited to opposing bad policy. There was no proven machinery or precedent through which to remedy past mistakes and to implement the alternatives that could preempt future atrocities. The distant holocausts continued unchecked, from Central America to East Timor.

It was perhaps a reflection of the active subversion of the Carter human rights policy by the foreign policy and defense establishments that, during the Carter years, human rights abuse reached its peak in Argentina and Nicaragua, and reached new and unprecedented levels (to be exceeded only in the Reagan years) in Guatemala and El Salvador. The United States' response to the pogroms and death camps of Argentina, the creeping demolition of Nicaragua, and the rustic genocide in Guatemala was largely one of silence, smoke screens, quiet diplomacy, and business as usual.<sup>[32](#)</sup>

The U.S. government, on balance, did nothing to stop mass murder by its allies. But the nominal aid cuts provided an effective alibi, while a significant part of the United States' apparatus without question contributed directly to the slaughter through military aid, advice, and the global screen of diplomatic defense against impolitic criticism.

## **The Question of Leverage**

The argument that the cuts in aid had reduced U. S. leverage to halt the slaughter, moreover, was specious and self-serving. To suggest leverage was lost was to suggest it had previously been used to good effect. But there was abundant evidence that U. S. assistance had previously contributed directly to just the kind of abuse the Carter administration was committed to oppose. If assistance could not be shown to have caused a particular pattern of abuse, it was eminently clear that it was often a party to it, having provided the means (from arms to computer systems) the motive (the global war against communism), and the medium (the organization and tactical software of U. S. military doctrine). If assistance had provided leverage with the recipients, given the record of the counterinsurgency states in the previous twenty years, it was largely pernicious. Where were the democratic institutions and the freedom from fear OIIC' might have hoped for? One cannot find a single example of U. S. military assistance used as an effective lever to rein in human rights abuse.

The question, then, was: How would maintaining the status quo of military assistance—which had been shown to have contributed directly to gross human rights abuse in the counterinsurgency states—conceivably be seen as a means to check human rights abuse? To suggest that military assistance should remain untouchable was, perhaps, to

concede that, in cultivating the counterinsurgency state, the United States' relations with such states had become a preeminently military affair. The broad spectrum of foreign relations with ordinary nations had, in policy terms, been severely circumscribed in dealing with the counterinsurgency state. Because the power of the counterinsurgency states lay with their armies—however comprehensively their leaders had embellished their stature with the trappings of political office, periodic elections, and sophisticated diplomatic representation abroad—the entree to dealings with these states was not the province of the U. S. diplomatic corps, but the highly developed structures of the U.S. military missions, training programs, and the primary medium of interservice accommodation, military assistance.

Curtailing military assistance for reasons of principle challenged the United States' military itself in much the same way as had the Department of State's postwar battles to regain its foreign affairs prerogatives from the War Department. The development of close intermilitary relations, particularly in the Americas, had been a feature of postwar relations that was largely parallel to, and independent of, the established structures of diplomacy.<sup>33</sup> These relations had been further cemented and strengthened since the counterinsurgency era of the 1960s through massive training and assistance programs, the large military assistance advisory groups installed in the counterinsurgency states, and the generalized adoption and adaptation of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine within the United States' sphere. The threat of a rift or a drastic limitation of the U. S. military's contact with its ideological brothers in arms threatened to undo their decades-long efforts to mold the counterinsurgency states.



The close association of the United States' defense establishment with the armies ruling those counterinsurgency states might well have forged ties of equal strength even had the military missions not sweetened the relationship with the material largesse. There was an ideological as well as a professional affinity between the counterparts. Above all, the U. S. military and intelligence establishment were accepted as brothers who made common cause in the fight against communist subversion.

The crux of the leverage conundrum was that the principles in question, these matters of human rights, were peripheral, when not wholly contrary, to the primary objective of U.S. military policy: to confront and suppress international communism by means fair and foul. And so the human rights policy could indeed have short-circuited the dynamics of the foreign policy process if it had been sufficiently muscular, although the real leverage lost by the U.S. military would have gone to other governmental sectors. The only leverage exercised was that of the military establishment on the foreign policy establishment itself, not on the military's foreign counterparts. By curtailing military assistance, the Carter administration, perhaps unknowingly, set in train a policy which if pursued comprehensively might well have undermined the military and intelligence establishment's hold on relations with the counterinsurgency states since the Vietnam era.

The armies of the counterinsurgency states that reacted angrily to Washington's human rights pontification did so in part because of its hypocrisy. The counterinsurgency practices at the root of the human rights uproar were, after all, hardly unknown to their U. S. counterparts, counsellors, and accomplices who had long worked with them—and there is no evidence they were ever disowned by them. The tone

of the reactions of the Latin Americans who either were the object of aid cuts or renounced overt aid may have been one of indignation, but the real venom directed at the human rights policy came from within the United States' defense establishment. Military materiel could be got, in any case (and seemingly still subsidized by U.S. funds), but the defense establishment itself found the new policy a profound challenge to its dominant position as diplomat abroad and power broker at home.

## **On Resolution and Counterrevolution**

Although the spirit was there, the available means to enforce the human rights policy went largely untapped, and the Carter administration's commitment to it flagged in the crunch. Jimmy Carter's apology for the Shah of Iran, far more than his refusal to send in the Marines (or to authorize an all-out covert action) to save the Shah, spelled both the end of the line in Iran and the bankruptcy of a decent and potentially world-shaking experiment in the use of U. S. power.

The counterinsurgency states in Latin America remained in the United States' sphere of influence and on intimate relations with the rest of the inter-American military and intelligence fraternity, which the United States continued to dominate. Indeed, the U.S. defense establishment was given increased freedom of action to the extent that the human rights policy absolved the United States of responsibility for the actions of its proteges. The record of mayhem and murder in the American sphere during the Carter years was perfunctorily noted in the annual 50213 reports, which led to some reduction in assistance; but there was little in the way of a "proactive" policy to bring allied counterterror atrocities to a halt. The outstanding examples of

counterinsurgent atrocity can be found in Argentina, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

In Argentina, a nationwide campaign of torture and abduction, “disappearance” and murder by the March 1976 junta was well under way when the Carter government came into office. The murders and the terror continued throughout the Carter years, tapering off on the eve of the November 1982 war with the United Kingdom. The campaign that the generals dubbed “the dirty war” formally ended in April 1983, when the junta published its *Final Document of the Military Junta on the War against Subversion and Terrorism*, which concluded that among other things, the 15,000 or so who “disappeared” over the previous eight years should be considered dead “for administrative reasons.”<sup>34</sup> After the collapse of the Somoza regime, Argentine advisers were invited to teach the skills of the “dirty war” in Central America, working with U.S. intelligence officers in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, and in the unconventional war against Nicaragua’s Sandinista government.

In Nicaragua, traditional measures of large-scale political imprisonment and enforced exile had already been largely replaced by mass killing and “disappearance” in 1975. The deaths were in the hundreds until armed opposition flowered in October 1977. Open revolt after the assassination of opposition leader Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in January 1978 was followed by the murder of thousands. The Carter administration has been credited by some and damned by others for *not* sending in the Marines or taking similar action in crushing the revolution. That the administration might have taken a direct role in stopping the prior slaughter and the resupplying of the Somoza regime was unthinkable.

In Honduras, efforts began in mid-1979 to build a U.S. military and intelligence infrastructure from which to run the unconventional war against post-Somoza Nicaragua and stiffen the U.S.- backed counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador. Military assistance to Honduras was tripled in 1980.<sup>35</sup> In Guatemala, tens of thousands had died in army “counterterror” operations from 1967 to 1977. The government of General Romeo Lucas García, who took office in July 1978, took the killing to new heights. Although nominally on the United States’ human rights blacklist, annual 502B reports continued to suggest that the bulk of the killing was a product of extreme leftists slugging it out with extreme rightists, as a passive army looked on. Guatemala still enjoyed backdoor security assistance, the diplomatic shield of the State Department, and the presence of a strong contingent of covert U.S. intelligence officers whose brief had little to do with enforcing Jimmy Carter’s human rights agenda.<sup>36</sup>

In El Salvador, mass killings began around the time of Carter’s inauguration, although there was no violent opposition to speak of at the time. The yearly death toll remained in the hundreds, however, until the Carter administration engineered the departure of President Carlos Humberto Romero and his replacement by a handpicked civil-military junta in October 1979. Nearly a thousand died at the hands of the armed forces in 1979, most of them peaceful demonstrators shot down in the street in the last quarter of the year. But the pattern of the next decade was set in 1980, when the Salvadorans lost an archbishop, four American church workers, and more than 8,000 others to counterterror at the hands of army “death squads. “ The public outcry of the Carter administration’s human rights advocates was more than neutralized by the imperative of containing communist insurgency in the region.

Human rights advocacy proved a poor second best to counterrevolution. Ideally, the administration wanted a humanely and decently conducted counterrevolutionary warfare. But in this respect they displayed their ignorance of the United States' own military doctrine; by sending the special warfare experts (Special Forces and CIA) to assume primary responsibility for training and advising allies in the counterrevolutionary crusade, they demonstrated a lamentable naivete as well.

## **Six Crises**

By the second year of the Carter presidency, the movement to restrict assistance on human rights grounds and to limit covert action was reversed, as hot spots in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Iran, and Afghanistan came to a boil. U.S.-backed tyrants fell in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Iran in July, October, and November 1979.<sup>37</sup> Marxist tyrant Hafizullah Amin fell in Afghanistan in December to a coup backed by a Soviet invasion.<sup>38</sup> The five countries were each the object of covert U.S. initiatives under Carter—and of far more intense efforts during the Reagan administration. Only in El Salvador, where a tyrant was neatly replaced by a U.S.-backed junta, was the crisis efficiently managed. The stage was set for the overt reassertion of American faith in the counterinsurgency state.

A sixth political upheaval went largely unremarked during the pivotal year 1979: another intervention by a Marxist state which, as in Afghanistan, set out to deal with a renegade Marxist regime. In January 1979, Vietnamese troops marched into Phnom Penh and ousted Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime—then, like the Soviets in Afghanistan, settled in for a long stay. The United States' subsequent covert, paramilitary policies on Cambodia, like those on

Afghanistan, involved unconventional warfare in concert with native allies who might otherwise have been deadly enemies. The war in Afghanistan put the United States in a nominal alliance with a wide range of sometimes mutually antagonistic mujahedeen groups, including fundamentalists in ideological concord with the more extreme of the Shiite mullahs of Iran. The war against the Vietnamese-backed regime in Cambodia placed the United States in a bizarre alliance with the Khmer Rouge and the former king, Norodom Sihanouk (the diplomatic posture was to back continued United Nations recognition of Pol Pot's Government of Democratic Kampuchea and to isolate the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh). Ten years later, after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and the Vietnamese from Cambodia, American support for unconventional warfare against the standing governments continued.

The foundations of American involvement in Afghanistan were laid in the six months preceding the Soviet invasion. After December 1979, when an already considerable Soviet presence snowballed with entire Soviet armies on the move, a paramilitary program to assist Afghan resistance movements went into high gear. Afghanistan, of course, provided a situation for waging unconventional warfare in its classic sense. The scenario was one of resistance in an occupied country—this time not only “occupied” by an undesirable native regime but by actual enemy aliens.<sup>[39](#)</sup>

In Afghanistan, tactics and, to a degree, expectations drawn from precedents set in World War II held true. The Soviet occupiers and their Afghan allies were guilty of all of the excesses common to an expeditionary force, from reprisal killings and torture to the wholesale destruction of villages, whatever their original intentions. Reliance on firepower and “death from the air,” too, often predominated

when lesser priority programs to win hearts and minds faltered. Reform and development programs proved awkward in the short term, particularly in the context of what rapidly assumed the characteristics of a holy war.

President Carter's initiatives would be taken up enthusiastically by the Reagan administration. The less than covert assistance programs for the diverse forces fighting in Afghanistan would reach enormous levels during Reagan's two terms. John Prados has estimated that the Carter administration provided some \$30 million to the resistance in 1980, and that funding levels increased under Reagan beginning in 1981, up to \$625 million by 1984, \$280 million in 1985, \$470 million in 1986, and \$630 million in 1987.<sup>40</sup> Added to third-country contributions and American aid to refugees in Pakistan, the expenditure of about \$2.5 billion made Afghanistan "the most expensive secret war ever waged."<sup>41</sup>

The mechanics and materials of the American role in Afghanistan would be revealed gradually over the nearly ten years of the Soviet occupation. Afghanistan would increasingly be presented as the Reagan administration's undercover success story—and Carter too would take pride in having started the ball rolling.<sup>42</sup> The feting of mujahedeen would be the order of the day in special operations circles throughout the 1980s although by 1989 some concern would be expressed over what was to come *after* the Soviet withdrawal. The details of American assistance are available in the press and in specialist journals (including *Soldier of Fortune*) and are not discussed here. Over the next decade, however Afghanistan should provide the basis for an assessment of waging unconventional warfare in a postinvasion scenario. The lessons of Afghanistan will almost certainly also be used to make a case for unconventional warfare in rather different

scenarios, just as the lessons learned in World War II were incessantly misapplied to the ideological framework of the Cold War.

The emerging war in Afghanistan was the most successful Carter covert action initiative. The decline and fall of the Shah of Iran and the debacle of the American hostages would be the administration's downfall and serve as the rallying cry for a renewed reliance on covert action and open intervention under the Reagan administration.

## **Carter and the Special Operations Elite**

A renaissance of the elite forces of special warfare—army, navy, air force, and CIA—and the proliferation of ever-more specialized forces began in the wake of the failed 1980 mission to rescue the Iranian-held American hostages; it went into high gear with the election of Ronald Reagan. The turnaround, pushed by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, began in 1977 under the Carter administration, first as a response to rising international terrorism—for which Army's Delta and Blue Light commandos were activated—and then to the Iranian Revolution.<sup>[43](#)</sup>

The regearing for low-intensity conflict in the 1980s also followed a second track quite distinct from the build-up for special operations. The more conventional innovation was to develop light infantry suitable for rapid deployment to overseas trouble spots—forces of which special operations components formed only a small part.<sup>[44](#)</sup> A post-Vietnam strategy, already crystallized in 1977, envisioned the use of general purpose forces outside the NATO framework to provide the capability for a fast and flexible response to overseas crises. The concept, outlined by the Department of Defense in a classified Presidential Review Memorandum,



was to develop forces that could operate independently, with neither forward bases nor the facilities of friendly nations; geographical areas cited as requiring such cover included Korea, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East.<sup>45</sup> Implementation of the strategy was under way in January 1979, when the fall of the Shah of Iran lit a fire under the planners. The assignment of units to a combined services force was reportedly concluded by mid-1979; President Carter announced that he had ordered the formation of the first Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) on 1 October 1979. The initial operational plans responded to the crises of the moment, in Iran and Central America; preparations for deployment (with some foresight) centered on the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean.<sup>46</sup> The command structure of the new forces was in place by March 1980: a Marine Brigadier General, P. X. Kelley, was appointed to command the first of the RDFs, with a general headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida.<sup>47</sup>

The RDF's combination of army, air force, navy, and Marine Corps forces was innovative insofar as it required tight interservice cooperation and a streamlined command structure. The concept provided for joint task forces to be brought rapidly together when required, not to remain on permanent standby. Available forces included most of the Marines' amphibious forces (some 50,000 men), three navy carrier groups, and a range of air force units. The exception, the RDF nucleus that was in fact on a permanent standby, was the 15,000 man 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, with three infantry brigades at a permanently high state of readiness for rapid deployment.

The army's role in the Rapid Deployment Forces was performed largely through light infantry divisions, formations that had been phased out in 1944 but were revived for "their rapid deployability as a show of force."<sup>48</sup>

The new units appeared to be designed both for a real flexing of U.S. muscle (a la Grenada) and as an ostentatious signal that a new era in overseas operations had begun. Army Chief of Staff General John A. Wickham described the rapid deployment of light infantry as a means to demonstrate the United States' "resolve and capability," particularly in scenarios where there are "low to mid-intensity conflict threats" and a U.S. presence may well "prevent the outbreak of war." Wickham stressed both the strategic value and the "battlefield utility" of "highly deployable, hard hitting combat units."<sup>49</sup>

The selling of the light infantry concept was in large part done through emphasis on its usefulness in "low-intensity conflict," particularly in the contested areas of the Third World. RDFs were also designed to restore a semblance of the United States' capability of decades past to operate militarily around the world, a need acutely felt in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution. The renewed projection of U.S. power at every level was a fundamental goal of the Reagan administration, and the RDFs would provide one means to this end. In practical terms, military strategists would view the light infantry primarily as a tool for in-and-out interventions along the lines of Grenada.

The RDFs formed just part of a military buildup on several levels designed to facilitate the projection of U.S. power overseas. In effect, the program seems to have been a compromise aimed at placating each of the military services as well as contending schools of thought regarding military options. Defense analyst Michael Klare summarized the expansion of forces for "insertion into overseas conflict zones" as having included, by 1988, "the acquisition of two new aircraft carrier battle groups; the formation of four new light infantry divisions; a significant increase in the Marine corps' amphibious capacity; a 50 percent increase in long-

range airlift capacity; and the revitalization of America's Special Operations Forces."<sup>50</sup> Mexican military analyst Lilia Bermúdez considered the RDF in the terms of Clausewitz's concepts of strategy:

*[W]ith the RDF the necessary force was created for global intervention of a conventional nature, its distinctive characteristic the capacity to saturate the theatre of operations.... [I]n terms of time [the RDF] can be inserted rapidly and decisively to resolve the crisis with the greatest speed, in a space that is as limited as possible—which in Central America one supposes could be Nicaragua or El Salvador.*<sup>51</sup>

Although the gurus of the new light infantry, such as Edward Luttwak, envisioned them performing a key role in long-term counterinsurgency efforts, this approach would gradually be scuttled. By 1986, army attitudes swung back toward "a more conventional, higher intensity role" for the light divisions.<sup>52</sup> According to doctrine, the primary role in counterinsurgency—and, indeed, all aspects of low-intensity conflict—had been assigned to the special operations force in the 1981 field manual FM 100-20, *Low Intensity Conflict*; this would remain the case, with conventional forces on call for reinforcement (or shows of force) if needed. The ascendance of special operations forces in the 1980s would be clinched by way of international terrorism, the Iranian Revolution, and the ideological romanticism of Ronald Reagan and the New Right.

The army's initial response to terrorism in the 1970s had been to eschew the special warfare solution in favor of more conventional formations with similar commando skills; the result was the creation of two Ranger battalions in 1974.<sup>53</sup> (The success of the Rangers in the Grenada operation—in contrast to the dismal performance of the special warfare

elites—would result in the creation of a third Ranger battalion.<sup>54</sup>)

A 1978 study of elite forces suggested that the Ranger model would, in effect, replace that of the Special Forces. The Ranger battalions, defense analyst Eliot Cohen observes, “fit the specialist model: they were relatively small forces trained for such missions as the rescue of hostages....”<sup>55</sup> The Special Forces were, for a time, unfashionable for their tendency to proliferate, to circumvent the chain of command, to grandstand with romantic stunts, indiscipline, and autonomy, and, even worse, to threaten the apolitical foundations of the military. The Ranger battalions, in contrast, provided neat packages of skilled personnel with most of the desirable qualities of elite units and none of the liabilities. According to Cohen, the reactivation of the Rangers, in short, was an expression of “the Army’s intention not to repeat its unpleasant experiences with the Green Berets.”<sup>56</sup> In fact, the prediction could hardly have been more inaccurate. Under the Carter administration, the revival of the Special Forces was already underway.

## **Delta Down in Desert One**

The Carter administration reevaluated the Special Forces with an eye to rebuilding them for narrowly defined tasks; the aim was to develop highly mobile commando forces for emergencies, not to expand the whole panoply of such forces. The development of the military’s antiterrorist capabilities was based on the example of the German and Israeli strike forces which had proved their worth at Mogadishu and Entebbe; the organizational model was the British SAS (Special Air Services).<sup>57</sup>

The army's First Special Forces Operational Detachment—Delta— became operational in November 1977 as an elite antiterrorist force, organized by Colonel Charlie Beckwith, former commander of Vietnam's Project DELTA detachment B-52. Beckwith was recruited by the Special Forces in 1958 and, in June 1962, took part in an exchange program with the British 22d SAS Battalion, accompanying SAS to Malaya in January 1963.<sup>58</sup> From his appointment as Commandant of the Army Special Forces School in 1974, Beckwith promoted the creation of an SAS-style "counterterrorist" unit; by August 1977, the climate was right, and Beckwith worked full time to set up a new Delta Force.<sup>59</sup>

An interim counterterrorism commando force, the Blue Light battalion, consisted of Special Forces personnel and was organized according to long-standing special operations lines. Delta was intended to be an elite, purpose-built force of about 200. Although manned largely by Special Forces veterans, it drew also on special operations forces from the other services. Based at Fort Bragg, Delta was organized in line with the SAS system of rigid selection criteria, tough training, and sixteen-man units. Selection criteria included exhaustive psychological testing to ensure that men with the necessary physical skills fit an equally exacting psychological profile of attitudes and motivation.

Although its personnel were perhaps ideally suited for the psychological strains of commando tasks, Delta Force was not particularly successful in its initial operations. Delta, unlike the SAS, remained dependent on other services for logistics and fit awkwardly into the military command structure. Both characteristics would contribute to its undoing in its first hostage-rescue endeavor, Operation EAGLE CLAW, the raid launched in April 1980 to rescue the American hostages in revolutionary Iran. A third element to which Delta's initial failures were attributed by military

critics was the presumption that daring, if not brash, leadership was appropriate for high-risk, sometimes strategic operations requiring enormous discretion and a cool head. Delta Force's commander, Colonel Beckwith, was chosen on the basis of his past derring-do in special operations. Army strategist Colonel Harry Summers, in a blistering critique of Beckwith's 1983 book on Delta Force (and his direction of the Iran raid), found in Beckwith's account a reprehensible reinforcement of the image of Special Forces "as profane, knuckle-dragging louts.")' Of particular concern to Summers was the contrast between Beckwith's self-serving, tough-guy braggadocio (most of the book) with his account of the Iran raid at "the critical moment when the plans began to fall apart," when his leadership at Desert One, the secret base in the Iranian desert, proved impulsive, emotional—and inadequate."

Summers concludes that the identification of the required qualities of command had in itself been faulty—in Delta's case, daring and valor had been confused with the classic virtues of leadership:

*The problem is that the Army was looking for boldness.... Beckwith seemed a logical choice. Forgotten was Clausewitz's warning that: "The higher up the chain of command the greater is the need for boldness to be supported by a reflective mind, so that boldness does not degenerate into purposeless bursts of blind passion. Command becomes progressively less a matter of personal sacrifice and increasingly concerned for the safety of others and for the common purpose."*<sup>62</sup>

In fact, the career prospects of special operations officers are, as a rule, truncated outside their special calling. A kind of vicious circle obtains: Advocates of greater resources and respect for special operations "complain that soldiers

attracted to unconventional combat are passed over for promotion because the regular military believes they make poor staff officers,"<sup>63</sup> while those with the potential to be good staff officers, in turn, are perhaps not attracted to special operations forces because of the cliquish, secretive, and unconventional character of the discipline. There appears to be no provision for young officers to be rotated through brief tours in Special Forces, either because the army does not want them "spoiled" by exposure to secret warfare or because the special operations community feels it can ill-afford to train and work with officers who intend only a brief stay before returning to more conventional units.

## **The End of Ideals**

The Carter administration's preoccupation with human rights had by mid-term been largely overwhelmed by the inertia of the foreign policy establishment and by demands for a traditional response to the unforeseen events overseas. The Cold War chorus at home shrilly attributed the collapse of stalwart anticommunist regimes in Nicaragua and Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the administration's lack of resolve. The administration responded with new resources for special operations forces and with open-ended military engagements in the secret wars of Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Central America.

The exhaustion (although not the reversal) of the human rights policy was almost complete. The administration's response to the bloodbath in El Salvador was to pour in military aid and plug into the situation its own unconventional warriors. This, and the commitment to a range of new secret wars, reflected the very policies whose sequelae of atrocity Jimmy Carter had most vigorously opposed. The renewed commitment to unconventional

warfare paved the way for the open-eyed amorality of the next administration.

As the Carter administration staggered to an end, its commitment to place the defense of human rights in the forefront of foreign affairs lay in tatters. A new era, in which Cold War ideology would inform U.S. policy without dissimulation, was about to begin. The great hope offered by Carter's idealism was ultimately finished off by Islamic fundamentalism, Central American revolution, and international terrorism, but it had long since been stymied by institutional resistance to the fundamental changes that Carter envisioned. The Reagan administration, in contrast, would find the great bureaucracies of the state ready and willing to return to the pre-Carter status quo and to relaunch the Cold War on the periphery.



# Chapter 14: Morning in America and the Special Warfare Revival

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## Ronald Reagan to the White House

The Reagan administration entered office with a chip on its shoulder and a desire to “get even” with the ideological adversary that had invaded Afghanistan, defended Angola, and succored the Sandinistas in Central America. The enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine—to hold the line in the nations under Soviet influence—itsself an aggressive variation of containment, was to Washington in the 1980s the equivalent of Krushchev’s call for wars of national liberation. The Third World locales of the U.S.S.R.’s erstwhile successes were to be the battlefield of the renewed Cold War. The first overt theater of operations was Central America, with political and military action focused on Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. Angola and Afghanistan would be dealt with on parallel, nominally covert tracks. The Reagan administration set out to reverse the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to turn back the revolutionary tide in Africa and Latin America.

A program of covert and clandestine action to reverse the Nicaraguan revolution was at the top of the agenda—its foundations were laid even before the Reagan administration transformed still- peaceful Honduras into the

new regional base for U. S. military power, to supplement the diminishing facilities in Panama. The annihilation of the small and ineffectual radical armed Left in Honduras was scheduled to be largely complete before the U.S. buildup there took off. That counterterror operation of murder and “disappearance” was perhaps successful in tactical terms. But, as always, it would leave in its wake lasting political costs.

After 1983, the Middle East became the Reagan administration’s center of attention. Its response to violence against American lives and various short-term interests in Lebanon and the Mediterranean took the form of an American campaign against the state-sponsored terrorism of others. The campaign brought the concept of counterterror out into the open, legitimizing it in the round of world opinion. Global counterinsurgency operations and unconventional wars were similarly sanitized as part of the campaign against international terrorism. The Reagan administration’s antiterrorist propaganda bandwagon associated the terror tactics of the Middle East with the Salvadoran guerrillas and Nicaragua’s beleaguered government. Shiite terrorism in Beirut was used to promote the renewal of police assistance to Central America and to pump up political support for the United States’ global programs to combat insurgencies and undesirable regimes.

### **Interest, Ideology, and the New Right**

Reagan’s new foreign policy team moved rapidly to establish its credentials by making Central America its initial platform. The United States’ commitment to counterinsurgency in El Salvador was boosted, and the holding action already in progress on Nicaragua was transformed into an active program of unconventional

warfare. Most of the new foreign policy chiefs were on record as advocates of a newly aggressive stage of American foreign policy: the post-detente revival of an activist Cold War. On Central America the consensus was that Nicaragua had been “lost” to Soviet expansionism by a weak foreign policy; the new policymakers disagreed only on the ways by which the United States could recover lost ground and prevent further slippage in El Salvador. An insider described the dispute as one “between the hard-liners and the ideologues.”) The ideologues had produced astonishing documents, which presented a picture of global conspiracy last seen in the Cold War comic books of the 1950s.

A 1980 document by “The Committee of Santa Fe”—made up of L. Francis Bouchey, Roger W. Fontaine, Lewis Tambs, and other Reagan advisers on geopolitics—reflects the paranoid tone of the ideologues:

*For the United States of America, isolationism is impossible. Containment of the Soviet Union is not enough. Detente is dead. Survival demands a new foreign policy. America must seize the initiative or perish.... Latin America and Southern Asia are the scenes of strife of the third phase of World War 111.... The crisis is metaphysical.... America is everywhere in retreat.... Even the Caribbean... is becoming a Marxist Leninist Lake. Never before has the Republic been in such jeopardy from its exposed southern flank.... It is time to seize the initiative.... Either a Pax Sovietica or a worldwide counter-projection of American power is in the offing. The hour of decision can no longer be postponed.<sup>2</sup>*

A hard-liner par excellence was the new Secretary of State, General Alexander Haig, a former Kissinger adviser who wanted to combat the communist threat but proved incoherent in defining and implementing the precise policies

required. (Haig was bright enough, however, to exclude the nucleus of the “transition team” from the State Department.<sup>3</sup>) On taking office, the new Secretary called for an offensive to reverse “the escalating setbacks to our interests abroad,” a pointed reference to the Carter administration’s problems with Ayatollah Khomeini and to the new government in Managua. These developments, “and the so-called wars of national liberation,” were a challenge to be met: They were “putting in jeopardy our ability to influence world events.”<sup>4</sup>

In February 1981, Haig launched his first foreign policy offensive in a media blitz denouncing the “Cuban/Nicaraguan Threat,” which prepared the way for a massive boost in U. S. involvement in El Salvador. *Time* magazine described the offensive as “a curious series of public presentations, “ dominated by “the prime proponent of the Administration’s us-vs-them world view, Secretary of State Alexander Haig,” and compared it to the hype over the Cuban missile crisis twenty years before..<sup>5</sup> Although government media efforts centered primarily on using the Cuban—and by extension Nicaraguan—bogey to justify military backing to El Salvador’s regime, the primary threat was clearly identified as coming from the Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup>

Haig’s explanation of the threat to the House Foreign Affairs Committee early in 1981 was entirely consistent with the analysis of the Committee of Santa Fe. The Soviet Union was, by his account, working through a four-stage plan that was to proceed from its success in Nicaragua to the collapse of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala: “I wouldn’t necessarily call it a domino theory, I would call it a priority target list—a hit list, if you will—for the ultimate takeover of Central America.”<sup>7</sup> The IICW president, presumably, was receptive to this interpretation. In a September 1980

campaign speech, Ronald Reagan went a little further: “I think we are seeing the application of the domino theory . . . and I think that it’s time the people of the United States realize . . . that we’re the last domino.”<sup>8</sup>

The influence of right-wing appointees’ personal ideology on foreign policy formulation became a hallmark of Reagan’s first term, although his own essential common sense in the face of Gorbachev’s initiatives (and better advice) eventually won out—much to the John Birchers’ consternation. Over the next eight years, the death of detente and the renewed specter of the “evil empire” would be followed by a rapid thaw and rapprochement. The moderation of American paranoia toward the Soviet Union, however, did little to moderate the American anxiety vis-a-vis the Third World. It was there that the triumph of ideology over reason was most apparent in foreign policy initiatives, as well as in military doctrines of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, recycled into the doctrine of “low-intensity conflict.”

The idea of national interest as a concept unrelated to personal qualms and ideology, as suggested by Admiral Mahan almost a century before was recalled in some critiques of the New Right’s lockstep approach to foreign policy. The hard-liners of the 1980s who wrapped their shrill cries of doom in the flag of realpolitik were confusing the world they saw through an ideological lens with reality and their penchant for aggressive (military) action with a strong policy. In a 1985 article responding to the administration’s glorification of covert action and fighting “fire with fire,” George Kennan defined the national interest in terms of military security, the integrity of the nation’s political life, and the well-being of its people. He appears to paraphrase Mahan in observing:

These needs have no moral quality.... They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either 'good' or 'bad.' . . ." As a consequence, a government "needs no moral justification, nor need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them." At the same time, Kennan notes, the idea of interest is detached from the personal inclinations of the administration of the day:

*[T]he functions, commitments and moral obligations of governments are not the same as those of the individual. Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience.*<sup>9</sup>

Kennan's dispassionate approach can also be applied to the formulation of policy, particularly as it concerns war. That interest informs policy and policy creates war is a long-standing tenet of military theory. Clausewitz reminds us that the art of war in itself provides no ready corrective for bad policy. Although the interpretation of interests, and thus the formulation of policy, may be biased or erroneous, policy remains the dominant factor in war. Clausewitz writes:

Policy, of course, is nothing in itself; it is simply the trustee for all these interests against the outside world. That it can err, subserve the ambitions, private interests, and vanity of those in power, is neither here nor there. In no sense can the art of war ever be regarded as the preceptor of policy, and here we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community.<sup>10</sup>

The crux of these questions for the Reagan administration was in its interpretation of the threat to the national interest, the remedy to the threat, and the best policy to pursue for

future security and prosperity. The danger lay in the administration's conviction that an ideologically sound package could be taken off the shelf to provide a response for any foreseeable circumstance (a proposition ironically close to that of the New Right's communist counterparts). Foreign policy initiatives—or reactions—that assume the characteristics of a moral crusade (however idealistic, however cynical) can acquire a strength of purpose and a momentum undaunted by reasoned analysis. The policymakers' ability to adapt policy to changing reality becomes proportionally limited. If for Kennan's "moral" quality we substitute "ideological," the danger becomes more immediate: Does the military security or the integrity of American political life require a crusading war to the death on every foreign field to crush an ideological adversary? Or would such a crusade indeed be detrimental to the long—or short—term integrity of political life, to the economic well-being, and to the military security of the nation?

## **The Doctrine of Low-Intensity Conflict**

A new name, low-intensity conflict (LIC), was adopted by the Reagan administration in 1981 as an umbrella term for the interrelated doctrines of counterinsurgency, special operations, and unconventional warfare. The American public was warned that low-intensity conflict represented the major threat—and challenge—of the 1980s, and a fresh doctrine and an improved capability were needed to meet that challenge. By waging low-intensity warfare, the United States could respond to it and play a forceful role in the world—at low risk and low cost. The new jargon was ideal for persuading a skeptical Congress and the public of the need to halt and roll back the advances of the Soviet Union and to take direct action against international terrorism.

The language of the hype over low-intensity conflict echoed John F. Kennedy's promotion of a counterinsurgency program as a new dimension to "the national arsenal. "" Kennedy had warned of free world security "being slowly nibbled away at the periphery" by subversion, guerrilla war, intimidation, and the like.<sup>12</sup> Low-intensity conflict, like insurgency in the 1960s, was viewed as the kind of conflict most likely to develop in the Third World and on the periphery of the First. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, in his 1987 report to Congress, updated the call to arms, warning that the world abounded with adversaries "who seek to undermine our security by persistently nibbling away at our interests through these shadow wars carried out by guerrillas, assassins, terrorists, and subversives in the hope that they have found a weak point in our defenses." A comprehensive "national strategy" was required to confront the menace of low-intensity conflict: Unless prompt action was taken, "these forms of aggression will remain the most likely and the most enduring threats to our security."<sup>13</sup> Low-intensity conflict doctrine was presented as a cure-all for the United States' troubles on the periphery.

In fact, the term had long been used by the military as one of three general categories of armed conflict distinguished by their intensity. High-intensity conflict entailed the enemy's deployment of atomic or other weaponry in an immediate threat to the very existence of the United States or its allies, or any conflict that required the mass mobilization of American resources to avoid defeat. Mid-intensity conflict was distinguished primarily by the major commitment of American forces, as in the Korean War, with a high potential cost: Heavy casualties could be expected and defeat was a possibility, although national survival would not be in the balance. Low-intensity conflict, in contrast, involved minimal commitment of American forces, a limited



objective, and the comforting premise that “U.S. forces never risk military defeat.”<sup>14</sup>

The 1980s usage of low-intensity conflict applied to the full range of conflict scenarios short of full-scale war involving a massive commitment of U. S. forces. The burden of low-intensity conflict would fall on allied foreign forces, proxies, or mercenaries. The Nixon Doctrine, whereby U.S.- backed counterinsurgency operations would be conducted by predominantly local forces, remained in force.<sup>15</sup> Aggressive unconventional warfare against undesirable regimes was also to be waged with predominantly local personnel, from Nicaragua to Angola. It was a maxim that American boys would not be casually sent to fight and die in foreign countries, but elite forces would organize others for the dirty work of low-intensity wars.

The real change was not in the doctrine but in its relative significance in foreign policy. The high- profile commitment to low-intensity conflict meant a turning away from intervention and armed conflict by conventional military means, in favor of military action through U.S. allies, proxies, and paramilitary assets, anywhere below the threshold of conventional armed conflict. The broad range of operations covered by the low-intensity rubric, however, still allowed the juxtaposition of special warfare and conventional military force, just as in previous decades.

The new doctrine dictated minimal direct involvement of U.S. personnel, mainly elite special operations units (although contingencies for American troops to move in remained). The Nicaragua operation was largely performed at arm’s length, with relatively few Americans committed inside the country—although some were present on the ground, in the air, or in scuba gear off Nicaragua’s ports. Contingencies for transforming the hostilities from nominally

covert to overt, from special warfare to conventional (but low-intensity) warfare, were prepared in neighboring Honduras, with the development there of a conventional U.S. military infrastructure of airstrips, barracks, supply dumps, and nonstop maneuver training. The invasion of Grenada was also “low-intensity”—but involved aircraft carriers, submarines, landing craft, and the whole panoply of high-intensity hardware.

A definition of low-intensity warfare suited to the attitudes and temperament of the Reagan administration emerged from defense analyst Robert H. Kupperman’s study, commissioned by the U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command.<sup>16</sup> Kupperman’s definition of “low intensity warfare” incorporates both special warfare and the traditional “small war” between the colonial powers and the colonized. “Low intensity warfare is . . . the limited use of force or the threat of its use, to achieve political objectives without the total commitment of resources and will that characterizes the wars of survival or conquest of nation-states.”<sup>17</sup> Typically, these conflicts are usually “asymmetric,” between contenders of vastly unequal strength. Whether conducted by the United States or by others, low-intensity conflict “can include coercive diplomacy, police actions, psychological operations, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, counterterrorist activity and military- paramilitary deployment.” More surprisingly, in Kupperman’s “working definition,” “the terms low intensity conflict and unconventional warfare can be used interchangeably.”<sup>18</sup>

The emphasis on unconventional warfare and special operations was reinforced in the course of the 1980s through a series of conferences and projects OTI low-intensity conflict, and also through the Reagan administration’s vigorous patronage of the unconventional forces of the military and intelligence establishment. The special

operations focus of the top-level low-intensity conflict conferences is discussed below. A joint-services research project (Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project, JLIC) was established in 1985 to consider the application of the developing doctrine to a full range of low-intensity scenarios.<sup>19</sup> Its broad definition of “low-intensity conflict” is based largely on the conflict environment: “It is, first, an environment in which conflict occurs and, second, a series of diverse civil-military activities and operations which are conducted in that environment.”<sup>20</sup> Its *Final Report*, not surprisingly, focuses on American planning for intervention in the Third World.

The JLIC project report defines five major categories, based largely on American military objectives, within the low-intensity conflict area:<sup>21</sup> insurgency, counterinsurgency, terrorism counteraction (defensive “antiterrorism” and offensive “counterterrorism”), peacekeeping (“military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore, or maintain peace, “ usually as part of an international effort), and peacetime contingency. The last is the catch-all category within which the rapid deployment of U.S. forces play a multitude of roles as an international gendarme (as, for example, on the eve of the Persian Gulf war). The peacetime contingency mission is defined as “politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by the short-term rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of conventional war, for example, strike, raid, rescue, recovery, demonstration, show of force, unconventional warfare, and intelligence operations.”” Insurgency, in the low-intensity typology, is both a part of the conflict spectrum and a mission statement for U.S. forces: In the latter sense, it is now sometimes termed “proinsurgency” and fits squarely in the offensive mode of unconventional warfare.

## **A Doctrine for “Countering Revolution”**

Although low-intensity conflict doctrine per se was to cover a multitude of scenarios, the bulk of the debate over the doctrine and its practical application in the Reagan years centered on the traditional Cold War enterprise of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare. The Reagan era saw a massive buildup of special operations and Rapid Deployment Forces for insertion into conflict situations that were beyond the capacity of elites alone or unsuitable for resolution through foreign recruits or proxies. The November 1985 Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of “low-intensity conflict” was clearly a compromise aimed at covering all contingencies and giving away little that could rebound politically: “a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives,” often protracted, ranging from “diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency”; it is generally limited geographically, and is “often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence. “ [23](#)

As a military doctrine, low-intensity conflict can be applied equally to one-off special operations, prolonged counterinsurgency or unconventional warfare, or to conventional military force projections along the lines of the Grenada intervention. Analysts Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh conclude, however, that notwithstanding its depiction by military strategists as “a war for all seasons,” it is “in essence . . . a doctrine for countering revolution. The ‘L.I.C. pie,’ as Pentagon insiders call it, is largely divided between counterinsurgency and proinsurgency operations—what the JLIC Final Report describes as ‘diplomatic, economic and military support for either a government

under attack by insurgents or an insurgent force seeking freedom from an adversary government.’ “[24](#)

Although during the 1980s, the term “low-intensity conflict” was applied to a broad range of power projection, it served as a distinct code word primarily for counterinsurgency. Its other applications, such as the peacekeeping or “peacetime contingency” dimensions, were largely conventional in nature and had a well-established terminology of their own. The writers at Fort Bragg who revised the field manual on counterinsurgency warfare for issue in January 1981 were instructed to use the term “low intensity” almost as a synonym for counterinsurgency.[25](#) The manual was entitled simply *Low Intensity Conflict*, FM 100-20; a subsequent revision, produced in May 1986 at Fort Leavenworth in the Field Circular series, FC 100-20, retained the same title. The new manuals were largely indistinguishable from their companion volumes of the late 1960s, although the new terminology no longer in itself promoted counterinsurgency as a political-military hybrid. The change was only the most recent in the periodic revisions of military nomenclature. Counterinsurgency doctrine’s previous code word, “internal defense and development” (IDAD), had been selected in the late 1960s as an upbeat, politically astute formulation for public consumption and had persisted into the 1980s. Counterinsurgency would continue to be called “foreign internal defense” within the low-intensity conflict framework but progressively dropped its “development” component.

## **The Special Operations Revival**

A campaign to rehabilitate special warfare had begun in the latter years of the Carter administration, and was led by veterans of special operations from both the military and the

CIA. Former CIA officer Theodore Shackley was one of the most influential pioneers of the covert action and counterinsurgency renaissance from the beginning of the Reagan administration.<sup>26</sup> Shackley's 1981 mass-market book, *The Third Option*, attacked the restrictions imposed by Congress and Carter on the CIA and the special operations forces of the military, and it offered concrete proposals for a return to the aggressive use of special warfare.<sup>27</sup> At the time, Shackley was taken seriously, despite his early retirement from the CIA in 1979 in the fallout over the Edwin Wilson affair—the “unofficial” operation in which ten tons of C-4 plastic explosive were exported to Libya in 1975 and 1976 and Special Forces men flew out to provide terrorist training there.<sup>28</sup> (One can postulate a Langley nightmare: the disclosure of evidence that Wilson's C-4 was used in the destruction of the United States Marine garrison in Beirut.)

Shackley's thesis was that the new constraints had eliminated the United States' flexibility to respond to world crises, reducing it to only two options short of nuclear war: “We could send in the Marines, we could do nothing.”<sup>29</sup> Shackley may have been aware of Joint Chief's chairman L. L. Lemnitzer's 1962 description of the counterinsurgency program as “an action program designed to defeat the Communist without recourse to the hazard or the terror of nuclear war.”<sup>30</sup> Shackley defined the “third option” as “the use of guerrilla warfare, counterinsurgency techniques, and covert action to achieve policy goals” in a full range of “low intensity conflict” scenarios. The first step necessary, he argues, is to “train a new cadre of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency experts”<sup>31</sup> for the CIA and special operations forces of the military.

Shackley's approach was much appreciated by the New Right advisers of the Reagan administration; even before the

1980 elections, it had garnered a hard core of advocates in defense circles. A 1982 article by defense analysts Richard H. Shultz and Alan Ned Sabrosky ratified the Shackley doctrine:

*[T]he United States will find itself involved at different times on the side of both insurgents and counterinsurgents. Too often we think of the U. S. role as primarily counterinsurgent—helping friendly regimes endure. However, given the unconventional conflict environment of the 1980s and the need to protect U.S. interests within it, we concur with Theodore Shackley that the United States must develop what he terms the “third option.”* [32](#)

Measures to this end were to include an expanded military security assistance program—to include the provision of military trainers and advisers—and a buildup of unconventional warfare capabilities. Shultz and Sabrosky, like Shackley, imply that the “techniques” of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency are one and the same: The means to the end in both is found in the area of special operations forces. Like Shackley, they recommend “a serious upgrading of Special Forces units” and a “restoration of a powerful paramilitary capability within the CIA.” [33](#)

The common denominator of Shackley and the Reagan team was the conviction that a new age of “unconventional” intervention was long overdue. The distinction between unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency was more blurred than ever, coming together in the field of special operations. If the two concepts were twins at inception in the 1960s, in the 1980s they were to be melded into a common design. The multipurpose covert action concept, Shackley argues, is suited to any occasion:

*Covert action is an intelligence discipline which can be subdivided into several functional parts. One such segment being paramilitary operations or the furnishing of covert military assistance to unconventional and conventional foreign forces and organizations.... [D]epending on which side of a conflict the United States is on, it can be devoted to either fostering or defeating so-called "revolutionary wars."*<sup>34</sup>

The Reagan administration responded to the lobbying of the intelligence and special warfare community by wholeheartedly promoting special operations forces as the American panacea for "unconventional threats." The administration's first instructions to the armed forces to beef up special operations capabilities followed close on the heels of Reagan's inauguration. The 1981 Defense Guidance document directed all service chiefs to develop a "Special Operations Forces" (SOF) capability as an explicit element of the national defense strategy. The role of special operations and special forces within the emerging doctrine of low-intensity conflict is discussed below.

The "third option" approach to low-intensity conflict was encouraged by a blue-ribbon Pentagon panel packed with cloak-and-dagger luminaries of the unconventional wars and covert actions of past decades. Set up by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Ikle, the panel was chaired by General John Singlaub, and its more illustrious members included General Edward Lansdale and General Harry Aderholt, a key figure in the secret war in Laos. Aderholt and Singlaub would both play a role in fund-raising for the *contras* and arranging their resupply.<sup>35</sup> In March 1984, the committee became known as the Special Operations Policy Advisory Group (SOPAG); its subsequent membership varied, but Singlaub retained the chair. Members of the panel over the next four years included Maj. Gen. Richard V.



Second, another “Contra-gate” figure; General John S. Pustay, author of the 1965 classic *Counterinsurgency Warfare* Brig. Gen. Donald Blackburn, a veteran of unconventional warfare in the Philippines; General Richard G. Stilwell; and Gen. William Yarborough, former Special Forces commander.<sup>[36](#)</sup>

The Singlaub committee, which apparently first met in April 1983, played a significant role in steering the United States away from the rapid deployment/light infantry approach to low-intensity threats, toward covert and clandestine secret warfare through proxies, paramilitary special operations, and extralegal tactics. In one sense, the recommendations were toward less rather than more violence: The apparent consensus was that the enormous firepower that characterized the Vietnam War would be counterproductive in the 1980s “low-intensity” wars. The main agents of action were to be special operations forces specializing in small-unit actions. Although the prescribed levels of violence were to be lower in quantitative terms, high levels of violence in concentrated doses were to be used in selective special operations.<sup>[37](#)</sup>

President Reagan was personally briefed on the first report of the Singlaub group at an NSC meeting; its “special operations” approach to counterinsurgency and guerrilla offensives would dominate the Reagan revival.<sup>[38](#)</sup> The United States’ way of warfare in the 1980s, from Nicaragua to Afghanistan and the Philippines, would follow the special operations lead. El Salvador mission chief Colonel John Waghelstein, for one, described the model for the 1980s as based on “the lessons of post-World War II insurgencies” and the experiences of officers such as Generals Edward Lansdale and John Singlaub.<sup>[39](#)</sup> If Lansdale, one of the most eloquent advocates of a no-holds-barred approach to psy-war, was the

archetypical exponent of amoral covert action, Singlaub is the model for the Rambo-style commando raider.

Singlaub, as opposed to Lansdale and other legendary unconventional warriors, did not attract the limelight. His ideas about low-intensity conflict, which appear to have carried the day with the Reagan administration, can only be extrapolated from what is known of his career. His reputation is based on his assignment to Fifth Special Forces. Former MACV chief General William Westmoreland describes Singlaub as having been “one of the first” commanders of the Vietnam War’s “joint unconventional warfare task force,” known generally by the acronym SOG (which is often mistaken for Special Operations Group), rather than its official designation as the “Studies and Observation Group.” He apparently led SOG for two to three years, beginning in 1966. Then Second Lt. Oliver North was reported by one source to have been under Singlaub’s SOG command in late 1968.<sup>40</sup> It was responsible for unconventional warfare in denied areas on the borders and in raids into Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam in the triborder area.<sup>41</sup> According to Westmoreland, SOG’s peak combat forces numbered “some 2,500 Americans and 7,000 South Vietnamese mercenaries.”<sup>42</sup>

The record of incursions into Laos and Cambodia, the main theaters of operations, was impressive if only because of the sheer destruction carried out. Former Green Beret Shelby Stanton says of the SOG style that by 1970 it won it “a global reputation as one of the most combat effective deep-penetration forces ever raised.”<sup>43</sup> The methods used in Laos and Cambodia combined the “anything goes” ethos of unconventional warfare doctrine, elite American and mercenary forces, and high-tech armament and air power: “Demolished convoys, blazing ammunition depots, slain guards, and kidnapped personnel highlighted the most

sustained American campaign of raiding, sabotage, and intelligence-gathering waged on foreign soil in U. S. military history.”<sup>44</sup> Stanton might have mentioned a further precedent: All of this went on in what was technically peacetime, in neutral countries. It was, in any case, understandable that in the unconventional warfare revival of the 1980s General Singlaub (and a slightly more mature Lt. Col. Oliver North) would be called in to organize a similar campaign against Nicaragua.

Those who admire Singlaub do so for his record in covert operations, from selective assassination to cross-border sabotage, carried out by elite American and mercenary forces: a record of bravery, bravado, and “can-do” ruthlessness. A veteran of OSS commando service behind the lines in occupied France, Singlaub’s postwar career led him to covert work in China and, in 1951, an intelligence assignment in Korea, to which he returned as U.S. forces commander in 1976. Singlaub was removed from command in 1978, after a dispute with the Carter administration; he retired the following year. Upon leaving active service, he remained very much in action, along with other retired generals who had similar special warfare experience and were united by a common bent toward extremist politics. In December 1979, as a member of the “American Security Council,” Singlaub and former Defense Intelligence Agency chief General Daniel O. Graham traveled to Central America and carried out high-level talks with Guatemala’s President Romeo Lucas García. The delegation appeared tailor-made to undercut U. S. foreign policy in the region: The press there presented the occasion as an army-to-army visit, and Singlaub’s message as an exhortation to hold fast against Jimmy Carter and “international communism.” Singlaub also established connections with Latin American neo-Nazis in the anti-Semitic World Anti-Communist League (and later served as its president). But it was his work in the

international arms trade which made him one of the linchpins of the Iran-contra scandal.<sup>[45](#)</sup>

The Reagan administration set out from the start to refurbish U.S. special operations forces and special warfare doctrine. Efforts were made to overcome some of the obstacles to expanding the special operations forces within the regular services, improving interservice coordination, and ensuring that these forces enjoyed sufficient personnel, training, and operational resources. Secretary of the Army John G. Marsh, for example, cited efforts to eliminate the stigmatizing effects of special operations service to officers' prospects for career advancement—and to legitimize their unconventional mission by breaking down their isolation and fully utilizing their potential “in the field of military assistance and training.... They are not competitors, nor should they be isolated from conventional forces.”<sup>[46](#)</sup>

In Reagan's first term, the political masters of the Pentagon also supported, for the most part, a renewed commitment to special warfare with full conventional backup. In his keynote speech to the 1983 special operations symposium at Fort McNair, Marsh remarked upon the traditional resistance “among leaders of conventional forces toward unconventional methods of coping with irregulars, partisans, or guerrillas. The soldier who tries to fight guerrillas with their own methods is often misunderstood.”<sup>[47](#)</sup> He suggested the time had come for the military establishment to acknowledge the need for a special warfare dimension in a world dominated by “the proliferation of unconventional threats.” In Marsh's assessment, a significant change “for the better” had already occurred in military perceptions—in part because of administration policies, in part because many of the army's top officers in the 1980s “were young majors and lieutenant colonels in Vietnam.”

Much of the defense establishment's internal debate on "low-intensity" conflict in the 1980s focused on special warfare. A renewed confidence in the ability of American unconventional warriors to turn a situation around in an overseas trouble spot took the place of a critical reappraisal of past practice and doctrine. The mechanics of special warfare were generally lumped under the rubric of "special operations," an old but repackaged panacea for low-intensity conflict. The official definition of "special operations" in the 1980s incorporated both insurgency and unconventional warfare:

*Special Operations: 1. Insurgency, counterinsurgency, resistance, transnational terrorism, counterterrorism;*

*2. Unorthodox, comparatively low-cost, potentially high-payoff, often covert or clandestine methods that national, subnational, and theater leaders employ independently in "peacetime" or to support nuclear/biological/chemical and/or conventional warfare across the conflict spectrum.*<sup>[48](#)</sup>

There was little innovation in the new approach to special warfare— apart from its promotion as a low-cost means to project U.S. power which should be used more routinely. The special operations formula was to be the United States' response to an increasingly complex range of Third World scenarios.

Counterinsurgency and indeed all aspects of special warfare doctrine had developed a reasonable level of political sophistication by the mid-1970s, acknowledging the necessity of combining military and civil initiatives. The thread of continuity from the 1950s, however, was the primacy of elite special warfare forces trained first in covert action commando skills and, as a seeming afterthought,

what was taken for political savvy. The 1980s revival made the special operations forces concept the centerpiece of “low-intensity” operations. The patchwork strategy of the 1960s, combining the commitment of huge conventional forces guerrilla operations, and “nation-building” development programs on a sometimes enormous scale was largely scrapped as too expensive, too slow, and too politically costly. The Reagan administration was also ideologically unwilling to commit huge economic resources to nonmilitary purposes, or, equally, to disrupt what it saw as model free-market economies.

The special operations forces (SOF) were characterized as a cost-effective, low-risk means of intervention by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, among others. According to Colonel John Oseth of the Naval War College, a permanent program of training and advisory assistance using such forces would enable the United States to engage directly in joint efforts with beleaguered allies without committing U. S. conventional forces to combat.<sup>49</sup> SOF provided decision-makers with a resource for rapid, unilateral action at a minimum cost, as a “third option” “for situations where conventional forces are inappropriate.”<sup>50</sup> Their readiness for low-cost, crackerjack military operations could also of course, encourage U. S. intervention in scenarios policymakers might later regret.

## **The Fourth Branch**

Even during the heyday of counterinsurgency in the 1960s, the military had been reluctant to bring about a major realignment of forces and doctrine away from conventional warfare, toward the unconventional. A consequence of this was the marginalization of the counterinsurgency skills tailored for the Special Forces and

the CIA, leading in turn to a failure to develop more “conventional” remedies to insurgency, tactics that would not require secrecy, deniability, and extraordinary commando skills. The monopoly of the Special Forces and the CIA on counterinsurgent capabilities, moreover, suggests a still-extant doctrinal position that defines these forms of conflict as unsuitable for regular forces. This in itself provides a rationale for the continued isolation of elite and covert forces and, given the covert (and often criminal) nature of certain unconventional tactics, for the limitation of the resources put into such operations.

Edward Luttwak, a 1980s advocate of a fourth service based on the Special Forces, acknowledges that “in guerrilla organization and counter-revolutionary warfare” the main requirement is “non-military—real knowledge and sensitivity about the cultural milieu, and also political skills, of course.” In contrast, “commando warfare is pure warfare, real warfare in its essence.” But he restates the argument that was prevalent in the 1960s—that if properly organized and supported, an elite force can somehow combine commando skills with political savvy and sophistication. Luttwak reaches an “extremely negative conclusion” on the present U.S. capability to field forces to combine these roles, however: “[A] really successful commando force” would be possible only if the military establishment treated it as “a high-quality center for the forces as a whole,” with accelerated promotion, to ensure it attracted top officers. His proposal, of course, was to do precisely that.<sup>51</sup>

Although little progress was made toward a separate service for special operations, steps were taken toward establishing a unified command. The army’s First Special Operations Command (SOCOM) was set up at Fort Bragg in 1982, in order to overcome some of the command and control problems that arose in Operation EAGLE CLAW, the

abortive raid to rescue the hostages in Iran. It created a staff structure that brought army Special Forces worldwide, as well as the two battalions of Rangers and the army's special psychological operations and civil affairs units, under a central command.<sup>52</sup> A navy equivalent, the Special Warfare Directorate, was also established in the 1980s in the office of the chief of operations, while the air force created an Air Division Command for special operations in 1984.<sup>53</sup> The failure of interservice cooperation, notably in the 1983 invasion of Grenada, prompted congressional pressure for a joint-services special operations command on the SOCOM model.

A step toward a unified special operations command was taken in January 1984 when the Joint Chiefs created a Joins Special Operations Agency for the planning and direction of special operations forces.<sup>54</sup> The Joint Chiefs had begun planning for the agency just a few days before the invasion of Grenada. The agency had four divisions—Research and Development/Procurement, Joint Operations, Special Intelligence, and Support Operations—but it exercised no command function.<sup>55</sup> Critics protested that a strictly advisory role was insufficient to effectively support and coordinate the disparate forces of the armed services. A significant lobby, both within the special operations community and in Congress, pressed for more: The most ardent advocates called for the consolidation of SOF in a separate service under the direction of a Defense Special Operations Agency and, to ensure the proper political clout for SOF, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations.<sup>56</sup>

The January 1986 congressional proposal to place all special operations forces under a unified command found considerable resistance within the military itself, part of



which represented something more than mere interservice rivalry. The military, in the view of one officer, would resist the move “in part out of a fear that such an arrangement would make it too easy for civilian leaders to send the commandos into action. Many officers . . . believe that under the present arrangement, the cautious nature of the military serves as a ‘brake’ OTI precipitate use of special forces.”<sup>57</sup> Nor was there consensus among the civilian leadership at the Pentagon. The Defense Secretary opposed even the plan for a unified command as “panacea”;<sup>58</sup> special operations and counterterror chief Noel C. Koch, in contrast, stressed that the resistance of the services to the desired upgrading of the special operations forces “had become so frustrating that he probably would support proposals in Congress to create a single agency....”<sup>59</sup>

The special operations advocates in Congress were opposed to some by others in Congress who balked at the prospects of a central military agency for special operations that would duplicate and compound the problems of oversight and illegal operations posed by the CIA—that special operations forces “might become a uniformed version of the Central Intelligence Agency, used to circumvent congressional restrictions on intelligence activities and the use of U. S. forces in combat operations. “ And although some of the units had been created to combat terrorism, there was concern that “they have since acquired mandates and training to conduct missions to counter insurgencies in Central America, Africa and Asia.”<sup>60</sup>

The worries about accountability were not, of course, limited to the military’s ultrasecret agencies; there was a fine ambiguity with regard to the military’s larger role in unconventional warfare—whether it fell within the purview of either the military or intelligence oversight committees. To many in the special warfare community, the best

compromise was no oversight at all. One account of “suspicions” that Special Forces were involved in covert *contra* aid observed cheerfully that “while the CIA is subject to American legislative control, the activities of the Special Operations Forces are not accountable directly to Congress—a factor that adds to the secrecy surrounding SOF operations.”<sup>61</sup> The official position is that such operations would, by necessity, occur under the operational umbrella of the CIA; as one intelligence officer explained, “any such use of them would be directed by the CIA and properly reported to Congress.”<sup>62</sup> The usefulness of covert action forces outside the CIA’s formal control, however, was more than merely explored during the period of illegal support for the unconventional war on Nicaragua.

The outcome of the debate was somewhat less than the new service proposed. A Special Operations Unified Command was provided for in defense legislation in 1986 for implementation in the 1987 fiscal year; it was to control its own budget, procurement, and operations, and to report directly to the Secretary of Defense.<sup>63</sup> Army General James J. Lindsay was appointed the first head of the unified command in April 1987, based at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida.<sup>64</sup> The new legislation also created a post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.<sup>65</sup>

# Chapter 15: The Special Forces' Buildup

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

The organizational response to the administration's demands for special operations forces and doctrine was in practice rather similar to that made in 1961 to President Kennedy's demands for a coordinated military response to the threat of insurgency. The manpower of elite special warfare units was rapidly built up to surpass mid-1960s levels. Special Forces personnel had peaked at some 13,000 men in seven SF Groups in 1969 dropping to three active groups in 1974. The 1980 force level of some 3,000 was less than the peak strength of just one Special Forces Group in 1968, the Vietnam-based Fifth, with 3,542 men.<sup>1</sup> Active-duty special operations forces in the three services rose from 11,600 in 1981 to 14,900 in 1985, with force levels, including reserves, reaching some 32,000 in 1988.<sup>2</sup> Active duty forces were scheduled to reach 20,900 by 1990, with total available forces numbering 38,400.<sup>3</sup>

Much of the buildup took place in the army's Special Forces, which the new administration tried to bring up to wartime strength. The army added 1,200 places to Special Forces in 1982, bringing its force level up to 4,000 in four active groups by 1984.<sup>4</sup> Each group had a nominal strength of 776 men, divided into three battalions. Although all four groups are stationed within the United States, three battalions and two other Special Forces detachments are permanently based overseas. A fifth group (the Third) was

scheduled to be established in 1990-1991 with special responsibilities for Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>5</sup> Army special operations forces in July 1986 were reported to include 4,800 Special Forces, 1,500 Rangers, 800 men in a Psychological Warfare Group, 250 in a civil affairs battalion, and about 800 in the aviation section.<sup>6</sup> By 1987, the manpower of the army's special operations forces was estimated at 9,100 on active service, with 12,400 in the reserves.<sup>7</sup> The Reagan administration also rapidly moved to rebuild the CIA's paramilitary capability, rehiring many of those laid off by Admiral Turner in 1977.

The special warfare revival was spurred on by a coordinated media offensive comparable to that of the first year of the Kennedy administration—the Green Berets were once again basking in the limelight.

Not surprisingly, they benefited from a dramatic rise in the funds earmarked for special operations forces in the defense budget. From an estimated \$500 million for special operations forces in 1981, funding rose to some \$1.2 billion in 1987 and \$1.5 billion in 1990.<sup>8</sup> Construction projects alone for special operations facilities at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Fort Bragg, and Hunter Army Airfield in the mid-1980s were budgeted at \$236 million.<sup>9</sup> The funding of the army's Special Operations Command (SOCOM), which was \$250 million in 1982, its first year of operations, was projected to go to \$700 million by 1990.<sup>10</sup>

Although civil affairs units were a part of the new special operations formula, they remained, as always, a minor part of special warfare. The army's 172-man 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, assigned to SOCOM in 1982, was and still is, in fact, the only active civil affairs unit in the army, and continues to provide support for the entire army. The 96th's four companies each specialize in a geographical region but

work both with conventional and special operations forces. The Army's small standing force for civil affairs in the 1980s reflects the limited role for such specialists beyond the context of conventional warfare; some 97 percent of the total army civil affairs manpower is to be found in the reserves, available for call up in time of need." In the meantime, the full-timers were subordinated to the more arcane requirements of special warfare.

A strong civil affairs component could reasonably have been encouraged as a means to temper the army's new involvement in unconventional warfare and low-intensity conflict; the civil affairs experience in postwar Europe might have offered a more promising route to counterinsurgency, for one, than the guerrilla approach associated with special operations forces. But the uneasy accommodation of a policy of galloping interventionism with the political requirement of appearing to work only at the invitation of overseas partners precluded any occupation-style approach. In practice, the chosen arrangement subordinated civil affairs more fully to the merely cosmetic needs of unconventional warfare. In Vietnam, the military's need for a strong civil affairs role was resisted by political fiat. In the spring of 1965 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed, in return for the commitment of American troops to Vietnam, that the military command deploy U.S. military civil affairs teams, "as in World War II," to take charge of provincial administrations. The suggestion was shrilly opposed by American civilian agencies and firmly slapped down.<sup>12</sup>

The air force also took part in the special operations buildup, bringing most of its special operations and search and rescue units together under the 23d Air Force; in 1983, the 23d's First Special Operations Air Wing was established, and based at Eglin Air Base in Florida.<sup>13</sup> By 1987, there were some 4,100 air force special operations forces on active duty

and 2,500 reservists. Five other SOF squadrons (and three in the reserve) were based at Eglin, Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, and Ramstein Air Force Base in West Germany. A helicopter detachment was based at Howard Air Force Base in Panama.<sup>[14](#)</sup>

By 1986 the navy's SEALs—Sea, Air, Land forces—had reached some 1,700 troops, organized into two special warfare groups based at Little Creek, Virginia, and Coronado, California, respectively. Arguably the best-trained of the elite units, SEALs continue the traditions of the underwater demolition teams (UDTs) created by the navy in 1942 to clear the way for amphibious landings; their role expanded in Korea to include reconnaissance and covert landings for deep-penetration raids.<sup>[15](#)</sup> The SEALs, which draw recruits from underwater demolition personnel, date to 1962 and first saw action in Vietnam. The characteristic SEAL force of sixteen-man units; navy plans in 1987 reportedly aimed at increasing the number of units from forty-one to seventy over five years.<sup>[16](#)</sup> Larger units included six SEAL Teams.<sup>[17](#)</sup> SEAL Team 6, with from 175 to 200 men, is believed to specialize in counterterrorism.<sup>[18](#)</sup> Secret navy units like Task Force 98 reportedly work out of eight bases, including the British Royal Air Force base at Machrihanish, Scotland.<sup>[19](#)</sup>

## **The Multipurpose Training Mission**

Defense Secretary Weinberger observed in 1983 that the military skills required to meet the challenge of low-intensity conflict were found “chiefly . . . in our special operations forces.” Army Special Forces took “a very large share of the burden . . . to instruct others in providing for their own defense” and to help give the people “a stake in the future” (through “civic action”).<sup>[20](#)</sup> In another statement, Weinberger explained that the special operations forces’ advisory role

had both a training objective—to organize counterparts and impart skills—and an operational role: “to reduce the probability that United States armed forces could be committed in foreign battles, and to demonstrate the resolve of the United States to fulfill its commitments.”<sup>21</sup>

The special operations concept of the 1980s retained the full range of functions assigned to the Special Forces in Vietnam, the so-called triplex Special Forces Mission of special unit, clandestine, and paramilitary operations.<sup>22</sup> In the 1980s,, the three functions would remain fused in the repertoire of special operations forces. The Special Forces had also acquired a major role in the training of foreign conventional forces in the 1960s—a role that would be sustained and increased. By the end of the Reagan years, Special Forces personnel had assumed most of the responsibilities for training and advising the regular forces of Third World countries, instilling conventional infantry with the skills and attitudes of the unconventional warrior.

The rapid expansion of special operations forces, their increased role in foreign military training and assistance, and the vigorous promotion of overseas military assistance in potential conflict areas were similar to the ferment of activity at the height of the 1960s counterinsurgency era. Four to twelve-man Military Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), which had provided a principal vehicle of training and assistance in the 1960s, also served as the workhorses of low-intensity conflict. According to former Joint Chiefs special operations chief Colonel Roger Pezzelle, training and advisory MTTs worked with “host country regular units, militia, reserve forces, and security units” (for militia and security units one might read paramilitary forces and intelligence groups). At the same time, Colonel Pezzelle noted, “a major part of all MTT activity” was carried out by special operations units, whose training “encompasses a

wide range of activity from ordinary military combat and counter guerrilla operations to building bridges and counterterrorist operations.”<sup>23</sup>

The number of MTTs abroad proliferated after 1980 just as it had in 1961. Army Special Forces provided most of the trainers. Some 130 Special Forces MTTs were scheduled for deployment in 1982, up from 53 four years before.<sup>24</sup> In 1986, 260 Special Forces MTTs provided assistance to 35 countries.<sup>25</sup> The expansion of training activities, measured in “man-weeks, “ was estimated to have been fivefold between 1980 and 1984, from 1,161 to 5,787.<sup>26</sup> By comparison, in July 1962, just eighteen months into the counterinsurgency era, the Joint Chiefs had announced that counterinsurgency MTTs comprising 1,512 men were operating in nineteen different countries.<sup>27</sup>

Special Forces’ role as trainers to foreign armies and paramilitary police, whether at home or abroad, was often undertaken in the glare of publicity. The Special Forces were expected to play both the “Rambo” role and that of the consummate professional, the winner of hearts and minds. The public, fed a diet of Green Beret feature films and staged interviews with Fort Bragg’s commanders, were confronted by seemingly contradictory visions of the elite force and its multiple missions: as the merciless purveyors of counterterror and as the wholesome trainers sent to “civilize” their brutal foreign counterparts.

Somehow, Pentagon media managers reconcile these image shifts. A *Time* feature, on “A Warrior Elite for the Dirty Jobs,” stressed that low-intensity conflicts were more commonly known as “dirty little wars.”<sup>28</sup> The Special Forces, who are presented as ideal for the job, are characterized as ruthless commandos with no time for winning hearts and minds: “These unorthodox struggles require a special type of



soldier: bold and resourceful, often trained in the black arts of stealth and sabotage, suitable for an elite unit that can vanish into alien territory or strike anywhere with speed and surprise.”<sup>29</sup> Write-ups on the role of special operations forces in countering terrorism went considerably further in stressing their bloodthirsty nature, as well as that of other elite units. A 1985 NBC television report on the 2,000-strong antiterrorist elite stated that the unit’s core consisted of 160 people (presumably Delta Force) “psychiatrically screened for their willingness to kill.”<sup>30</sup> A *Newsweek* feature on special operations forces reported an exchange at the Los Angeles Olympics: A National Guardsman on duty asked a Task Force 160 pilot about his mission; “ ‘If I tell you, I’ll have to kill you,’ [the pilot] replied.”<sup>31</sup> The ferocious image was by and large consciously cultivated, and matched by a set of skills and mission orders that indeed required a measure of ferocity. When that image was inconvenient however, Special Forces could be presented in a radically different light.

When presented to the press in their role as trainers of regular armies (or paramilitary police), Special Forces were characterized as cosmopolitan professionals handpicked for their human rights sensitivity. A *Newsweek* feature on Special Forces trainers in El Salvador presented a picture of a conventional boot camp aiming to produce “tough, flexible counterinsurgency units . . . able to hit and pursue guerrillas into the hills,” while also “offering lessons in humanity: how to treat civilians fairly and how to take prisoners as well as tally body counts.” (The villain of the piece was “history,” the Salvadoran army’s traditional brutishness, which Special Forces were steadfastly fighting.<sup>32</sup>) The same themes were systematically harped upon in much of the mainstream media’s reporting on American training of Salvadorans.

A *New York Times* feature on Green Beret training for Salvadorans, "Salvador Gets Rights Lesson From the U.S.," described the training of cadets in "the rudiments of military operations, with a heavy emphasis on human rights and antiguerrilla techniques. "33 Major Roger Slaughter, a Spanish-speaking officer from the Special Forces detachment in Panama, "tapped his pointer against the chart listing the do's and don'ts of gaining the support of the people in a fight against guerrillas," and told his visitors that "an army cannot violate the individual rights of the people they are sworn to protect." And so,

*[w]ith that admonition, drawn from the doctrine of the United States Army, Major Slaughter summed up the message that he and other American instructors have been trying to impress on the army of El Salvador through officer candidates.... Major Slaughter said that winning the allegiance of peasants ... means respecting them.... He said that it meant avoiding what he called "indiscriminate acts of violence."*<sup>34</sup>

The problem of reconciling real special warfare skills and attitudes, notably those involving illegal tactics, to the planners' multipurpose expectations is less easily managed than are public relations. Can Special Forces really be expected to switch from selective assassination one day to civic action the next while standing by to serve as light infantry in a conventional rapid deployment scenario? Should they be expected to? The special operations advocates appear to see no contradiction between the Special Forces' extralegal and unmilitary covert action role, in which military ethics and the rules of war are jettisoned, and their main role in the training of foreign military and paramilitary forces.

Special Forces' heavy responsibility for advisory and training assistance to foreign forces has had some influence on the manner in which this role is seen by the institutional armed forces. A comment by General Paul F. Gorman at a 1986 symposium suggests that the traditional lack of enthusiasm of the mainstream military for unconventional warfare now also extends to advisory assistance. On the one hand, there was a "significant, largely overlooked congruence between our key cadres for Security Assistance and those for Special Operations Forces." On the other, special operations personnel and "those on Security Assistance duty abroad [largely the same people] are up against two or three times as hard a problem in obtaining recognition for their contributions."<sup>35</sup>

The implication was that this role, too, fell to Special Forces by a process of elimination—and by the trend through which advisory assistance since the 1960s had centered increasingly on counterinsurgency. Once Special Forces came to field the bulk of overseas trainers, the curriculum, perhaps naturally, became increasingly skewed toward the unconventional skills and attitudes for which Special Forces are unique.

## **The Elite Genre**

The turn to the more glamorous elite special forces for counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare in the 1970s and 1980s responded in large part to the need for the appearance of tough action being taken against an increasingly ubiquitous enemy. Defense analyst Eliot Cohen identifies three motivations for the creation, support, and deployment of elite units: "The first is military utility—rational, non-political reasons for having elite units. The second. . . the irrational and romantic sources of support for

elite units. The final type . . . stems from the increased politicization of war and military actions in the past half-century.”<sup>36</sup> However complex the blend of motives for their creation (or revival), elite units are powerful symbols—a means through which signals of resolution and intent can be sent both at home and abroad. In particular, governments have traditionally “sought to cultivate the heroic image of elite units to build up domestic morale.”<sup>37</sup> But, as the military is aware, this can backfire. Cohen adds two riders on the symbolic role of elite units:

*First, a democratic government cannot easily control the publicity that surrounds elite units; a government can initiate such publicity, but finds it hard to limit it.... Secondly, elite units may be misleading or ambiguous symbols, distorting serious public and governmental discussion of complex issues, encouraging instead a preoccupation with martial theatre.*<sup>38</sup>

The latter concern is perhaps more important; the psychological impact of elite organizations and operations on policymakers and public alike can radically skew perceptions of a particular conflict, substituting the romance of the image-makers for the reality. Cohen cites the French paratroops (“*Paras*”) in Algeria as a case in point; from a solution they promptly became the crux of the problem. And the public’s view of the war, too, focused increasingly on whether one was for or against the *Paras*: “[T]he paratroops were a simpler topic to deal with than the philosophical, political, and strategic complexities of the Algerian problem. The average Frenchman’s feelings toward the whole Algerian problem could be reduced to his feelings toward the paratroops.”<sup>39</sup> The American equivalent was, if ultimately to less effect, to make the Green Berets (via John Wayne) a symbol of American patriotism in Vietnam; the romanticized Green Beret made disengagement just that

much harder and contributed to America's feeling of betrayal by its own leaders.

As a small force with a highly specialized, highly dangerous mission, the army's special warfare experts naturally developed with the characteristics of an elite, like the commandos or rangers of wartime— though with the added elements of shadow and secrecy of the intelligence operative. The characteristics of the army Special Forces were later shared by other American special warfare units, and an affinity with the elite forces of other nations developed. Modern elite military units can be distinguished by their assignment to unusual, extremely hazardous missions, their requirements for forces small in number but highly trained and physically exceptional; and their all-important image—as Cohen notes, “an elite unit becomes elite only when it achieves a reputation, justified or not—for bravura and success.”<sup>40</sup>

Another traditional feature of elite units which the Special Forces embraced was the cultivation of a “hard-boiled” self-image, both through training and through public relations. Image serves an important psychological warfare function. As well as intimidating adversaries, an elite force's tough self-image, its familiarity with death and destruction, can build unit morale and remove combat inhibitions. The French Foreign Legion—“the brides of death”—and the *Paras* each developed a cult of death as part of their esprit de corps. The *Paras*' prayer illustrates their professedly abnormal mindset:

*Give me, my God, what you have left  
Give me what no one else would ever ask  
I don't want riches  
Not success, nor even health . . .*

*I want insecurity and unquiet  
I want torment and chaos.*<sup>41</sup>

American psy-war chief General Robert McClure, an advocate of tactical terror,<sup>42</sup> was also aware that a ruthless reputation could backfire on a unit, perhaps inducing an adversary to fight to the death rather than to surrender to a foe not known for taking prisoners. McClure acknowledges the role of self-image as a motivator, but questions the usefulness of its public dissemination:

*I fully recognize that our troops must adopt a tough, hard-boiled killer attitude If they are going to not only survive, but to win these battles I wonder, however, if that indoctrination, which, I repeat, is very necessary, needs to be widely publicized in the press and broadcast to our enemies?*<sup>43</sup>

McClure's concern was prompted by the small number of prisoners taken in the Korean conflict and widespread publicity on Operation KILLER and the Hunter-killer Teams there. It might well apply to the more common scenarios in which elite units are deployed in counterinsurgency, in close contact with the civilian population.

The issue of terror and elite elan is particularly relevant to counterinsurgency/counterterrorism forces, forces that are in constant contact with the public. Both the training methods of special forces (including public exercises in towns and cities) and their public image (from threatening billboards and gory regimental insignia, to the standard-issue uniforms) may serve to cultivate an aggressively antisocial orientation, such as that of the colonialist Foreign Legion. They may also prepare the ground for atrocity.

## **Psychological Screening—and “Modeling”—for Elite**

Since 1961, U.S. military procedures for the selection of personnel for specialized counterinsurgency and covert action tasks have been the objects of intensive research in army, air force, and navy programs.<sup>44</sup> In 1961, an air force project was initiated to develop “psychological selection methods for dangerous counterinsurgency missions”; a similar program followed that was conducted by the U. S. Army Personnel Research Office (USAPRO) at Fort Bragg’s Center for Special Warfare. The first testing of active-duty Special Forces personnel who were considered successful candidates was already under way in early 1961 and provided the basis for a profile that would be used to develop tests to determine the probable performance of Special Forces candidates. By 1962, three series of tests were in use: the “special forces suitability inventory” was designed to assess personality characteristics considered appropriate for the discipline; the “critical decisions test” measured risk-taking; and the “locations test” assessed spatial perception.<sup>45</sup> By the 1970s, the military could count on sophisticated means to establish personality and skill profiles for the ideal counterinsurgent or covert operator.

Another branch of military psychology applicable to the elite counterterrorist units was “atrocities research,” studies of why atrocities occur and the personality traits associated with killers. A navy research project led by psychologist Sigmund Streufert was the subject of awkward questions in 1971 by Congressman Cornelius Gallagher, who found the research to be “designed to measure how different individuals value human life; in other words to screen for those who, attaching little value to life, might make good killers.”<sup>46</sup> More disturbing is evidence of research into means of conditioning military personnel into more efficient killers. Peter Watson, in his study of the military use of psychology, refers to a 1975 NATO-sponsored conference on

stress and anxiety in which U.S. Navy doctor Thomas Narut lectured on “symbolic modeling,” by which people could be taught to cope with certain stresses, techniques that he said were “being used with ‘combat readiness units’ to train people to cope with the stress of killing.”<sup>47</sup> The methods were reportedly used for commando teams and special navy operatives, and they involved the screening of “films specially designed to show people being killed in violent ways. By being acclimatized through these films, the men were supposed eventually to become able to disassociate their emotions from such situations.”<sup>48</sup> Other aspects of the program included training aimed at “stress reduction” and “dehumanization of the enemy.” Dr. Narut reportedly also described the screening procedure for men with “passive aggressive personalities” suitable for “commando tasks”:

*They are people with a lot of drive, though they are well-disciplined and do not appear nervous, who periodically experience bursts of explosive energy when they can literally kill without remorse. Dr. Narut said that he and colleagues had therefore been looking for men who had shown themselves capable of killing in this premeditated way.*<sup>49</sup>

## **The Trouble with Elites**

The regular military was still not prepared to open the Pandora’s box of special warfare tactics to conventional American forces, and it remained largely dependent on the disciplines and elite forces of special warfare. The implication was that the regular services remained unhappy about degrading the services as a whole when the dirty work could just as well be left to the “elite” personnel of Special Forces.



The alienation of the political warriors of the postwar period from the mainstream military had been a consequence of both their elite status and the professional “impropriety” of their role in special, political, or “dirty” warfare. An officer at the Army War College, writing in 1983 recounts the case of a Fifth Special Forces Group commander relieved of his command “largely because of the collision of two competing impulses: that of the Army officer who doesn’t lie, cheat, or steal, and that of the intelligence operative who always has a cover story to disguise his true function or intent. Some problems refuse to go away. “ In short he concludes, the U.S. Army “has demonstrated institutional antipathy to elites and continues to do so.”[50](#)

The disquiet over special warfare can be traced back to the confusion of unconventional warfare with psychological warfare in postwar doctrine, and at the inception of Special Forces. Colonel Russell Volckmann in a 1969 letter concerning the Special Forces’ subordination to the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, recalled the concern of officers promoting the Special Forces concept: “Behind-the-line operations and the ‘dirty-tricks game’ had enough opposition amongst conventional military minds that had to be overcome without adding the additional problems inherent in Psychological Warfare. However, we lost that

European experience has shown that elites need not be specialists in the clandestine aspects of warfare to engender institutional unease and to assume characteristics deemed threatening to military order and discipline. Institutional resentment and preoccupation can be stimulated by separate formations of a distinctly higher status (and potentially decisive power, on the lines of the French *Paras*). A second cause for institutional distrust is quite different, and involves those special units that have been

assigned roles at the bounds—or beyond the bounds—of the permissible in the laws and usages of war; the snipers, raiders, and irregulars that since the nineteenth century have pushed back the limits in modern warfare. Forces with unique, elite skills may be set apart because they are elite in status or isolated from the regular services on the grounds of military decorum and discipline.

## **The Elite within the Elite**

The Fort Bragg-based Delta Force was the primary antiterrorist force for the high-profile actions of hostage rescue and terrorist interdiction. An agreement with West Germany was reported in late 1986 permitting Delta to use facilities there as a forward reconnaissance and intelligence gathering base for a twelve-man unit, and to carry out joint operations with the German GSG9 and British SAS forces.<sup>52</sup> Delta was an elite within an elite. The existence of other secret antiterrorist units drawn from the military's elite forces would gradually be revealed over the years.

The army's secret counterterror detachments were most often exposed in the 1980s when things went wrong through an excess of zeal, by military disasters that could not be hushed up, or when corruption—encouraged by the use of untraceable, unaccountable funds—became too serious to be overlooked. Delta's secret role in the Grenada invasion became known largely because of scathing critiques by military insiders of its poor planning. Intended to secure the main airstrip before the arrival of the army Rangers, Delta arrived precisely two hours late, supposedly because planners misread Grenada's time zone.

Delta Force received further unwanted exposure in October 1985, in the wake of the *Achille Lauro* hijack. The diversion by U.S. Navy jets of an Egypt Air airliner to an

airfield in Sicily had already incensed the Italian government. Delta threw relations even more out of joint by precipitating an angry, armed face-off with Italian troops on the ground after the diversion. Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi told the press a week later of the tense moment in which Italian troops were ready to fire on Delta Force troops who had rushed out of a C-141 transport that landed right behind the Egyptian aircraft.<sup>53</sup> Delta's involvement had hitherto been a secret.

Delta's problems were not limited to its military operations. In 1985, an army inquiry found evidence that Delta personnel had embezzled up to \$500,000, with one Special Forces colonel and three associates accounting for at least \$60,000.<sup>54</sup> An internal army inquiry into the matter was put off in the fall of 1985 on the grounds that it could cripple the unit's planned operations in the Mediterranean.<sup>55</sup> The army ultimately, announced that eighty Delta men received "nonjudicial punishments; and seven were facing courts-martial.<sup>56</sup> Lt. Col. Dale Duncan, who headed an army special operations proprietary, Business Security International (BSI), was charged with submitting a series of false invoices, including one bill for \$56,230 in electronic equipment that had been paid for by another army intelligence unit.<sup>57</sup> These were the first of what *Newsweek* called "a growing number of investigations, prosecutions and courts-martial focusing on alleged financial impropriety by members of Delta and other super-secret units spawned by the Reagan administration. "<sup>58</sup>

The prosecutions that ensued brought to light some of the contradictions between covert action accounting, where the rule of thumb was to eliminate the paper trail, and democratic accountability. Colonel James E. Noble, an army judge on the court martial which acquitted Special Forces

Master Sergeant Ramon Barron of charges pertaining to his work with BSI, concluded: "The Army chose this extraordinary means to circumvent accountability for money.... By so doing they also chose to risk losing the money."<sup>59</sup> John Prados, in commenting on the Delta Force's disdain for standard accounting procedures, observes wryly that "items procured for supposedly clandestine missions included a Rolls-Royce and a hot-air balloon."<sup>60</sup>

Two years after the Delta corruption inquiry, fresh investigations revealed more information on Business Security International, which suggested that it had operated quite apart from Delta Force. BSI was described as a front for army covert actions, set up in 1983 and code-named "Yellow Fruit," to provide security for joint army-CIA operations in the Middle East and Central America. An April 1987 CBS News report linked "Yellow Fruit" to the covert operations of the National Security Council that were coordinated by Lt. Col. North and retired General Richard Secord.<sup>61</sup> In its reporting on the *Iran-contra* affair, CBS tied BSI ("Yellow Fruit") to a Swiss bank account used by North and Secord to lease a cargo ship for arms movements. The army halfheartedly disputed the bank account charge, but CBS stood by its story (the account number had been provided to CBS by a former member of the unit). "2 BSI / "Yellow Fruit" was most likely an operation run by the newest of the Pentagon's covert intelligence agencies, Intelligence Support Activity (ISA).

The top-secret ISA was created as the army's Foreign Operations Group (FOG), in response to the crisis in Iran after the fall of the Shah. It operated over a year unbeknownst to the Secretary of Defense, the CIA, or Congress. The unit, renamed Intelligence Support Activity, was formally established in October 1980 by then-army chief of staff General Edward C. Meyer. Initially established

for covert intelligence collection to support operations during the Iran crisis, ISA was subsequently employed for covert operations considered too sensitive for the army's special operations and intelligence establishment.<sup>63</sup> Although ISA was allegedly unknown to congressional intelligence oversight committees until 1982, it had already engaged in major covert operations.

The first hints of ISA's existence emerged in March 1983, when Lt. Col. James "Bo" Gritz testified to a congressional subcommittee about his abortive raid into Laos early that year. Gritz said that in 1981 he had been approached by "a special intelligence (group) referred to as 'The Activity' " concerning a covert mission into Indochina aimed at freeing any American MIA's still held there.<sup>64</sup> Although neither Congress nor the Pentagon would confirm the account—or the existence of the ISA— by May 1983, press inquiries established that Gritz had received some support in the intelligence area from a new army agency, the ISA. The *New York Times* concluded that the ISA had participated in the January 1982 rescue of General James Dozier from Italian Red Brigade kidnapers and was "operating missions against leftist forces in El Salvador and supporting anti-government forces in Nicaragua."<sup>65</sup> Other sources credited ISA with unspecified operations concerning hostages in Lebanon.<sup>66</sup>

The current status of the ISA—which may now exist under another name—is unclear. Like Delta Force, some of its personnel exploited its clandestine operations for personal gain. In 1985, the ISA was reportedly disbanded after FBI investigators "discovered lavish trips being taken by some officers and their wives."<sup>67</sup> But the *Washington Post* reported that in 1986 the ISA had carried out a number of classified actions in coordination with the intergovernmental "Operations Sub- Group" (OSG) set up to coordinate

counterterrorist operations.<sup>68</sup> John Prados has suggested that the Counterterrorist Joint Task Force at Fort Bragg, a unit of less than twenty men, may be “an operational component of ISA.””” Another source has suggested that ISA, rather than just a tight group of operatives, is probably “a computer data base of operatives with special skills who can be assigned for covert operations.”<sup>70</sup> In the past, special operations personnel were kept on call after their formal discharge from active duty.

The army’s top-secret special operations air arm, Task Force 160— or the “Night Stalkers”—was exposed to the public gradually, mainly in consequence of casualties that could not wholly be concealed. A battalion-strength unit, TF160 supported covert Special Forces and Delta operations on detail from the 101st Air Assault Division. Based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, Task Force 160 crews worked in civvies and flew a range of high-tech helicopters for “black operations. “ Its involvement in the Grenada invasion—as the helicopter airlift component of Delta Force—was revealed after one of the helicopters was shot down. Photographs taken of the downed chopper and of others dropping off commandos showed they were Hughes 500 models, which were not officially in use by the army.<sup>71</sup> Authorities eventually acknowledged the death of one Task Force 160 helicopter pilot in Grenada; subsequent Defense Department budget requests for the replacement of equipment lost in the operation suggested that up to ten other helicopters, some of them Task Force 160, may have been lost.<sup>72</sup> Investigators of the web of CIA and Defense proprietaries involved in the “Contra-gate” affair subsequently attributed the covert transport of the helicopters to Barbados—in anticipation of the invasion—to a proprietary headed by retired Air Force Lt. Col. Richard Gadd, who would also preside over the airlift of assistance to

the contras in partnership with retired Gen. Richard Secord.<sup>[73](#)</sup>

Task Force 160 next appeared in the news in December 1985 after the *Detroit Free Press* interviewed the friends and families of sixteen army men reportedly killed in helicopter accidents in the unit.<sup>[74](#)</sup> Although the inquiry did not tie specific deaths to covert operations, it concluded that the unit had “flown missions into Nicaragua and other hostile Central American zones, despite U. S. laws forbidding such military activity.”<sup>[75](#)</sup> The father of Warrant Officer Donald Alvey, age 26, who was reported killed in a chopper crash off the Virginia coast on 20 March 1983, recounted his son’s stories of his clandestine exploits: “Don flew a bunch of missions into Nicaragua.... He’d go somewhere and pick up a group of people in a clearing in the jungle . . . armed troops, speaking Spanish—and take them to another clearing in the jungle.”<sup>[76](#)</sup> Relatives said the unit members wore civilian clothes, flew by night, and were instructed to destroy their aircraft if they were forced down; they were also told “that the U.S. government would disavow them if captured or killed.”<sup>[77](#)</sup> A Fort Campbell spokesman responded, stating that “no Fort Campbell units have been involved in any military operations.”<sup>[78](#)</sup> The stories were consistent with the accounts from relatives of earlier U.S. covert action casualties in Nicaragua during the last years of Anastasio Somoza Debayle’s regime. The secret units involved in the United States’ war on Nicaragua found more comprehensive exposure in the course of the Iran-*contra* hearings.

# Chapter 16: The Middle East Calls the Shots

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

In 1983, a series of events in Lebanon and the Gulf states reoriented American priorities toward the Middle East and, as a result, American counterterror assumed an unprecedented public face. Bombing attacks on American embassies in Lebanon and Kuwait, the annihilation of the U. S. Marines' Beirut landing force by suicide bombers, and the situation of American hostages redirected the administration's energies toward aggressive counterterror.

On 18 April 1983, seventeen people, including four top CIA officers, were killed in a bomb attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut. On 23 October 1983, in simultaneous suicide attacks, the U.S. Marine Headquarters at the Beirut airport was utterly destroyed, killing 243, and the headquarters of the French army's 2,000 man contingent was badly damaged, killing 58.<sup>1</sup> The antecedents to the attacks were largely unknown outside Lebanon and, in the United States, the attack was wholly unexpected — and to most, inexplicable. Americans were suddenly faced with the costs of a bloody war without ever having understood that, in the minds of many Lebanese, the United States had already been at war with their country for some time.<sup>2</sup>

In September 1982, the U.S. Marine contingent landed in Beirut as the Israeli withdrawal from the invasion of Lebanon began. The initial American role was ostensibly neutral. In the course of 1983, however, overt backing for the Maronite



Christian government of Amin Gemayal and firm support for Israel significantly changed the way the American presence was seen. The September 1983 battering of Lebanon's green hills with behemoth shells from the battleship *New Jersey* (each leaving "a crater as big as a tennis court") wiped out any appearance of American neutrality — which had never been accepted by Iran-based Lebanese groups in the first place.<sup>3</sup> But whatever the circumstances, to the American public and to the Reagan administration, a bombing that claimed American lives was a terrorist bombing.

The Reagan administration was appalled and disconcerted by the rage unleashed against the United States in Lebanon. It had come into office hooting derision at Carter's inability to deal with the Iranian hostages — and pledged tough programs and policies to combat terrorism.<sup>4</sup> Yet Beirut threatened to become Reagan's own humiliation on the scale of Carter's debacle in Iran's DESERT ONE. A further blow to the tough talking administration's bruised sensibilities came unexpectedly in September 1983, over the Soviet Union's Sakhalin Island. Soviet aircraft shot down Korean Air Lines flight 007, killing 269 people, 60 of them American citizens (among them the founder of the John Birch Society). American dismay at the unrepentant ayatollahs of Iran, the battering in Beirut, and the destruction of KAL 007 created the climate for a new style offensive in U. S. foreign policy.

The result was a confused mix of ferocious efforts at counterterror including U. S. complicity in at least one car bomb in Beirut, along with such bizarre undertakings as the arms-for-hostages deals with Iran (complete with gift Bible and key-shaped cake). The public opprobrium attached to the Middle East-style of terrorism — hostage taking, bombings, aircraft hijacks, and murder — would, however, be exploited rather cynically by the administration to justify

its pursuit of political warfare quite above and beyond the real battle against terrorism — and outside the Mediterranean theater.

Reciprocal terrorism and retaliation would continue in the Middle East throughout the Reagan administration — and, as in the often spurious distinction between terror and “counter/error,” it was not always easy to determine who had struck the first blow. The bombardment by the U.S.S. *New Jersey* and the demolition of the Marine headquarters were only the highlights from eight years of action and reaction, in which the self-righteous indignation of the various parties to the conflict fueled campaigns of terror and cloaked them in the language of retaliation and reprisal. The emotional charge would attend the nongovernmental hijacks, hostage-taking, and bombings as well as the antipersonnel terror tactics of governments at ground level and from the air.

The overt U.S. response to the 22 October 1983 Beirut bombings came immediately and on several levels. The covert response was to gear up extralegal counterterror capabilities in the overseas hot spots, and to strike back using terrorist methods. The French responded, on 17 November, to the attack on its army headquarters with time-honored reprisals: the aerial bombing of the Baeka Valley region from which their assailants were believed to have found support. The 17 November 1983 raid was planned as a joint air strike with American Sixth Fleet aircraft. On this occasion, the United States pulled out on the grounds that the perpetrators could not be effectively targeted.<sup>5</sup> Immediate conventional retaliation by American military action was forestalled — at least in the Lebanon.

The outburst of patriotic sentiment inside the United States after the Beirut bombings, and particularly the attack

on the Marines, was skillfully channeled to raise support for rapid action to preempt future outrages. A congressional sidelight was the prompt introduction and approval of antiterrorism legislation. The immediate, public manifestation of the new hard-line policy was a full-fledged military invasion — of the Caribbean island of Grenada.

The invasion of the Caribbean microstate Grenada took advantage of the American public's outrage at being "pushed around" in the Third World. The events in Lebanon tended to reinforce a feeling of American impotence in world affairs, which lingered long after the release of the U. S. embassy hostages in Tehran in January 1981. The administration's saber-rattling and seemingly futile efforts to retaliate against terrorism somehow seemed to exacerbate the malaise. Beirut was the clincher: Americans were not accustomed to entire American military commands being wiped out in an instant, without resistance. Whether the victims were civilian airline passengers or U. S. Marines in a fortified headquarters, the psychological impact was the same: The United States was under attack.

While the rubble still smoldered in Beirut, opportunity knocked in the Caribbean. Grenada offered a way to restore American self-confidence and to warn the ideological adversary that the United States was still to be reckoned with. The combined objective of the operation was to restore morale back home while achieving policy objectives overseas. The Grenada invasion provided the United States public catharsis in the classical sense, which "purges viewers of their pity and fear by giving them small doses on stage."<sup>6</sup>

Events on Grenada the week before the Beirut bombing set the stage for intervention. On 12 October the left-wing government of Maurice Bishop, in power since 1979, was

overthrown by an extreme-left faction of his left-wing New Jewel Movement led by General Hudson Austin and Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard. On 19 October, Bishop and other top government leaders were taken from their cells at the army's Fort Rupert headquarters and killed. Bishop's revolutionary regime had been a thorn in Washington's side since its inception in a 1979 coup. His murder provided an ironic pretext for military action to restore Grenada to its place in the American sphere in the eastern Caribbean. Grenada was already on the White House crisis management agenda on Saturday, 22 October; at 2:30 A.M. on Sunday, 23 October, the president was informed of the Beirut bombing. At about 7 P.M. that Sunday evening Reagan decided that frustration over Beirut did not mean American hands were tied over Grenada. He decided to act.<sup>7</sup>

On the morning of Tuesday, 25 October, the invasion began. Originally, Operation URGENT FURY was to have involved only the Marine Corps' 22d Marine Amphibious Unit. (Stationed on the U.S.S. Guam and four support ships, the unit musters its own landing craft, helicopter gunships, armor and artillery.) The flotilla was underway en route to Lebanon before being diverted south to Grenada. At the last moment, it was determined that the Marines could not handle the island's defense forces (nominally 3,000 Grenadians and as many as 750 Cubans, most of them civilians). The final invasion line-up brought together a naval carrier task force (six ships), the five ships of the Marines' Amphibious Ready Group, the Air Force Tactical Fighter Wing and First Special Operations Wing from Eglin Air Base, and the Army's 82d Airborne Division — which is now billed as the principal rapid deployment force equipped for low-intensity conflict.<sup>8</sup>

The invasion was envisioned as an operation that would be over in a matter of hours: The island is only fifteen miles

long and ten miles wide, and its population of roughly 110,000 people was badly shocked and disoriented by the murder of Maurice Bishop. But for almost a week Grenadian troops and a group of 100 of the nearly 700 Cuban engineers and advisers on the island put up active resistance. Between 23 October and 21 November, when the operation was formally suspended, an estimated 45 Grenadians were killed and 337 wounded. Cuban casualties were estimated at 25 dead, 57 wounded. As many as 6,000 American

troops were on the ground at any one time, with 10,000 more available for reinforcement. The use of overwhelming force was not without cost however. U.S. Army casualties were 18 dead and 57 wounded; the Marines suffered three dead and seven wounded.<sup>9</sup>

The considerable toll of American casualties claimed by “friendly fire,” by accidents, and by a general lack of coordination between participant forces was the principal object of criticism by military insiders in the postinvasion summing up. Even the achievement of the invasion’s primary objective was ill-planned. In his television address on Thursday 27 October, President Reagan said the Marine task force had been diverted because of concern that the some 1,000 Americans studying there at St. George’s Medical College could be “harmed or taken hostage.” But planners failed to determine just where the students lived and studied. While rescue forces “liberated” the main “True Blue” campus on the very morning of October 23, only 123 students were found there; 426 other students were at a different campus altogether, “Grand Anse,” halfway across the island; they were left to their own devices throughout the first two days of the invasion. Army and Marine forces took the second campus at about 4 P.M. on Wednesday afternoon. In the event, the students were never threatened

by their Grenadian hosts or the armed Cubans near the campus; indeed, there were no student casualties in the affair. [10](#)

Over a year after the Grenada invasion, an American cartoonist portrayed an American fighter pilot diving on a tropical scene — signposted “Nicaragua” — while exclaiming, “Take that, Shiites!” The twofold suggestion, which had considerable currency at the time, was that U. S. impotence in the Middle East had prompted the Grenada adventure and that Nicaragua could be a sequel. That the Grenada initiative was taken at short notice, precipitated by Shiite plastic explosives in Lebanon, was suggested by more than Reagan’s own insistence that the events “though oceans apart, are closely related.” [11](#) On the level of diplomacy, the most striking evidence that Grenada was a reflexive action was the administration’s failure to consult with Margaret Thatcher, Britain’s prime minister, before undertaking an operation in Britain’s Commonwealth sphere. Reagan’s political “soul mate” reportedly learned of the plan at about 10 P.M. on Monday night, as the U.S. ships closed on the island. Thatcher’s “special relationship” with Reagan sufficed to permit a ninth hour (midnight) telephone call to the White House urging postponement of the invasion; but her plea was shrugged off. [12](#) In a BBC World Service broadcast a week later, the prime minister protested against the lack of consultation and rejected the American president’s justification of the invasion. [13](#)

## **Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Low-Intensity Conflict**

The rhetoric of the antiterrorism campaign proved effective in rallying American public support for the tough projection of power overseas. The campaign foundered on

the inability to match rhetoric with effective action against the real terrorists of the Middle East. Air strikes, naval shelling, and counterterror car bombs appeared only to sow further dragon's teeth. The debut of the battleship *New Jersey* and the destruction of the Marine garrison were followed by further bombings and a spate of kidnappings on a hitherto unprecedented scale. On 16 March 1984, the CIA's Beirut chief, William Buckley, was kidnaped (he would be tortured to death by his captors in mid-1986). Other kidnappings would follow. On 20 September 1984, the U. S. embassy in Beirut was bombed again; fourteen people died. Forces of Lebanon's Shiite militia were credited with the assaults and kidnappings. The hidden hand identified in the Shiite fundamentalists' attacks was not Soviet, though — it was Iranian.

The terrorism epithet was applied to the actions of the administration's designated enemies across the board. Sometimes this assumption represented a serious misanalysis (or deliberate misrepresentation) of the nature of actual or potential conflicts. It also muddled home-front perceptions of overseas power projections in a manner intended to garner support. Presumably the American public wants to see its government's use of force overseas as moral and good. The government's approach, therefore, is to assure the public that an overseas military assignment is both overwhelmingly benevolent and ultimately safe. It was anathema to suggest (to the public) that others might consider an American intervention a kind of war.

The antiterrorism campaign at home aimed to promote low-intensity conflict as a way the United States would do what has to be done militarily without having to resort to war. As much of the low- intensity conflict spectrum became subsumed under the antiterrorist rubric, military intervention was characterized as a tough kind of crime

control. Attacks on the U.S. military presence in conflict situations overseas, as a consequence, became all the more outrageous because they were unexpected. The killing of U.S. combat troops and advisers overseas — from Lebanon to San Salvador — would be regarded as terrorist acts somehow even more heinous than terrorists' casual murders of American civilians.

A Defense Department commission on "The Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act" concluded that the attack on the Marines "met the criteria of a terrorist act."<sup>14</sup> This was not only a political necessity, it was roughly consistent with the then-current definition of terrorism — a definition that strained to span the gap between open international warfare and common domestic criminality. Defense Department Directive 2000.12 defined terrorism as "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property, with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological reasons."<sup>15</sup> (Thus, a domestic organization fighting a foreign expeditionary force can be dubbed "revolutionary" if it does not represent the government that is recognized by the foreign intruders.) The definition was almost as broad, and therefore almost as useful, for the justification of counterterror as the Joint Chief's 1962 definition of insurgency: "illegal opposition to an existing government."<sup>16</sup>

A subset of the insiders' critiques of "low-intensity conflict" doctrine challenged the rush to classify assorted threats and acts of violence as "terrorism." Pentagon Middle East specialist Lt. Col. F. Hof has challenged both the official definition of terrorism and the accepted wisdom in Washington that the destruction of the Marines' Beirut headquarters was an act of terrorism. The September 1983 shelling by the *New Jersey* was, in Hof's view, a



consequence of “a decision to openly enter the Lebanese conflict... on behalf of Gemayel’s army... From that moment the Marine BLT Battalion Landing Team] Headquarters. . . assumed the character of a lucrative military target.”<sup>17</sup> In making the point, Hof refers to Che Guevara’s distinction between the military tactic of sabotage (which Guevara found a “highly effective method of warfare”) and terrorism (“which is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its results, since it often makes victims of innocent people.... Sabotage has nothing to do with terrorism”).<sup>18</sup> Terrorism, in contrast to other military tactics, is characterized in Hof’s analysis by “indiscriminate results which victimize innocent people” — hardly the case in an attack on an expeditionary force’s military headquarters.<sup>19</sup>

There were other anomalies in the way the Pentagon was obliged to view the incidents in Beirut and terrorism in general. The Defense commission on the Beirut bombing had itself recognized that the official definition of terrorism unreasonably applied to only the actions of “revolutionary organizations.” This neatly ruled out of the terrorist class American or friendly government’s acts like the bombing of the Greenpeace *Rainbow Warrior*. Terrorist violence was also defined solely in terms of its intended effect (not the substantive nature of the act). Hof observes wryly that by classing as terrorism all violence from “revolutionary” quarters “used to ‘coerce’ or ‘intimidate,’ the directive is, in effect, saying that all revolutionary violence is terrorism” — including the United States’ own “revolutionary” clients: “Are we to conclude, therefore, that the Nicaraguan *Contras* are engaged in terrorism, with the United States serving as their state sponsors? That conclusion is inescapable if we rely on the DOD definition.”<sup>20</sup>

The Defense Department’s findings on the Beirut airport affair neatly fit the Reagan administration’s public relations

needs in counterinsurgency and counterrevolutionary warfare in Central America. The lumping of all insurgent (or revolutionary) violence into the broad category of terrorism had long been a staple of administration foreign policy. The heavy toll of Middle East conflicts would allow the United States' response to revolutionary threats of "low-intensity" around the world to be portrayed as a crusade against terrorism.

The 14 June 1985 hijack of TWA Flight 847 would conflate the United States' antiterrorism and counterinsurgency programs even further. During a stopover at Beirut Airport, Shiite hijackers beat and shot to death U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem and dumped his body in front of the television cameras.<sup>[21](#)</sup> Thirty-seven of the passengers were taken from the airport to safehouses in West Beirut — the destination of dozens more Americans and Europeans who would be seized in the years to come by a variety of groups.<sup>[22](#)</sup>

The hijacker's demands referred to the sequelae of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon: the release of 766 prisoners detained in Lebanon who had been taken to Israel (and who were themselves in a sense hostages). On this score, the hijackers were nominally in agreement with the United States, which had protested to Israel that the removal of Lebanese citizens to Israel was a violation of the Geneva Conventions.<sup>[23](#)</sup> Complications arose insofar as the United States was obliged to back-channel its pressure on the Israelis to give in to the demands while maintaining its public posture of "no negotiations with terrorists." In the end, the Israelis would release most of the prisoners in question, and the last of the American hostages recovered their freedom on 30 June 1985.<sup>[24](#)</sup>

The of the American public over the TWA hijack was aggravated during the same week by events a world away in San Salvador. A guerrilla attack on a sidewalk cafe in which four Marines were assassinated led Americans to instinctively link hijacks and hostage-taking with revolutionary insurgency. The introduction of a *Newsweek* lead story on the hostage crisis observed that, just as navy diver Robert Stethem was buried, “six more Americans — four U. S. Marines and two civilians — died in a murderously efficient terrorist attack OTI an outdoor cafe in San Salvador.”<sup>25</sup>

The killings occurred in San Salvador’s entertainment district, the Zona Rosa. A pickup truck carrying some ten men in Salvadoran army uniforms pulled up alongside a swank cafe — apparently after spotting the four Marines ten minutes before — and sprayed the scene with submachine-gun fire. The Marines were in civilian clothes and, according to embassy sources, unarmed. The evidence that the four Marines had been targeted included reports that some were “finished off” after they were wounded.<sup>26</sup> Two American civilians described as businessmen died with them, as did seven Salvadoran civilians (at least fifteen others were severely wounded). Only one American had previously been tracked and murdered by insurgents in El Salvador (although a round dozen had been murdered by government forces): Lt. Cmdr. Albert Schaufelberger, an adviser, who was shot in the head as he waited in his car for a girlfriend in June 1983. Schaufelberger’s murder, indeed, had been the object of disturbing speculation that he had been killed by a government “death squad” in a “black” operation — a double-blind to blame the guerrillas and win increased military assistance.<sup>27</sup>

There were no doubts over the Zona Rosa killings — a small oddball faction of the guerrilla coalition promptly

claimed responsibility for the attack.<sup>28</sup> Before the Zona Rosa (and by and large afterward), Salvadoran insurgents had fairly consistently eschewed terrorism — if one applies the term only to indiscriminate violence against innocents in order to make a point. The Zona Rosa attack, with its echoes of attacks on the French cafes of Algiers, was out of the ordinary in that its planners clearly must have envisioned dozens or more civilian casualties (the gunmen, after all, *strafed* the cafe area). The attack also appeared to break an unstated FMLN (Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front) policy against the assassination of U.S. government operatives in noncombat situations (for public-relations reasons rather than any ethical reservations). The assassination of selected Salvadoran targets, by contrast, had long figured in the range of insurgent tactics (although, unlike their adversaries, Salvadoran insurgents in the 1980s rarely murdered prisoners).

The reporting in the United States of the TWA hijacking and the assault in San Salvador tended to echo and, in turn, to influence the administration's own statements on the two incidents. The theme of the day was that America was under attack. Ronald Reagan, promising to rush through \$128 million in military aid for El Salvador, characterized the Salvadoran insurgents as just another group of terrorists battering at the gates of American freedom: "We have our limits — and our limits have been reached.... This cannot continue ... We must act against those who have so little regard for human life and the values we cherish."<sup>29</sup> This was strong stuff, and it showed just how effectively the fear and revulsion over Middle Eastern terrorism had spilled over to color the American reaction to attacks of any kind on Americans overseas. The San Salvador incident would permit the administration to piggy-back, security assistance and covert operations for Central America on the campaign against Middle East terrorism.

About a month after the Zona Rosa killings, the administration went public for the first time on U. S. operational involvement in Salvadoran counterterror. The White House announced that twenty-one guerrillas were tracked down and killed in reprisal for the killing of the six Americans (nine were said to have been captured).<sup>30</sup> The operation, carried out by Salvadorans, had been made possible by “U.S.-supplied intelligence.” The White House said the operation had “inflicted a major defeat on the guerrilla organization which planned and carried out” the attack. Defense Secretary Weinberger went slightly further, stating that the government “with our assistance has taken care of — in one way or another, taken prisoner or killed — a number of the people who participated in that killing.” There was perhaps a psychological need at the time to have a ripping success story with which to back up the rhetoric on terrorism. Unfortunately (at least for those killed — not to mention Weinberger’s credibility), the administration would later have to back down on its claim. The reprisal, as it turned out, misfired:: The Salvadorans had hunted down the wrong people. A Pentagon spokesman followed up the Weinberger interview clarifying that “he did not mean to suggest the actual triggermen had been captured or killed” — rather, the group targeted was actually just one of several who could have carried out the killings. <sup>31</sup>

The Zona Rosa killings would have an immediate return for the administration in the field of police assistance — as would the kidnaping of President Duarte’s daughter not long afterward (Ines Duarte would subsequently be released unharmed). In July, a frustrated Congress agreed to “waive” the legal ban on assistance to the police forces of El Salvador and Honduras. In the ensuing months, bids to boost police and military assistance to El Salvador and throughout Central America would be couched in the terms of antiterrorism. William Ball III of the State Department

warned the House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman, Dante Fascell:

*We face the prospect of more incidents of the type suffered in the June 19 Zona Rosa incident.... The democratic governments of the region face the prospect of more kidnappings such as the recently concluded ordeal of President Duarte's daughter.... Terrorism is like a spreading plague. To be effective we need to ensure that all of the countries of the region are eligible for this assistance — including Guatemala and Panama.*<sup>32</sup>

After 1985 the propaganda side of the antiterrorist crusade in Central America would have little material of the quality of the Zona Rosa attacks: The most grotesque acts of terrorism there were those conducted not by revolutionaries but by American allies in El Salvador and Guatemala, and U.S. employees — the Nicaraguan *contras*.

There would be no such dearth of terrorist grotesquerie in the Mediterranean. Reciprocal violence and retaliation there would continue throughout most of the balance of the Reagan administration. The hijack of the Italian cruise liner *Achille Lauro* in October 1985, two years after the bombing of the Marines, further fueled American outrage. The murder of an elderly wheelchair-bound American, Leon Klinghoffer, because he was a Jew, smacked of Nazism. There as no ambiguity to the act — *this* was international terrorism at its most heinous. The American response was a test of its readiness to take risks: U.S. Navy fighters intercepted the Egyptian airliner carrying the four-man hijack team from the scene of the crime. At risk was both the American alliance with Egypt — which had negotiated the surrender of the four and pledged safe-conduct to Tunisia — and relations with Italy. The airliner was escorted by the American jets to the Italian air base at Sigonella, Sicily — provoking a

confrontation between a team from the American Delta force and Italian troops. The Italians ultimately made the arrests.<sup>33</sup> Two months later, the same Egypt Air 737 aircraft was hijacked and forced down in Malta. A hard-nosed approach this time led to disaster. U.S. trained Egyptian commandos stormed the plane in an attempt to free the hostages. Sixty people died.<sup>34</sup>

The high profile of Middle East terrorism and the American response would periodically be renewed, peaking when U.S. planes bombed Libya in April 1986. The raiders killed two of the chief of state's children in an undisguised attempt to "take out" Mu'ammar Qaddafi — a high tech variation on the ancient option of assassinations.<sup>35</sup> The administration justified the bombing of April 1986 by citing "intelligence reports" that, it said, linked Libya to a West Berlin nightclub bombing that had killed two U.S. servicemen.<sup>36</sup>

Beirut had routed the American intruders and held on to the innocents whom high explosive could not prise free, from the Archbishop of Canterbury's aide Terry Waite to the newsman Terry Anderson. It would continue to haunt the West long after Reagan retired to his ranch. Iran, on the other hand, was too powerful and too dangerous to engage frontally,. The best target for the United States was Libya — an enemy the American public could learn to hate and which American fighterbombers could hardly miss.<sup>37</sup> Libya could be "safely" humiliated by American carrier groups and bled from 30,000 feet — although it is arguable whether there is any safe distance today even for a superpower. Perhaps more important was its central role in the Reagan administration's propaganda efforts. Libya's Qaddafi did indeed become the figure Americans loved to hate — and by periodically battering Libya from a distance Reagan could

demonstrate his resolve in the war against terrorism in the Mediterranean.

The Reagan administration had picked a fight with Libya at the very beginning, claiming that Qaddafi's regime, hydra-like, provided the evil genius behind a multiplicity of terrorist groups. Libya's Washington embassy was closed down in May 1981 and, in August 1981, the United States ostentatiously challenged Libya by edging a carrier group into the Libyan-claimed Gulf of Sidra. The Libyans took the bait when fighters from the carrier U. S. S. Nimitz moved into Libyan-claimed airspace over the Gulf of Sidra, the first of the feints and parries that would continue right up to the eve of George Bush's inauguration.

The United States drew first blood when American Tomcat F-14s shot down two Libyan Sukhoi-22 fighters with air-to-air missiles. These were the first combat "kills" by U.S. fighters since the Vietnam War.<sup>38</sup> The jingoistic enthusiasm with which news of the skirmish was greeted back home may have ensured a return engagement: Thrashing Libya was good domestic politics. A replay of the Gulf of Sidra incident of August 1981 was acted out in the final weeks of the Reagan presidency. On this occasion, the United States' saber-rattling followed American campaign that Libya was preparing to produce chemical weapons — which was curious in its timing, because CIA reports had claimed as early as 1983 that Libya *load* chemical weapons.<sup>39</sup> As yet another American task force approached Libyan waters on 4 January 1989, Libyan fighters again rose to the bait: Fighters from the John F. Kennedy downed two as they shadowed the group some seventy miles off the coast. The Reagan administration would claim one last kill in its eight-year war against "terrorism."



The brief renewal of the propaganda war on Libya in the dog days of the Reagan administration was an exception to the otherwise reduced emphasis on antiterrorism rhetoric in the last of Reagan's eight years. The everyday reminders of the war against terrorism had subtly yielded to *perestroika* and the reordering of Eastern Europe. Terrorism, the scourge for which no remedy had been found, was largely removed from the front page by the last year of the Reagan administration. Little would be heard of the hostages still in the darkness of Beirut's cellars as the 1988 elections approached.

## **A Dangerous World**

A main theme in the administration's counterterror rhetoric after 1983 was that going beyond the limits of the law was sometimes a matter of survival. American scruples were regarded as a potentially fatal handicap to the nation in a newly dangerous world. As in the 1960s, the challenges of insurgency — and the new bugbear, terrorism — were held to have proliferated, in part, *because* of American success in deterring nuclear and conventional war. Low-intensity conflict, moreover, was deemed a particularly insidious challenge in that it aimed to take advantage of America's high moral principles. The question was whether the United States had the backbone it needed to get down off its high horse and fight dirty when faced with the unscrupulous tactics of the adversary.

As before, it was suggested that the United States had accrued sufficient moral capital to set aside its principles when necessary. In a 1986 speech, George Shultz maintained that the enemy presumed we would be bound by moral constraints — and therein lay the challenge:

*They hope that the legal and moral complexities of these kinds of challenges will ensnare us in our own scruples and exploit our human inhibitions against applying force to defend our interests. Ambiguous warfare has exposed a chink in our armor.... The fact is, we will never face a specific threat that does not involve some hard choices that are difficult for a democracy. The simple, tragic truth about many low-intensity challenges is that the "rules of the game" are often blurred, at best.*<sup>40</sup>

The threat, however, was not particularly new. The "low-intensity" nomenclature addressed much the same concerns below the threshold of conventional war that had prompted the development of political warfare capabilities in CIA and army Special Forces after 1947. The launching of the counterinsurgency era in 1961 was explained in similar terms, ushering in an exponential growth in America's political warfare activities. The rhetoric of the 1980s, too, was remarkably similar in tone and content to Kennan's early discussions of the incipient Cold War and the Kennedy administration's demand for a new dimension in America's defense program.

While Shultz's hard-line rhetoric was part public relations — an attempt to blame Congress for foreign policy disasters such as Lebanon and to distract the public with so much martial posturing — there had already been since 1981 a very real dimension of "fighting terror with terror" underway in Lebanon, Central America, and elsewhere. The intervention in Nicaragua had already bobbed to the surface in Congress with William Casey's program to mine the harbors. Still to come, in October 1984, was the public furor over the American government's "murder manual" for the *Contras*, and revelations about its help in creating Honduras' army "death squad" in 1981 and its role in the March 1985

“counterterror” car bomb that killed eighty bystanders in Beirut. A counterpoint to Shultz’s gung ho approach to righteous intervention was provided by the more cautious approach taken at the Pentagon. This was often ascribed to Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s personal views on the matter (as well as to a long-standing professional rivalry between the two men) but in fact reflected deeper doubts in the defense establishment than were suggested by the loud voices of the special warfare lobby.<sup>41</sup> In a November 1984 speech, Weinberger wanted that the routine projection of military power in foreign affairs “would surely plunge us headlong into the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam war, without accomplishing the goal for which we committed our forces.”<sup>42</sup>

The Secretary of Defense was not speaking out against an expansion of covert action but rather a proliferation of ill-conceived military commitments with fuzzy objectives. The half-cocked commitment of troops in Lebanon, a symbolic power projection gone wrong, was an experience Weinberger (who had opposed the measure) did not want to repeat. The bottom line on committing troops, he argued, should be whether it is “deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.” In that case, the military would require “clearly defined political and military objectives”; troops would be sent in with “the clear intention of winning” with requisite logistical and personnel support. The Pentagon was determined to avoid either a repeat performance of Beirut or a Vietnam style quagmire without a clear political consensus at home.

Weinberger’s long list of conditions under which U. S. forces would be employed overseas was frequently cited as the stumbling block to bringing the military into action against terrorism. By contrast, Shultz complained that the United States risked becoming “the Hamlet of nations,

worrying endlessly whether or not to respond,” and he pressed for a bold strategy “of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation.”<sup>43</sup> Weinberger’s approach was clearly unwelcome to those who proposed that the norms for the use of military force become more akin to those applied to the CIA.

The cautious approach to intervention — and a wanting against overestimating what multipurpose special operations forces can do — was also put forward by realpolitik strategists who stressed “playing to win,” notably Samuel P. Huntington.<sup>44</sup> His strategy for the United States in the Third World established the conditions for military intervention much like those set out by Weinberger: Ideally, the United States would act quickly so that its objective would be achieved before its political will to win diminished. Intervention would be offensive in nature, involve overwhelming force, and use to full advantage the United States’ high-tech arsenal.<sup>45</sup> Huntington warned that military force should only be used to achieve *military* objectives — and that the United States should not think it could defeat guerrillas “by sending out small counterinsurgent teams” or winning the hearts and minds of the populace:

*Military forces arc not primarily instruments of communication to convey signals to an enemy; they are instead instruments of coercion to compel him to alter his behavior. Nor arc they normally good instruments of political and social appeal, to win the hearts and minds of people. Military forces arc designed to defeat opposing military forces, they arc not very useful in the pursuit of other goals.*<sup>46</sup>

Weinberger’s preconditions for major military engagements overseas and the occasional critique of special operations did not severely restrain overseas adventurism

under the Reagan administration. Covert action and “low-intensity” military action as “signals” — to threaten adversaries and reassure the American public — continued. Counterinsurgency programs would continue to emphasize special warfare even as they depended upon conventional air power and American technology.

The challenge of international terrorism in the 1980s provoked considerable debate within the military establishment and brought counterterrorism to the fore. One terrorism expert contrasted the “successful” counterterrorism aspect of counterinsurgency with the dearth of comparable doctrine for the more perilous international stage: “ A military response to terrorism . . . where it does exist is primarily directed at that type of terrorism associated with regional insurgencies.... Military doctrine to combat terrorism does not deal with those who practice non-territorial terrorism, who often seek targets . . . thousands of miles away from a strife zone.”<sup>47</sup> Advocates of military involvement in the dirty work of international counterterrorism sought a new, improved doctrine that would address the constraints hitherto limiting such action. Not least of these were the moral constraints at home. These could, by and large, be circumvented in counterinsurgency and limited covert action, but nonetheless threatened to hobble any aggressive campaign against international terrorism.

The reluctance of the conventional armed forces to engage in international counterterrorism should not be exaggerated. The post-Vietnam military establishment’s conviction that it should not be called in unless a clear and obtainable objective was defined and a political mandate assured was, of course, a factor in both the small-war scenarios of “low-intensity conflict” and in the one-off operations of counterterrorism. The “unmilitary” aspects of

counterterrorism's covert action side were not a particular concern, because these tasks would continue to be assigned to forces outside the military mainstream. The matter of the political mandate, however, was a very real and decisive constraint: No one would like to be left swinging in the wind when politicians lose their nerve. The military's part in offensive counterterrorism beyond the counterinsurgency area would be by and large in a unilateral American initiative. There would be no sharing of responsibility — or displacement of opprobrium — for failure.

Stephen Sloan, a terrorism expert who advocates greater military involvement in counterterrorism, suggests a major constraint is lack of confidence in the mandate for military counterterrorism: "Counterterrorism operations are a risky and dirty business, and it is debatable whether government leaders have the political resolve to engage in such actions in the absence of a clear public mandate." <sup>48</sup> Although the military had made progress in developing special operations capabilities for counterinsurgency, "they have been unwilling to refine these assets to engage in offensive counterterrorism operations . . . with the clandestine services of the Central Intelligence Agency." <sup>49</sup>

## **The Covert Response**

On 3 April 1984, a covert response to terrorism that had been under way in a piecemeal form for some time took official shape in a presidential directive on counterterrorism. NSDD-138, which remains classified, laid down the ground rules for going after terrorists. Although its final form was apparently less forthright than the original draft, it "did not exclude preemptive attacks on persons presumed to be preparing terrorist attacks." <sup>50</sup> Later in 1984, a Presidential Finding was to transform NSDD-138's policy statement into

counterterror action. The finding authorized and instructed the CIA to organize and train overseas counterterrorist units in several countries and to unilaterally preempt and punish terrorist action.<sup>51</sup> It purportedly specified that the foreigners trained “were to be used with great care and only in situations where the United States had good intelligence that a [terrorist] group was about to strike.”<sup>52</sup> Operatives undertaking “preemptive” actions were given “the authority to kill suspected terrorists if that was the only alternative.”<sup>53</sup> Defense Department counterterrorism chief Noel Koch called the new policy “a quantum leap in countering terrorism from the reactive mode to recognition that pro-active steps are needed.”<sup>54</sup>

The counterterror programs covered by the 1984 finding were reportedly implemented in about a dozen countries ranging from Honduras (where a counterterror infrastructure had been installed since 1981) to Lebanon.<sup>55</sup> The Lebanese project, “to form and train three teams of Lebanese capable of neutralizing or disabling terrorists,” eventually blew up in the face of the Reagan administration. The tough talk would make

it even more difficult than before to explain the distinction between the permissible and the deplorable, or to deny the United States’ hidden hand behind the more heinous actions of its allies. Secretary of State Shultz had, after all, stated for the record that the American response to the Marine headquarters bombing should include “means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation.”<sup>56</sup> Less than a year **later**, a Lebanese intelligence source working with the CIA was quoted in a classic affirmation of the counterterror ethos: “You’ve got to stop terrorism with terrorism .<sup>57</sup>

The CIA's Lebanese terror connection came to the fore on 8 March 1985, when a car bomb exploded below the apartment of Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, leader of the Shiite group Hezbollah, the Party of God. The bombing was the product of CIA work with counterterrorist Units in the intelligence service of Lebanese President Amin Gemayel's short-lived minority government. The bomb destroyed an apartment block, killing some 80 people and injuring 200 — Fadlallah was unharmed. Sheikh Fadlallah later said he had "accurate information about the involvement of American, Israeli and Lebanese intelligence organs" in the attack. The CIA, however, bore the brunt of the responsibility.<sup>58</sup>

The story reached the American public on 12 May when the *Washington Post* linked the attack to a secret directive from the president in the fall of 1984, ordering the CIA to train foreign teams to make preemptive strikes against suspected terrorists.<sup>59</sup> The story attributed the attack to one of the CIA-trained units, and quoted a Lebanese intelligence source claiming credit for the action. The source maintained that while no American agents participated in the action, "the CIA knew it was being planned."<sup>60</sup> CIA officers, it seems, were more concerned with the disclosures than with the lives lost: they "were upset that one of [the agency's] most secret and much-debated operations had gone astray." The entire operation in Lebanon, they said, was immediately canceled.<sup>61</sup>

That CIA involvement in counterterror in Lebanon was canceled across the board is highly unlikely — although some of its assets may well have been cut adrift. Gunning for Hezbollah's leader was neither the last nor the first occasion for CIA involvement in covert action in Lebanon. According to Jack Anderson, a secret policy memorandum of 6 March 1982 marked a change from previous CIA policy on relations with the Lebanese government, concluding that



henceforth “the agency should provide military and financial assistance, as requested, to the Phalangist militias.”<sup>62</sup> Anderson certainly got one part of the story straight, but the conclusion of his November 1982 article was, to say the least, premature: “The CIA strategy has been so successful the Lebanon may now wind up as a U.S. protectorate.”<sup>63</sup>

The RAND Corporation’s chief terrorism specialist Brian Jenkin added a footnote to the sequence of terrorist actions in Lebanon, under scoring the tendency of creative “counter”-terrorism to sow dragon’ teeth.<sup>64</sup> Jenkins dates the beginning of the continuing Lebanon hostage crisis to a kidnaping on 4 July 1982, just one month after Israel invaded Lebanon. The victims were Iranians — “three diplomats and a journalist” — and their captors an Israeli-led Christian militia. The four, traveling in a car with diplomatic plates, included charge d’affaires Mohser Mousavi and political officer Ahmad Motevasselian, whom the State Department claimed was a top Revolutionary Guard official. They were stopped at a checkpoint manned by the Lebanese forces, taken away, and never seen again. Jenkins contrasts the lack of interest of American and Western media in the kidnaping with the fury of the Iranians — and he dates the high-stakes era of political kidnaping in Lebanon to this incident. <sup>65</sup>

It seems that the United States did little either to placate the Iranians or to distance itself from the perpetrators. Iran apparently sent feelers to the United States in 1985, offering assistance in locating the growing number of American hostages seized since 1982 in return for help in recovering their own. The United States at that time sent word that according to their sources, the four Iranians were dead. The Iranians might reasonably have suspected some degree of complicity, foreknowledge, or complacency in the matter, and the American failure to lean on its Israeli allies was perhaps sufficient motive to unleash their own brand of

hostage counter/error. The United States' indifferent response simply might have been a case of tactlessness, or a tendency to shrug off the violence of others as a matter of "political culture. " A view of the Middle East as a culturally violent place, of people accustomed to car bombs and kidnappings, also may have helped to remove the constraints against the United States' participation in the terrorism game. American officialdom sometimes apparently fails to understand that other nations react to having their diplomats held hostage or butchered in the dark in much the same way as we do.

Immediately after the May 1985 disclosures, the CIA issued a statement declaring that it "had no foreknowledge of the bombing incident" and "never provided any training of Lebanese security forces related to the events described." This was particularly careful wording: What sounded like a denial that the CIA had trained the security forces involved was really an avowal that any training provided was unrelated to this particular car bombings. Many found it less than convincing; Admiral Stansfield Turner, in a seminar on terrorism a year later, referred to the incident as an illustration of the risks involved in close association with foreign counterterrorists.<sup>66</sup> Turner's concern about the domestic costs of the antiterrorism crusade was already on the record: "I just believe fervently that we've got to be careful that in the name of defeating terrorism we don't become terrorists."<sup>67</sup>

The most cynical aspect of the antiterrorism campaign was a COncerted effort by the administration to hitch its ideological agenda — from Beirut to Central America and the Caribbean — to the antiterrorism bandwagon. Just weeks after the Beirut bombing, but before the American link was revealed, the new get-tough policy was reiterated in speeches by National Security Adviser Robert C. McFarlane

(on 25 March 1985) and CIA chief William Casey (17 April 1985). The speeches appear to have been a public expression of the secret antiterrorism finding of 1984. Casey used virtually the same emphatic yet ambiguous words as had McFarlane:

*We cannot and will not abstain from forcible action to prevent, preempt or respond to terrorist acts where conditions merit the use of force. Many countries, including the United States, have the specific forces and capabilities to carry out operations against terrorist groups.*<sup>68</sup>

The attacks on U.S. Marines in San Salvador a few weeks later would be used to boost the administration's rhetoric. Within a month Congress agreed to waive the ban on assistance to foreign police for El Salvador and Honduras — assistance that was largely unrelated to the threat of terrorism but had everything to do with crushing opposition.

Congress was briefed on counterterrorism policy in May 1985 by Fred C. Ikle and the director of the State Department's Office of Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, Robert B. Oakley.<sup>69</sup> Ikle distinguished between "antiterrorism," which was defensive, and "counterterrorism," which involves "offensive measures." Both would be part of the program, and armed counterterrorism initiatives would be considered even with the "risk that innocent lives may be lost and operations fail."<sup>70</sup> Back-channel signals sent out at about the same time included leaks to American television networks suggesting that the executive ban on assassinations was under "serious review." NBC reported "the USC of military commando teams to carry out executions, instead of the was being discussed."<sup>71</sup> While this was officially denied by the White House, the tenor of the message held true: The

administration was prepared to go to extremes in its antiterrorist operations and it wanted the world to know it.

President Reagan himself was a spokesman for the new hard-line approach. In a July 1985 speech that appeared to be aimed at preparing the public for American reprisals overseas, the president identified a group of five countries as “a confederation of terrorist states . . . a new, international version of Murder, Inc.”<sup>72</sup> NO one was surprised at the inclusion of Iran and Libya, but paired with them were Cuba, Nicaragua — and North Korea. All five were said to be “engaged in acts of war against the government and people of the U.S.”; the United States therefore reserved “the right to defend itself.” That the same terms had been used previously to describe U. S. operations, when Lyndon Johnson protested that “We had been operating a damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean,” went unremarked (see p. 205).

Reagan’s speech set the stage for a new effort to boost security assistance in Central America, a region where terrorist methods on the Middle East model were largely the province of the United States’ allies. This time the administration’s appeals to public sentiment failed, the Central American Counter- terrorism Act, presented to Congress in August, was derailed at the committee stage. Administration efforts to tie aid to Guatemala into a regional package, and to sidestep human rights criteria across the board, provoked resistance to what was seen as an attempt to militarize Central America — and not to combat terrorism at all.

A “Presidential Finding” was reportedly signed in January 1986 to permit the kidnaping of terrorist suspects in other countries and transport them secretly to the United States. Although it has never been released, press reports said it did

not authorize assassinations.<sup>73</sup> This finding coincided with another round of high-level rhetoric and strategic press briefings much like those of the spring of 1985. On 19 January, the State Department's chief legal adviser, Abraham Sofaer, told the *New York Times* that the department would support "the 'seizure' of fugitives in other countries if the chances of success were reasonable.... [S]uch a move would violate international law but ... there were legitimate arguments in favor of 'bending' the rules in extraordinary circumstances."<sup>74</sup> Secretary of State Shultz remained, as always, the principal high-level spokesman for lash-back counterterror:

*Some have suggested that even to contemplate using force against terrorism is to lower ourselves to the barbaric level of the terrorists. . . It is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing terrorists in international waters or airspace, from attacking them on the soil of other nations even for the purpose of rescuing hostages, or from using force against states that support, train, and harbor terrorists or guerrillas.* <sup>75</sup>

The Shultz statement and the finding of January 1986 appear to represent a victory over the more cautious approach taken by Pentagon chief Caspar Weinberger. Just days before Shultz's comments, Weinberger had warned: "We must not use terrorist means to deal with terrorism."<sup>76</sup> His views were shared by many others in the foreign policy establishment. Among the more eloquent of them was former Undersecretary of State to Kennedy and Johnson, George Ball, who in 1984 warned:

*[L]et us take care that we are not led, in panic and anger, to embrace counter-terror and international lynch law and thus reduce America's conduct to the squalid*

*level of the terrorists.... Otherwise, we may find our position confused with that of the warrior bishop during the Albigensian crusade, who, when asked by a soldier how they could tell the CathoLics from the heretics, replied that they should kill them all, since "God will know his own."*<sup>77</sup>

The Albigensian analogy was not that farfetched: A popular (U.S. made) T-shirt among the Salvadoran military expressed the same sentiments. One of the better known officers of the elite Atlacatl battalion, Captain Juan Grande, better known as "*Cuchillo Grande*" (Big Knife), was famous both for his unit's penchant for murder and mutilation and for receiving journalists in a T-shirt adorned with the slogan, in English, "Kill them all, let God sort them out later."<sup>78</sup> The Salvadoran military had long applied such norms when dealing with its own people — but what was tacitly accepted by the United States in unconventional warfare was not openly touted as an option in international conflict. The novel element was that the United States threatened to adopt the norms of the counterinsurgency state as the basis for its own behavior in the arena of international affairs.

Well after the Beirut car bomb and the Presidential Finding of January 1986, evidence that the United States continued to dabble in unilateral (and multilateral) terror in the Middle East began to come to the attention of the public through the Iran-*contra* hearings and the trial of Oliver North. Over a year after the car bomb incident, the press reported evidence that North and McFarlane had directed a top-secret inquiry into the attack on the Marine garrison and organized a response.<sup>79</sup> Reportedly, intelligence tying the attack to Hezbollah had been gathered by the NSC through Marine trainers working with the Lebanese *Deuxieme Bureau* (hardly an unbiased source). North was said to have run operations outside CIA channels "against the Syrians with

the help of aides to Samir Geagea, a Maronite Christian militia leader . . . [and] the suspicion was that the attack on Sheikh Fadlallah may have been one of those operations.”<sup>80</sup> This, in turn, according to one interpretation, may have doomed the subsequent efforts of the NSC troubleshooters to play covert diplomacy with the Iranians.

The “Contra-gate” hearings lent substance to the reports of direct American involvement in counterterrorism above and beyond the efforts of the CIA. The heavily censored transcript of testimony by Lt. Col. North to a 9 July closed session, released in February 1988, provided some details of the illicit side of U.S. programs — although reference was made only to actions which took place considerably after the Beirut car bomb incident. A program of counterterrorism had been developed jointly by North with Israeli counterterror expert Amiram Nir in meetings in November 1985 and January 1986, with a budget of \$2.5 million siphoned off from the profits of U. S. arms sales to Iran.<sup>81</sup> The “projects” were intended to deal with the holding of American hostages and apparently included proposals for “kidnapping Lebanese or Iranian citizens.”<sup>82</sup> North said plans were sent to Rear Admiral John Poindexter for presentation to President Reagan, and discussed with CIA chief William Casey, who “was enthusiastic about it.”<sup>83</sup>

Although North maintained that “none of these operations ever went to fruition,” there is some reason to believe otherwise. North acknowledged that “two or three of them were approved for pursuing,” and that “seed money” was committed to them “to see if things could get going.”<sup>84</sup> Further press reports followed in December 1988 after Amiram Nir’s alleged death in a mysterious plane crash in Mexico, that suggested the joint Israeli- American terror operations had indeed gone forward in Beirut — and

possibly in Syria. In Beirut a counterterrorist team, using Druze gunmen, was credited with the abduction and murder of a Shiite “gangster” who had organized the kidnaping of journalist Terry Anderson.<sup>85</sup> Less plausible was Syria’s charge that a series of bombings in Syria on 16 April 1986, the day after the United States bombed Libya, was the work of an NSC-Israel counterterror partnership. Between 140 and 144 people were killed and 149 injured.<sup>86</sup> A covert paramilitary offensive in progress against Syria might, however, explain why Syria was left off President Reagan’s July 1985 list of states sponsoring terrorism: Deciding not to telegraph one’s intention was particularly logical in the Syrian case, where terrorism against Syrian targets might reasonably have been presumed to be of Israeli — or Iraqi — origin.

The launching of unilateral counterterror on the international stage was among the more dramatic, and costly, of the initiatives of the Reagan administration. It was inevitable that American involvement in Middle East terrorism would lead to terrible mistakes — and be found out. U. S. responsibility for the carnage produced by one car bomb lent credence to accusations over countless other horrors. The Reagan administration, concluded the *Washington Post*, had gone out on a limb with “repeated public warnings of its intent to pre-empt and punish the attackers even if the evidence was not of courtroom quality and even if innocents were endangered.” The rhetoric of counterterror was hardly conducive to restraint:

*The administration also responded, it now turns out, with a CIA program to set up several foreign-manned counterterror teams in Lebanon.... What remains so distressing is the utter predictability of the whole sequence.... The United States has lost a major part of the moral advantage it claimed as a victim and enemy of*



*terrorism.... The principal responsibility . . . falls on a president captivated by thoughts of fighting fire with fire.*<sup>87</sup>

Some months before the Beirut incident, terrorism specialist Robert Kupperman expressed concern that simplistic counterterrorism could backfire — a warning that became more compelling in the following years. Sending assassination teams overseas, said Kupperman, would invite retaliation in kind and lead to military confrontation and the prospect of failure (“Suppose the hit team had failed: some of our elite forces would have been caught, publicly humiliated, tried and hanged”). But the main risk of covert counterterrorism, however meticulous the planners, would be loss of the moral high ground:

*Their very secrecy can open the door to unacceptable behavior — recall the recent Central American “how-to” assassination manual, or the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. We clearly undermine our position against international terrorism which we can be accused — correctly — of engaging in the tactics of terror ourselves. The notion that their terrorism is automatically immoral and that our counterterrorism is automatically more| will not stand much scrutiny.*<sup>88</sup>

Kupperman cogently observes that counterterrorism often contributes to terrorists’ desired end: a breakdown of the values of the society under attack. “Terrorist acts create public and media demands for government action. That action can sacrifice more than we can afford. We must combat the McCarthy-era tendency to reach for simplistic solutions that turn out to be constitutionally corrosive.”<sup>89</sup>

# Chapter 17: Watching the Neighbors: Low-Intensity Conflict in Central America

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

## **Terrorism and Aid to the Political Police**

The outrage over the Beirut bombing of October 1983 prompted both the invasion of Grenada and the proliferation of U.S. covert counterterror operations. One of the provisions of the 1983 Anti-Terrorism Act was the renewal of overt police assistance. The object of the new legislation, unlike the stated objective of earlier programs, was explicitly political in nature: the violence to be opposed was political violence, political terrorism. For the first time, Congress approved a program explicitly aimed at better *political* policing overseas—responding to the popular sentiment against international terrorism that was fueled by the Reagan administration.

The Reagan administration's renewal of major police assistance programs to counterinsurgency states began even before changes in the law were pushed through the way was opened for the U.S. military to provide police assistance on a large scale simply by stressing the paramilitary nature of the police to be assisted and by redefining their primary tasks as essentially military in nature. The militarization of the Third World police, which had been a concealed consequence of U.S. assistance in the

1960s, was in the 1980s turned into a virtue: their militarized status made it possible to provide aid denied thus far to those forces stuck in the mold of the civil police tradition.

A series of legislative initiatives facilitated the administration's broader objective: renewing an assistance program that could openly deal with nonmilitary police and intelligence agencies. At the top of the bill were initiatives promoted as part of the campaign against terrorism. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (ATA) was approved by Congress in November 1983, its stated objective to enhance, through training and equipment, the ability of the law enforcement personnel of friendly foreign governments to deter and counter terrorism, with an emphasis on bomb detection and disposal, management of hostage situations physical security, and other matters relating to the detection, deterrence and prevention of acts of terrorism, the resolution of terrorist incidents and the apprehension of those involved in such acts."<sup>1</sup> The initial appropriations were modest, a mere \$5 million for each of the two subsequent fiscal years; this would be nearly doubled, to \$9.8 million a year later.<sup>2</sup> The increase was justified as a provision to improve airport security (a precaution about which no one could complain) and, for the first time, to permit the provision of certain commodities from the munitions list of military and police supplies requiring export clearance from the Department of Commerce.<sup>3</sup>

Considerable efforts were made by congressional human rights watchdogs in the 1980s to prevent an across-the-board revival of the defunct Public Safety program, wrapped in the flag of antiterrorism. Congress was to be notified in advance of countries programmed for assistance; respect for human rights was to be a factor in their eligibility and annual reporting On program activity was required.<sup>4</sup> The act

also limited overseas training by U.S. government personnel to no more than thirty consecutive days—apparently to prevent the repetition of the earlier cozy relationship of Public Safety’s in-country advisers with foreign political police. Despite this, the ATA program appears to have been intended to maximize the opportunities to exert an influence very similar to that of its predecessor.

The act required that training be provided almost exclusively in the United States, and it set out a three-stage program. Top security officers were first to attend a two-week seminar and visit a range of U. S. security agencies, from FBI to TEA and municipal police departments. A U.S. delegation was then to visit overseas counterparts and thrash out a detailed program. And, finally, foreign officers would begin training at establishments in the United States. Unlike Public Safety, when all began their instruction at Washington’s International Police Academy (IPA), training would be provided by several agencies in many different places—a procedure that might reduce the clubbiness among participants but could also make monitoring the program more difficult.<sup>5</sup> Within two years, Congress had been notified of the intention to develop programs with 70 countries and that 1,456 foreign officers had received training in the United States.<sup>6</sup>

A companion to ATA cloaked police assistance in another program designed to improve the administration of justice overseas. The legislative foundation for a program to assist the Administration of Justice (AOJ) was laid in 1985, with an addition to the Foreign Assistance Act. Section 534, which was limited to Latin America and the Caribbean, emphasized the provision of training and material assistance for the court systems and legal profession and the “revision and modernization of legal codes and procedures.”<sup>7</sup> It opened another door to police assistance by authorizing,

“notwithstanding section 660 of this Act, programs to enhance investigative capabilities, conducted under judicial or prosecutorial control.”<sup>8</sup>

The new legislation authorized the allocation to the program of up to \$20 million yearly until September 1987. The police assistance aspect of the program was set apart as the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), with some 10 percent of the overall funding.<sup>9</sup> The program was defended by the administration as a necessary corollary to the work with lawyers, laws, and the courts. A State Department letter to Congress claimed: “Helping Central American governments improve their courts . . . will not have full impact on criminal justice if the courts are not presented with well-developed cases by police investigators.” The rule of law would suffer “no matter how much the courts may improve” so long as police investigators lacked training in “basic investigative skills.”<sup>10</sup>

Congress attempted to prevent the use of AOJ funds to train political police in the kind of investigative skills that had brought the Public Safety program into disrepute—such as torture—by adding a rider specifying that funds would only be used to improve police capabilities where investigations were “conducted under judicial or prosecutorial control. ” The intention was to foster court-directed judicial police, without backing either the enforcement side of policing or the monitoring of civilians, that is, “intelligence. ” The matter of police eligibility for assistance rapidly became a bone of contention when the administration’s classification of foreign police forces falling under “judicial or prosecutorial control” proved to be arbitrary. The administration AOJ training for Salvadoran National Guard investigation officers to irate congressmen by claiming, apparently with a straight face, that the Guard was actually under the control of the courts.<sup>11</sup> Congressional

aides knew better: The National Guard was (and is) technically a part of the Salvadoran army

At its inception the legislation seemed to have the potential to do some good—a sensitive program to reinforce the very fabric of the legal system might have made some contribution to making the rule of law a reality. The Judiciary working in conflict situations often lack even the most basic of resources, from office furniture and photocopiers to the vehicles required to make on-the-spot inspections. Antiquated legal procedures, too, may well be improved by a concerted effort to review and reform them. Higher wages, improved infrastructure, better training and improved procedures, however, could hardly by themselves make the Judiciary independent, particularly in a state dominated by military institutions committed to circumventing the law in order to crush insurgency.

The conundrum of assistance for the administration of justice in counterinsurgency states revolves around the fiction that counterterror atrocities against subversives and suspected subversives are somehow aberrations distinct from the “lawful” counterinsurgent program. Catching up with mysterious “death squads,” then, could be presented as a problem for ordinary crime control (and aid to this end sold to Congress and public opinion as a signal of human rights awareness). The essential premise is that human rights abuse is a somehow natural phenomenon: a consequence of private initiative, personal pathology, ignorance, or accident. Counterinsurgent terror on a large scale is, however, rarely the work of either renegades or civilian psychopaths; indeed solitaires and off-base auxiliaries who go freelance, and against the grain of policy, are themselves promptly dealt with, extralegally, by the counterinsurgent apparatus.

Another rationale for assistance in the administration of justice was that the terror tactics of the security services are a natural response to the incompetence (or betrayal) of the courts. A long-standing argument was made that the failure of courts to hold, prosecute, and convict suspected subversives poses insuperable obstacles to the counterinsurgent. In the context of the counterinsurgency state, criticism of the weak judiciary in the 1960s, as in the 1980s, was presented as a prime impetus behind counter/error: a terrible, swift sword cutting through the dithering and corruption of the courts to bring instant justice. A 1967 Public Safety report, for example, suggested that the Guatemalan army “bypassed the courts,” summarily executing “suspected guerrillas and supporters,” because they could have no confidence in justice being done otherwise: “Guatemalan Army officers significantly remark that the first suspects captured were turned over to the courts but. . . obtained their freedom.” This, they said, was “bad for their forces” morale.” Counterterror was the solution to the morale problem: “Thereafter the number of guerrillas turned over to the courts seemed to diminish somewhat.”<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, a 1965 Pentagon study on relations with Latin American armies reflected the notion that the law itself, let alone the courts, was among the main “handicaps” to counterinsurgency. The civilians, it suggested, returned the guerrillas to the street moments after the soldiers rounded them up: “[Many. . . legal systems require courts to free prisoners, even notorious guerrillas . . . unless witnesses can testify they actually saw the accused commit the crime.”<sup>13</sup> Counterterror posed a shortcut solution to *that* problem; a better legal system could develop in its own good time.

Ironically, the argument of judicial incompetence would also be made in the 1980s to explain the impunity of

counterterrorists before the law. One of the recurring issues in the debate on human rights in El Salvador and Guatemala, for example, is whether police and military personnel can be brought to book if the judiciary is too frightened or corrupt to act. The answer proposed is more U.S. assistance—for the police and military, to train them to be better citizens and professional counterinsurgents, and for the judicial establishment, to teach judges, prosecutors, and investigators essential skills, and how to resist blandishments and intimidation. All well and good—except for the problem of the institutional doctrine and policy behind counter/error.

Should the incompetence of the courts, rather than the political will of the military, be the real barrier to bringing the military's own mass murderers to justice, there was an easy solution in most of the counterinsurgency states. Military wrongdoers could be brought before the military's own courts—most armed forces cultivated by the United States jealously guard the jurisdiction of their own courts over military, and often police and paramilitary, personnel. The failure of the military courts to punish even the more blatant lawbreakers is more difficult to explain away as a matter of poor training, legal technicalities, and intimidation. A review of the record of the military courts in the counterinsurgency states most renowned for human rights abuses will show that atrocities, as a rule, are simply not dealt with either as crimes or disciplinary offenses requiring investigation or prosecution.

If the armed forces of the counterinsurgency states had the least interest in taking to task the murderers among them they would do so counterterror and covert forces, like any conventional military outfit observe as a basic imperative the maintenance of discipline, cohesion and purpose. As a consequence, they tend to punish only those



crime! and offenses that threaten the unit. What is more, in an unconventional or covert organization, punishment may be meted out by the same extralegal methods as those employed against their adversaries: the threat or reality of torture, mutilation, or death. The harshest punishment is often reserved for those who undermine the institution's purpose from within by resisting their share of dirty work (which in a later period, when war crimes trials might take place, could make their counterparts vulnerable); or those whose disobedience suggests a disaffection, and by extension common cause with the enemy. Counterterror is no work for an undisciplined military or paramilitary force; it can only be sustained where discipline is absolute, where breaking ranks means a broken head. The counterterrorist cannot risk being compromised by an undisciplined underling or colleague; like organized crime, unconventional military hermetism must be absolute, enforced by absolute sanctions.

In most of the counterinsurgency states, police and military personnel have remained almost exclusively within the jurisdiction of the military courts and military law. No one has suggested that the failure of military justice systems to bring to account torturers within their ranks or to proceed against military mass murderers was a consequence either of courtroom technicalities or lack of legal training. Whereas the military courts could prosecute and punish torture, "disappearance," and mass murder, but refuse to do so, they often also refuse to deliver suspects to the jurisdiction of civilian courts—even when civilian prosecutors have assembled damning evidence against them. The apparatus of civilian justice, feeble or not, incompetent or not, has been largely irrelevant to military discipline, even when exercising limited jurisdiction over military personnel, so long as counterterror and tactical lawlessness have remained elements of military strategy. Improving the civil

courts, so long as military institutions shelter the counterterrorist, offers a remedy to programmatic counterterror.

The root of the problem is that the conduct of a “dirty war” by the armed forces is not a consequence of feeble judicial structures or of the inadequacies of the civil police—though it can certainly feed upon, and be shielded by, these failings. Security assistance creates a vicious cycle: On the one hand, the argument goes, a well-trained police and a more competent judiciary would be able to crack down on the “death squads,” thereby justifying U.S. training and support; on the other hand, it was U.S. assistance that helped create the “death squads” in the first place. The proposals to enforce human rights by judicial and police assistance help to mask the much larger program of lethal contributions to the dirty war. Individual prosecutors and courageous magistrates may, and indeed sometimes do, make brave efforts to bring the counterterrorist to justice, although they do so at their peril. But whenever the tactics of counterinsurgent terror are the product of the collective will of the armed forces, the administration of justice and the rule of law will continue to be sacrificed to the generalized lawlessness of a dominant branch of the government itself.

The 1980s renewal of aid expressly designed for El Salvador’s police was delayed for a time by the alacrity with which the United States’ allies there murdered American nuns and officials. In the first years of the decade, when tens of thousands of civilians were murdered by military and paramilitary forces, Congress balked at overt police aid. The administration had, after all, elected to pin part of the blame for the “death squad” phenomenon on a few renegades in the paramilitary police services (a lightning rod to deflect criticism from the armed forces). While the bulk of the blame for killing leftists continued to be laid on a shadowy

“extreme right,” the police bore the blame for killings that could not otherwise be explained away, perpetuating the fiction of the military’s noninvolvement. The Treasury Police, a force that did indeed perform much of the dirty work, took much of the flak. The fact that the police were commanded by army regulars was simply ignored.

The proscription of police assistance under Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act was successively (and, in the end, simultaneously) circumvented by lending the police military assistance, creating new police units under a judicial aid program, and—in the wake of the Zona Rosa attack off off-duty U. S. Marines—by a “waiver” agreed to by Congress in August 1985 permitting police assistance in El Salvador and Honduras.<sup>14</sup> The 1985 measure also lifted the ban on police assistance for countries with a “longstanding democratic tradition,” no standing army, and “10 record of gross and persistent human rights abuse.”<sup>15</sup> (This strengthened the legal basis of aid programs already in progress in Costa Rica and the small nations of the Eastern Caribbean.) Human rights training was not part of the curriculum, although some National Police trainees received a module on “police-community relations.”<sup>16</sup> The military curricula, like those of ATA, failed to cover the students’ correct response to an illegal order and excluded consideration of political rights. A Defense Department official claimed, “Our guys aren’t qualified to teach” political rights; apparently, “the judicial system, rather than the police, is expected to determine which political activities are legally permissible.”<sup>17</sup>

Police assistance under the Anti-Terrorism Act was modest in scale compared to aid provided through the military.<sup>18</sup> ATA training, however, began in a manner reminiscent of the outlawed Public Safety assistance program. The first group

of Salvadoran trainees brought to the United States for training was found to include three officers well known to human rights monitors as among the army's top administrators of "death squad" terror. Congressional fears that the program might lead to charges that the United States was rewarding state terrorists—or helping them to improve their criminal skills—had resulted in pledges that the U. S. embassy would screen participants "to exclude suspected abusers of human rights." Apparently the administration ignored the agreement. Senator Tom Harkin, a critic of ATA, exploded: "We're training hard-core killers to be more efficient."<sup>19</sup>

The State Department's counterterrorism chief Bob Oakley piously chastised Senator Harkin for presuming "to pronounce publicly a guilty sentence. . . without specifying—names, dates, places—what they were guilty of."<sup>20</sup> Oakley's own "background check" found that "no one we have been able to talk to has even heard rumors" of anything like the allegations made. "There is nothing," he insisted, to suggest that any of the individuals have "a past record of torture, killings or similar rights abuses."<sup>21</sup> Yet, a simple review of human rights reporting since 1979 would have substantiated claims that the army battalions, brigades, and police units in which the trainees had command responsibilities were among the most enthusiastic in sowing counterinsurgent terror. A more honest response was attributed by the Los Angeles Times to another State Department official: "There could be some truth in it, but I doubt anyone can ever prove it. These guys were in the National Guard when it was doing some very nasty things, but in a country where every officer's bad record has been erased, how do you know?"<sup>22</sup>

Consorting with state terrorists could hardly be explained away by inadequate record keeping at the U.S. embassy in

San Salvador. The Salvadorans on the guest list who raised the hackles of human rights monitors were former commanders and acting or former intelligence chiefs of units with a clear and bloody track record over many years They included:

*Col. José Dionisio Hernandcz. in 1986 National Guard chief of staff, who was one of the small group of officers who had been involved in the administration of counterinsurgency terror since 1979; his past assignments include service as third in command of the National Guard; as commander of Army Garrison Number 6 in Sonsonate from November 1983 to February 1986; appointed Deputy Director of the National Guard in February 1986;*[23](#)

*Lt. Col. José Adolfo Medrano, intelligence chief of the National Guard and a top army chief throughout the years of the terror Of the early 1980s— and long before; a graduate of the International Police Academy's first course, in 1963, when it was still based at Fort Davis in the Canal Zone;*

*Major Baltazar Lopez Cortes, a former National Guard intelligence chief;*

*Captain Victor Cartagena Martinez, intelligence chief of the Treasury Police, previously intelligence chief of the Second brigade and company commander of the "Arce" rapid response battalion in San Miguel (Cartagena was also the object of rather personal charges: former prisoners of the Treasury Police claimed he had directly participated in beating them and subjecting them to electric shocks).*[24](#)

The first of the ATA classes of twenty Salvadoran “police chiefs”—army officers of the rank of lieutenant or above—began training in the United States in late June 1986. By the end of the year seventy-six officers had completed courses. Although the antiterrorism curriculum was to have included instruction in “human rights and internal discipline,” the substance of this remains obscure. A spokesman of the State Department’s Office of Counter-Terrorism, which runs ATA, said, for example, that the course instructors “‘stay away’ from discussing political rights, such as which rallies or newspapers should be judged legal, because That’s a political question not handled by the police.” [25](#)

The major programs of assistance for the Salvadoran National Guard, National Police, and Treasury Police were provided under the military assistance program, as the units involved were to perform military functions. The term “military,” in this context, was applied to anything expressly dealing with counterinsurgency and, subsequently, antiterrorism. In the 1960s, the police function was at least nominally distinguished from that of the military vis-a-vis counterinsurgency, though in practice it was largely neglected and wholly subordinated to the unconventional warfare prerogatives of the military.

The 1980s approach to police training dropped the pretense of the civil police’s independence from the military, perhaps partly because of the constraints on training ordinary police, but essentially because the changing view of insurgency lent itself to a military and paramilitary response alien to the concept of a civil police. The State Department’s October 1986 notification of the intent to reprogram military aid for the police in El Salvador stressed this:

*Counterterrorism in El Salvador combines police and military techniques to meet a threat which combines elements of guerrilla warfare with open criminality, both in urban and rural areas.... The training curriculum composed entirely of military techniques, responds to the quasi-military nature of the Salvadoran terrorist threat.*<sup>26</sup>

A U.S. Embassy official told an American delegation in 1986: “You have to recognize that every policeman in El Salvador has a double mission: law enforcement, and a counter guerrilla mission. What the [U.S. Military Group] is focusing on is the military role.”<sup>27</sup> It was not, therefore, particularly duplicitous to use military assistance to train policemen: The police status of the national bodies was in part, itself a polite fiction (as was the suggestion that only the police, and not the military, manned the “death squad” units).

The U. S. Military Group trained and outfitted some 2,800 policemen between 1982 and 1984, including six police infantry battalions of the National Police and one each of the National Guard and Treasury Police. The quasi-legal argument explaining this was that these units were engaged primarily in military activities “and do not perform regular police duties.” Similarly, a fifty-man Salvadoran SWAT team—the Special Anti-terrorism Commando, comprised of police from the three forces— was trained in 1984 by the Defense Department on the grounds that its rapid response antiterrorism brief was “military” in nature. Congressional critics saw their worst suspicions confirmed when the team first went into action in June 1985. Ordered in to break up a hospital workers’ strike, the squad beat and handcuffed medical staff and patients, halted surgery in progress (one patient died), and, in a classic mistaken identity gaffe, shot

dead four undercover National Police officers. Union leaders were dragged off to jail for illegal strike action.<sup>[29](#)</sup>

After August 1985, military training of police was to be justified by reference to Section 660(d). Despite the “waiver” on Section 660 restrictions, the U.S. military continued, as before, to be the main trainers of the Salvadoran police. The only change in an eight-week course for police on “field counterinsurgency tactics” taught by military advisers was its expansion to twelve weeks and the addition of specialized training in hostage-rescue skills.<sup>[30](#)</sup> Day-to-day advisory assistance comparable to the CIA’s Public Safety assignments was provided by the appointment of a member of the Military Group to advise each of the three police services (it cannot be ruled out that they, too, may have been seconded from the CIA).<sup>[31](#)</sup>

By 1985, the expanding program also began to bring regional security services and their leading personalities together under U. S. sponsorship. Congressional investigators subsequently found that Central American security chieftains were being flown out to secret “planning” meetings in Miami.<sup>[32](#)</sup> Alarm bells might well have rung at the coincidence of the meeting’s stated focus on “investigations” and the attendance of regional political police figures, such as El Salvador’s Colonel Reinaldo López Nuila.<sup>[33](#)</sup> It was, after all, the “Investigations Advisers” of the Public Safety program who worked directly with the political police in Central America—under the auspices of the CIA, not AID. An August 1986 congressional caucus report noted that, in addition to the “well-motivated but largely unproductive efforts to strengthen the Salvadoran judicial system,” U.S. programs “based on questionable interpretations of law” had trained over 4,000 police officers.<sup>[34](#)</sup>



Congressional resistance eventually restrained the efforts to expand security assistance throughout Central America. By August 1985, assistance was proceeding overtly along four tracks: military aid, police aid under 660(d) waivers, special programs under ATA, and Administration of Justice programs.<sup>35</sup> A proposal to introduce a fifth track, through an omnibus Central American Counterterrorism Act, was under discussion as early as the spring of 1985. The proposal would have funded a combined five-country military/police assistance budget of \$53 million. The \$26 million “Law Enforcement” section was to have earmarked \$12 million for El Salvador—and a contentious \$3 million for Guatemala, a country still in the congressional eye for having taken the “death squad” formula to the limit.

Congressional watchdogs were particularly concerned with the elimination in the draft act of provision for the congressional oversight committees’ veto power over reprogramming military assistance funds to El Salvador and Honduras and the renewal of police aid to Guatemala. They were also worried that the antiterror bandwagon was being used to propose transfers of arms that were particularly useful for state terror—notably submachine guns and sniper rifles “with day and night scopes” for El Salvador. Representative Buddy MacKay expressed a widely held skepticism regarding the human rights situation in Guatemala and Panama:

*It is not persuasive to me to say we are going to have an election in Guatemala . . . when I can read in the weekly news magazines that that is cosmetic, that whoever serves there is going to serve at the leave of the military.... [A]nd it is not persuasive to me to say let's train some people in Panama to combat terrorism, when the terrorist is the mall that is running the army.<sup>37</sup>*

The administration may have jumped too soon, tempted by the antiterrorist opportunity opened by Salvadoran guerrillas when they attacked U.S. Marines in June that year. Congress had already been stampeded into waiving bans on police aid to El Salvador on 11 July. This time the Congress held fast—the Central American Counterterrorism Act was defeated.

The new buzzword, international terrorism, brought an emotional charge that “insurgency” or “subversion” or even “revolution” could never match. No American could rightfully oppose a program to combat International terrorism—and few in Congress thought very long or very hard about the means being proposed to do so. The antiterrorism campaign served to rehabilitate the idea of police assistance precisely in the areas in which the Public Safety Program had been most harshly criticized. From its inception in 1956 to its dissolution in 1975, Public Safety had presented its primary mission, at least for public Consumption, as the development of conventional civil police capabilities. Revelations of the close association of some of its advisers with local political police and intelligence agencies were enormously embarrassing. In the proposals for renewed police assistance, the emphasis was unashamedly placed on political investigation and intelligence, with the police role in special operations a close second. The U.S. public in the 1960s was uneasy about the way such aid to counter subversion and insurgency could shade into repression of a much broader nature. The 1980s formula, which identified the worldwide nemesis as terrorism, was made considerably more palatable.

The legislative initiatives of 1983 opened the way for a 1960s-style campaign to beef up the overseas security assistance program. They also avoided the human rights requirements for assistance to the counterinsurgency states

under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act. The resulting programs of advice and assistance would serve to disseminate a rehabilitated U. S. military doctrine combining counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare—the doctrine of low-intensity conflict. It would retain most of the worst characteristics of previous counterinsurgency doctrine while dropping its better features. The implementation of the unconventional aspects of the doctrine, moreover, would be spurred by a foreign policy that legitimized the tactics of reprisal and retaliation in kind in political warfare.

### **Experiments in an “American Lake”**

Some of the first efforts to raise the level of assistance to friendly foreign police forces under the Reagan administration were made in the Caribbean and in Central America. The approach in most cases was to train small paramilitary forces (and sometimes create them from scratch) as if they were military formations. U.S. security assistance in the Caribbean before the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program began centered on Puerto Rico as a training center and a source of U.S. personnel. Since 1980, the 12,000-man Puerto Rican National Guard, one of the best trained, best-equipped American national guard units, had provided training to the paramilitary security services of Barbados, Dominica, and Jamaican.<sup>38</sup> The use of U.S. military forces to train regional paramilitary security units was one way to bypass the Public Safety training ban. In December 1981, after an attempted coup in Dominica, Congress authorized a \$1 million fund to assist the defense forces of the small islands of the eastern Caribbean, even though most of those governments preferred small police forces to standing armies of any size.

This training of police by the U.S. military proceeded side-by-side with the training of the same forces by the FBI. FBI training for Caribbean police was permissible under the Justice Department waivers for certain kinds of instruction. A pilot training program was established by the FBI in Puerto Rico during 1982 to train police officers from the U. S. and the Caribbean “in basic criminal investigative matters.”<sup>39</sup> Now known as the FBI’s Caribbean Police School, it provided two four-week sessions annually, from 1982 to 1984, training “137 mid-management officers,” including 21 from the U.S. Army and Navy, and 80 from sixteen foreign countries.<sup>40</sup> (Statistics on its work after 1984 are not available.) The combined paramilitary police force of Barbados, Jamaica, Dominica, Antigua, Saint Vincent, and Saint Lucia, which joined the U.S. task force in the wake of the Grenada invasion, had all enjoyed American tutelage.

Training in the Caribbean increased after the October 1983 Grenada operation. The British promptly detailed a team of police advisers, supported by a Senior Superintendent from Barbados (and a modest budget of “750,000) to rebuild Grenada’s police force in the civil police tradition.<sup>41</sup> The United States was reluctant to surrender its newfound influence in the region to the British, however, and proceeded with its own style of police assistance. The objective was to establish a regional paramilitary force with the capability to preempt Grenada-style “crises” should leftists threaten to take power anywhere in the Caribbean. To that end, Congress agreed to waive restrictions on police training in the Caribbean, and the president authorized a \$15 million program.<sup>42</sup>

In February 1984, nearly 100 Army Special Forces eight-man teams were reported to be operating in the area, organizing paramilitary “Special Service Units” on Grenada’s neighbors Saint Kitts-Nevis, Antigua, Dominica, Saint Lucia

and Saint Vincent, and Barbuda.<sup>43</sup> A year later 160 Grenadian police recruits, too, underwent Special Forces training. The best would join “an 80-man paramilitary force that will wear combat fatigues and carry M-16 rifles”—Grenada’s own Special Services Unit (SSU).<sup>44</sup> The irony of sending Special Forces teams to train Caribbean police was largely missed by the United States’ press. The *New York Times* reported that “they are teaching police recruits . . . a variety of skills useful to either a soldier or a policeman.”<sup>45</sup> The peculiar attitude of the United States’ unconventional warriors toward the rule of law apparently disturbed no one: perhaps because they were not even aware of the nature of special warfare and the orientation of special operations forces at the time.

This paramilitary project was Washington’s top priority in the region. Each of the microstates of the eastern Caribbean was to have an SSU and to work in conjunction with the small conventional army of Barbados in a Regional Security System (only Trinidad refused to join). By the end of 1985, the United States had trained and equipped SSUs on each of the islands with an explicit countersubversion, counterinsurgency brief: that is, “to provide their governments, most of which do not have armies, with extra muscle for dealing with insurgencies and external attack.”<sup>46</sup>

The first test of the new forces of the “Eastern Caribbean Security System” came in 1985 with regional maneuvers to “liberate” Saint Lucia. Military exercises, code-named “Exotic Palm, ‘simulated’ a situation in which a member-nation of the regional security system is threatened by insurgents, and needs assistance.”<sup>47</sup> Participants included the Special Forces’ proteges from Dominica, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts-Nevis, and Grenada.<sup>48</sup> A disturbing detail that tends to confirm the aggressive nature of Special Forces

training was the Saint Lucia SSU's war games assignment: working with U.S. Navy SEALs to play the part of left-wing guerrillas. This implies that at least basic *offensive* unconventional warfare skills were passed on to these police recruits, perhaps through training in the "Aggressor" guerrilla tactics used in maneuver warfare. A year later, in "Ocean Venture '86," Grenada was "liberated" for a second time. As in the previous exercise, U.S. airborne troops operated in conjunction with eastern Caribbean forces from "the special service units set up with US support."<sup>49</sup>

The antiterrorism rationale for security assistance opened the way to revived programs of U.S. police and military assistance to the region. Often the distinction was almost academic. Costa Rica's Civil Guard (the country boasts of having no standing army since 1948) was one of the first paramilitary police forces to enjoy the increased attention from the United States in the Reagan years.<sup>50</sup> After 1981, diplomatic and economic pressure virtually forced the Costa Ricans to abjure neutrality and take sides in the war on Nicaragua—and to prepare to take up arms in the fight.<sup>51</sup> Although Costa Rica has no army, U.S. assistance to its police was military in substance (and itemized as such in the federal budget), and was provided by the army's Green Berets. Like the specialist CIA trainers of the old Public Safety program, they were hardly representative of the civil police tradition.

U.S. military involvement in Costa Rica grew rapidly during Reagan's first term. Military assistance levels rose from \$300,000 in 1981 to \$11 million in 1985.<sup>52</sup> At times the enthusiasm of U.S. officials for Costa Rican projects outstripped that of their Costa Rican counterparts, who, after all, had the sometimes difficult task of ensuring continued domestic support from an electorate jealous of its country's sovereignty as well as its democratic, neutralist tradition. In

November 1983, U.S. Defense Undersecretary Fred Ikle visited classified projects along Costa Rica's northern with Nicaragua, and let slip that 1,000 U.S. , engineers would arrive there before Christmas to build roads and a defensive infrastructure. The resulting uproar in Costa Rica obliged then-President Luis Alberto Monge to cancel the project. Costa Rican sources had reported the presence of a fifteen-man U. S. Army unit that was working on an airstrip in the north coast area even before Ikle's visit, but the prospect of 1,000 such soldiers dampened the Costa Rican goodwill considerably.<sup>53</sup> The State Department apparently dates the real "breakthrough" in Costa Rica to a formal request for \$7.6 million of military aid in the spring of 1984—about three times the previous aid levels.<sup>54</sup> A classified report urged that the request be granted in order to push Costa Rica "more explicitly and publicly into the anti-Sandinista camp."<sup>55</sup> The document did warn of the "public relations danger"—that the United States would be accused of militarizing Costa Rica. The report's solution was "to keep the spotlight on Nicaragua as the aggressor."<sup>56</sup>

The politicking over Costa Rica's neutrality seems to have had a covert action backdrop. Popular disapproval of Green Beret trainers was mitigated by a series of border incidents involving Nicaraguan troops, *contras*, and Costa Ricans along the San Juan River. Nicaraguan patrol craft on the river sometimes strayed up Costa Rican tributaries, and Costa Rican rivercraft were sometimes fired on from the Nicaraguan shore. On 31 May 1985, as protests at the arrival of U. S. Green Berets peaked, two Costa Rican Civil Guards were killed under suspicious circumstances at the border post in Las Crucitas. Such incidents readily fueled anti-Nicaraguan sentiment in Costa Rica. Two months later, two British mercenaries, Peter Glibbery and John Davies—apparently employed as CIA contract agents to work at the

Costa Rican end of the *contra* network—claimed convincingly that these clashes may have been staged by the United States.<sup>[57](#)</sup>

Doubts as to the official version of the incident at Las Crucitas were expressed soon after it was reported. President Monge had responded to the events with suspicious haste, denouncing a “premeditated attack” by the Nicaraguans and placing an instant freeze on relations. Minister of Public Security Benjamin Piza Carranza made an immediate public call on the United States to speed up arms shipments (the first arrived within ten days). The United States, in turn, allegedly tendered a suspiciously impromptu offer to send troops.<sup>[58](#)</sup> Former president Pepe Figueras, a harsh critic of the Sandinistas, openly expressed his skepticism: “I don’t think it has been sufficiently proved that the attackers were the Sandinistas. I think it’s part of a ploy concocted internationally.”<sup>[59](#)</sup>

The detention of a group of mercenaries at a Costa Rican *contra* camp on 24 April—including the two British, as well as a Frenchman and an American—was a consequence of Costa Rica’s playing several hands at once. Three of the detainees who spoke to the press said they were “unpaid volunteers” with the *contras* “southern front who had operated in the area with the active support of the local Civil Guard “until the same men apologetically arrested them, explaining that there had been a change of orders.”<sup>[60](#)</sup> The government had previously straddled the fence on several occasions, authorizing *contra* airstrips while briefly detaining high-profile *contra* leaders in San Jose (with publicity geared to demonstrate they were not hosting the southern front’s forces). Previously, those detained were quietly released—and sometimes left the country for a “cooling-off” period. Glibbery and Davies were recruited through the ostensibly private, Alabama-based Civilian



Military Assistance (CMA) after an assignment in South Africa. They began to talk to the press when their expected release failed to come through.<sup>61</sup>

The July 1985 interviews leveled allegations that were embarrassing to both Costa Rica and the United States. The Civil Guard, it seemed, had on 26 March delivered a supply of arms to the *contras*, including 72 Brazilian-made grenades. 62 of more concern to the CIA were Glibbery's and [Davies's claim that *contra* supply routes ran through military channels at Ilopango airport in San Salvador to airstrips near Costa Rica's border with Nicaragua—including the one on American John Hull's ranch (claims subsequently confirmed during the Iran-*contra* hearings). Most sensational was their allegation that CIA instructions discussed not long before their arrest included "plans . . . to fabricate a border incident, shelling the Costa Rican town of Los Chiles and "planting" bodies of Nicaraguan soldiers, to provoke US intervention."<sup>63</sup>

The major training programs for Costa Rica took off in the spring of 1985. By then an arms supply effort had equipped the police with mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, grenade launchers, and, in a single shipment in April 1985, 4,000 M16 rifles. In February 1985, 45 Costa Rican guardsmen left for the U.S. Regional Training Center in Honduras to attend a two-month counterinsurgency course to prepare them to become instructors.<sup>64</sup> In May 1985, a 24-man Special Forces Mobile Training Team arrived in Costa Rica to train the Civil Guard's *Batallon Relampago*—the "Lightning Battalion."<sup>65</sup> *The Nation's* account of the graduation of the battalion's A and B companies after three months of training by Green Berets in 1985 notes wryly that anyone at the ceremony "would recognize the 375 men for what they are, soldiers." Militarization (or

“paramilitarization”), it seems, was part and parcel of U.S. security assistance. Richard J. Walton reported:

*They were trained by elite combat troops to counter subversion and guerrilla warfare, and they were trained not with Police Specials but with M-16s, .50 caliber and M-60 machine guns, and anti-tank weapons.... Minister of Public Security Benjamin Piza Carranza. . . told me he would like to see the entire 5,500 man force receive similar instruction.*<sup>67</sup>

The entire 750-man Lightning Battalion was trained along lines similar to those of El Salvador’s rapid response battalions, which were also trained by the Special Forces. A second elite force of 400 police officers underwent training in 1985, with an explicitly “anti-terrorist” brief, the affiliations of the U.S. trainers involved was not revealed. Minister of the Presidency Danilo Jimenez said only that the antiterrorist force was being trained by “Israeli and US agents.”<sup>68</sup>

Another Costa Rican innovation that smacked of the counterinsurgency state was the organization of a paramilitary militia—a civilian defense body suspiciously reminiscent of El Salvador’s infamous ORDEN—in late 1982. OPEN, the Organization for National Emergencies, was officially described as a civilian volunteer organization to support regular security forces “in national emergencies” and “to defend democracy”; it was administered by the Ministry of Security.<sup>69</sup> Like ORDEN, OPEN’s members, in the words of Vice-Minister of Security Johnny Campos, “must be “citizens of proven democratic faith.” They must sign a declaration professing their belief in democracy. Communists are not permitted to join. “7” Civil Guard Lt. Col. Carlos Zeledon stressed that OPEN was different from the previous National Reserve or National Guard, in that it

was “more civil in character.”<sup>70</sup> It might be added that it was more political in character as well—a matter much discussed in Costa Rica, where the possibility that extremist right-wing groups would infiltrate the group was recognized.

In early February 1983, authorities announced that some 10,000 citizens had been preparing over the previous two months to participate in OPEN; their training included “self-defense use of light weapons, and emergency rescue techniques.”<sup>72</sup> Campos refused to say whether the United States assisted in the creation of OPEN, claiming the matter was a “state secret.”<sup>73</sup>

Costa Rica did not become a military staging area for the United States along Honduran lines; it did, however, provide a safe rear area— dotted with airstrips and supply dumps—for contra incursions into Nicaragua, until the Iran-contra scandal gave Monge’s successor, Oscar Arias Sanchez, a pretext to curtail assistance to the Contras. Costa Rica’s cooperation with the United States’ regional plans was closely related to the economic squeeze put on Monge when he assumed office in 1982. Costa Rica had been in a debt crisis since the late 1970s, and had become increasingly dependent on U.S. financial aid.<sup>74</sup> This aid—much of it with strings attached—jumped from \$16 million in 1980 to \$200 million in 1983; the threat to pull the plug on aid was an increasingly significant factor in the bilateral relationship.<sup>75</sup>

The threats came out in the open after President Arias began to backpeddle from Monge’s commitments to U. S. policy shortly after his election in February 1986. He moved to shut down the contra supply base on John Hull’s ranch near the Nicaraguan border (Hull would later receive further media attention in the context of the Iran-contra hearings when allegations emerged that CIA contract pilots used his ranch to bring in guns and take out narcotics). Arias ordered

the airstrip there closed and the U.S. operations in the area curtailed; some contras were actually detained for a short time.

The Tower Commission report describes the NSC response to news on 9 September 1986 of the airfield closure and of an impending Costa Rican announcement of the action. In a conference call, NSC staffer Oliver North, State Department's Elliot Abrams, and Ambassador Louis Tambs decided to limit the damage through economic bullying: "North said that they had decided North would call Costa Rican President Arias and tell him if the press conference went forward the US would cancel \$80 million in promised AID assistance and Arias' upcoming visit with President Reagan."<sup>76</sup> North also told the commission that both Tambs and Abrams had "reinforced this message with Arias," and that National Security Adviser William Poindexter had supported the initiative. North's NSC field team in Central America had advised a similarly heavy-handed approach in a coded transmission on 10 September informing Washington that the airfield—code-named "Plantation"—had been raided. The text reflects a typical Yankee disdain for presidents of smaller republics who get in the United States' way:

*COSTA RICAN SECURITY forces raided Plantation yesterday and impounded 77 drums of gas. Rumors [redacted] apprehension for questioning denied late last night. One raiding official who claims saw facilities for 400 men at site arrested [redacted] .... Alert Ollie Pres. Arias will attend Reagan's dinner in New York Sept. 22nd. Boy needs to be straightened out by heavy weights.*<sup>77</sup>

The story did not end with the airstrip contretemps. Arias stuck to his guns on the closure and announced it to the media; Washington responded as threatened, cutting unilateral grants and loans, and blocking aid from

international financial institutions.<sup>78</sup> Arias did not buckle under U.S. pressure, however, and eventually put through his own regional peace plan (to Washington's dismay), which won him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987.

## **Exporting Off-the-Rack "Insurgency"**

The offensive component of political warfare had been a covert side of U.S. policy since the 1940s. In the 1980s, it was made public in formal policy statements. The Reagan administration entered office determined to roll back revolution around the world, and said so quite openly. El Salvador was the primary theater of operations to crush a revolution in the making. Nicaragua was to be the showcase operation of spoiling and reversing a successful revolution through concerted unconventional warfare. Propaganda efforts to justify covert intervention in Nicaragua would go some way toward distracting the U.S. public's attention from the all-out warfare in El Salvador and the tens of thousands of political killings by U. S. allies there.

The theoretical side of offensive counterrevolutionary warfare had been worked over for decades by backroom Cold Warriors: Some of the Reagan team's policymakers had been working to this end for many years, and the more innovative ones would find the opportunity to put into practice their own theories from decades before. Among them was Central America policymaker Constantine Menges. In a 1968 paper he prepared as a RAND Corporation strategist, Menges set the stage for his 1980s role in waging the unconventional war on Nicaragua. In "Democratic Revolutionary Insurgency as an Alternative Strategy" (March 1968), he elaborates on the organization of U. S.-backed "insurgency" against revolutionary regimes. The tactics, in his assessment,

*would be precisely the same as those immortalized by the Viet Minh and Viet Cong: systematic assassination of key communist officials at all levels of government; selective recruitment of cadre elements; efficient use of limited external material assistance; incessantly “political” warfare, meaning establishment of model governments in areas free of communist government control; attacks on communist military units known to be demoralized and the like.*<sup>79</sup>

Menges’s 1968 paper acknowledges that sonic allies are not really worth saving, and it reserves the Option to dump so-called allied regimes that are potential liabilities. The preferred contingency, however, is to maintain moderate backing for an ally while preparing for the morning after its fall. The “unsuitable” allies that had outlived their usefulness could be propped discreetly, but the United States would not go out on a limb to save them. The primary effort was to go toward selecting and protecting a more congenial successor. This was in practice the approach taken during the rapid decline of El Salvador’s General Romero, and it was also applicable as the Marcos regime progressively lost its grip. The long fall of the Somozas was an occasion in which all the options were covered—diplomatic tut-tutting and estrangement cloaked backdoor U.S. training and a green light to Israeli arms shipments. And even as Somoza flew out, a last-ditch deal was being frantically promoted to form an Inter-American peace force. If the installation of a more acceptable moderate was unrealistic, and an undesirable revolutionary regime seemed inevitable, preparations were in order for a future campaign of guerrilla insurgency.

The preparations to be made before the collapse, as outlined by Menges, were to include setting up a U. S.-backed “revolutionary” force to act when the time was ripe:

“Thus it might be feasible to do nothing to prevent a communist movement from seizing power against a government we consider ‘unsuitable,’ but meanwhile make efforts to encourage the formation of an underground movement which will emerge later.” The underground movement would “snake its move” within six months to a year, time enough for the revolutionary government to have won “that massive unpopularity . . . which usually follow[s].”<sup>81</sup> And so, as Somoza and friends fled, preparations for life after Somoza went into high gear.

The covert and unilateral preparation for unconventional war on the territory of allied nations was not a particularly novel idea. The development of local, U.S.-controlled assets as resources against future crises was one aspect of the 1962 Special Forces mission to Colombia discussed earlier, while the CIA’s high-level assets in Central America (notably in Panama’s Manuel Noriega) have more recently been in the news. The doctrine and practice was to make some preparation for unconventional warfare in the counterinsurgency states, against the possibility that friendly governments could (and in some cases, should) collapse. This could be done as part of U. S. military assistance and training programs within the country as well as through joint contingency planning with the host government.

A major role of U.S. special operations forces was to prepare and encourage host governments to take unconventional measures to combat subversion and insurgency before it was too late. There was also a secondary track—not always known to the head of the host government—for preemptive special warfare operations: If the host was unsuccessful in quashing prorevolutionary stirrings, or collapsed altogether, U. S. assets in the country could be called upon. Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz,

commander of the First Special Forces Command explained that special operations forces gave us “the capability of being introduced into a given country, being established on the ground with contacts, maybe even with our own intelligence networks,” in anticipation of later needs. This, he confided, “is the secret of the peacetime to wartime transition.”<sup>82</sup> The strategy assumed that the United States could carry out undercover organization (and operations) overseas virtually at will—if not in pursuit of a particular objective, then simply as training exercises and insurance. This could explain why U. S. military personnel were detailed to help the Costa Ricans build roads along the Nicaraguan border, and more recently, ostensibly to fight drug traffickers in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru.

The long-term placement of U.S. assets through special operations was secondary to the prime objective of helping allied governments develop counterinsurgency states that would preclude any insurgency. The tactics of unconventional warfare were encouraged as legitimate tools to preempt serious threats. The United States’ instruction in illicit counterinsurgency, however, coincided with a second, more public track of U. S. foreign policy: pressuring these self-same governments to professionalize their police and armed forces and to respect human rights. The advisers in unconventional warfare, moreover, could not decide the critical threshold at which the host government would turn to the illegal tactics of unconventional warfare, the extent to which such tactics would be used, or the timetable of its action. U.S. doctrine at every level encouraged military counterparts to consider domestic political problems as an aspect of global political warfare—in the same light as the international skulduggery of spies and commando raids. The nonviolent political opposition—if labeled ideologically suspect—was fair game. The unrestrained use of unconventional warfare tactics by host governments, as if



the enemy had already taken control, was perhaps inevitable.

As an allied counterinsurgency state turned increasingly to the unlimited terror of unconventional warfare, the United States still had several options. It could extend unrestricted support to its threatened ally, or it could covertly support one or more of the contending factions for power. Alternatively, the U.S. response to a government on its way out could be to organize a third force, an autonomous insurgent movement that would nominally fight the old regime while setting out to hamstring and supplant its principal adversary. Menges called this "Triangle Warfare": that is, "the fomenting of a national revolutionary insurgency that would draw upon the best persons within the major social institutions, and unite them in a cohesive movement opposed to both the corrupt government and the communist insurgency."<sup>83</sup> In the postcollapse situation, then, U.S.-backed rivals to undesirable revolutionary movements could keep up the fight, unencumbered by any association with the old regime.

Menges suggests that the United States' position improves as the communist movement becomes more dangerous and the government weakens, with "the disruptions and intrinsic tragedies of a country in the throes of communist insurgency . . . made to work in favor of the ultimate victory of the U. S.-supported democratic revolutionary movement." Terror and counterterror would create the preconditions for a third contender to move in, pick up the pieces, and assume control:

*All the brutality of the struggle between the rival terror machines might therefore serve to reinforce the desire of many for some other alternative—a third choice.... The effective democratic revolutionary movement could*

*enter the open battle late, fight against two weakened and tired opponents, and gain more strength and support with every offensive action taken against both the Communists and the legal regime.*

A more common alternative to the “triangle” approach has been applied to collapsing regimes with still-viable armed forces: nurturing selected factions within military establishment capable of leading palace coups, and providing the new faces to revive and remodel old systems. The “reformist” coups in El Salvador in 1979, Guatemala in 1982, and the Philippines in 1985 could all be interpreted as variations on this theme. The coup option provides a means to avoid (or deflate) “mass participation, uprisings, disturbances and the like,” while “leaving some kind of government intact.” Although the coup is usually the only option the United States will consider, the transfer of power offers little in the way of a remedy to the political problems that may have led to unrest. Menges points out that the “coup alternative . . . often leaves the successor regime quite constrained as to new policy alternatives”— an analysis Corazon Aquino might appreciate.

In practice, U.S. policymakers found that backing a third force between the unsuitable and the unacceptable was preferable to taking chances with mercenaries and volatile paramilitary forces, but such options were foreclosed in situations in which authentic revolutionary movements had already swept the traditional armies from the field.

In Nicaragua and Angola, the “triangle warfare” model was applicable. In Angola, the United States backed first Holden Roberto’s FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) and then FNLA and UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) as alternatives to the Soviet-backed MPLA (the ruling Popular Movement for the

Liberation of Angola); the geometry of intervention was made rather more complex by the addition of Zaire, South Africa, and odds and ends of “assistance” from the European powers. The Nicaraguan example began after the first year of the revolutionary government, when Eden Pastora—Comandante Zero—split with the government and set up as a guerrilla leader on his own. As leader of the *Tercerista* faction of the FSLN (roughly, “the third way”), Pastora’s band would be a natural for recruitment and assistance by the United States. The arrangement ultimately broke down on two scores: U. S. war managers distrusted Pastora and, in the words of *Newsweek*, “alienated the only group likely to attract widespread support in Nicaragua.” Even worse, the United States selected the rump of the National Guard as the backbone of its campaign, “supporting the only wrong, the only truly evil alternative.” [87](#) Even though Pastora was, ultimately, brought on board, the romance ended prematurely when Pastora balked at taking orders and at direct collaboration with the former National Guard officers running the main contra forces. On 30 May 1984, a bomb exploded at a Pastora press conference in a shack along the San Juan River, killing two journalists and severely injuring others. Pastora escaped with his life, but his usefulness to the counterrevolution was terminated.

## **Tripartite Arrangements**

A favorite U.S. option in the 1980s was to bring; the forces of third countries into U.S. unconventional warfare offensives—under their own or false colors, on a cash-down or voluntary basis. The motives (and rewards) varied. Theodore Shackley cites as a model the assistance lent to the CIA’s Meo program by an elite paramilitary unit from Thailand.[88](#) Shackley’s 1981 proposals suggest that he saw no political problem in hiring outside forces, a logic that

could also apply to U. S. contract forces in unconventional roles: “Selectively employ ‘volunteers’ as combat troops or advisers. The supply of high-quality manpower is limited in any country.... The volunteers can be reservists from a neighboring country who have just finished tours of active military duty and are hired to fight on fixed contract terms.”<sup>89</sup>

A 1986 paper from another RAND analyst, Charles Wolf, concurred with Shackley and proposed to do formally what in practice occurred covertly: induce Third World allies to provide counterinsurgency/counterrevolutionary forces to operate shoulder-to-shoulder—or stand in for—U.S. forces in third-country scenarios.<sup>90</sup> “Cooperative Forces” would be drawn from Third World “countries and movements” for the advancement of mutual interests, notably “pluralism, human rights, ‘open’ societies and containment and reversal of the Soviet Union’s empire in the third world.”<sup>91</sup> The reference to “movements” may well refer to such Cold War dinosaurs as the World Anti-Communist League or to the range of American oddball organizations called in to help out with the *contra* embargo-busting campaign. Wolf identifies likely “cooperative” candidates as including Venezuela, Brazil, and Argentina in the Americas. He distinguishes between our “cooperative” forces and the enemy’s proxies or surrogates: “Proxies act at the behest of a controlling power, which bears all the accompanying costs. Cooperative forces act from mutual interest, and share in the cost, responsibilities and decision making.”<sup>92</sup> Cooperative forces would be on call with counterinsurgency services “at the invitation of beleaguered third world countries.” And in the proinsurgency field, they would include “the forces of ‘front line’ states willing to provide support for the insurgent local forces” throughout the world.<sup>93</sup>

The proxy option was particularly appealing at the time because it mirrored yet another of the alleged methods of the Soviets, who were seen as past masters of “surrogate” forces acting at their behest, the Cubans in Angola being the prime example. Wolf’s proposal appears to have been adopted intact by the “low-intensity” school—a recommendation phrased in much the same terms appeared in the 1988 report of the blue-ribbon Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. The commission’s report lauded what it saw as the Soviet achievement in the field (with a fairly indiscriminate list of supposed surrogates) and recommended work with our own Third World allies “at developing ‘cooperative forces.’” It ruefully admitted that

*we have a lot to leant from the Soviets in this regard. Soviet efforts to advance and defend their interests in less developed countries are typically supported by a familiar cast of characters—Cubans, Nicaraguans, Vietnamese, North Koreans, East Europeans. These cooperating forces are led and financed by Moscow.... The entire operation carries enormous advantages for the Soviet Union, both in minimizing its own risks of confrontation with the West and in making available troops that blend readily into the environment.*<sup>94</sup>

Ideally, the American project would result in “mobile forces available for duty in particular regions, or even outside them.” In the process participating allies would be able to “improve their military capabilities and perhaps their regional political and economic influence.”<sup>95</sup>

The third-party option was actually used extensively in covert actions well before the idea was bandied around in public. Argentinian and Israeli advisers played a major role in the organization of the unconventional war on Nicaragua and in the covert counterterror bloodbath in Guatemala

between 1979 and 1982. Argentinian trainers based in Honduras were on the job with the U.S. advisers at the inception of the program to build an irregular army for the war on Nicaragua. Although Israel's role in the region was even more extensive, not all of the Israeli offers of help were taken up. A May 1986 exchange of computer memoranda at the National Security Council between Lt. Col. North and Admiral Poindexter illustrates the Israelis' eagerness to gain political capital through such exchanges:

*DEF[ense]MIN[ister] Yitzhak] RABIN SENT HIS MIL[itary]AIDE TO SEE ME WITH THE FOLLOWING OFFER: THE ISRAELIS W[oul]D BE WILLING TO PUT 20-50 SPANISH SPEAKING MILITARY TRAINERS/ADVISORS INTO THE DRF [Democratic Revolutionary Forces] IF WE WANT THIS TO HAPPEN. THEY W[oul]D DO THIS IN CONCERT WITH AN ISRAELI PLAN TO SELL THE KFIR FIGHTER TO HONDURAS.. .. RABIN WANT TO MEET W/ME PRIVATELY IN N. Y. TO DISCUSS DETAILS. MY IMPRESSION IS THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO MOVE QUICKLY ON THIS IF WE DO DESIRE. ABRAMS LIKES THE IDEA.*<sup>96</sup>

The interchange of counterterror personnel between El Salvador and Guatemala, and the role of the ubiquitous CIA Cubans in both countries is rather less known. The November 1980 "Dissent Paper on El Salvador and Central America," a twenty-nine-page paper attributed to the State Department's "dissent channel"—but officially disavowed—is one quasi-official source that reports that better "communication and cooperation among armed forces and paramilitary organizations" in Guatemala and Honduras was a key part of U.S. strategy on El Salvador and Nicaragua.<sup>97</sup> Contingency plans for regional intervention in 1980 reportedly included the creation of "a paramilitary strike force of former members of the Nicaraguan National Guard, anti-Castro Cubans, Guatemalan military personnel and

mercenaries,"<sup>98</sup> although it was said to be impossible to substantiate "charges that CIA has been promoting and encouraging" this.<sup>99</sup>

The February and March 1982 *Washington Post* exclusives that revealed parts of the Reagan administration's covert action plans in Nicaragua tended to substantiate the CIA parentage of a multinational, but unilateral, regional paramilitary program.<sup>100</sup> The *Post's* analysis of National Security Council records on the November 1981 presidential finding read very much like the November 1981 Dissent Paper. The action plan provided for the "conduct of political and paramilitary operations against the Cuban presence and Cuban-Sandinista support structure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America."<sup>101</sup> The "formation and training of local paramilitary "action teams" was proposed for intelligence collection and "to engage in paramilitary and political operations in Nicaragua and elsewhere."<sup>102</sup>

On the noncovert side the 1988 report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy suggested third-party involvement in El Salvador was a starting point for broader regional cooperation: "The war . . . became a model of sorts for cooperative efforts: under American leadership other Latin American countries proved willing to offer military training."<sup>103</sup> Second-government involvement in El Salvador was, in fact relatively small in scale although possibly significant in the intelligence field. One of the more surprising partnerships was Venezuela's secret provision of a twelve-man mobile training team in 1982 to assist in the organization of 350-man hunter-killer *cazadora* battalion modeled on similar units set up in Venezuela in the 1960s.<sup>104</sup> In 1985 Venezuelan trainers were revealed to be working with the intelligence officers of Salvadoran security services—services that U. S. trainers were banned from

assisting. A Salvadoran officer confirmed that “the Venezuelans are picking up where the United States is not allowed to train,” after human rights workers received reports that uniformed Venezuelans had supervised the Interrogation of political prisoners.[105](#)

Argentine counterinsurgents, too, are credited with having lent assistance at the inception of the Salvadorans’ own “dirty war” in 1980/1981. Former Salvadoran security chief Colonel Roberto Santivanez who emerged from shadowy retirement in the United States to be interviewed in 1985, was one source on the Argentine connection. Argentine advisers, he said, working with “unemployed” former Nicaraguan National Guardsmen, had been involved in setting up the clandestine infrastructure for counterterror “death squad” operations in the immediate aftermath of the October 1979 coup. Santivanez credits these “cooperative forces” with having actively promoted a decentralized system for “death squad” targeting of subversives at the local level while identifying the National Police, National Guard, and Treasury Police as those responsible for the bulk of the killings. “It The grass-roots intelligence system onto which the “death squad” campaign of killings was grafted was based on the preexistent structure of ORDEN, the paramilitary network of some 100,000 members set up by the armed forces explicitly for counterinsurgency in the 1960s.[107](#)

The Dissent Paper lends further credence to a role for “cooperative forces” in some of the stickier areas of Salvadoran counterinsurgency. “The most solid bloc of support” reportedly came from the Southern Cone, with Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay providing training and advisers on “intelligence, urban and rural counterinsurgency, and logistics. Argentina is held to have become



the second largest trainer of Salvadoran officers after the United States.”

## **The Other Political Dimension**

A major distinction between old-style counterinsurgency and the new doctrine of the 1980s—what Sam Sarkesian called “the new counterinsurgency era”—was the quiet watering down of its reform and development dimension.<sup>[109](#)</sup> Development and reform had traditionally been considered unmilitary (a matter for civilian agencies), unworkable (an impertinent interference with allied governments), and precipitous (impossible to achieve without having first crushed the insurgency). The 1986 low-intensity conflict Field Circular, FC100-20, continued to refer to Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) as a part of the philosophy of counterinsurgency, its definition dating from the 1960s counterinsurgency era: “the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, psychological, and military powers of a government, including all police and internal security forces, to prevent or defeat insurgency.”<sup>[110](#)</sup> The same manual makes only an oblique reference to problems of unattractive allies, merely asserting that the host government “must clearly demonstrate that it is a better choice than the insurgent organization.”<sup>[111](#)</sup>

A more extensive acknowledgement of the political underpinnings of counterinsurgency was made in the 1986 joint-services study of lowintensity conflict.<sup>[112](#)</sup> The study concludes that the existence of a well developed insurgency is often in itself evidence of a “legitimate crisis” in the society, with a likelihood that “political, social, and economic disparities” had provoked armed opposition. The solution to this problem, however, is seen to lie with the host government, which is expected to use military force

carefully while defusing the more acute of the grievances that fuel it. The governing authority must both “discipline the use of force” and realize that “the true nature of the insurgent threat lies in its political claims and not in the military movement.”<sup>113</sup> Sound advice, but barely reflected in the training, equipment, and operational assistance provided to allied counterinsurgents. The report of the Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project, like many products of committees, incorporates the practical and the philosophical on an equal footing. Operational doctrine does not.

The doctrine provides no formula, apart from the cosmetic device of civic action, through which to transform the political aspect of counterinsurgency analysis into programmatic action. On the contrary, the political mood of the Reagan administration was to abjure poetical pressures on ideological allies, however ruthless and authoritarian, in line with the principle that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”—and by elaboration, that one does not tell one’s friends how to live.” strictly military side of counterinsurgency, in contrast, is subject to immediate implementation with a modicum of training and equipment.

The stated commitment to democratization and development provided a fine gloss to the military contest with subversion, much as in the classic counterinsurgency doctrine of the 1960s. The extensive development programs of 1960s counterinsurgency, however, had been betrayed by their incomparability with the doctrine’s military dimension (and blocked or corrupted by the status quo in every theater). The doctrine of the 1980s revival restated the same analytical premises but largely eschewed a direct, hands-on military role in counterinsurgency’s political dimension. In the new operational doctrine, the U.S. forces’ lowintensity role largely shed the last of its reformist trappings in deference to programs of strictly military action.

The Reagan administration gradually came around to recognizing that a regime with a reformist face was an asset in counterinsurgency (particularly with the American people) and, conversely, that an undisguised tyrant was a liability. In the 1980s revival, however, the U.S. military had progressively distanced itself from any role in the nation-building and reform stakes.

Even at the height of the 1960s counterinsurgency era, the military's involvement in the political and economic side of counterinsurgency, from *civic* action to administrative reform, had continually bumped up against the practical matter of the military's primary mission and expertise. In the 1980s, SOUTHCOM commander General Paul Gorman had growled about the old style as a product of "military hubris and political naivete which then afflicted our policies"—and which, hopefully, "may never again be associated with U. S. policies for low intensity conflict."<sup>115</sup> The new, streamlined counterinsurgency was less ambitious, to the relief of the old-timers (with a few exceptions). Special Forces commander Brig. Gen. Joseph Lutz, while not opposing broad spectrum action by other agencies, remarked that "as a military operator I think we should focus on the military part of the equation."<sup>116</sup> For the Special Forces—and the mainstream military—counterinsurgency was ultimately a military problem to be resolved through military operations.

The decline of the reform and development dimension in the Reagan era was a consequence of several factors. There was, as noted, ideological distaste for interference with allies' economic and political structures and a realpolitik argument that reform could actually be counterproductive.

There was also a return to the perennial argument that reform and development were impractical until *after* the military threat had been eliminated. Some military pundits

argued that the development side of the equation was based on mistaken analysis—and should be junked: “One of the myths that gained currency during the 1960s is that poverty causes insurgency. That belief had a corollary: that economic development sweeps insurgency away.”<sup>117</sup> Colonel Rod Paschall argued that the corollary to the myth, that “economic development may be an important and laudable element in a government’s plan to deal with insurgency,” should also be swept away, observing that

*history clearly indicates such efforts are not essential to success. Insurgencies have often been put down with repressive, brute force. Paradoxically, development pushed too far can sever the sometimes fragile threads of social stability—as the Shah of Iran found out.... Additionally, economic development, hard enough to achieve in peace, is extremely difficult to produce in the midst of a guerrilla war.*<sup>118</sup>

Even were a theoretical basis to support development as part and parcel of counterinsurgency, the constraints on the success of the “carrot” were implicit. Economic reforms were contingent on not rocking the free-market boat; democratization was constrained by an arrogant mistrust of the target population’s ability to decide on its own future in a satisfactory manner. As Henry Kissinger remarked in the course of covert action planning for Chile’s 1970 elections: “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”<sup>119</sup> The pursuit of both economic and political reform also flew in the face of the premise that the United States acted at the invitation of a host government which ran the show. Reforms in counterinsurgency states like Vietnam or El Salvador were incompatible with the interests of the domestic elites, civil and military. These local counterinsurgents were fighting largely to avoid just the

kind of social and economic readjustments posited, albeit mildly, in U. S. doctrine. How could they accept even a limited land reform that would recognize the validity of the principle of social justice which insurgents espoused?

Similarly, how could national elites in the counterinsurgency states accept a real democratic process when they were convinced that it would bring precisely the changes demanded by the insurgents? That it would erase their privilege and, perhaps for the first time, make them accountable before the law for their actions? The hypocrisy of their American patrons with regard to the democratic process further hamstrung efforts to coax national elites to mend their undemocratic ways. The United States' manipulation of elections and its vetoing of even the milder opinions of the Left in the counterinsurgency states has sent a clear and sharp and persistent message to reluctant democrats that democracy is not yet for everyone. U. S. efforts to ensure that the Christian Democrats won over the extremists of the Right in El Salvador's 1984 elections was hardly an object lesson in democracy—especially when combined with pressures to ensure that the left-wing opposition supporting the insurgency be excluded by fear or electoral fiat from running candidates

The reluctance of the elites of the counterinsurgency states to get fully into the spirit of reform and development might have been overcome had the U.S. commitment to this been more robust. The reform dimension of special warfare fell flat precisely because it was seen by the U.S. counterinsurgent as a medium of psychological warfare—as special warfare's sugar coating. At best, reform was promoted as a special warfare tactic, not as a policy to promote justice and a better life in line with the values and standards of living Americans claim for themselves.

# Chapter 18: An Un-American Way of War

[Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

Just as in the period of the “discovery” of unconventional warfare and then counterinsurgency in the late 1950s and the 1960s, the literature of “low-intensity conflict” emphasized the stresses and strains it put on the high principles of the American fighting man. General John Calvin, SOUTHCOM commander in the mid-1980s, called the new conflicts “uncomfortable wars.” His own experience in such wars included a 1950s stint as an adviser in Colombia and later service in Vietnam (a not unusual example of U.S. personnel taking their Latin American experience to other theaters).<sup>1</sup> Colonel John Waghelstein warned that these wars were problematic for the military establishment because “this kind of conflict is fundamentally different from the American way of war.”<sup>2</sup>

Another former SOUTHCOM commander, Galvin’s predecessor General Paul Gorman (a veteran of Vietnam, Korea, and unspecified intelligence work) has also stressed the disagreeable nature of low-intensity conflict.<sup>3</sup> Such conflict is defined in terms of the tactics used— and the unfair advantage of the adversary. As in 1950s writing on political warfare, the nature of low-intensity conflict is characterized as an undeniably dirty war, however disturbing to right-thinking Americans; mirroring the enemy’s dirty tactics is presented as the only means to equalize the fight. General Gorman’s description of *the*

*enemy's* style of low-intensity conflict is fairly representative: It is "inherently a form of warfare repugnant to Americans, a *conflict* which involves innocents, in which non-combatant casualties may be an explicit object. Its perpetrators are secretive, conspiratorial, and usually morally unconstrained. Their operations are the antithesis of respect for human rights." There is also a suggestion that the enemy's ruthlessness gives them an edge: "They can succeed if all they undertake is death and destruction, and yet they can impose on a defending government grave imperatives for restraint, heightened regard for human rights, creative reconstruction and societal reform under stress."<sup>4</sup> The way is clear, then, for an argument that Americans should respond in kind.

The emphasis in much of the published record is on the constraints imposed upon U.S. forces in combating unscrupulous adversaries. Counterinsurgent Sam Sarkesian has stressed that meeting the challenge of unconventional warfare is "complicated by the American way of war" and the American system, "whose norms and values constrain and limit strategic and tactical options in responding to unconventional conflicts...."<sup>5</sup> To an extent, the challenge is posed by the tactics of low-intensity conflict, particularly "revolution and counterrevolution"—including "hit and run raids, ambushes, assassinations, terror, and occasionally conventional operations."<sup>6</sup> The larger problem, however, is the historical basis of American warfare on "a 'moral' dimension." Sarkesian notes:

*Going to war was for the purpose of achieving some higher "good" [and] usually demanded a clear identification of the enemy and his "evil" purposes. Moreover, the American way of war attempts to make a clear distinction between war and peace.... But, in the*

*contemporary international environment, there seem to be few clear lines between war and peace.*<sup>7</sup>

Sarkesian's advice, like that of the 1950s political warriors, is to respond in kind to the adversary and to educate the politicians and the people that the "American view of war is generally incompatible with the characteristics and demands of counterrevolution"—and that counterinsurgency tactics (including assassination) should not be constrained by unrealistic ethical standards:

*If American involvement is justified and necessary, national leaders and the public must understand that low-intensity conflicts do not conform to democratic notions or tactics. Revolution and counterrevolution develop their own morality and ethics that justify any means to achieve success. Survival is the ultimate morality.*<sup>8</sup>

## **Low-Intensity Ethics**

The most fanatical advocates of counterterror in the 1980s were the civilians in government, in the defense establishment, and in the quasi-academic world of experts in the fields of terrorism, special operations and counterinsurgency. Pentagon legal consultant William V. O'Brien's writing on special operations provides some insight into the way counterterror was reconciled with military law, ethics, and professionalism in the 1980s.<sup>9</sup> O'Brien, like other proponents of special operations as the key to winning in low—intensity conflict, argues that their brief duration, specific targeting, and urgency (or necessity) justify "exceptions to the normal moral and legal constraints" on military action. Special operations in "surgical strikes" are a case in point:



*First, they are discrete and, accordingly, do not present the problem of cumulative violations.... Second, they may be presumed to be justified by a high and urgent necessity that may require sacrifice of other values such as some of the normal moral—legal constraints. Third, as a practical matter surgical operations may be subject to intrinsic limitations arising out of the capabilities of the force and the circumstances of its deployment.*<sup>[10](#)</sup>

O'Brien argues further that the one-off nature of special operations, in turn, justifies the U. S. forces' occasional "immoral and illegal conduct"; so long as the "overall record" is within the rules, special operations do not breach the norms of "just war." The suggestion that war crimes are acceptable in small doses, the selective ideal of special warfare, recalls the 1967 army manual's warning that only selective counterterror is legitimate ("i.e. genocide is not an alternative"). O'Brien's warning not to go too far bears the same double message—that war crimes are to be expected but should not be excessive in number:

*[S]uch conduct in itself may not necessarily bar the claim that just war standards have been met generally. However, repeated, cumulative violations of the war conduct law could well become sufficiently important to bar claim to just war status. This is an important point in special operations involving extraordinary, controversial means not normally used in regular conventional operations.*<sup>[11](#)</sup>

The illegal side of special operations has also been justified by suggestions that the legitimacy of assassination, torture, or other special tactics can be weighed beforehand. O'Brien recommends a cost—benefit calculus that would involve

*a comprehensive... analysis in which all of the potentially immoral and illegal actions were included in the evil effects of the operation, to be balanced against the just cause. . It might be possible to come out with a legitimate finding of overall proportionality even though a number of clearly immoral or illegal actions were contemplated from the outset and carried out in the operation.* [12](#)

The argument that war crimes in small quantities are acceptable is an exercise in quantum ethics—and an expression of the irrational belief that American crusaders in the ideological war can do no wrong. The argument epitomizes the Cold Warriors' blind faith that the just cause of America suffices to purify virtually any act of outrage carried out in its name. When psychological warfare chief General Robert McClure requested access to Hermann Goering "and his partners" at Nuremberg, to learn of the black arts of psy—war from the true masters, he surely believed that his motives in doing so were pure (see p. 59). Similarly, when Ed Lansdale mused on the need for a twentieth-century update of *The Prince*, he did so in the belief that Americans could perpetrate small evils, and indeed must shoulder a burden of such evil, while still remaining pure of heart. The same logic—or more correctly, faith—underlay the Cold War course by which Americans set out explicitly to mimic the worst they could imagine of their ideological enemies, and to export this parody of the adversary as a counterinsurgency model through which to defend the Free World.

The argument for war crimes in small doses is no more compelling in terms of law than in terms of ethics. The escape clauses in the fine print of the norms of law and civilized conduct are largely imaginary. The leeway for isolated operations, however, are hardly the anarchic acts of

renegade individuals. Special operations as proposed and programmed within the United States' defense establishment are clearly determined and regulated at the highest level. There can be no exemption from accountability for torture and assassination, summary execution and hostage-taking by U.S. forces—including foreign contract personnel—that are under orders to this effect, or instructed to use their discretion in the use of illegal means to attain designated objectives in accordance with special operations doctrine. Whether performed covertly or overtly, governments are responsible for the crimes of war or peace committed at their behest.

The ethical argument in defense of selective terror and “surgical strikes” is less compelling than the practical observation that what really matters is the way these things are perceived. An axiom suggested for war planners was that “long duration of special operations permits more time for criticism and opposition to accumulate force.”<sup>13</sup> Unless observers can document a crime in the course of special operations and show it to be part of a pattern, it is argued that there is no crime—and that little can be made of crimes that are rapid in execution, surgical in precision, and each unique in nature. Swift success, moreover, induces instant approval—and subsequent amnesia, as O’Brien points out: “It is a hard, but true, fact of life that success overcomes a lot of moral, legal, political, and cultural scruples.”<sup>14</sup> The remedy, then, is to either conceal the action or perform the dirty work with sufficient speed, and above all success, to put a damper on criticism.

Ethical considerations were seen by many special operations advocates to enter the low-intensity equation as a matter of practical politics—not a particular deference to esoteric moral or legal yardsticks. That a bout of selective assassination or a commando raid can turn around a

situation overnight, however, is a premise that finds little application to the realities of situations like those of El Salvador or Nicaragua in the mid-1980s. Although the special warfare experts excel in the short, sharp engagement, they tend to lose the more subtle political contests. Yet it is *these* contests, with their political subtleties and ethical absolutes, that ideological war is all about.

In counterinsurgency, ethical considerations may be the key to winning, and hunter—killer commando raids or assassinations that achieve minor objectives may well torpedo any reasonable expectation of winning over the people. The politics of special warfare, however, remain largely stuck in the attitudes of the commando. As Major General Michael D. Healy, former Commander at Fort Bragg, remarked from his abuse built into the laws of war allows for acts of error and omission, insubordination and anomaly, but not for a premeditated flouting of the law in a strategy of terror. Isolated war crimes that are committed in violation of enforced superior orders would clearly be insufficient to tar the belligerent force as a whole. American special own experience with army Special Forces, “I know of no question ever being raised by participants regarding morality or legality of the mission. There was simply a dedicated determination to win.... Despite petty detractors, they went out and got the job done.”<sup>15</sup>

Some Americans in government were clearly aware that the “can do” approach was not always good enough—that breaking the law could be counterproductive. Jimmy Carter’s CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner pointed this out, in the context of moves to broaden the CIA’s scope for domestic activities, with an argument that would apply equally to military special operations forces. He opposed domestic operations on the grounds of CIA attitudes to law:

“CIA officers are not trained to operate in the domestic environment, where regard for law is a primary consideration. The ethic of intelligence is to get the job done in spite of local laws.”<sup>16</sup> What was fine for covert actions in domestic environments overseas was poison back home. Special operations were not devised with the law in mind—neither our law nor anyone else’s.

The potential of special operations to engineer swift success is limited to minor theaters in the low-intensity scenario. Insurgencies are rarely successfully countered by single, daring operations in a manner comparable to lightning hostage—rescue raids or hit-and-run reprisals against foreign capitals. Insurgencies that can be rapidly overcome with selective assassination or with rapid “surgical” operations hardly merit the name. Nor are undesirable regimes as a rule so fragile as to await only a Rambo commando to topple them. As a consequence, the public-relations factor is particularly acute in counterinsurgency. Special operations can hardly be both a centerpiece of long-term counterinsurgency and, at the same time, selective and covert.

## **The Medium and the Political Message**

The political cost at home of using terror tactics becomes proportionately higher as their use continues in an open-ended conflict. The counterterror advocates argue that Americans suffer from a crippling tendency to exaggerate and become emotional when confronted with certain tactics of special operations, especially in counterinsurgency. The media in particular are accused of establishing “utterly unrealistic” standards of behavior through the “unfairness and irresponsibility of much of the reporting and bias engendered by these subjects.”<sup>17</sup> O’Brien sums up the

counterinsurgent's frustration at the average American's bias against torture, murder, and starvation—and his or her failure to understand their necessity:

*Torture is the single favorite... followed closely by "tiger cage" atrocity stories.... Attacks on the revolutionaries' leadership and infrastructure, including terrorist or alleged terrorist methods used as anti—terror instruments, are generally viewed with repugnance on the American home front, as the media and anti-war movement campaign against the Phoenix operation in Vietnam demonstrated. Starvation as a means of combat is another source of popular revulsion.... Forced movement of civilians, often genuinely required for their own safety or because of legitimate military necessity, is the source of endless criticism.*<sup>18</sup>

Torture and summary execution, by O'Brien's standards, are abhorrent but sometimes necessary for eminently practical reasons: "It may not be possible to give quarter, detain, or care for prisoners and civilian detainees." Torture in turn, may be the lesser of two evils: "An argument may be made that torture in *exceptional circumstances* may be required to obtain vital information from prisoners or detainees. Many innocent lives and the success of the mission may depend on such information being obtained in time."<sup>19</sup>

The view that torture is legitimate if used selectively found some favor among special operations advocates attending the 1983 National Defense University symposium on special operations. A commentary by the moderators accepted the logic of exceptions, that "if torture is the only way to get information that is absolutely indispensable... many of us might agree, *ex post facto*, that it was necessary." This, however, is held to be "a different proposition from routinely

torturing every prisoner of war over a fifteen-year period. Not all prisoners have critical information, there is a great difference between special cases... and a routine amoral approach to things."[20](#)

The civilian advocates of unrestricted unconventional warfare have been most articulate on the topic of international terrorism. A common argument is that terrorists (like communists in the 1950s and insurgents in the 1960s) are beyond the pale of civilized conduct and should not enjoy any of the protection offered by law to normal human beings. The underlying premise is that terrorists are readily identifiable as a breed apart (perhaps by the mark of Cain). Raymond Price posits:

*There is a need... for a return to the use of extralegal procedures. The rush to purity in which the CIA's covert action capabilities were gutted in the 1970s was an open invitation to terrorism.... Law alone is not enough. Anyone tempted to join the terrorist underground should be on notice that enlistment is his own death warrant, exercisable wherever he is caught.*[21](#)

The “instant justice” implied is, of course, precisely the point of counterterror in doctrine. In practice, this has been the foundation of state murder of ideological antagonists in many counterinsurgency states since the 1960s — although a small percentage of the victims were actual terrorists by any definition. Similarly, the idea of a “terrorist underground” can be interpreted broadly. An opposition party tainted by an undesirable ideology, a peasant union with an unsavory view on private property, or a troublesome priest may come to be classed with the actual bomb-thrower.

Advocates of counterterror in the 1980s have sometimes cited Guatemala as a model example. Defense analyst

Edward Luttwak contrasts the go—for-broke tactics in Guatemala—which he deems successful— and what he considers a halfhearted approach in El Salvador:

*If [journalists] go to Guatemala to look for guerrillas, the only ones they will find are in the mortuary. They can never encounter a live guerrilla. The war in Guatemala is being won; the war in El Salvador is being lost. The one big difference is that the Guatemalans are apparently determined to win, and their determination to win is very clear. Secondly, the Guatemalans are extremely modest in terms of how they conduct their operations. . . Even a bad army can win a guerrilla war if it uses the appropriate tactics and methods systematically.*<sup>22</sup>

Luttwak appears to be unaware that the Salvadorans have since 1974 resolutely used the tactics perfected by the Guatemalans, with army “death squads” and civilian auxiliaries murdering some 50,000 locals between 1980 and 1983 alone. Since 1984, there have been a few prisoners—but the norms remain those of counterterror and instant execution.

Another advocate of tough tactics against subversives, Neil C. Livingstone, the author of a number of studies of international terrorism, makes more or less the same point as does Luttwak, but cites El Salvador as the example of successful counterinsurgency. The “death squad,” in Livingstone’s view, represents an appropriate means to an end: “As many as half of the approximately 40,000 victims in the current conflict in El Salvador were killed by death squads.... In reality, death squads are an extremely effective tool, however odious, in combatting terrorism and revolutionary challenges.”<sup>23</sup> Livingstone even justifies counterterrorists who wipe out entire families. In Argentina, he observes, mass murder “played the most significant role



in defeating an organized terrorist challenge.”<sup>24</sup> Of the “more than 15,000 victims,” “nearly all were leftists or relatives of left—wing activists.” A clean sweep was organized with a view to the future. The Argentine’s answer to the liberal’s lament—that terror begets more terror—was to eradicate all actual and potential opposition: “Too often the death of one family member at the hands of government security forces radicalized every brother, sister, and cousin, who then became terrorists in order to avenge the victim. Thus, when a terrorist was identified every member of his or her family was often killed to prevent blood feud.”<sup>25</sup>

## **Atrocity and Military Standards**

Like the French theorist—practitioners of *guerre révolutionnaire*, the special operations experts argue that the ends justify the means. The inherent righteousness of the counterinsurgent’s cause is counted upon to keep the terror within responsible limits. Torture, for example, may be disagreeable, but the pain of the victims is to be weighed against the lives of the innocent—a logic that presumes the victims to be among the guilty. The argument of expedience and necessity—that it is impractical to take prisoners or irresponsible not to torture them—takes the special operations forces back to the norms of the 1950s doctrine of unconventional warfare.

The French idea of the *guerre sale*, the dirty war, provides a model justification for reactive terror: a convention by which the adversary is blamed for initiating dirty warfare. Overcoming American scruples was viewed as a principal challenge to be met so that America could compete in the dirty war. The U.S. Army field manuals of the 1960s warned that troops engaged in counterinsurgency were subject to “continuing morale and psychological pressures,”

particularly because of the “natural reluctance of the soldier to repress women, children, and old men who may be supporting guerrilla activities” and “the elusiveness of the guerrilla and the difficulty in identifying him.”<sup>26</sup> A particular stress of guerrilla warfare, identified as “fear of guerrilla atrocities,” in turn, is found to lend itself to retaliation in kind. 27

The emphasis on the “un-American” nature of guerrilla war suggests that in such an environment it is somehow inevitable that Americans too would commit atrocities. This persists in the Vietnam retrospectives of the popular press, as evinced in a 1988 *Newsweek* article:

*There was also the very nature of the fighting—sinister guerrilla warfare in which soldiers were often unsure who the enemy was. It was, especially, a war fought without boundaries, spilling over among a civilian population of women and children and constantly tumbling into transgressions.... Many GI's took part in atrocities or witnessed them. One veteran tells of seeing his buddies detonate a grenade in a woman's vagina. Another was ordered to throw an old woman down a well, then drop a grenade on her.* <sup>28</sup>

But tumbling into transgressions was something more than falling into temptation: It depended very much on the fact that the conflict was defined as an “unconventional war” in which no one was bound by rules.

There is a consensus in the literature that atrocities are part and parcel of counterinsurgency, although these arguments are countered by others that emphasize the political cost. A 1983 *Military Review* article, “Preventing Atrocity in Low—Intensity Conflict,” observes that atrocities have “an impact well beyond the physical damage involved,

reflecting a special kind of symbolism that transcends immediate circumstances.”<sup>29</sup> Although a high-impact act of counterterror might be described positively in the same terms, this author stresses the cost in terms of American values:

*Again, the nature of low-intensity conflict runs counter to certain American values. Many... have noted the American hunger for a moral element in going to war.... If US forces commit atrocities abroad, it not only aids their opponents, but it also serves to weaken resolve on the “home front.”*<sup>30</sup>

The author warns that “it is vital to prevent atrocity at a point where it seems imminent—on the battlefield or in the streets,” but he also places equal emphasis on the urgency of “pointing out to policy makers the links between atrocity and their actions, policies and rhetoric....”<sup>31</sup>



The propensity to commit atrocities in counterinsurgency warfare has been addressed by military historian John M. Gates, who contrasts the American nineteenth-century experience with the present. “Atrocities have taken place in virtually all wars,” writes Gates, “but the frustrations of guerrilla warfare... create an environment particularly conducive to the commission of war crimes.”<sup>32</sup> Gates’s account of the crushing of the Philippines’ independence movement at the turn of the century underscores the contradictory reactions of army leaders to the realities of guerrilla warfare. The campaign of “pacification” progressed from a fairly correct treatment of the enemy in arms and the civilian population (building schoolhouses and the like to show the benefits of colonialism) to ruthless scorched-earth reprisals throughout entire regions. As one officer warned, it was no use “going with a sword in one hand, a pacifist pamphlet in the other hand and trailing the model of a

schoolhouse after.”<sup>33</sup> A similar debate with a similar outcome—that military victory comes first—was a feature of the 1960s counterinsurgency era and was revived in the 1980s.

The conclusion drawn from the turn-of-the-century Philippine experience was that the army then made at least some effort to calibrate the machinery of pacification in accordance with the law of war of the time. Gates observes, notwithstanding, that atrocity reports became the hallmark of the Philippine campaign, with an increasing blurring of the limits of military law: “The more frustrating the campaign became, the more frequently the Americans crossed the line separating the harsh reprisals sanctioned by General Order 100 from such crimes of war as torture and wanton destruction.”<sup>34</sup> Despite this, Gates contrasts favorably the nineteenth-century soldier’s “effort to fight guerrillas within the context of a set of legal and moral restraints” with the norms of counterinsurgency today:

*In places as remote from each other as El Salvador and Afghanistan, one sees an acceptance of widespread and seemingly indiscriminate terror against civilians as a primary technique for dealing not only with insurgents and their supporters, but with the uncommitted as well. At present, the laws of war are frequently ignored.*<sup>35</sup>

A quantitative review of courts-martial of American servicemen during, respectively, the four peak years of the Philippine pacification campaign (1900—1904) and the twenty-five-year American presence in Indochina could materially strengthen the argument that military toleration of atrocity has indeed increased. The court-martial of the brigadier general that commanded the Samar campaign may be a case in point: No top officers in Vietnam were the object of such attention. The record on both Vietnam and

the Philippines suggests, however, that courts-martial for war crimes resulted by and large in slaps on the wrist. Philippines-era courts-martial for torture included prosecutions brought for hanging suspects by ropes (which resulted in reprimands); none, however, are on record for the use of the  water cure,  where water was funneled into a prisoner's nose and mouth (which might suggest official sanction).<sup>36</sup> Courts-martial in Vietnam, which centered on charges of mass killings, appear to have presented a similar pattern of selective prosecutions and punishment, and to have been few in number, as Gunter Lewy points out:

*At times, charges brought were not commensurate with the seriousness of the offense, and sentences adjudged by courts-martial in Vietnam sometimes were so light as to eliminate any deterrent effect. This fact may have contributed to an attitude of laxity and indifference regarding war crimes.... As of 21 May 1971, 29 Army personnel had been convicted of war crimes in Vietnam, and confinement had been adjudged against 15 of them. Data available for 13 of these men show that on the average they served 51.5 % of their sentences before being released as a result of parole or clemency action.*<sup>37</sup>

Those found guilty included My Lai's Lieutenant William Galley, convicted of the premeditated murder of not less than 22 people. Sentenced initially to life imprisonment at hard labor, he spent just 3 1/2 years in detention, under "house arrest."<sup>38</sup>

Critics of the United States' relaxed approach to humanitarian law in Vietnam have pointed out that there was a serious problem of omission in the training of conventional forces, let alone special counterinsurgency

units. In 1967, for example, army regulations required just one hour of instruction on the Geneva and Hague Conventions during basic training and an annual refresher course. Troops received a Geneva Conventions update on arrival in Vietnam and were issued code of conduct cards outlining some of the basic dos and don'ts.<sup>39</sup> Lewy cites a former Marine battalion commander whose testimony was included in the records of the court—martial of several Marines for atrocity killings, in order to stress that the question of war crimes—and illegal orders—was simply not addressed: “[I]n my 20 years of commissioned service, I know of no time period of instruction where an individual Marine was told when he could disobey an order.”<sup>40</sup>

An army inquiry in the aftermath of the My Lai scandal (the Peers Inquiry) recommended that a new approach to training in the laws of land warfare be required.<sup>41</sup> New training materials were, in fact, prepared by personnel from the school of the army's Judge Advocate General, the army's chief legal officer. It was recognized that practical interpretation of the rules of war was required in order to make the lesson stick. A 1970s officer training course took this practical approach, for example on the matter of illegal orders:

*While an American soldier must obey promptly all legal orders, he must also disobey an order which requires him to commit a criminal act in violation of the law of war.... An order to execute a prisoner or detainee is clearly illegal. An order to torture or abuse a prisoner to get him to talk is clearly illegal. [The soldier] should first try to get the order rescinded, but if the person giving it persists, then he has to disregard it. . Soldiers are to be instructed: “The lack of courage to disregard an illegal order is not a defense to a charge of murder, pillage or any other war crime.”<sup>42</sup>*

This was a good start—what remained was for army operations commanders to back up the army lawyers. This was not to be the case.

In practice, counterinsurgency became increasingly marginal to the mainstream military in the 1970s and even more exclusively the province of the Special Forces and associated units from the other services. The development of human rights training materials for American officers leading American regulars in counterinsurgency scenarios had little impact. The counterinsurgency wars of the 1970s and 1980s were fought largely by local forces, trained by U.S. Special Forces. Much would be made of the “human rights” curricula fed into the United States’ training program for Salvadoran troops in the first years of the 1980s—the years of the highest level of killings outside of combat there. So long as the norms of special, unconventional warfare allowed for breaking the law, the rules of war could have little effect.

The explanation of the special approach to war crimes in counterinsurgency may well lie with the changing concepts of warfare since 1900. The U.S. Army in 1900 did not distinguish between the conventional war (in which military law and regulations are, for the most part, unambiguous and ironclad) and unconventional war (in which discretionary powers to go outside the law are written into a doctrine designed to cover special circumstance). The varying scenarios of Indian-fighting, the Civil War, and the subjugation of the Philippines prompted changes in regulations and operational orders (and legal provision for reprisal killings) but not a wholesale suspension of norms of military discipline, law, and order.

A distinction should be drawn between circumstances that beget atrocity—from civil war and intercommunal violence

to wars of conquest or pacification—and a policy that relies on it. The whole sphere of counterterror (or “direct action” in another terminology) opens the door to atrocity as policy, however selective its proposed implementation.

## **Direct Action and the Lexicon of Terror**

A 1986 study prepared for the House Armed Services Committee’s Special Operations Panel by special operations authority John M. Collins outlines the skills required of the military’s special operations forces for their varied missions. Their military assistance, advisory, and training role encompasses “unconventional warfare and internal defense/foreign internal defense, terrorism, and counterterrorism.”<sup>43</sup> A skills chart lists Assassination and Abduction (“A&A”), Hostage Taking, Random Killing and Maiming, Sabotage, Capture, and Termination as some of the basics of the genre.” The definitions suggest their formal status under present doctrine:

*Assassination and abduction are illegal special operations employed offensively for sociopolitical purposes. Official actions to capture or kill key insurgents and transnational terrorists (“Termination”) are legal and defensive.*

*Assassination and abduction (A&A) are direct, discriminating, essentially decisive, economical, and occasionally unique ways to achieve required results.*<sup>45</sup>

The report’s distinction between assassination and termination is less than clear. Termination is defined variously as “‘surgical’ antipersonnel operations”;<sup>46</sup> “Legal steps to kill individuals or groups”;<sup>47</sup> and a “euphemism for killings by authorities of individuals or groups engaged in



illegal and/or warlike activities.”” To a layman, termination might sound like *legal* assassination; what makes it legal is the nature of the target and the fact that it is “official.” Assassination, in turn, appears to be distinguished only by its illegality.

The Collins study distinguishes between skills needed for the execution of “direct action”—assassination, abduction, hostage-taking, termination, and the like—and those required for planning their application. Assassination, in short, is no work for amateurs: “Any malcontent, for example, can murder or maim indiscriminately, but it takes expertise and meticulous planning to pick proper targets, times, and places, parlay results into political capital, and replicate successful processes repeatedly.”<sup>49</sup> The greater the potential repercussions, the higher the planning skill levels required. In assassination and abduction, for example, “operational skills are paltry, compared with those of planners, who must predict implications correctly.”<sup>50</sup>

A footnote to a chart outlining decision-making levels within the U.S. command structure in relation to distinct special operations tasks notes that it excludes from its scope “political assassination, which is illegal; also political abduction and terrorist acts listed on Figure 2 [hostage taking, random killing, and maiming] because of official and public disapproval.”<sup>51</sup> Another footnote adds, however, that both the United States and the Soviet Union “back associates that sometimes employ tactics shown, but the United States disapproves in principle.”<sup>52</sup> The extent, let alone the expression, of disapproval over the actions of associates was also a matter of varied definitions and qualifications. Asked a hypothetical question on the proper governmental response when “the ruler of a country vital to the West starts to kill off his political opponents,” Alexander Haig suggested that there are murders and then there are

murders: “When you say he had this fellow butchered in the street, it is very different from first-degree murder in the classic court-room case.”<sup>53</sup> Frank Devine, who was U.S. ambassador in El Salvador when mass terror began there in 1979, said, diplomatically: “We would certainly inform [the hypothetical ruler] that we do have objections to an iron fist policy. [But] I would look with appreciation at his 20 years of loyal support and anti—Communism. . .

The consensus was that assassination was forbidden but “termination” was not, although the definition of assassination remained deliberately obscure. Congressional debate on the *contra* “murder manual” focused on the terms of Executive Order 12333 of December 1981: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the U.S. government shall engage in or conspire to engage in assassinations.” The congressional committee finding was that the CIA had not violated EO 12333, at least willfully. Duane R. Clarridge, described as the Latin America division chief of the CIA’s Directorate for Operations, briefed the Senate subcommittee in response to the charges. According to an account of the secret briefing, Clarridge acknowledged the murder of “civilians and Sandinista officials in the provinces, as well as heads of cooperatives, nurses, doctors and judges,” but he maintained they were not within the terms of EQ 12333: “These events don’t constitute assassinations because as far as we’re concerned assassinations are only those of heads of state.” He continued, “I leave definitions to the politicians.” “After all, this is a war—a paramilitary operation.”<sup>55</sup> Senators apparently did not challenge Clarridge’s specious interpretation of the law.

A similar interpretation appears in a paper delivered at a joint Services symposium on terrorism in 1985. Guy B. Roberts observed pointedly that EQ 12333 made no attempt to define assassination, and he wondered, “Could a military

operation designed to eliminate a terrorist threat conceivably involve assassination?"<sup>56</sup> The implication was that it could not, and in any case, Roberts maintained that an Executive Order "does not have the force of law, and an act in contravention of that order is not prosecutable."<sup>57</sup> A 1986 paper by an army intelligence officer also distinguishes between "assassinations" and deliberate killings—which are considered legitimate insofar as they are comparable to conventional military actions against military personnel. Such operations against "such usually 'hard' terrorist targets as ideological leaders, military commanders, planners, intelligence personnel, logisticians and henchmen" could include forced extradition or "creative efforts to delay, harass, intimidate and physically eliminate individual transnational terrorists and their sponsors."<sup>58</sup>

The legal limits of "direct action" may depend on the situation; the assassination that is forbidden in peacetime might be the normal task of a sniper or other elite fighter in wartime. The tendency to wage war without declaring war, as in unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, sometimes makes the distinction purely academic. The wartime situation might be illustrated by the approach taken at the Marine Corps' Scout Sniper Instructor School in Quantico, Virginia. The school, opened in 1976 to train personnel from all services, teaches killing by stealth. According to Captain Steven L. Walsh, the officer in charge, "the bottom line is to kill people.... It's a specialty, like flight school."<sup>59</sup> The eight-week program is not just target shooting:

*It teaches assassination from a concealed position, firing over long distances with a high-powered rifle.... Snipers are invaluable for light infantry maneuvering and night-time defense, and are gaining new importance in an era of terrorism, according to military leaders....*

*Training at the instructor school is secretive. The marines, who feel gung-ho about the program but are wary of controversy, show a certain defensiveness. Sniper methods and deployment are not considered topics for discussion.*[60](#)

The fairly broad definition of “assassination” made political guidance from the government of the day all the more important. After the CIA-linked bombing went awry in Beirut in March 1985, the administration used a rather liberal interpretation of the range of permissible “terminations” in defense of the CIA. According to the *Washington Post*:

*Officials said the short-lived covert operation... did not violate the presidential ban on involvement of U. S. personnel, directly or indirectly, in any type of assassination planning or operation.... Officials reasoned that killing terrorists was “preemptive self-defense,” rather than assassination, according to a source. “Knocking off a guy who is about to kill you,” the source said, “is no more assassination than a policeman getting off the first shot at a man pointing a shotgun at him.”*[61](#)

In the world of covert action and preemptive counterterrorism, careful deliberation and specific decisions may well be required before taking action. But ambiguity over what is forbidden can combine with the political signals of tough-talking rhetoric to encourage actions outside the law on a more generalized basis.

The practice of illicit tactics may be facilitated—or suggested—by seemingly innocuous and eminently reasonable procedural tips in army manuals. The unclassified version of the U.S. Navy’s counterinsurgency doctrine for Marine Corps landing forces, for example, is

largely unexceptionable, a compendium of recommended routines and practical advice.<sup>62</sup> Practical recommendations in the navy's 1967 counterinsurgency manual (FMFM 8-2), however, could, with a little imagination (and under the stress and frustration of counterinsurgency warfare) lead directly to many of the forms in which gross abuse of human rights has been reported in counterinsurgency scenarios. To wit: "Paragraph 304, a. (1) Avoid ♦'advertising' the fact that a guerrilla is a prisoner until competent authority has decided how best to exploit him."<sup>63</sup> This is the number-one recommendation for dealing with surrendered and captured guerrillas. Placing "advertising" in quotations is the equivalent of a comradely "wink": Perhaps it was illegal to openly recommend total secrecy in these matters. Number two is to strictly prohibit "abuse, maltreatment, or harassment" of the prisoners. A standing order to keep quiet about detentions, however, could be the first step of a routine of temporary or permanent "disappearance." Forces that are authorized to deny holding prisoners during interrogation are rather more likely to abuse, maltreat, or kill them when their whereabouts are known only within the ranks of the military.

Keeping detentions a secret until interrogation has been completed is hardly a convention exclusive to the U.S. military. Police who are investigating terrorism—or organized crime—often prefer to snatch suspects and interrogate them before their cohorts have an opportunity to escape or eliminate evidence. Judicial safeguards should be in place to ensure that police are accountable before the law in such situations, yet in a military operation this accountability is absent. Counterinsurgency programs built upon the U.S. military model adapt to the full range of domestic law enforcement U.S. *military* norms developed for the exceptional circumstances of wartime. In doing so, they tend

to sidestep the safeguards of the domestic legal system within which they nominally operate.

The Marine Corps manual's recommendations on the intelligence value of the relatives of "known guerrillas" might also be interpreted as commonsense law enforcement advice—in a rule of law situation. Elsewhere it could be an inducement to hostage-taking, blacklists, and "death squad" activity, all of which are still common features of counterinsurgency in the 1990s:

*Paragraph 303 (b) (5) The names and locations of families, relatives, and friends of known guerrillas are obtained. These persons are valuable sources of information and may be used as a lure for trapping guerrillas.... Establishment and maintenance of records concerning black and gray lists should be restricted to those units having the capability to administer them.*<sup>64</sup>

More direct references to supposedly illegal tactics also appear in unclassified Special Forces manuals of the 1980s, which recommend guerrilla tactics to be used in the multiple scenarios of unconventional warfare. Included among the range of special operations are missions to "abduct selected personnel."<sup>65</sup>

The contention that Special Forces' use of "A&A"—Assassination and Abduction—skills was prohibited because they were illegal is questionable. Direct involvement in terror operations by U.S. personnel in peacetime would, no doubt, be limited to the "surgical," deniable, and closely supervised operations with which the CIA is occasionally credited. More significant is the proliferation of American assets—overseas allies and disposable acquaintances—trained and assisted in the skills and wherewithal of direct action mayhem and terror. The pool of "A&A" talent within

the U.S. armed forces is clearly considerable, and these assets at one remove may be even more numerous and used more regularly. U.S. contract employees of Hispanic origin played a major part in the more complex of the sabotage and raiding operations in the undeclared war with Nicaragua. Termed “UCLAs,” these “Unilaterally Controlled Latino Assets” were disposable personnel whom the U.S. government could (and would) deny if caught out; and so they were free to use the full range of special operations skills their Special Forces trainers could impart.<sup>66</sup> But this was almost a sideshow to the Special Forces training relationships with foreign military and paramilitary forces.

The evidence from U.S. counterterror programs in recent years directly contradicts the suggestion that official “disapproval” of illegal tactics means a complete avoidance of their use. U.S. teams have been caught instructing foreign associates in the use of selective “A&A” (and, on occasion, random killing and maimings) too often. Some of the more colorful accounts of counterterror in action have emerged when operations went wrong (as in the March 1985 Beirut bombing), or when counterterror teams were exposed as they undertook particularly eccentric—or renegade—projects. The Edwin Wilson affair, in which former or active CIA personnel recruited a Special Forces “A” Team from Fort Bragg and set up a terrorist training school in Libya, was an example of the latter (Wilson’s prison sentence still fails to allay doubts as to his team’s initial agency status). Special Forces Master Sgt. Luke Thompson later told interviewers that his posting to Tripoli was unusual only in that he did not quite understand why the United States was working with the Libyans.<sup>67</sup> The training in “A&A,” the manufacture of explosive devices ranging from ashtrays to plastique potted palms, using American C-4 plastic explosive and high-tech timers, were apparently all in a day’s work. The Wilson affair took place at the height of Admiral Turner’s clean-up of the

CIA's special warfare establishment during the Carter administration.

Better examples of the institutional side of contemporary counterterror can be found in the Reagan administration's efforts in Central America: the overnight transformation of Honduras into a counterinsurgency state of army "death squads" and "disappearances," and the unconventional war against Nicaragua illustrate the two dimensions of modern military counterterror. The manual prepared in the 1980s for the unconventional war on Nicaragua, *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare*, though aimed at the United States' proxies, promoted the liberal use of "A&A" skills. The United States' partnership with El Salvador's terrorist armed forces as tens of thousands of people were detained and slaughtered offers further evidence that terror tactics are still on the special warfare agenda, and not only at arm's length.



### **The Sorcerer's Apprentice<sup>68</sup>**

Underlying the counterterrorist doctrine is the premise that terrorism is overwhelmingly effective. It has been taken for granted in all U.S. Army field manuals and training curricula for foreign armies. Insurgents are continually characterized as terrorists, and terrorism is vaunted as their best shot at power. A précis of a 1980s officer candidate course at Fort Benning illustrates this. Lessons on "The Rural Guerrilla" were based on a chapter of Field Manual 31-16 (on counterinsurgency) and on Cuban-born adventurer, "General" Alberto Bayo's 1960 *150 Questions for a Guerrilla*.<sup>69</sup> Bayo's approach to guerrilla warfare was very much that of an apolitical, renegade prankster who deals in coercion and terror, reflecting his conventional army and urban terrorist experience in Spain and Morocco. Theorists of



revolutionary warfare from Mao to Guevara were notably absent from the curriculum, as were the views of more sensible opponents of terrorism like Yoram Dinstein, who states flatly:

“Terrorism must not be confused with guerrilla warfare. Guerrillas who comply with the rules of warfare have nothing in common with terrorists: they are simply irregular troops. Conversely, terrorists... disobey the laws of armed conflict by attacking civilians indiscriminately in order to instil fear.”<sup>70</sup> The net effect of the course was to reinforce a distorted view of guerrilla warfare and so to provide a warped model for counteraction: That is, if guerrillas are terrorists then counter guerrillas are counterterrorists.

A lack of confidence in American values permeates this perspective, a conviction that it is impossible—or suicidal—to attempt to fight back against the terrorist with anything less than counterterror, and that “in the strange new world of terrorism... civility’ requires decided uncivilized responses... the end justifies the means and the use of appropriately brutal’ means is the only vehicle to protect lives.”<sup>71</sup> Even the option of retaliation “directed surgically... at those directly responsible” is considered too restrictive—because “retaliation almost never would be imposed in practice because of the difficulty of identifying and locating the actual killers.” The alternative proposed is terrorism against second parties, including the innocent: “[P]rotection of lives and morals requires only that retaliation be directed at parties who can influence the future behavior of the terrorists. The closer they are to the terrorists the better... regardless of the actual degree of their complicity.”<sup>72</sup>

A fascination with the use of terror is also found in the voluminous literature spewed out by academia’s numerous specialists on terrorism. Some scholars appear to have a

complacent and sometimes enthusiastic view of the necessity or legitimacy of countering terrorism with terror—a matter discussed further below. The popular position has not, however, gone unchallenged. Conor Cruise O'Brien took issue with the specialists that “partly deprecated and partly condoned” terrorism and counterterrorism, expressing a certain squeamishness on the topic but concluding that it is, after all, effective.<sup>73</sup> O'Brien notes that Bowyer Bell, in his *Transnational Terror*, “like Machiavelli, sees that terrorism can have its uses. He does not rule it out for our side,” and finds the general public too squeamish on the subject.<sup>74</sup> O'Brien warns that there are few certainties in the realm of terrorism, “no calculus of violence” by which one can gauge the political efficacy of murder.

Because terrorism is assumed to be overwhelmingly effective, it is seen as an unfair advantage over law-abiding governments. As a 1986 *Military Review* article bemoans, “While terrorists can engage in violence with relative impunity, we wish to take an ineffectual moral high ground which limits us to commit forces in so-called clean wars.”<sup>75</sup> The dominant view in the Reagan era was that terror is the secret of the insurgent, the key to the manipulation, organization, and motivation of an otherwise static society. That insurgents might emerge from an grass-roots popular movement demanding change, and the public might not need to be terrorized into compliance by revolutionary task masters—this was unthinkable.

The mirror imagery was sometimes bizarrely reinvigorated by events—and by the way events were reported. The resolution of a kidnaping in Beirut of three Soviet diplomats in 1985 (a fourth was killed) would be attributed by the American press to prompt counterterrorism by the KGB. According to the accepted account, a relative of a Shia

Muslim leader was kidnaped, castrated, and shot. The severed organs were sent

to the Hezbollah leader with a warning that other relatives would be dealt with similarly if the three were not released. This, in the American view, led to the release of the kidnap victims and effectively stopped anti-Soviet actions in Lebanon. But was it true—either the story of retaliation and mutilation, or the suggestion that in *this* case (and in this case alone) tit for tat was the end of the story? It would seem that the CIA, then seeking more rope for overseas counterterror operations, might have had more to gain from the story than the KGB. Whatever happened to win the release of the Soviet diplomats, the American counterterror advocates took the story and ran with it. An op-ed piece by former Council of Economic Advisors staffer Benjamin Zycher stresses the humanitarian nature of such “surgical” counterterror—the quick and nasty response winning lasting benefits:

*Brutal, you say? Uncivilized? Inhuman?... The “inhumanity” of the KGB limited the death toll among innocents to two; moreover, it is a safe bet that terrorists will think twice, or more, before attacking Soviet diplomats or civilians again. It is the “brutality” of the KGB that will protect innocent life.*<sup>76</sup>

The model most frequently cited for counterterror in the 1980s was Israel, although even counterterror advocates were not wholly convinced that the Israeli policies of reprisal, retaliation, and preemptive strikes did not do more to nurture than to neutralize future threats to Israel’s survival.<sup>77</sup> Neil Livingstone, who favored the Israeli approach, dates its wholehearted adoption of aggressive counterterrorism to the Black September group’s murder of eleven members of Israel’s Olympic team in Munich in 1972,

and the subsequent decision to devise a new approach to the terrorist threat.”<sup>78</sup> The outcome was, by his account, the creation of a new division within Israel’s secret intelligence service, the Mossad, known as “Mivtzah Elohim” or “Wrath of God,” described by Livingstone as

*a new organization committed to fight fire with fire... [that] relentlessly struck back at the Black September terrorists, conducting daring raids into Beirut to kill the top leadership of the organization, tracking down Palestinian operatives in Europe and other locations and assassinating them.*<sup>79</sup>

The Israeli approach, in Livingstone’s view, was to “wage a war in the shadows... sending out hit teams to terminate the architects and executioners of terrorism” as a threat and a warning to others.<sup>80</sup> Livingstone’s thesis in brief is that under certain circumstances, in order to defend national interest in a dangerous world, “systematic murder must be sanctioned and legitimized as an instrument of national policy.”<sup>81</sup>

A document said to be a top-secret CIA report on Israel’s intelligence and security apparatus, dated March 1979, provides further detail on Israeli counterterror, or “executive action.”<sup>82</sup> The report notes that operations carded out by Mossad stations ranged from “formal liaison exchanges with host services through unilateral projects to special executive actions against Arab terrorists... especially in parts of the Near East and Western Europe.”<sup>83</sup> Lebanon, in particular, was “attractive for intelligence projects,” including assassinations or destruction of “Palestinian terrorist leaders, personnel and installations,” and support for “Christian rightists in Lebanon’s civil war.

An Israeli Psychological Warfare or Special Operations Division, “probably in the Political Action and Liaison Directorate,” was reported to run “highly sensitive covert action operations against Arab terrorists and ex-Nazis, and sabotage, paramilitary and psychological warfare projects.”<sup>84</sup> Mossad was also responsible for terror operations to be blamed on others, “to create mutual distrust among Arabs and to draw Western sympathy away from the Arab cause.”<sup>85</sup> The CIA report cites one “Wrath of God” operation gone wrong—an ad hoc special operation directed from Mossad headquarters, with agents deployed on temporary duty: “In July 1973, an Israeli assassination squad of 16 was involved in the murder of a Moroccan Arab in Lillehammer, Norway. Norwegian authorities captured, tried and imprisoned six of the “86 group.

A denouement to Israel’s campaign of vengeance against Black September came some time after the car bomb murder in 1979 of Ali Hassan Salameh, who reputedly had led the Munich terror operation. Ali Has-San, it seems, may have been a double agent working with (if not necessarily for) the United States.<sup>87</sup> Salameh, according to one account, had passed information on terrorist plans and apparently gone to some lengths to protect his American clients. The *Sunday Times* of London recounts the affair:

*[Salamehi warned Henry Kissinger that his jet was in danger of being shot down on a visit to Lebanon in 1973 and he provided him with a personal bodyguard. The following year he warned the CIA station chief of a plot to kidnap him and a grateful CIA flew him and his wife.., for an all-expenses-paid holiday to Hawaii.... [T]he Israelis set out to kill Salameh and in 1979 they finally succeeded, but only after they had asked the Americans if they would object. A bureaucratic fumble led the Americans to deny Salameh and ensure his death.*<sup>88</sup>

The antiterrorism hysteria in Washington in the immediate aftermath of the 1983 Beirut attack on the Marines led to serious consideration of adopting the tactics of the Israelis for dealing with the United States' own international adversaries. Secretary of State Shultz alluded to the matter in his speech on terrorism on 29 October 1984, a month after the U. S. embassy annex in Beirut was bombed:

[N]o nation has had more experience with terrorism than Israel, and no nation has made a greater contribution to our understanding of the problem and the best ways to confront it.... Much of Israel's success in fighting terrorism has been due to broad public support for Israel's anti-terrorism policies. Israel's people. . . entertain no illusions about the meaning or the danger of terrorism.<sup>[89](#)</sup>

Shultz's expression of admiration for the tough Israeli approach was followed by a plea for a similar national consensus on counterterror within the United States, "to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation... to prevent and deter future terrorist acts."<sup>[90](#)</sup> "There should be no moral confusion on this issue," he exhorted, "our aim is... to make the world a safer place to live for all of us."<sup>[91](#)</sup>

In the event, the United States did not fully implement unilateral counterterror on the Israeli model during the Reagan years. The concept of counterterror, however, was reinvigorated and put into practice through American training and organizational initiatives. Although it was too dangerous for Americans to be fielded as hit men, U.S. sponsorship of foreign contract agents, proxies, and allied armies for counterterror would be an ongoing part of the covert arsenal of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency. Yet, American secret warfare professionals remained reluctant to engage openly in

counterterror, at the risk of bumping off the wrong targets and being exposed thereby; and there was added concern at a higher level over the potential of terror to provoke terror, irrevocably and unpredictably altering the uneasy scheme of international relations. Special operations authority John Collins describes and dismisses the allure of Israel-style counter-terror in a single paragraph:

*Counterterrorism incorporates many of the most complex special operations.... Technology is important but human factors predominate. Tactics and strategy must mesh, or the final result is failure. Israel's eye-for-an-eye and tooth-for-a-tooth tactics, for example, have been widely admired for many years; from a strategic standpoint, however, they leave the nation insecure, by creating terrorists faster than air strikes and hit teams can kill them.*<sup>[92](#)</sup>

## **The Terror Manuals**

The organization and waging of unconventional warfare on Nicaragua, in turn, illustrated through its tactics of atrocity a commitment to the old-style norms of 1950s political warfare. Nicaragua was special, indeed, in that the atrocities of the irregular forces fighting the war could be matched to their U.S. government training materials. The 1983 *Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare* manual issued, in Spanish, to *contra* forces by the U.S. government put on the record, albeit inadvertently, the 1980s standing of its doctrine of unconventional warfare.

The 1983 manual provided a documentary link to prior U.S. army field manuals that explicitly prescribe the use of terrorism.

The psychological operations manual was the second CIA *contra* manual to receive unwanted media attention. A sixteen-page manual in comic book format had been issued earlier the same year, illustrating thirty-eight ways by which right-thinking individuals could sabotage the Nicaraguan government and economy. The suggests and general tone were reminiscent of “General” Alberto Bayo’s *150 Questions for a Guerrilla*. Options included wasting water and electricity; puncturing tires, gas tanks, and radiators; putting earth or water in gas tanks; making anonymous telephoned death threats to the boss; damaging office machinery; and instructions on making Molotov cocktails. “Anti-Sandinista Slogans” to be daubed on walls are illustrated, profoundly, with “Long live the Pope.”<sup>94</sup>

The comic book received relatively little attention; its format and the “prankster” nature of much of what it proposed combined to encourage the media to view it as a relatively trivial production. The psychological operations manual was of another caliber: It openly set out criteria and a methodology for murder. Americas Watch examined the manual in the context of the United States’ obligations under the Geneva Conventions, and concluded:

*[T]he United States has aided and abetted the contras in committing abuses by organizing, training, supplying and financing them, and by serving as their vigorous and enthusiastic public relations advocate. In addition, by publishing and distributing the CIA’s Manual. . . the United States has directly solicited the contras to engage in violations of the laws of war.*<sup>95</sup>

The latter point was also made by the International Court of Justice, in a ruling of 27 June 1986: By producing and distributing the manual to the FDN (Nicaraguan Democratic Front, that is, the *contras*), the United States government



had “encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to the general principles of humanitarian law. “[96](#)

The manual was sufficiently blatant in its advocacy of terrorism that the House Select Committee on Intelligence, which nominally exercised oversight over CIA, was obliged to investigate the matter. In a public report of its findings, issued in January 1985, the committee said it “had been written by the CIA in 1983 for use in the ‘covert’ war against Nicaragua,” which had violated the Boland Amendment and other domestic legislation:

*The manual talks of “neutralizing” Sandinista officials and creating martyrs. This raises the question of whether Executive Order 12333, which prohibits assassinations, was violated. The manual also talks of shooting civilians trying to leave a captured town, blackmailing others to work for the contras, and endangering innocent people by inciting violence in mass demonstrations.*[97](#)

The committee’s conclusions were a model of equanimity. The manual was, indeed, found to have constituted a violation of the Boland Amendment although it was less clear on the matter of the ban on assassinations. But no one, and certainly not the CIA as an institution, was found to have deliberately violated either the one or the other. The low-level agency men held responsible for the manual were perhaps ignorant of the law. The high-level policymakers were, at worst, not exercising adequate “command and control of the entire Nicaragua covert action.” The committee concluded: “Negligence, not intent to violate the law, marked the manual’s history. The Committee concluded that there was no intentional violation of Executive Order 12333.”

The committee's exoneration of the CIA on the grounds that its establishment had been ignorant and negligent contrasted with the administration's defense of the manual as being essentially beneficent. Ronald Reagan himself maintained that the furor over the manual was "much ado about nothing"; that the reference to "neutralizing enemies meant no more than to tell them "you are not in charge any more." [98](#)

Perhaps most ironic, in the light of the manual's content, was the administration's characterization of it as a positive step toward inducing the *contras* to exercise *restraint* in waging unconventional war. When CIA chief William Casey broke agency silence on the manual, a *New York Times* editorial noted he had insisted that "the bulk of the manual" counsels soldiers to befriend the population, and that "the instruction about 'neutralizing' adversaries is not as important as the manual's lessons in guerrilla etiquette."[99](#) Casey's approach was echoed by Reagan stalwarts, notably Senator Malcolm Wallop, a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, who claimed, "Taken as a whole, the manual calls for the avoidance of violence to the extent possible and was designed to put restraint and a rationale on guerrilla operations. As a whole, the manual is a code of conduct for which the United States ought not to be ashamed."[100](#)

Taken as a whole, the *contra* manual, like the military doctrine of unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, offers relatively little space for explicit prescriptions of terrorism. Terrorism is there, however, as if it were a legitimate and necessary part of the whole. And as such, the point is not that United States should be ashamed but that it should halt the promotion of terrorism by its agents, in accord with the behavior it demands of others in the international community.

Direct reference to counterterror figures in only a fraction of the volumes of doctrinal guidance produced by the military and intelligence establishment. Counterterror is not, however, a matter of technical complexity but rather a signal. While more complex and prolific guidance is laid down in doctrine to *limit* the scope or nature of particular military actions—as, for example, in the rules of engagement for peacekeeping forces—the instruction authorizing counterterror removes barriers, inviting its application as a routine tactic. In the Nicaraguan case, as in the counterinsurgency programs of El Salvador and Guatemala, terror tactics by troops advised by U.S. personnel were not incidental but central to the military effort. The evidence is in the pattern of military practices—the sheer ubiquity of atrocity—and in the doctrinal guidance attributing to terror and counterterror an outstanding virtue. The role of terror remains at the heart of the doctrine of unconventional warfare and as such continues to permeate both counterinsurgency and the ill-defined area of special operations as a whole.

# Epilogue

## [Instruments of Statecraft: U.S. Guerilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism, 1940-1990](#)

When the Bush administration began in January 1989, the high public profile of the counterinsurgency and special operations revival of Reagan's first term had already faded from the limelight, and public attention swiveled toward the dismantling of the Eastern Bloc. The new challenge was the management of an emerging world order in which the Kremlin was no longer the master of the "evil empire." The withdrawal of Soviet advisers and military assistance from the regimes deemed undesirable by the United States, the grudging acceptance by the United States that the Soviet Unions' commitment to revolution abroad was a thing of the past, and the Soviet leadership's increasing and evident preoccupation with domestic crisis and potential national dismemberment have been read as signs of capitulation in the global battle of powers and ideologies.

Were it true that the Soviets were the real power behind every undesirable regime, subversive group, or revolutionary movement, and that without Soviet support communist insurgencies wither on the vine, the new order cleansed of Soviet domination might have been expected to have been largely conflict-free. But even hard-liners who had long insisted that the way to crush insurgency was to "go to the source," to lean on Moscow, found that revolution persisted even when the Soviets had unabashedly withdrawn from the great game. Undesirable regimes continued to thumb their noses at the United States. The ideological underpinning of the Cold War, too, remained intact, as socialism, communism, and myriad hybrids

remained a potent force and no less antithetical to the counterideologies of the U. S. establishment and its client cultures, armies, and regimes around the world.

The decline of the Soviet Union as public enemy number one has removed one source of U.S. insecurity but revealed the bare face of other sources of U. S. conduct. In the past, the United States challenged the imperial prerogatives and expansion of the European powers (and later Japan) in defense of its own interests and in the name of democracy. It also claimed its own prerogatives and established new forms of patronage from the ruins of more decrepit empires. This political and economic imperative would be echoed in a continuing commitment to maintaining an American edge over an increasingly united Europe, the rebuilding of Eastern Europe, and the economic power of resurgent Japan. The Gulf War, financed primarily by the oil states, Japan, and the Europeans, served admirably to reaffirm U.S. power and to guarantee its economic foundations by establishing its military stewardship over the oil states of the Gulf. Closer to home, it would be served by the creeping absorption of Latin American and Canadian economies into a block of unequal partners.

A second mission of U. S. foreign policy—to maintain stability within its sphere and to counter revolution—has also been revealed outside the context of the Cold War. Panama was invaded in 1990 to restore stability within its own borders and throughout the region. The Panamanian government could no longer be trusted to deal reliably with the United States, and so its stability was in question. That was sufficient cause for the United States to intervene (provided, as projections showed, that intervention could be managed within acceptable costs).

Although the Cold War may have ended, a more diffuse but no less lethal Cold War has continued to guide U. S., if not also Soviet, policy. The East-West conflict provided a conceptual framework for U. S. unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency, and defined U. S. interests in largely ideological terms. Although the threat from the East has been removed at a stroke, a profusion of lesser centers of provocation, threat, and opportunity have continued to confront the United States' Cold War apparatus—and to sustain Cold War attitudes that had been reaffirmed by the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. If the Cold War between the superpowers is over, the Cold War on the periphery—the primary theater of U.S. unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency since the 1950s—has been largely unaffected by the changes in the East, and continued to be waged enthusiastically by the Bush administration in Cambodia, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and much of South America.

George Bush had a taste of special operations as a minor player in the Iran-contra scandal, and more than a taste in his brief tenure as CIA director in 1976-1977. The excesses of special operations gone wrong and the Reagan administration's crusading Cold War rhetoric of retaliation have been largely superseded by a seemingly more businesslike and less visible approach to political warfare more appropriate to the waning of the Cold War. In practice, unconventional warfare apparently continues to be waged along much the same lines.

The Reagan administration had succeeded in winning the public and congressional approval required for a more vigorous program of intervention overseas and had built up the specialized military forces required, including the CIA's "paramilitary" cadre. The buildup continued under the new

president. Total military special operations forces reached scheduled levels of 38,000 in 1991, including reserves. Active duty forces based in the continental United States as of April 1991, totaled 18,250, with 5,170 operating overseas. A further increase of about 1,500 was scheduled for fiscal year 1992 with the activation of another Army Special Forces Group (the "Third" SFG, with a force level of about 1,350) and of ten Navy SEAL platoons (about 150 men in total). The navy fielded 3,250 SOF personnel and the air force 3,750, with most of the army's 11,250 active SOF in the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Special Forces Groups (each with about 1,400 men, in three battalions). In addition, the secret Department of Defense "Congressional Budget Justification for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict" for fiscal year 1991 provided for 963 SOF to be based at Fort Bragg's Special Warfare Center and 465 at the First Special Operations Command (SOCOM) at Fort Bragg. The assignment of a further contingent of 935 personnel is identified only as a "CLASSIFIED MISSION."<sup>1</sup>

The invasion of Panama was the Bush administration's first experience of using U. S. military strength outside the ideological framework of the Cold War. The 20 December launch of Operation JUST CAUSE involved some 25,000 troops, including the 13,000 strong Canal Zone garrison of the U.S. Southern Command headquarters (perhaps a salutary lesson to other nations that host foreign bases). Some 4,000 special operations forces were deployed in what may have been a foreshadowing of a more ubiquitous U. S. role in "low-intensity conflict" in the post-Cold War era. The president gave four reasons for the intervention: to protect American lives and property; to keep open the Panama Canal, which was endangered by an unstable government; to "restore democracy," installing in the presidency the amiable banker Guillermo Endara who, the United States maintained, *would* have won the May 1990 elections had

General Manuel Noriega not rigged them; and, in the first major test of a new U.S. legal doctrine forged in Reagan's counterterrorism program—that U.S. agents could arrest and remove to the United States' jurisdiction for trial anyone, anywhere. The latter was exemplified by the detention of Noriega, his summary removal to the United States, and his being brought to trial in an American court for drug trafficking.<sup>2</sup>

The failure of a U. S. -backed coup in October 1989, despite the efforts of an enormous CIA presence, was, ingenuously, presented to the world as a shameful consequence of a U. S. "hands-off" policy not unlike the Kennedy administration's withholding of full air support at Bay of Pigs. The media accepted the official story: that the Panamanian officers who failed—and were summarily executed for their pains—*would have* succeeded had their American managers been allowed to play a more direct role. One story that was floated with the same apparent rationale, indeed, maintained that the attempt failed because it was off schedule and not coordinated with the American friends: that "a US backed coup may have been in the offing . . . [but] the 'un-official' coup got in the way."<sup>3</sup>

The October affair in Panama City was represented in the United States as a "humiliation" for the president—only because it failed. The subsequent invasion was a response to the charges of a presidential lack of resolve, a symbolic exercise that was costly mainly in Panamanian lives. Another casualty of the failed coup, however, was the erosion of even nominal constraints on U. S. special operations. In an uncharacteristic throwback to the aggressive rhetoric of Reagan's first term, the president's men pointedly told the media that the White House was unhappy with the constraints on its "unconventional" operations overseas, in particular the ban on assassinations first issued by President



Ford in 1976 (and sometimes interpreted *only* as concerning the murder of heads of state).<sup>4</sup> Top officials were said to have “endorsed calls for more latitude” for operations to support “potentially violent efforts to overthrow foreign dictators.” Among them, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft had complained that the assassination ban had been “forced on the Executive Branch by a Congress bent on ‘micro-management.’”<sup>5</sup>

Special operations by and large sidestep requirements for democratic decision-making and accountability at home, and can be largely concealed from the public. A recourse to special operations limits the cash outlay required for intervention and the political cost of failure. Special operations in the new world order would have a new range of objectives, with their missions—and pretexts—adjusted to the end of the Cold War. The new missions, such as drug enforcement, will provide a vehicle for continuing some of the old missions that persist from the Cold War and the counterinsurgency era.

The deployment of U. S. military special operations forces in Bolivia Peru, and Colombia to train and support military counterinsurgency forces, under the umbrella of a drug enforcement program, has been one aspect of the new order.’ The authorization of \$65 million in emergency military aid to Colombia by President Bush in August 1989, for example, was announced as part of the “war on drugs.” But congressional inquiries later showed that 77 percent of the assistance was for military needs unrelated to the war on drugs but fully consonant with the Colombian military’s decades-long war on subversion and insurgency—and with the Bush administration’s continued waging of an unfinished low-intensity conflict in the spirit of the Cold War.<sup>7</sup>

Predictably, the civilian objective, narcotics control, took a back seat to counterinsurgency in the best tradition of U. S. special operations. A 1990 congressional report disclosed that the Colombian army was generally uninterested in narcotics control, and that the antinarcotics police “has had to contend with the increasingly powerful alliance of trafficking organizations, armed rural landowners *and their military protectors*”; and that presidential authority had had to be sought to permit the police “to bypass military commanders” in operations against the cartels. The military, then, which had forged an alliance with armed landowners and drug barons in developing its counterinsurgency apparatus, was part of the problem of narcotics trafficking, and not an effective means of suppressing it.<sup>8</sup>

The Peruvian military, too, recipients of significantly less U. S. assistance, was a reluctant partner of Special Forces personnel in narcotics control operations, but was a good deal more enthusiastic about U.S. support for its counterinsurgency war.<sup>9</sup> The construction in September of Special Forces training facilities at Mazmari in the *ceja de selva*, in the highlands on the “eyebrow of the jungle,” and of a fortified U.S. fire base at Santa Lucia, in the heart of the Upper Huallaga Valley coca lands controlled by *Sendero Luminoso* (*Shining Path*) guerrillas, suggested U. S. special operations forces were settling in to stay. Built on the model of the Special Forces’ fighting camps of Vietnam’s hinterland, with a ten-man U.S. contingent attached to local forces, U.S. forces first came under fire at Santa Lucia on 7 April 1990, in a Shining Path guerrilla assault on the helicopter compound and the fuel storage area. The attack was repelled by U. S. forces and Peruvian National Police; the Peruvian military failed to provide any kind of support.<sup>10</sup> Congressional investigators concluded that the local army’s posture reflected more than mere indifference or

incompetence, noting that “narcotics interdiction efforts in the Upper Huallaga Valley continue to be frustrated by the Peruvian military.” The traffickers, in fact, were building their airstrips and laboratories close to army bases in order to maximize the protection the army could offer them.<sup>[11](#)</sup>

Measures to make the United States’ drug program more attractive to the Peruvian military have preceded under the Bush administration. Since April 1990, the Peruvian military, which was unhappy with dealing with civilian DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) officers, has dealt with an active-duty colonel of the U. S. military as the coordinator of U.S. operations in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Overt assistance to the military’s nationwide counterinsurgency effort and U.S. diplomatic assistance in covering up the Peruvian military’s record of atrocities could be the next step in the new order. The armies of the counterinsurgency states are still the United States’ primary allies in the war against subversion. But armies that were attracted by the martial appeal, the ideological simplicity, and the brotherhood of global common cause engendered in Cold War counterinsurgency may well remain reluctant allies in the war against drugs—even as a quid pro quo for uncritical U. S. support in their respective wars on domestic subversion.

In the first years of the Bush administration, the numbers of U.S. troops moving in and out of Guatemala reached levels perhaps not equaled since 1966-1967. Flights out of the United States’ Palmerola Air Base in Honduras, specially built for regional low-intensity conflict, brought special units into Guatemala for short-term deployment on a range of projects designed to assist the Guatemalan army in its counterinsurgency campaigning. Already by mid-1989, U.S. Air Force pilots were reported to “regularly hold training exercises in the Guatemalans’ A-37 attack planes,”<sup>[12](#)</sup> while opposition sources claimed an estimated forty Green Berets

were working out of the army's special jungle warfare school in the Petén, and U.S. forces were providing tactical support with helicopter gunships during counterinsurgency operations in the mountains of El Quiche. <sup>13</sup> National Guard units from Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Alabama were part of the acknowledged U.S. presence, employed in civic action and other tasks to complement the Guatemalan army's work to subdue, indoctrinate, and control its suspect Indian population. <sup>14</sup>

Because the Cold War is no longer, in any case, waged unilaterally by the United States in the "Free World," a certain role will continue to fall to others as its terms change. A reluctance to abandon the Cold War might have been expected, particularly in the military institutions the United States had trained and organized and inducted into the Cold War brotherhood. The domestic elites of the counterinsurgency states such as Chile, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Peru, are a factor, in that their intransigent opposition to change has been fueled by the extremism of the United States' anticommunist ideology for export and sustained by decades of a U. S. commitment to defend them from their enemies. The Cold War attitudes and ideology that informed U.S. policy, most comprehensively in the fields of foreign affairs and defense, provided the template on which many "Free World" clients have modeled their societies, their political institutions, and their security systems.

The real war against the ideological enemy that was being fought in Central America as Bush moved into the Oval Office was sustained and expanded as he took control and extended further to the south on the back of the "war on drugs. " The war in the Americas, in the Philippines, and elsewhere continued to be a war on communism and anything remotely akin; it is not an afterimage of the Cold

War but the Cold War itself removed from the East-West theater.

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Within seven months of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 the United States and its allies had cleared Iraqi forces from Kuwait and wrung a cease-fire and virtual surrender from Baghdad in a hundred-day campaign. The swift, miraculously one-sided victory in the desert was a milestone for the United States and for George Bush. The president's exuberant claim—"By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all"—illustrated the persistence of American anxieties over the nation's performance in war—two decades after Vietnam—and the way the Gulf War was seen in the United States.<sup>15</sup> The invasion of Kuwait was, in American eyes, a test of the United States' will and military power and an opportunity to shape the post-Cold War world and found a "new world order."

In a Pentagon speech in March 1989, Bush affirmed that the primary lesson the 1980s was that "strength secures peace. " Strength, in turn, would consolidate peace and U. S. interests in the wake of the Cold War, in an international scene that was "defined by opportunity, a chance to advance America's interests and ideals, and to strengthen the forces of freedom now gaining a foothold in many places around the world." The vision extended to a Pax Americana beyond the millennium, "a new American century where freedom and democracy will flourish."<sup>16</sup>

Mobilization for war with Iraq and the creation of the alliance that made it all possible was the first major test of the United States' role in a new world order. Although Bush's rhetoric of a new world in America's image began with his inaugural address,<sup>17</sup> the concept was developed in his 1991

State of the Union Address, calling for a crusading role for the United States in a “new world order”: “We are Americans. We have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And when we do, freedom works.”<sup>18</sup> In his triumphal speech to Congress on 5 March, he averred that the war had been the first test of “a new world coming into view, a world in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order.”<sup>19</sup>

Theoretically, in the wake of the Iraqi invasion Bush’s new world order is one free of the ideological strictures of the Cold War, a community of purpose that would in the future transcend national rivalries. Even should the Soviets play a largely passive role, a new order could at least provide a means to bring together under U.S. leadership the other powers of the North. The latter would, arguably, be less a new order than a throwback to the predominance of the United States in the immediate postwar period. A union of the powers of the North would, moreover, update the lineup of what had been envisioned in the course of World War II and at the inception of the United Nations as the policemen (in a benign sense) of the postwar world.<sup>20</sup> The Gulf War appeared to justify an increased U.S. mission as international gendarme, in a manner not dissimilar to that posed by postwar decolonization, when the United States assumed new “responsibilities” as a declining Europe’s grip on the world lapsed. The old Cold War mission of countering aggression was updated as righteous “new order” intervention. Even without the Soviets, the ills of the world still required the discreet use of U. S. power when they impinged on U. S. interests. The field was clear for what Charles Krauthammer, an advocate of a new U.S. mission, called a policy of “robust and difficult interventionism.”<sup>21</sup>

The war also showed, however, that there are new powers in the world indifferent to the East-West confrontation that

has dominated the North for so long—countries that have viewed the Cold War indeed as an opportunity for their own aggrandizement. As Iraq's eight-year war with Iran demonstrated, there was a free market in the best war technology of East and West. Neither treaty or diplomatic posture or ideological affinity have encumbered the new war machines in their acquisition or their use of new weapons. Commercial agreements vouchsafed by U. S. agencies cleared the way for sales of advanced missile technology to Iraq; the British provided a broad range of weaponry, including the precision-steel components of an Iraqi "super gun" with nuclear capabilities; the French, missiles (including Exocets), Mirage fighters, and assorted ground-war hardware; the German chemical business provided the industrial plant required for poison gas.<sup>22</sup> The Soviets, of course, provided the bulk of the Iraqi equipment as well as advisory contingents.

The 1982 conflict in the Falklands was a precursor to the Gulf War in that it, too, occurred outside the framework of the Cold War. There was no East-West angle to the dispute and the contenders were not ideological adversaries. It was a North-South conflict, with the mature power of the North moving to check the ambitions of a medium power of the South. The war in the South Atlantic, too, was a brief affair. It was perhaps more representative of post-Cold War conflicts to come, however, to the extent that the emerging power of the South made effective and costly use of the advanced military technology of the North before collapsing in defeat.<sup>23</sup> Some 1,800 Argentines died in the conflict for the islands they called the Malvinas, with hundreds killed when the battleship *Belgrano* was torpedoed by a British submarine. The toll of British servicemen was 256 (to be contrasted with the 90 American combat deaths of the Gulf War).<sup>24</sup> A lesson of the war was that Argentina's—and other

new international players’—pilots could fly top-of-the-line Mirage fighters with the resolve and skill of their European or American counterparts. The destruction of the British destroyer *Sheffield* by French Exocet missiles showed the limits of even the best defensive measures against determined and skilled opponents. Even a small war against an unranked contender could be costly.

The mobilization against Saddam Hussein’s armies, and the military success of the overwhelming force thrown at Iraq could hardly be a prototype for military engagement in the new order. The circumstances, for one, were uniquely auspicious for consensual multilateral intervention, what Henry Kissinger described as “an almost accidental combination of circumstances unlikely to be repeated in the future.”<sup>25</sup> The United States could act under United Nations auspices and cloak in multilateralism an operation that was largely U.S.-planned, manned, and carried out. The undeniable fact of Iraq’s aggression and the U.N. sanction the political space the United States needed to wage all-out war on Iraq. Its alliances in Europe and in the Gulf provided facilities from which to organize airlifts and the operational bases from which the war would be waged. And for the first time, Americans went to war having been promised that other nations would pay them for their trouble.<sup>26</sup>

As well as bolstering American confidence in its military might, the war against Iraq did much to rid the U.S. armed forces of the opprobrium that was also part of the “Vietnam syndrome,” at least in the eyes of the media. The Gulf War was portrayed, for the most part, as a moral endeavor, a “good war.” Yet, reports of indiscriminate torture and killings carried out by Kuwaiti forces—with the knowledge of the U. S. Special Forces—in the days after Kuwait’s liberation suggest that the Gulf War meant business as usual.



Although some of the killings, notably of members of Kuwait's 200,000-strong Palestinian community, many of whom were born there, were initially attributed to freelance "death squads," persistent reports gradually emerged that special Kuwaiti units were involved that worked in tandem with U.S. Army Special Forces personnel.<sup>27</sup> A few days after the liberation, a *New York Times* reporter described an operation in which Kuwaiti troops moved through a Palestinian neighborhood. Accompanied by an American soldier, "apparently a member of the Special Forces unit," troops dragged a young Palestinian man by his hair, then clubbed him with a rifle butt; one of the Kuwaitis "cocked his M-16 and put it to the man's temple," when the American soldier, no doubt conscious of the reporter's presence, pushed away the would-be executioner and himself frisked the prisoner.<sup>28</sup>

A British reporter described a similar scene, in which Kuwaiti forces shot up a Palestinian district, randomly beat civilians while U. S. Special Forces with them "did nothing to stop this indiscipline, and shouted obscenities at journalists who asked why they did not intervene." <sup>29</sup> On 3 March, British reporters from *The Independent* and *The Observer* intervened to physically restrain Kuwaiti troops who were beating a Palestinian boy; when challenged over his acquiescence, a U.S. Special Forces officer offered a quintessentially American, and more than vaguely threatening, response: "You having a nice day? We don't want your sort around here with your dirty rumors. You have a big mouth. This is martial law, boy. Fuck off."<sup>30</sup> U.S. Special Forces were also present in Kuwaiti police stations that served as torture centers, the press discovered, and human rights researchers later confirmed.<sup>31</sup>

An anonymous official of the U.S. Special Forces noted: “Our people on the ground didn’t understand what their role was.”<sup>32</sup> This was highly plausible given the Special Forces’ multiple brief: From one day to the next, the same personnel were expected to shift from the kind of no-holds-barred unconventional warfare one might have expected to be turned against Iraqi occupation forces and collaborators to a peacetime, counterinsurgency, countersubversion role. Clearly their Kuwaiti partners preferred to deal with the suspect peacetime population with the unconventional warfare ruthlessness that their American mentors had taught them; and the legitimation of unconventional warfare in the gray areas of counterinsurgency posed no doctrinal barriers to their doing so with their Special Forces escorts. These were the tasks for which Kuwaiti Special Forces were organized and trained by their American friends: Only the Iraqi oppressors were absent.<sup>33</sup>

The lessons of the Gulf War will be a long time emerging. The potential for Third World powers to confront the United States on a conventional military footing will surely now be seen as a credible threat, despite the United States’ success in battering Iraq into submission. The enormous cost of the operation will not go unnoticed, even with the underwriting by other nations. Nor will the enormous political advantage, at home and abroad, of waging a war against an enemy who was in defiance of the United Nations. The unity of the United States and its assorted allies in the operation could never have been expected to cement a lasting alliance comparable to that of a NATO united by the Warsaw Pact threat. As the Eastern threat has diminished, the economic ascendance of Japan, the prospects of a United Europe powered by Germany, and continuing American economic decline threaten the old alliances that were temporarily restored in the Gulf.

“We are not called upon to be the world’s policeman,” argued Secretary of the Army John Marsh in February 1989, qualifying an earlier remark that the United States would not shy away from low- intensity conflict to protect its interests, from access to raw materials and supply routes to the fight for “ideas . . . the support for and survival of the concepts upon which our heritage as a people are based.”<sup>34</sup> The Bush administration, however, promptly showed that while the United States would not be obliged to police the world (or to step in, as in Iraqi Kurdistan, when its actions set in train unplanned human catastrophes), It would increasingly take it upon itself to intervene when it was opportune to do so. The Panama intervention that rounded off President Bush’s first year, however, had already sounded a warning that unilateral intervention in the post-Cold War could be justified on the flimsiest of pretexts. Military action could flow from mere impatience with other means, from a president’s sense of pique and preoccupation with self-image, or an affront to American pride.

The United States has the military power for unilateral interventionism when its adversary is no more formidable (or distant) than Manuel Noriega’s Panama, and when such challenges are posed just one at a time. Other potential scenarios for intervention could severely tax U. S. power: Over a third of the U.S. Army’s fighting forces, 42 percent of its battle tanks, 46 percent of the Marines, and 75 percent of the Air Force’s tactical aircraft were committed to the Gulf War. The enormity and sophistication of Iraq’s military machine, moreover, is hardly unique in the South. A military confrontation with any such nations, whether multilateral or unilateral, will require similar, major commitments. Skeptics have questioned both the American capacity *to pay* for the grand international role mooted and to rally even a modicum of the powerful support offered to its initiative in the Gulf.

More serious, however, is concern that in the absence of its traditional enemy, the Bush administration has aimed its sights on a new challenge to global security that in its nebulous definition provides a mission that is both unrealistic and potentially even more dangerous than the United States' past crusade of anticommunism. "The U.S. government seems lost without something to contain," was the assessment of analyst Walter Russell Mead. In the waning days of the Cold War, Mead observes, "America found a new and deadly menace: instability. At a time of diminishing national resources and power, the United States has not lowered its foreign policy horizons, it has universalized them." <sup>36</sup> William Pfaff, in turn, interprets the president's "new order" as "some form of permanent mobilization . . . under American leadership to prevent or punish manifestations of international 'disorder.'" <sup>37</sup> At the same time the enormity of the cost of intervention on the Gulf model, without subsidy, will provide a boost to the low-cost medium of covert action, of unconventional warfare through special operations: low-cost, low-intensity but robust intervention designed to achieve immediate objectives (and to preempt more costly conflicts).

Commentators on both the Left and the Right have argued that the end of Soviet influence poses a threat to peace that is perhaps less manageable than that of the old Cold War. The euphoria of the right-wing over the collapse of communism is tempered by concern that "the real threat to world peace could be the chaos that would be unleashed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union as 'an imperial world system.'" <sup>38</sup> As Patrick J. Glynn, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, notes: "It's easier to cope with a world where the Soviets are being the Soviets." <sup>39</sup> The old system was, if nothing else, predictable—and dealing with the troubles of the world through hot-line diplomacy with just

one prime correspondent had a certain elegant simplicity to it.

Harvard analyst Stanley Hoffman, too, has remarked upon the advantages of the bipolar world in which the superpowers, “knowing they could blow themselves up, restrained themselves and their allies.” He warns that the “new world order” “may remain a slogan or a sardonic label applied to a situation far more chaotic than the world of the Cold War.”<sup>40</sup> A lesson of the Gulf War, in turn, was that its model for crisis management would have no place in a new order of authentic security:

*One lesson is that an ounce of prevention is far better than a ton of punishment. If, in a world of shaky regimes, contested borders, ethnic upheavals and religious revivals, every act of aggression requires the mobilization of three-quarters of a million men, sent across the seas to face well-armed troublemakers, there will be very few cases of collective security.*<sup>41</sup>

A similar, more schematic projection of things to come has been set out by defense analyst Edward N. Luttwak, who observes: “For more than forty years, the affairs of the world have been greatly troubled but also structured by the Soviet-Western antagonism.”<sup>42</sup> Luttwak is concerned with “the new antagonisms that could shape world politics,” and suggests that “cultural tensions, cultural collisions, and economic resentment” could fuel a ninety-degree rotation of the East-West conflict into a conflict of North and South. <sup>43</sup> The unequal alliances cemented by the Soviet-Western antagonism, in turn, could break down as a consequence of “the worse alternative of an ‘internalization’ of conflict . . . fragmenting the grand coalition of Americans, East Asians, and Europeans, even as ethnic strife is already dividing the Soviet Union.” The end of the central, global conflict on

which the world pivoted for more than forty years could result in the breakup of “the coalitions, blocs, formal alliances, and solidarities created by the cold war. “[44](#) i

A new order in which the nations North dominate the South may, in turn, appear reminiscent of the imperial age before World War 11, when the North offered the lethal benefits of imperial peace and stability to the dominions of the South through the products of their burgeoning industries of war. As in the age of past empires, in a new world order of powerful international peacekeepers the expected conflicts with the rising powers of the South may be matched by unforeseen conflicts between the collegial powers of the North. Such conflicts may be less akin to the ideological wars of the Cold War than to the traditional clashes of empires over raw materials and foreign markets.

As opportunities arise and challenges are posed, the United States can be expected to act on the basis of interest. But the idea of interest can still be expected to be colored by the Cold War ideology of denial and containment. The sustained commitment of the Bush administration to the unconventional wars in Cambodia, Afghanistan, and around the world, and to the counterinsurgency crusades in Central and South America, Asia, and the Pacific are indeed more than the afterimage of the Cold War. The unfinished crusade against communism can be expected to color the United States’ role in the 1990s just as it dominated its mission in the 1960s. The Cold War did not end simply because Moscow could no longer pay its bills; the new American mission to guarantee stability sounded suspiciously like its long-standing aim to preserve the status quo against “red” subversion and insurrection. That “stability is no virtue to the oppressed” appeared to hold no more weight in the new world order than it had in the old.[45](#)

The designated enemy to the south, at the grass roots, then, was the familiar enemy of the Cold War, unchanged in essence but no longer embellished with the status of Soviet puppet. At the local level, the small wars and police actions of counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare continue to be waged. The states that enthusiastically adopted U. S. Cold War precepts and counterinsurgency doctrine have always looked toward the enemy within as their primary challenge. The Soviet presence in the Southern Hemisphere was always largely abstract, and rather less important than the continuing threat of labor unrest, class struggle, subversion, and insurgency. As long as the United States continues to fund the counterinsurgency states, to arm and train their armies and police, and to work with them in the suppression of dissidents and insurgents as before, the auguries for change are poor.

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